What If - Finland had been prepared for the Winter War?

John Langdon-Davies

John Eric Langdon-Davies (1897–1971) was a British author and journalist. He was a war correspondent during the Spanish Civil War and the Russo-Finnish war. As a result of his experiences in Spain, he founded the Foster Parents' Scheme for refugee children in Spain, now called Plan International. He was awarded the MBE for services to the Home Guard. Author of books on military, scientific, historical and Spanish (including Catalan) subjects.

Born in Eshowe, Zululand (South Africa) on 18 March 1897, he came to England at the age of six and attended Yardley Park Prep school and Tonbridge School. In 1917 he published The Dream Splendid, a book of poetry inspired by the beauty of nature. According to one critic, it showed "all the young poet's faults", to another, "Mr Langdon-Davies's verse owes nothing to the transient excitements of the hour", referring to the fact that it was not influenced by war fever. The Times Literary Supplement said it was "the outcome of a brooding imagination intensely affected by open-air influences....and expressing itself with a real sense of style”. When called up for service in 1917 he refused to wear uniform. This resulted in a short term in prison before being given a medical discharge. He intended to continue his academic career at St John's College, Oxford, but one of his three scholarships was removed as a result of his military record. Another, tenable only to single men, was removed when he married Constance Scott in 1918. The resulting economic situation forced him to abandon his university career, which ended with a diploma in anthropology and history.

In 1919 Langdon-Davies wrote “Militarism in Education”, published by Headley Brothers. The book was a study of the effect of the militaristic and nationalistic content of various educational systems. He stresses the importance of environment and early influences in the education of the young, compared with heredity. During this period he was moving between London, Oxford, Berkshire, Southampton, and Ireland, where he got to know leading figures in the political world. He also made his first visit to Catalonia (Spain), after which, in 1921, he and Connie, with their two small sons, settled for more than two years in the Pyrenean village of Ripoll, where he met groups of Spanish left-wing intellectuals and nationalists. Here, reading a lot of poetry and much influenced by Arthur Waley's translations of “A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems”, he wrote a small book of verse, Man on Mountain, which was printed in Ripoll and published by Birrell and Garnett in 1922. He returned to London and spent another period travelling extensively, this time between England, the United States and Catalonia. The Daily News sent him to Barcelona in 1923 to report on the coup by Miguel Primo de Rivera, which he reported on as being comparable to the Irish question.

In 1924 he began a series of lecture tours in the USA, speaking to women's associations and universities on history, literature and his own work. He also spent a year living in New York between 1925 and 1926, during which time he wrote “The New Age of Faith”, published by the Viking Press, N.Y. 1925, second ed. January '26. In it he attacks the pseudo-scientists whose books were so popular in the USA at the time, provoking a number of counter-attacks which pointed out that Langdon-Davies himself was not a professional scientist. But the majority of the 60 or more published reviewers were in agreement with John Bakeless, who wrote, "....rarely has popular science been written with such spicy impertinence, such gay insouciance, or with so much intelligence and such scrupulous regard for facts....".

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John Langdon-Davies, from a 1929 Press Card

He then moved to Sant Feliu de Guíxols, on the Catalan coast, where he stayed from 1926 to 1928 and wrote “Dancing Catalans”, a study of the significance of the so-called “Catalan national dance”, the sardana. Twenty years later the Catalan writer Josep Pla said that it was the best book ever published on the sardana: "With the exception of the poetry of Joan Maragall, there is nothing in our language comparable with this essay". A Short History of Women, published in New York, had also appeared in 1927. In it Langdon-Davies traces the development of the idea of Woman from the primitive taboo, the Christian fear, worship of fertility, etc., which was now to be reshaped by the new knowledge. Virginia Woolf comments on some of the author's ideas in A Room of One's Own. In 1929 he settled in Devonshire (England), but three years later (1932) he moved back to the USA. He returned to England again in 1935 and lived at Clapham Common.

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John Langdon-Davies, photo taken at the time he was living in Sant Feliu de Guíxols, Catalonia

In May 1936 he went to Spain to report on the May Day celebrations in Madrid for the News Chronicle, who sent him out again in August that same year to cover the Spanish Civil War. On this second trip he travelled by motorbike with his sixteen-year-old son Robin, whom he left with the "Revolutionary Committee" in Puigcerdà for safe keeping. In 1937 he wrote “Behind the Spanish Barricades”, which has recently been re-published (2007). Langdon-Davies was strongly criticised by George Orwell for his coverage of the Barcelona May Events (Els Fets de Maig in Catalan) in his “Homage to Catalonia”. The “May Events”, for those unfamiliar with the Spanish Civil War, took place between May 3 and May 8, 1937 and were a virtual Civil War within a Civil War as the Stalinists of the Spanish Communist Party (led by the murderous Dolores Ibárruri, known as La Pasionaria and emerging as the most powerful faction within the Republicans) sent units of the Assault Guard (Guardia de Asalto), under the control of police chief Eusebio Rodríguez Salas to take over the Anarchist-run Barcelona telephone exchange (the pretext being that the Stalinists and the police they controlled suspected the Anarchists were listening to their telephone messages. On 6th May Communist Party of Spain death squads assassinated a number of prominent anarchists in their homes. The following day over 6,000 Assault Guards arrived from Valencia.

The telephone workers fought back, as holding the exchange was not only a matter of prestige for the Anarchists but also a strong-point in any struggle for power in the city, thus sparking a city-wide conflict. Five days of street fighting ensued, with anarchist workers and their allies (the Durruti group and supporters of the Trotskyite Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (POUM), building barricades and fighting with the Assault Guards and Stormtroopers of the Stalinists. A compromise was negotiated, but the ultimate result was the weakening of the position of the Anarchists and of POUM. British author George Orwell describes these events, in which he took part, in “Homage to Catalonia.” Orwell saw the May days as a suppression of the revolution by parties backed by Stalin's USSR such as the PSUC. He argued that the USSR did not want a genuine socialist revolution in Spain, describing Barcelona in 1936 as a city under the control of the workers - police replaced by workers' patrols, workplaces collectivised - and the egalitarian nature of the militias in Barcelona (such as the POUM militia in which he served). He contrasts this with the oppressive police state that developed after May and the subsequent suppression of the POUM. In the second appendix of his book, he explains that the spark of the friction among Republican forces was the Government order to surrender all private weapons in order to build up a “non-political” police force, from which trade union members would be excluded.

Illustrating her Stalinist mindset and in the best traditions of Stalin’s purges and the show trials that would take place very shortly in the USSR, the murderous Ibárruri ascribed the events to an "anarchotrotskyist" attempt at shutting down the Republican government on orders from General Francisco Franco, acting in tandem with Adolf Hitler. According to her, the violence was the culmination of an anarchist plot which included plans to stop the movement of trains and cut all telegraph and telephone lines; she cites an "order [from the Catalan government] to its forces to control the telephone building and disarm all people whom they encounter in the streets without proper authorization" as the aim of the anarchist plan. She did not provide any evidence to support these claims, which were widely held by fellow Party members at the time but have since been discredited.

POUM had been formed in 1935 by the revolutionaries Andreu Nin and Joaquín Maurín.as a communist movement in opposition to Stalinism The two were heavily influenced by the thinking of Leon Trotsky. POUM was in fact considerably larger in membership than the Communist Party of Spain. After Anarchists were pushed into conciliation by their moderate leadership, POUM was left isolated and, unsurprisingly, was driven underground. Andreu Nin was detained and tortured to death by NKVD agents in Madrid, and his party consistently labeled as provocateur in Spanish Communist Party propaganda. These events formed the basis for Orwell’s development of his anti-totalitarian thinking.

For Langdon-Davies on the other hand, although he admired the spontaneous response by the workers organisations to the outbreak of the Civil War, saw international fascism as posing a serious threat for the whole of Europe and “felt that this was not the moment for social revolution” Langdon-Davies himself was a a left-wing intellectual with Marxist leanings who was not a member of the Communist Party – like so many members of the left-wing British “intelligentsia” of that era (and later) –and in the Civil War his view was that a united fight against the “fascist” uprising was necessary. Like many communist “fellow-travelers” in the 1930’s, particularly so many of the writers and war correspondents cover the war from the Republican side, he turned a blind eye to the activities of the Stalinist Communist Party of Spain and their usurpation of power and of control over the armed forces of republican Spain. In his article for the News Chronicle on the May fighting in Barcelona, he began by declaring the cause of the fighting as “…a frustrated putsch by the Trostkyist POUM.”

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“Behind the Spanish Barricades” by John Langdon-Davies. In 1936, John Langdon-Davies went to Spain to report on the May Day celebrations for the News Chronicle. By the time he returned in August, civil war was raging, and many of those he had seen celebrating lay dead. On this second trip he crossed Spain on his motorbike with his teenage son and described what he saw and heard in this book, which he wrote in just five weeks and was published to the critical acclaim of the left in 1937.

There is now of course conclusive evidence about the way the Spanish communists acted following instructions from Moscow and how they deliberately planned and carried out the elimination of POUM. In the end it was for this and other reasons, that John Langdon-Davies changed his views on Soviet communism and wrote so many strong and vigorous denunciations of that kind of policy, not least in his two books on the Winter War – “Finland: The First Total War” and “Invasion In The Snow: A Study of Mechanized War.” In the books, Langdon-Davies is highly critical both of the actions of the Soviet Union and of his fellow-members of the left who failed to support Finland. He always provides an interesting analysis of how and why the Finns did so well fighting against the Red Army. Langdon-Davies would remain in Finland for much of the Winter War, covering the fighting and attaching himself at various times to different Finnish military units.

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John Langdon-Davies speaking in the USA in April 1940 at a Fund-Raising event held to raise money for the Finnish military. Langdon-Davies was a polished public speaker and over a one month speaking tour raised considerable amounts of money for the Finland Fund.

After returning to the UK following the conclusion of the Winter War, Langdon-Davies would go on to write standard handbooks, The Home Guard Training Manual (1940), and The Home Guard Fieldcraft Manual (1942), for the British Army, as well as a number of other military manuals.

Hilde Marchant

Born in 1915, Hilde Marchant had been a young journalist who got her start, as a number of other young and aspiring British journalists did, in the Spanish Civil War. There’s not a lot of information available on Marchant herself, but she was seemingly a prolific reporter and during and after WW2, she also wrote a number of books, perhaps the most lasting of which is entitled “Women and Children Last: A Woman Reporter's Account of the Battle of Britain."

Here’s one of her articles from the Winter War. It’s not exactly riveting writing, but the message that the Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto wanted to convey was there. Finland was fighting hard and even small amounts of assistance could help. Article after article by different reporters conveyed the same message in one form or another, along with constant portrayals of the sufferings being inflicted on the people of Finland.

From The Argus, 2nd February 1940 (Autralian newspaper - http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/11291843)
MASS AIR RAIDS - SUFFERINGS OF FINNS - PLANES NEEDED
By HILDE MARCHANT, of "The Argus" Special Service
VAASA (FINLAND),

Thursday: Vaasa has been subjected to mass air raids from the beginning of the war. Following, the most recent raid the streets, are still smouldering. There was a dramatic preciseness about the last raid. A straight line cuts diagonally across a street where 36 bombs were dropped upon people's homes. It is a line of singed, .collapsed wood. The bombs opened the snow and churned up the earth beneath it. The line wobbled only at one place, where it bent a little to take in the annex of a hospital. I went into one small four roomed house which is now just a pile of wood. The house was covered in snow, which looked like a funeral shroud. Water from the firemen's hoses hung as a solid curtain of icicles over broken furniture. Everything had been smashed.

The streets were deserted as I went through the town. The inhabitants told me that everyone kept indoors until 3 p.m., as the air raids took place every morning. At 3 p.m. there was a scramble to the marketplace, and the shopping women rushed into the streets with small pushcarts fitted to skis, which they piled up with parcels, and hurried home before the blackout.

No Food Shortage

I arrived at Vaasa by air with a party of Swedish nurses. When our plane landed in an ice-covered field a peasant woman greeted us with coffee, brown bread and butter, and half a pint of cream. There is no shortage of food in Finland. A Norwegian doctor in charge of' a military hospital that was bombed recently said that the real difficulty was to keep the patients in hospital. They all wanted to return to the front to fight before they were well. It was market day when 1 arrived, and huge pieces of meat were stacked up on sledges round the Statue of Liberty. Women bought the meat for dinner.

We want planes

No sandbags are to be seen at Vaasa. They are not necessary. The shape of the houses is indistinct, because the fallen snow rounds off the roofs and blends with the snow in the gardens. At Vaasa I heard one continual cry, "We want planes." People in the town suffer almost daily from mass air raids, but there is not one fighter plane to go up to meet the raiders. An officer of the Finnish Navy in Vaasa told me all available pursuit aircraft are being used in the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus and in the east, with none to be spared to defend the smaller cities such as Vaasa. “We need Britain and France to send us more fighter planes,” he told me, “Even a few fighter planes would help us against the bombers.”

Next: The Italian War Correspondents
 
Two Japanese Reporters in Finland, Tsurutaro Adachi (Domei) and Kichinai Kitano (Osaka Asahi)

In the mid-1920’s, the Japanese government had sent over 400 scholars of Japanese national universities to foreign countries, primarily in Europe, to acquire new academic knowledge or new scientific methods. Eighty percent of these scholars went to European countries, and many of them chose Germany as their place of study abroad. For the Japanese students, Germany was the most attractive place not only by reason of the tradition in Japanese academics, but also as a new model of democracy under the Weimar constitution in 1919 after the collapse of the monarchy (at this period one must remember that Japan was enjoying a liberal democratic period of sorts and was not governed by the military-dominated cabinets that would take power in the 1930’s).

To this circle of Japanese students abroad over the period 1926-29 belonged many young scholars who would later take the lead in post-war Japanese academics and culture. Rouyama, Arisawa and Kunizaki of Tokyo University and some associate professors from Kyoto University - Muraichi Horie, Yoshihiko Taniguchi, Katsuichi Yamamoto, Katsujiro Yamada - were members of this group. Between 1927 and 1930, Kisaburo Yokota, Yoshitaro Hirano and Takao Tsuchiya of Tokyo university, Itaru Kuroda, Yoshinosuke Yagi and Torazo Ninagawa of Kyoto University, and Isao Kikuchi and Junnichi Funabashi of Kyushu university were all also in this group, as was Ichizo Kudo, a teacher of Judo who studied at the Berlin Sport College and who later became the commander of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police School.

In 1930-33 when this group became politically more active, in addition to these students, there were also Japanese artists and journalists in Berlin. Koreya Senda in theatre was the first and the leading artist of this group. Seki Sano and Yoshi Hijikata in theatre, Teinosuke Kinugasa and Souzo Okada in film, Seiichirou Katsumoto and Seikichi Fujimori in literature, Ousuke Shimazaki in painting, and Bunzou Yamaguchi in architecture were also members. Morimichi Okagami, the Asahi Shinbun correspondent, Toumin Suzuki of the Dentsu, and Yuzuru Yosano were the journalist members. Many young students of Berlin University, among them, Hiroshi Kitamura, Masuo Ureshino, Tsurutaro Adachi and Kakutarou Inoue later became Japanese correspondents in Europe during the war. Tsurutaro Adachi would be one of the two Japanese journalists to cover the Winter War (post-WW2, he moved to Jiji and became head of the politics department).

The other Japanese reporter in Finland for the Winter War was a rather better known journalist, Kichinai Kitano (1892-1956). He is mentioned in "Around-The-World Flights: A History" By Patrick M. Stinson on the round the world Graf Zeppelin flight in August 1929. Kitano was to travel as far as Tokyo, reporting for Osaka Asahi. In 1924 was the author of a book, Shinbun Eigo no yomikata to kakikata, published in Tōkyō: Hokuseidō Shoten, Taishō 13, 1924.

These two journalists between them would cover the Winter War for the Japanese newspapers, their reports on the early successes of the Finnish military in fighting the Red Army would do much to drive the dispatch of Japanese volunteers, eager to gain revenge for the defeat of Japanese forces at Nomonhan at the hands of the Red Army, to Finland. The articles by these two reporters, together with others written by a Finnish-Japanese couple, would fascinate the Japanese people. Also holding the attention of the Japanese, and the subject of many articles over the course of the Winter War, was the Finnish martial art, KKT or "KäsiKähmäTaistelu". The Japanese found KKT, with its basis in the Japanese martial arts and its use of different hand weapons such as knives, bayonets and entrenching tools a topic of endless fascination. Following the dispatch of the Japanese volunteers and further assistance to Finland early in 1940, the progress of the volunteer force was closely followed, with interest and with great pride at their achievements in battle alongside the Finns. For all of these reports from Finland, Tsurutaro Adachi and Kichinai Kitano would be the correspondents on the spot.

The Italian War Correspondents

There were around a dozen Italian correspondents in Finland covering the Winter War. Of some, such as Felice Bellotti, Cesare Beretta, Cesare Bonscossa, Attila Gamisa, Carlo Dall'Ongaro, Cesare Faroni, and Vittorio Mantovani very little seems to be known beyond their names. Of others, there is limited information available and on one or two, notably Indro Montanelli, a great deal of information is available. The reporting of the Italian Correspondents reflects the overwhelming support for Finland that was expressed by the Italian public – a support which led Mussolini to clash with Hitler over Italian support for Finland and which led to hopes in both Britain and France (which were not fulfilled) that Italy might be coaxed away from its alliance with Germany and, if not into siding with the Allies, at least into maintaining a state of non-belligerence. The Italians would be amongst the strongest supporters of Finland, selling large numbers of aircraft and munitions to Finland and providing one of the larger volunteer contingents, an Alpini Division. A great deal of coverage in the Italian press was devoted to these brave volunteers and public support for Finland would remain strong throughout the Winter War.

Mario Appelius for example (born 1892, died December 1946) was a correspondent for Stefani and Il Popolo d'Italia. From childhood he had shown a keen interest in travel and adventure, after running away from home, his father sent him to work on an Italian ship as a cabin boy as punishment. He deserted this modest job in the merchant navy and wandered through Egypt, India, Indochina, the Philippines and China. Entrepreneurial and artistic by nature, at the age of twenty he had already visited three continents, poised between poverty and wealth. While in Africa he had been hired as an interpreter and in the thirties he began a career as a successful writer, thanks to a talent for imaginative and biting descriptions of the cities, the people and the states that he visited across five continents. In 1930 he founded il Mattino d'Italia in Buenos Aires which he managed until 1933. He then became a war correspondent for Il Popolo d'Italia in Ethiopia and Spain. He became a fascist supporter early and remained a convinced fascist to his death. After the German invasion of Poland, he pointed out that the German successes were due to the application of the techniques used by the Italians in Catalonia in the Spanish Civil War. He was a strong and vocal supporter of Finland during the Winter War in the Italian Press, praising the valorous Alpini Division and the Garibaldi Regiment of Italian volunteers fighting in Finland as well as extolling the heroic volunteers of the Italian Air Force and Navy who fought with the Finns. During the Second World War he was a radio commentator, it was his voice on the radio repeating the Italian phrase: "Dio stramaledica gli Inglesi!" (God curse the English!).

Giovanni Artieri was a special correspondent for La Stampa of Turin during the Winter War (and in total, for almost twenty years). He was elected a Senator of the Italian Republic for two terms and was made a Count by Umberto II. In the last years of his life he had retired with his wife, writer Esther Lombardo, in his villa in Santa Marinella, near Rome.

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Giovanni Artieri: 25 Match 1904 – 12 February 1995, Correspondent for La Stampa

Massimo Caputo ( July 29, 1899 – 1 March 1968) graduated from the University of Turin in 1920 with a law degree and immediately began a career in journalism as a correspondent of the Gazetta del Popolo in Vienna. The following year he moved to the Rome office where he remained until 1924. He was correspondent in Berlin in 1925 and 1926, Vienna from 1927 to 1935 and again in Berlin from 1937 to 140, when, after the Winter War came to an end, after which he returned to Italy and worked in Turin for the Gazetta del Popolo until 25 July 1943. He joined the Resistance and then on July 4, 1945 he was appointed Editor of the Gazetta del Popolo, which under his leadership took a conservative line.

Italo Zingarelli (9 July 1891 to 1972) of La Stampa di Torino was one of the better known Italian journalists of the time. In 1910 he had been editor of L’Ora of Palermo, after which he worked for the Corriere della Sera and then L'Epoca. He returned to the Corriere della Sera in 1921 as Correspondent in Zurich and Vienna. In 1926 he was briefly editor of L'Epoca before becoming correspondent for La Stampa in Vienna. From 1952 to 1962 he was the editor for Il Globo in Rome.

Cesare Rivelli (1906 – 1983) was correspondent for the Gazzetta del Popolo in Finland during the Winter War. Rivelli held strongly Fascist views and was a supporter of Mussolini to the end. Along with Felice Belloti he continued to broadcast over the radio in support of Mussolini even after his popular support declined, concluding his later broadcasts with the proclamation "I believe in Mussolini's Italy and in the final victory." After the war, Rivelli continued his journalistic activities and was also intensely active as a translator and in writing screenplays for films.
 
Indro Montanelli, Corriera, della Sera

Indro Montanelli, correspondent for Corriera, della Sera was perhaps the best known Italian correspondent of the Winter War, is considered one of the greatest Italian journalists of the 20th century and was among the 50 World Press Freedom Heroes of the past 50 years named by the International Press Institute in 2000. Montanelli was born in Fucecchio, near Florence, on April 22, 1909. He studied law and political science at the University of Florence, graduating with a Law Degree in the early 1920’s where he wrote a thesis on the electoral reform of Benito Mussolini's fascism. Allegedly, in this thesis, he maintained that rather than a reform it amounted to the abolition of elections, which goes some way to illustrate the ambiguous nature of the Italian fascist censorship of the time. According to him a short experience of the French cultural atmosphere in Grenoble, where he was taking language lessons, led him to realise that his true vocation was that of the journalist.

Montanelli began his journalistic career by writing for the fascist newspaper Il Selvaggio ("The Savage") and in 1932 for the Universale, a magazine published only once fortnightly and which offered no pay. Montanelli admitted that in those days he saw in fascism the hope of a movement that would have resolved the economic and socioeconomic differences between the north and the south. This enthusiasm for the fascist movement began to wane when in 1935 Mussolini forced the abolition of the Universale along with other magazines and newspapers that expressed opinions on the nature of fascism. In 1934 in Paris Montanelli began to write for the crime pages of the daily newspaper Paris Soir, then worked as foreign correspondent in Norway (where he fished for cod), and later in Canada (where he ended up working on a farm in Alberta!). It was in New York that he began a collaboration with Webb Miller of the United Press. While working for United Press he learned to write for the lay public in an uncomplicated style that would distinguish him within the realm of Italian journalism. One lesson he took to heart from Miller was to "always write as if writing to a milkman from Ohio". This open and approachable style was something he never forgot and he'd often recall that very quote during his long life.

Another indelible American moment occurred while teaching a course. Someone had asked him to explain an article that Montanelli had just read. Montanelli told him he'd repeat it since he clearly didn't understand... Hitting the table, the red-faced student cut him off and angrily told him that if he hadn't understood Montanelli's article, then it was Montanelli who was the imbecile! (and who needed to change it). During this time in the USA Montanelli conducted his first interview with a celebrity: Henry Ford. During the interview, surrounded by American art depicting pastoral and frontier subjects, Ford began to reverentially talk about the Founding Fathers. Looking at the decor, Montanelli astutely asked him how he felt about having destroyed their world. Puzzled, Ford asked what he meant. Undaunted, Montanelli pressed on that the automobile and Ford's revolutionary assembly line system had forever transformed the country. Ford looked shocked, and Montanelli realized that, like all geniuses, Ford hadn't had the slightest idea of what he'd really done.

When Mussolini declared war on Abyssinia with the intent of making Italy an empire, Montanelli immediately abandoned his job with the United Press and became a voluntary conscript for this war. He believed then, along with many Italians of the time, that this was the chance for Italy to bring civilization to the 'savage' world of Africa, an enthusiasm that Montanelli blamed later on his passion for the works of Rudyard Kipling. In spite of these initial passions, it was this very experience that led to Montanelli's biggest change of mind with regard to Italian fascism. Montanelli began writing about the war to his father who – something of which Montanelli was totally ignorant - sent the letters to one of the most famous journalists of those times, Ugo Ojetti, who published them regularly in that most prestigious of Italian newspapers, Il Corriere della Sera.

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Indro Montanelli in Abyssinia in 1936

On his return from Abyssinia, Montanelli became a foreign correspondent in Spain for the daily newspaper Il Messaggero, where he experienced the Spanish Civil War on the side of Francisco Franco's troops. He shared a hotel room with Kim Philby, who, decades later, would reveal himself to the world as one of the greatest Soviet spies that ever existed. One day he disappeared. Years later Montanelli received a mysterious note saying: "Thanks for everything. Including your socks". It was from Philby. After the capture of the city of Santander, Montanelli wrote that “(...) it had been a long military walk with only one enemy: the heat”. This portrayal contrasted rather strongly with the official propaganda of the times that painted the “battle” as glorious blood shed by the Italian contingent. In fact the only casualty he noted was a single death in an Alpini regiment caused by a mule kick that threw the unfortunate trooper down into a dry river bed. For this article he was repatriated, tried and expelled from both the Fascist party and from the Journalists Union. When, at the trial, he was asked why he had written such an unpatriotic article, he replied: "Show me a single casualty of that battle: because a battle without casualties is not a real battle!" The trial ended with a full acquittal.

Nothing he did could get him back membership of the Fascist Party but in 1938, the then Minister of Culture, Giuseppe Bottai, offered Montanelli the job of Director of the Institute of Culture inTallinn, Estonia, and lecturer in Italian at the University of Tartu. In this period the then director of the Corriere della Sera, Aldo Borelli, also asked Montanelli to engage in a “collaboration” as foreign correspondent (he could not be employed as journalist, because this had been forbidden by the fascist regime). On his way through Europe to Estonia, Montanelli was in Germany in late August 1939. He was present in Berlin in August, when the “bombshell” of the Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact was announced. He was sent to report from the front in a Mercedes accompanied by German state functionaries. In the vicinity to the city of Grudziądz the car was stopped by a convoy of German tanks. On one of these stood Hitler himself, but a few feet from Montanelli. When Hitler was told that the person in casual clothes was Italian, he jumped out of the tank and eyeing Montanelli like a madman, began a hysterical ten minute speech followed by military salute and exit. Albert Speer, who had also been in the convoy with fellow artist Arno Breker, corroborated the story in 1979. Apart from this episode - which Montanelli was forbidden to report - there had been little to report because the invasion of Poland was completed so rapidly that it was over within weeks. His articles on Poland embarrassed the Fascist regime in Italy and it was asked that he be expelled from Germany.

Montanelli was not welcome back in Italy, and so decided to move on to Lithuania. The joint German-Russian invasion of Poland instinctively told him that more was brewing on the Soviet Union’s borders. His instinct was correct because shortly after his arrival in Kaunas - the seat of Lithuanian government - the Soviet Union delivered an Ultimatum to the Baltic Republics. At this point Montanelli continued to travel towards Tallinn as it was his wish to see a free and democratic Estonia, before it too was invaded by the Soviet Union. After writing a number of pro-Estonian articles, he was expelled by Estonia’s new masters, the Soviet Union, for being a foreigner. He was forced by the events to cross the Gulf of Finland by ferry from Tallinn to Finland, where he reached Helsinki.

Montanelli describes his arrival in Helsinki, the atmosphere of a country threatened, but which will not yield an inch of territory to the Soviet tyranny. "At the port in Helsinki a girl with eyes the color of water and with unsurpassed grace does the honors and provides the latest information. Courteous, objective, diligent, wearing a badge that says "Lotta Svärd," she has come to occupy the place of her brother who has been called to arms. Helsinki made a great impression on me. Everyone moves in an atmosphere of absolute calm. The mobilization begins in a very organized manner and does not cause any confusion or disarray. It is clear that everyone volunteers, the ability to sacrifice, the sense of duty that everyone feels has been furthered by the measures taken by the civil and military authorities. These civil and military authorities have acted very wisely in anticipation of the worst, that the war is almost certain. The response to a Russian attack is planned with absolute coldness, there is no consideration given to non-resistance." In a few lines we distinctly hear the drama of a nation that is going to go through a tough test, appealing to the virtues of its people: unity, calmness, composure, dignity and determination.

Finland was certainly not a safe haven as Stalin was preparing to attack. In Finland Montanelli began writing articles about the Lapps and the reindeer, although this was not for long as Molotov now made demands in Finland. The Finnish delegation, headed by Paasikivi, had refused to give in to these requests and on their return it was clear that war was in the air. Montanelli was not able to write about the details of the talks between the Soviet and Finnish delegations, as they were shrouded in strict secrecy, but he was able to interview Paasikivi, who was happy to fill him in on everything except for the actual content of the talks. He prowled the streets of Helsinki that autumn, interviewing ordinary people, politicians and of course Italian diplomats. The situation was tense.

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Indro Montanelli in Finland

The view commonly held by foreign diplomats in Helsinki was that the Finnish envoy to Moscow, Paasikivi, had gone to "negotiate the surrender." Everyone was quite sure of this: the West, the Soviets, the Germans and even the editor of Corriere, Aldo Borelli.The logic of numbers was unassailable: the Soviet Goliath was able to pulverize in a heartbeat the Finnish David, with its laughably small Army. The common view was that there could be no resistance. The matter seemed to be a repeat of the events in Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn. Mussolini was on the verge of ordering the Alpini Division and the Italian air force and naval elements in Finland for the winter exercises recalled. The Editor of the Corriere advised Montanelli to leave Finland, “…journalistically, Finland was no longer interesting”. Indro decided, against everyone's advice, to stay. He was the only foreign journalist to witness the return of Paasikivi from Moscow.

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J.K. Paasikivi leaving for Moscow for negotiations, October 1939.

Here's how he recalls the incident: "It's an October evening in the dark with the snow typical of those latitudes. I reached the street in front of the Parliament, and I find an impressive crowd: silent, each wrapped in a fur coat, each with a lighted candle in his hand. A car draws up: out climbs Paasikivi, tall and impertuable, he cleaves the crowd and goes in to Parliament. Then, without any warning, from the mouths of all who are standing, the Finnish national anthem is sung, similar to a church hymn. Paasikivi goes in, the doors close, all is silence again. I reach the Italian Embassy and inform the diplomats: "You have miscalculated. According to your logic the Finns will give up, but I've seen them. They may be all slaughtered, but they will never give up." These embassy staff, they think I’m crazy, but I write an article announcing the war and its is in all the papers in Italy the next morning. Then a diplomat comes to see me. Mussolini wants to talk to me on the telephone. I go to the embassy and we talk for over an hour, I explain everything to him. He thanks me and then talks to the Ambassador and the commanding officer of the Alpini Division who have joined us. The next thing I know is we are in a car driving to see the President and Marshal Mannerheim, where it is announced that the Alpini Division and all Italian forces in Finland for the winter exercises that were to be held are at the service of the Government of Finland if the Soviet Union attacks and Finland chooses to fight. My article on this was in all the newspapers in Italy the next day – and then in papers in the UK, France and America.”

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKRvD5i44Ko
“..without any warning, from the mouths of all who are standing, the Finnish national anthem is sung, similar to a church hymn”

Montanelli stayed on of course. Throughout the Winter War, Montanelli wrote hotly pro-Finnish articles both from the frontlines and from bomb-stricken Helsinki and Viipuri. He wrote prolifically and eloquently - about the almost mythical qualities of the battle of Tolvajärvi, of Suomassilimi and Raate Road and the stand on the Kollaa, of the violent battles of the Karelian Isthmus, the ski troops, the ice roads through a wilderness of snow and ice and darkness, the attack on the Soviet Navy in Krondtstad and of men like Captain Pajakka who with 200 Lapps penetrated deep into the USSR and immobilized 20,000 Russians between Murmansk and Petsamo. He wrote about the Lottas, the old men of the Home Guard, the teenage Cadets manning AA guns and searchlights, the 12 and 14 year old boys and girls working in factories, carrying out the jobs of the adults so that their parents were free to fight.

He wrote about the men and women of the Finnish Air Force and the Navy and he also wrote much about the heroic Italians fighting alongside the Finns, the men of the Alpini Division, of the Garibaldi Volunteer Regiment, of the Regia Aeronautica and of the ships and men of the Regia Marina in the Baltic as well as of the individual volunteers, men such as the fighter pilot Diego Manzochhi who flew as a volunteer with the Finnish Air Force. There are descriptions of gutted houses, the composure of the Finns in air raid shelters, the excitement of the Lottas’ manning an AA gun as they successfully shoot down a Russian bomber (“Our second this week,” one tells Montanelli). Accounts of fighting in the woods: snipers on skis against tanks and numberless Russian divisions advancing in endless ranks through the snow. An interview with Soviet prisoners who have lost their ideological certainties. A portrait of Tampere, a small industrial city under attack by Soviet bombers "to make a birthday present Stalin” according to a Russian pilot who was shot down.

His condemnation of communism and the USSR is evident in many of his articles, although he avoids the use of the styles common to nationalist and fascist propaganda. For the Italian public, anesthetized by two decades of ritual warmongering and the dull and lackluster propaganda for Mussolini’s regime, Montanelli’s reporting provided a ray of sunlight and his reports were followed with great enthusiasm by the public. Sales of the Corriere della Sera skyrocketed, almost doubling within days (from 500,000 to 900,000 copies per day). The Fascist regime was not quite so enthusiastic – Montranelli had no reluctance in giving an account of the courageous resistance of a free people, rallied around its institutions, against the expansionist ambitions of a great totalitarian power. The description of the dignity and tenacity of the Finnish fight against the Russians taught Italians a lot about the risks of a war of aggression. In hindsight, the Russian infantry, ill-equipped, unable to understand the political and ideological reasons for the war, subject to an incessant propaganda so unreal as to be surreal, do not seem much different from the Italian infantrymen who were sent in October 1940 to the Greek border. With the benefit of hindsight, the attacks on Greece and Finland are like two faces of the same monster: the totalitarian state that thrives on propaganda, war and oppression - and the Italian censors certainly understood this.

They ordered Aldo Borelli, the editor of the Corriere della Sera, to censor Montanelli's articles. He had had the courage to reply that "If I censor Montanelli, I lose 500 thousand sales a day. Are you going to reimburse me? Readers of the Courier della Sera, like all Italians, are on the side of the Finns…". Thanks to this unexpectedly brave position, perhaps assisted by the political uncertainties of Italy’s position as a neutral at that time as well as the Italian Governments semi-official assitance to Finland which was highly popular, Montanelli continued to write what he wanted, and the Corriere della Sera continued to publish his articles as written. Montanelli afterwards had this to say: "Maybe I was not objective, but I certainly could describe what happened. Then I learned that the only master of a journalist is the reader. And when you are on their side, there is no power that can overcome you, even that of a dictator." There was however an unexpected benefit for the Mussolini regime. Not only was the sale of military equipment to Finland financially beneficial, but as a result of the groundswell of support from the Italian public for Finland, the Mussolini regime found itself the beneficiary of a surge in support due to the assistance that was being given by the Alpini Division and the units of the Regia Aeronautica and of the Regia Marina to Finland.

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In his reporting from the Winter War, Montanelli describes with unparalleled effectiveness the role played by snow in the fate of Finland. On December 4, 1939 wrote: "Bismarck said that a statesman must have the courage at some point to say, “Tomorrow it will rain” and then commend themselves to God and go ahead. Journalists sometimes are in a similar position. This was the case last night when the fear of not being on time with my article led me to say suggest that perhaps today Helsinki would no longer exist. (..due to the bombing.) This morning at ten Helsinki was deserted but still alive, wrapped in a shroud of snow that fell from the sky. The concealment was perfect. An icy wind from the North encrusted the city in glassy strands of tears. I thought about what effect those icicles would have on the wings of airplanes. Outside, the thermometer was well below zero. People looked at the sky and blessed it: this good dirty cotton sky so ugly to look at, but so very, very valuable. (...) The snow is the most dramatic event of the day. As he spoke casually of conversations in Moscow, Mr. B., of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, palpitates with pleasure a handful of this snow, from this Finnish expert comes the satisfied comment “it is powdery”, as if he were talking not about a war but about a ski race. And then he added: “The snow comes from Karelia”, apparently an old Finnish adage.

In Karelia, in fact, the snow is a meter deep, blocking any military operations by the Russians. When I was in the area a month ago, before the war started, it was easy to get an idea of what it would be like to be in a war here, among the impenetrable forests of fir trees and the lakes encrusted with ice. At night it is thirty below zero and the nights last twenty hours a day. The Air Force will not fly. The artillery fires into a black void. While the Russians slowly advance, they must bring everything with them as when the Finns retire there are only ruins of burned villages left. Victory in this war looks elusive for the Russians."


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In the Finnish resistance to the Red Army, the human factor played a key role. Montanelli is attentive to this factor, giving us quick sketches from which spring the psychology of the combatants. Glowing flashes of insight spring from the details of his dry prose, flashes in which you can see through the subtle, sometimes ethereal , ideologies, and facts that inextricably identify men. The chipped shoes a Russian prisoner wears reveal the disorganization of a totalitarian state which cynically indoctrinates their men with propaganda. The granite certainties of Russian prisoners suggest the ability of the Soviet regime to win the hearts and minds of entire generations, shaping a way of thinking in which even the evidence before them cannot lead them to deny the word of the Party and if Stalin.

In an article written on 8 December 1939, Montanelli noted: "I saw three Russian prisoners interned here and offered up to the curiosity of a few journalists. We agree that the three men are an inadequate sample on which to make a judgement of a people and of an army, but certainly they have inspired me with no optimistic opinions about the Red Army. Physically, all three are indifferent to what was happening around them, their equipment was bad. Their uniforms were of poor and rude cloth, dirty and torn. Horrible shoes, chipped, whose soles strangely resembled cartoon shoes. The weapons they carried at the time of capture: rifles and pistols, were however, good. I asked them what unit they belonged. They replied that they belonged to the second team of the third platoon. But which company this platoon belonged to they did not know, much less which Battalion and what Regiment. They only knew that when they crossed the border, they had been told that the war would last a week and after that they would go home. "

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Montanelli was not satisfied with this limited sample of Soviet humanity, he continued to search for true pioneers of socialism and eventually he found them, outlining personalities that have the immediacy of reality, filtered through a literary talent, and which are nor caricatured or demonized. There is instead a fund of human compassion towards the victims of indoctrination that blinds the senses and dulls the mind. "So far, among the prisoners I had not met anyone who was a Communist, and the conviction had come to me that they were hiding from interrogation out of fear. But perhaps it is true. Maybe there are very few communists in Russia, or otherwise they were not sent to the front. Of all the soldiers with whom I have spoken, I have found only one member of the party. (...) I saw him today, a handsome man about 35 years old with gray eyes and blond hair, tall, square, badly dressed, but clean, very strict indeed as to personal hygiene. Despite three days of captivity he had was shaved perfectly, the uniform in place, the hair combed. (...) I asked him if he was a communist and he said firmly: “Yes”. He spoke slowly and calmly. (...) When asked if he had taken part in the bombing of Helsinki he replied sincerely that he hopep that the Soviet Air Force had never bombed Helsinki, having received orders from the first day of operations, that you attack only military objectives. I pointed out that I was present at the bombing. He said: “Impossible”. I insisted that I had seen with my own eyes the women and children killed. He said: “It is not true.” There was nothing to be done. I asked him what he thought of the Finns and he honestly told me that they are good soldiers. I asked him what he thought of the Russians, and he said they are good soldiers. "

The compassion of Montanelli does sometimes fail to emerge. For example, in front of the fanaticism of a young Russian woman his prevalent feeling is one of disgust. "Today I saw a person of some interest, a Soviet woman. She is a 22-year-old student in the third year of medical school, a volunteer nurse on the northern front where she fell captive: a girl more beautiful than ugly if she was washed and combed a bit better. The Finns appreciate her bravery and are gallant, they refusedto intern Olga in a concentration camp with the other prisoners, although she protested as she wishes to be treated as a common soldier.

As a common soldier, however, she was dressed in “…pants, boots, etc. She smoked like a chimney and was passing herself off as militaristic. This was very bad her manners were rather indecent. I did not have the opportunity to question her a lot. After the first questions the conversation resulted in a monologue that echoed the sadder clichés of Communist propaganda. I wanted to know something more modest than the Bolshevik cosmogony, I wanted to know how the health service in the Russian army was organized. (...)I can summarize the content of her response: Men are stupid in the mass. Only a fraction of them, realize where and what happiness is. That fraction are the leaders, superior to the stupid mass because they have sufficient intelligence to understand the truth, and because they have sufficient intelligence to understand that we can not understand, that we must submit to the wisdom of the leaders. It 's the case of the humanity of this century, which is like all the other centuries stupid too. And there is a fraction of humanity that is a little less stupid, governed by the sound judgment of the disciplined and enlightened few. This fraction is Russia. In Russia the majority is not enlightened (Olga said literally so), but the discipline requires that they follow the few visionaries. Russia has a duty to impose this happiness on the rest of mankind. That's why the Soviet Union makes war. The dead do not count because when it comes to the human race, there is no right to skimp blood, there is a duty to perform, to bring about the universal revolution in person. (...).

I asked if now, in the midst of the miserable humanity of Finland, she felt unhappy. And Olga, greedily eating a boiled potato, she said these exact words: “Comrade journalist, you can write and print that a Soviet prisoner of bourgeois Finland has a duty to be unhappy.” I have done as Olga requested and acknowledge that there is a duty for the Soviets to be unhappy. Among the many unfortunate prisoners I saw this is perhaps the most unfortunate, because she did not even manage to make me pity her.
"

While Montanelli’s compassion for Russian prisoners is intermittent, not so for the innocent victims of war. Among the many, he chose to reflect on a group of monks from Valamo, demonstrating his skills as a narrator: "On the night of February 18, two hundred and fifty greek-orthodox monks gathered quickly the Byzantine vestments, ornaments and jewels of the sacristy, a fabulous treasure of gold crucifixes, icons of ancient scrolls and manuscripts in Slavonic characters, gathered in the church and prayed for the salvation of the soul of their persecutors. Out in the moonlight, Soviet bombs fell in search of Finnish batteries stationed around the monasteries, flares indicated advance patrols a few kilometers away on the lake, the positions closer and closer, the enemy more and more threatening. Two hundred and fifty monks continued to pray, the solemn notes of the choir filled the aisles of the church. The commander of the artillery stood in the doorway, looked nervously at the clock and did not dare move. The Archimandrite saw him, nodded his head, smiling, continued to pray with others. Finally ... the singing stopped, the monks appeared out of the dark, shadows reflected on the whiteness of the snow, some on foot, some on horse-drawn sleighs loaded with their sacred treasures. They took the path to the mainland over the ice of the lake, leaving behind the ruins of their monasteries destroyed by the bombs of Soviet Russia. It is over for Valamo, the Mount Athos of Finland. (...) The monks are all old, the youngest is 70 years old, and they have the eyes of children. Always they pray that God will forgive their persecutors and the octogenarian father smiles. "

Montanelli knowingly plays on contrasts, insists on apparently insignificant details to describe the different facets of the spirit of the Finnish people, able to keep intact his human sensitivity even in the midst of the horror imposed by the imperatives of the war. In February 1940 he observes: "This nation has been independent for twenty years. The Finn loves her so much and with such jealousy that he is ready to destroy it rather than lose it. The suffering is experienced under a mask of indifference that sometimes makes us doubt whether these are human beings. “But you are a human?” I asked a Finnish friend today, a refugee. We were on the road, it was snowing, my friend shrugged, and looked at the other refugees. Suddenly one of them ran to the sidewalk, picked something up that had stirred on the ice. It was a sparrow, half-frozen. All left their luggage to rush to see. The sparrow was there in the hand of the man who gripped it with a strange tenderness. At one point the sparrow tried to fly. He took a small flight and landed on the branch of a tree. Everyone began to argue. They decided something, one went to find a ladder in a warehouse across the street, another a birdcage from a house. It was funny to see people of sixty, seventy years old chasing a sparrow. Finally they caught him, warmed him with, deposited him in a cage and were visibly content. Without any emotion just 24 hours before they had set fire to their ancestral homes, because they do not want them to fall into the hands of the Soviets. "

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From the perpetrators to the victims, from extras to actors, no one is excluded from the news of Montanelli. In the description of Marshal Mannerheim, commander of the Finnish Armed Forces, he sees echoed the virtues of an entire people. The portrait by Montanelli is not this time vivid and immediate, but it is rather more like the bust of a hero of the classics carved in marble. But this is not designed for propaganda purposes or for flattery, but with an intuition capable of capturing in Mannerheim the incarnation of the Finnish people at war. Certainly we are facing simplifed reporting, but with a great literary force, a simplification that attempts to capture the meaning of events and find a line of argument, relying on instinct.

In his article of December 30, 1939 Montanelli wrote: "At seventy-two years old, Marshal Mannerheim went every morning in times of peace to gallop in the park on a white horse. A handsome man, very military, his hair thick and shiny, with a short black mustache, until a few weeks ago he was a little apart from public life, not from arrogance or contempt, but from an instinctive love of solitude. Friendly and forgiving, his effort was to make people forget who he was and what it represented in the history of Finland and the Nordic countries. You could hardly drag him to talk about himself and his memories. The only subjects for which he showed interest were hunting, dogs, horses. (...). During the crisis that led to war with Russia, more than a few people have attributed an attitude of intransigence to Mannerheim. His past as a Tsarist officer and the anti-Bolshevik crusade of 1919 reinforced the view that the Marshal always had a vendetta against Bolshevism. And although he strictly limited his work to the military-technical field, the most fervent Finnish nationalists looked to him as a natural leader. But while the game was played at the diplomatic table, Mannerheim expressed no opinions, or at least none that were shown. Now Mannerheim is no longer visible. For his particular nature has always been of a character strangely distant and lonely, a cold and solitary will. But now he is more remote than ever before, in the middle of the mysterious Finnish headquarters deep in the icy forests. From a bare and almost monastic room, sitting at a large desk tidy, Mannerheim directs the operations of his victorious army. He maneuvers on the map, calculates with patience, listens carefully, issues a few terse and direct orders. It all depends on him: Army. Navy. Air Force. And they resemble him in action: balanced, calm, tenacious."

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Indo Montanelli’s book, “Dentro La Storia: Finlandia 1939-1940, Ungheria 1956” published in 1992 by Rizzoli (Milano)

While in Finland Montanelli also reported on the German invasion of Norway where he was arrested by the German army for his hostility towards the German-Italian alliance. He escaped with the help of his friend Quisling, and made a run for the north of the country where the English and the French were disembarking their troops at Narvik. He was met by the one-eyed, one-armed Major Carton de Wiart who explained that there were no more than 10,000 Allied troops in Norway - many of them not even adequately trained for battle. Nobody seemed to know where their garrison was. The British wanted to go inland and attack the Germans, but the French wanted to stay put and consolidate their positions. After having seen the clockwork invasion of Poland by the German troops, this disarray was a worrying sight. When the Germans began bombing these positions the Allies were forced to embark once again and beat a hasty withdrawal to England. Montanelli in his turn beat a hasty retreat northwards to the Finnmark, now occupied by Finnish forces, where he resumed reporting on the Russo-Finnish war. Following Italy's entrance into WW2 in June 1940, Montanelli reported on the anomalous situation in Finland whereby Italian troops fought side by side as comrades-in-arms with British soldiers while their comrades were at war elsewhere.

Following the end of the Winter War, Montanelli returned to Italy where he was promptly assigned with the responsibility for following the Italian military campaign in Greece and Albania as correspondent. Here he says he wrote very little: “I remained at that front for months, writing almost nothing, a small reason was because I fell ill with typhus and a huge one because I refused to push as a glorious military campaign the quaking pummeling that we caught down there.” One of his articles at this time was considered "defeatist" by the censors, who in turn ordered the closure of the periodical in which it had been published. After witnessing war and destruction in the Balkans, and the disastrous Italian invasion of Greece, Montanelli decided to join the Partito d’Azione, part of the Resistance. He was arrested by the Gestapo and sentenced to death in January 1944 for an unflattering piece on Mussolini and his lover, Clara Petacci. Salvation came at the end of 1944 with the help of unknown conspirators who arranged for his transfer to a prison in Verona. The transfer was then transformed into a dash for the Swiss border. The identity of these conspirators remained a mystery until decades later, when it emerged that it had been the result of collusion by several agencies. (OTL, Among them, Marshall Mannerheim allegedly put pressure on his German allies ("You are executing a gentleman" he said to von Falkenhorst, the commander of the German troops stationed in Finland) resulting in Berlin's opening of an inquiry).

After the war, Montanelli returned to Il Corriere della Sera where he built a reputation as one of Italy’s most-respected journalists. He reported from various European capitals and was one of the first correspondents in Budapest during the Hungarian uprising in 1956. In 1973, he decided to leave Il Corriere, after its new owners signaled a swing to the left, and founded his own conservative daily, Il Giornale. In 1977, Montanelli was walking to his office in Milan when he was shot four times in the legs by members of the extreme leftist Red Brigades outside the head-office of the Corriere della Sera. His friend and surgeon was amazed on how "four shots could hit those [long, thin] chicken legs of his and still completely miss a major artery or nerve bundle". Montanelli credited his indoctrination as a child in the Balilla fascist youth and its mantra, "die on your feet", for saving his life. He maintained that had he not held on to the railing during the incident the fourth shot would have surely hit him in the stomach. In his typical ironical and satirical vein he also thanked Il Duce. In a petty insult the "Corriere della Sera" published an article about the incident ("Milan journalist kneecapped"), omitting his name from the title. Undaunted, Montanelli returned to his position as editor in chief of Il Giornale and launched a campaign against terrorism. “If they [the terrorists] think I am going to shut up, they are very mistaken,” he told the media at the time. “There is no one on the paper who would give in to these tactics.”

Ironically, Il Giornale was eventually muzzled by Montanelli’s friend, media mogul and future prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, who had become a minority shareholder of the paper in 1978. When Berlusconi decided to enter politics in 1994 against Montanelli’s urging, Montanelli was typically outspoken in his condemnation. He predicted that Il Giornale would join Berlusconi’s three television networks as a mouthpiece for the candidate’s election campaign. Montanelli came under heavy pressure to switch his editorial line to a position favourable to Berlusconi. Montanelli however never hid his bad opinion of Berlusconi: "He lies as he breathes", the journalist declared. In the end, protesting his independence, he founded a new daily, for which he resurrected the name La Voce ("The Voice"), which had belonged to an historical newspaper. La Voce, always an elitist paper, folded after about a year, and Montanelli returned to Corriere della Sera. "). Montanelli spent his last years vigorously opposing Silvio Berlusconi’s politics. He died on July 22, 2001 in Milan.

The author of some 60 books, Montanelli was the recipient of numerous awards, including the World Press Review’s International Editor of the Year for 1994 and Spain’s prestigious Prince of Asturias Award for Communications and Humanities in 1996. His belief in journalism free of any constraints was best exemplified in his decision in 1991 to refuse an appointment as senator-for-life of the Republic of Italy. In a letter to President Francesco Cossiga, he wrote: “Unfortunately, the model of an absolutely independent journalist prevents me from accepting this flattering offer.”
 
A Sidebar on the Valamo Monastery – mentioned by Indro Montanelli

A Sidebar on the Valamo Monastery – mentioned by Indro Montanelli, who witnessed the evacuation of the Monks

The Valamo Monastery is an Orthodox monastery in Finnish Karelia, located on Valamo, the largest island and part of an island archipelago of the same name in Lake Laatoka, itself the largest lake in Europe. The archipelago consists of some 50 islands, the largest also called Valamo (the name is Finno-Ugric and means the high, mountain, ground) – and is best known as the site of the 14th century Valamo Monastery as well as for its natural beauty. In the 12th century, the islands were a part of the Novgorod Republic. In the 17th century, they were captured by Sweden during the Time of Troubles, but Russia reconquered them less than a century later. When the Grand Duchy of Finland was set up in the early 19th century as an autonomous part of the Russian Empire, Alexander I of Russia made Valamo a part of Finland. In 1917, Valamo became a part of newly independent Finland, and was the scene of fierce fighting during the Winter War before the Red Army was driven back. Subsequently through WW2 and the Cold War years, the area remained heavily fortified by the Finns, with also a large Finnish Air Force air base nearby at Sortavala. As well as the Monastery, the area is now frequented by tourists, particularly in the summer months.

The climate and natural history of the island are unique because of its position on Lake Ladoga. Spring begins at the end of March and a typical summer on Valamo consists of 30-35 sunny days, which is rather more than on the mainland. The average temperature in July is 17 °C. The winter and snow arrive in early December. In the middle of February the ice road to the nearest city of Sortavala (42 km) is traversable. The average temperature in February is minus 8 °C. More than 480 species of the plants grow on the island, many of which have been cultivated by monks. The island is covered by coniferous woods, about 65% of which are pine. The island was formerly visited repeatedly by Emperors Alexander I, Alexander II, and other members of the Tsarist imperial family. Other famous visitors include Tchaikovsky and Mendeleyev. The island is permanently inhabited by monks and families. In 1999, there were about 600 residents on the main island; including Maavoimat service personnel, restoration workers, guides and monks.

It is not clear when the monastery was founded. As the cloister is not mentioned in documents before the 16th century, different dates - from the 10th to the 15th centuries - have been expounded. According to one tradition, the monastery was founded by a 10th century Greek monk, Sergius, and his Karelian companion, Herman. Heikki Kirkinen inclines to date the foundation of the monastery to the 12th century. Contemporary historians consider even this date too early. According to the scholarly consensus, the monastery was founded at some point towards the end of the 14th century. John H. Lind and Michael C. Paul date the founding to between 1389 and 1393 based on various sources, including the "Tale of the Valamo Monastery," a sixteenth century manuscript, which has the monastery founded during the archiepiscopate of Ioann II of Novgorod. Whatever the truth may be, the Valamo monastery was a northern outpost of Eastern Orthodoxy against the heathens and, later, an Eastern Orthodox outpost against Catholic Christianity from Tavastia, Savonia and (Swedish) Karelia.

The power struggles between the Russians and the Swedes pushed the border eastwards in the 16th century. In 1578 the monastery was attacked and numerous Orthodox monks and novices were killed by the Lutheran Swedes. The monastery was desolate between 1611 and 1715 after another attack by the Swedes, the buildings being burnt to the ground and the Karelian border between Russia and Sweden being drawn through Lake Ladoga. In the 18th century the monastery was magnificently restored, and in 1812 it came under the Russian Grand Duchy of Finland.

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A 19th-century Skete (monastic community) on a distant island of the Valamo archipelago

In 1917, Finland became independent. The year 1918 was one of the hardest for the monastery because of hunger and the confiscation of monastery property by Finnish troops. Thirty monks died, more than five hundred left the island. In November 1918, the monastery was taken over by the Finnish Orthodox Church, which had become independent and an autonomous Church under the Orthodox Church of Constantinople (it had been a part of the Russian Orthodox Church). Under the complex political circumstances, in order not to seem “pro-Russian”, the Finnish Church urged reforms. In September 1925 the liturgical language was changed from Church Slavonic to Finnish as a result of demands from Bishop German (Aav), a former Estonian priest, who headed the Finnish Orthodox Church. The liturgical calendar from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar. These changes led to bitter decade-long disputes within the monastic community of Valamo and were not recognized by the Orthodox.

A large part of the brethren, observant of the Russian Orthodox canons, refused to serve under him or the Greek Orthodox Church metropolitan Hermanos. Persecutions followed. Some monks returned to the USSR to meet almost certain death, some left for Serbia. Other banished monks brought the traditions of Valami to various countries of the world: France, the USA, Morocco, Germany. Father losif, Dather Mikhail, and Father Ieronim were retired from their posts and left for outer sketes. Monks who followed the old calendar style gathered and held services in a pottery workshop, which became their Church. The sorrowful separation of the brethren lasted until 1946. By 1925 there were about four hundred people in the cloister, among them seventy hieromonks and forty hierodeacons. There were about a hundred hired workers to do the forestry work (Finnish Orthodox Karelians used to have a tradition of going to Valamo before marriage in order to pray and to work for the benefit of the monastery). Twenty-five women-pilgrims settled on the island and formed their own monastic community, worked in the garden and looked after the laundry.

In Lutheran Finland, Valamo was the light of Orthodoxy. Every year it held meetings of clergy from the thirty-five Finnish Orthodox parishes, in 1926 the delegates of Baltic choir communities stayed in the monastery for three days, the monastery published its magazine 'Daybreak', as well as books. In 1926, Hieromonk Isaaky started holding regular services in Finnish in the Cathedral of Peter and Paul. There was a boarding school for thirty poor boys, and a school for Karelian boys. In the 1930s, under the supervision of Hieromonk Dosifey, the boys participated in some restoration work as well as in icon-painting. In two churches the Psalter was read continuously with prayers for the dead and the living. In the 1920s and 1930s Valamo was visited by such writers as B.K. Zaitsev (March, 1935), M.A. Janson, A.V Amfiteatrov, E.N. Chirikov, A.N. Tolstoi. Prince Aleksey Meschersky took vows here and was later buried at the Old Brethren cemetery. Valamo forever remained a centre of the Russian diaspora until after the fall of the communist regime.

The territory was fought over heavily in the early stages of the Winter War. The most destructive attacks were the bombings of the 2nd and 4th of February 1940, when Valamo was attacked by three raids of seventy planes. The monastery could have been razed to the ground. However, the damage was not as serious as it could have been. Finnish officers talked about that with amazement, concluding that either Soviet pilots had felt pity for such a beauty, or St. Sergius and St. German had protected their cloister. The monastery was evacuated in early 1940, when 150 monks were temporarily settled in Heinävesi (as were Monks from the Konevitsa and Petsamo monasteries together with a small number of monks from Eastern Karelia who had survived the Soviet regime and who were moved to Heinävesi during the war as a safety measure). The community at the New Valamo Monastery in Heinävesi still exists – some of the evacuated monks choosing to remain there after the war, as did a number of the monks liberated by the Maavoimat from within Soviet Karelia. After the war, the monastery buildings at Old Valamo were meticulously renovated and restored - as were the Orthodox monasteries at Konevitsa and Petsamo - and many of the Monks returned. The Valamo Monastery however remains the leading monastery of the small Finnish Orthodox Church. In the last two decades, a significant effort has been made to return the monastery to a state of spiritual seclusion.

There are now about 160 men of the brethren in the Cloister today, living in the Central Part of the Valaam Monastery and in the sketes on the surrounding islands of the archipelago. On Valaam and on the nearest islands the brethren live and carry out various duties at the farm of the Monastery and in the sketes: in the St. Nicholas skete, the All Saints skete, the Alexander Svirsky skete, the Prophet Elijah skete, the Sergy of Valamo skete, the Gethsemane skete, the Konevitsa skete, the Smolensky skete and in the Avraam of Rostov skete. In the 21st century a new skete has already been built –Vladimersky skete. Nowdays there is a monastic life there. The fact that the Monastery is located on islands results in the brethren running a rather large economy: their own inland water transport, a small vehicle fleet – cars and agricultural machinery, the farm, the stable, the smithy, the workshops, their own gardens, where about 60 sorts of apple trees grow. There are the bakery and the dairy processing plant, where the brethren of the Valamo Monastery do what they can do to help the local population. The brethren of the Cloister together with monastery workers, pilgrims and volunteers carry out various duties in different departments: in the department of the Protopope, in the department of the hotel service, in the department of the Provisor, in the sacristy, in the missionary department, in the library and in the warehouse.

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The Valamo Monastery Cathedral

Following are some historical and current photographs of the Valamo Monastery

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Abbot Damascene

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A view of the Monastery from Monastery Bay

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A Birds-eye view of the Valamo Monastery in the 1930’s

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In the Icon-painting Studio

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A Service in the upper church of the Transfiguration of the Saviour Cathedral

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The Valamo Monastery Hotel

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Damage to the Monastery Hotel from a Soviet Air Force bomb blast during the Winter War

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The damaged St Andrew Bell – photo taken in 1941, after the Winter War

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War damaged Monastery buildings - 1940

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The Gethsemane Skete

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Hieroschemamonk Ephrem's cell

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Timber floating near the Monastery

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Kyrie eleison ... (Hierodeacon Veniamin)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oEWXKbsV8lc
Kyrie eleison ...Mercedes Sosa

(OTL note: The Valamo Monastery is now part of the USSR so don’t be using my ATL descriptions as to its being part of Finland to try and get there…..also, see the Monastery’s own website - http://valaam.ru/en/ - it’s part of the Russian Orthodox Church, not the Finnish Orthodox Church).
 
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Another fantastic add! I really like reading these, the amount of historical study must be stupendeous. :eek:

You're not kidding about the study, the hard part is tracking the info down online or from books and journals - for the monastery, all I had was that one mention in Montanelli's article (which was BTW, translated from Italian from an Italian website on Montanelli), so I decided to take a look and hey, there were those wonderful photos - so I decided to throw it into the mix. not really necessary to the ATL but what a wonderful place - and the fact that it's being restored is great.... Anyhow, glad others enjoy these obscure little bits and pieces of background info. The photos especially - those bring home what to me is the real history - the people who are impacted by the broad sweep of events in which they find themselves.
 
What then of the Finnish Press and the Winter War?

What then of the Finnish Press and the Winter War?

Before we return to the Foreign Press for a final summation, it’s perhaps also worth taking a look at the Finnish Press and how the Finnish newspapers reacted to, and reported on, the Winter War. This is more relevant that it at first seems, as many foreign correspondents picked up translations of Finnish newspaper articles for their own use. Also, both the Finnish newspapers and the foreign correspondents relied to an extent on the daily media releases from the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus (VTK, or State Information Centre). Add to this the strong sympathy and support that almost all of the foreign correspondents felt for Finland and foreign reporting took on a more and more “Finnish” viewpoint as the War continued. This, a look at the Finnish Press is certainly both relevant and justified.

When examining coverage of the Winter War in the Finnish Press, we are dealing largely with the nation’s defence. Questions dealing with the enemy and hostilities were naturally a dominant daily topic in Finnish newspaper editorials and articles and the subsequent reputation of the Winter War is dominated by an image of the Finns’ complete unanimity. Examining the sources strengthens this view because the language used during the war appears remarkably similar in all newspapers, and every paper pretty much described the enemy using the same negative arguments and views, regardless of previous political affiliation. In general, one can say that Finns in general already had a preconceived mental image of the Soviet Union created over different periods and the unprovoked Soviet attack on Finland dovetailed into this.

This view had its roots in the repeated invasions of Finland and its seizure from Sweden in the eighteenth century, followed by the increasing nationalism and a desire for independence from “the loathsome embrace” of Russia in the nineteenth century. The achievement of independence in 1917 and the subsequent Civil War between the Whites and the Reds in 1918 had resulted in a stirring up of hatred against Russians and an increasing fear of communism, especially among influential right wing movements such as the Akateeminen Karjala Seura (AKS or “Academic Karelia Society) and the Lapua Movement (Lapuanliike). While some political parties perhaps could be considered more nationalist than others, the negative image of the Soviet Union permeated the entire Finnish middle class and indeed, was also widely held among leftists, excluding only the extreme left, largely as a result of events in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and the purges of the late 1930’s, news of which was well known in Finland, where refugees from across the border regularly arrived. Thus, the Finns image of the USSR had centuries-long roots due to a common history that included repeated conflicts, occupation and oppression.

Since independence, the Finnish military had viewed the USSR as the only potential threat to Finland. Through the 1930s Finnish military preparations had been directed towards meeting this threat. Care was taken however, even by the rightist politicians, not to unduly inflame relations with the neighbouring giant. Indeed, at the same time as Finland was increasing defence spending through the 1930’s, every effort was being made to increase reciprocal trade with the USSR and tie both countries into a mutually beneficial relationship. However, the Purges of the late 1930’s and the execution and deportation of large numbers of Karelians and Ingrians across the border were well-known in Finland and despite not being made much of in the Finnish Press, the activities of the NKVD reinforced the negative views of many Finns with regard to the Russians. This negative image of the Russians became ever more pronounced in late 1939 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the “stab in the back” of Poland, the “agreements” with the Baltic States and then the pressure on Finland to adjust the borders and grant the USSR bases in strategic Finnish locations. In all of these acts, the USSR ensured that it was the very archetype of the same enemy that had repeatedly attacked and oppressed Finland in the past.

On the outbreak of the Winter War, Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus (VTK, the State Information Centre) had very little work to do to create a negative image of the enemy that would unite all Finns. The actions of the USSR achieved this quite successfully, creating an enemy “tailor-made” for the media, both Finnish and foreign, to demonise with ease. Influencing public opinion within Finland to adopt and receive views the government wished it to adopt and receive in this regard was not a great challenge. Nor was it a challenge to suitably influence the foreign press. This also was a relatively easy task that the Finns generally left to the USSR to achieve for them, something which the USSR did quite effectively, turning even former sympathizers such as John Langdon-Davies into outright opponents. The biggest challenge turned out to be detailed censorship of military information and the development of information-sharing guidelines associated with military topics and the actual fighting. Thus, censorhip and the provision of information to the press was not so much a political question as a military one, due to the unanimity shared between the press, both local and foreign, and the people.

Non-Socialist Finnish Newspapers

When the portrayal of the enemy in the Finnish news media is examined more closely however, differences emerge in the seemingly unified descriptions of the enemy. Different ideologies and ideals existing in the country are reflected in the image of the enemy created by newspapers - because of course the papers naturally wanted to appeal to their own particular groups of readers. For readers with right-wing inclinations, which included many members of the Agrarian party, the emphasis was on a patriotic war of national defence. This was the view that made its appearance in the first Order of the Day of the Military Commander, the Marshal of Finland, C. G. E. Mannerheim.

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Mannerheim’s first Order of the Day, 1 December 1939

Commander-in-Chief’s Order of the Day No. 1.

On 30 Nov 1939, the President of the Republic has appointed me Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces.

Valiant soldiers of Finland!

I accept this task at a moment when our centuries-old enemy is once again attacking our country. Confidence in an army commander is the primary condition for success in war. You know me, and I know you and I know that each and every one of you is prepared to fulfil his duty even unto death. This war is merely a continuation and final act of our War of Independence.

We fight for our homes, our religion and for our Fatherland.

MANNERHEIM


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Here is the 1st Order of the Day, text in Finnish but Mannerheim’s corrections in Swedish.

This view, succinctly expressed in Mannerheim’s first Order of the Day, presented the war as a battle of national defence in which the Soviet Union threatened home, religion and the fatherland. It also included a theme which had been emphasized throughout the 1920s and 1930s in Government, Suojeluskuntas and Army publications and by nationalist and conservative groups, namely that the Civil War of 1918 was a War of Independence (or War of Liberation) from the Russians. In the non-Socialist Finnish newspapers, this view and the history behind it was utilized from the very start of the war.

These non-Socialist Finnish papers described and made use of the historic connections between Russia and Finland. Old conflicts were used for comparison, mainly the Great Wrath. With the help of these, it was possible to describe that the Soviet Union was Russia’s successor and also very demonstratably the archenemy. It was “that old tormentor” which throughout history had attacked Finland and forced every generation to defend the country. The image of the USSR that was presented by the conservative factions in Finland, most explicitly by the right AKS and the Lapua Movement was utilised. Understandably this image was the strongest in papers of the extreme right and of the Agrarian Union and is seen in these papers from the first days of the war. Because war is generally a unifying force, it is not surprising that this enemy image based on history soon found its way into the newspapers of the political centre and occasionally into newspapers of the Left.

This “image of the enemy” also included appealing to the cultural difference between the Finns and the Russians and the Russians’ difference from the western peoples. Uuno Kailas’ famous poem “Rajalla” (On the Border) was well-known and was often referred to over the course of the Winter War, even finding its way into an English translation and being printed in foreign news articles about the Winter War:

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Uuno Kailas, born Frans Uno Salonen (29 March 1901 – 22 March 1933) was a Finnish poet, author, and translator. After his mother's death when he was young, he received a strict religious upbringing from his grandmother. He studied in Heinola and occasionally in the University of Helsinki. In 1919, he took part in the Aunus expedition, where his close friend Bruno Schildt, whom he had persuaded to take part, was killed. Kailas' critical reviews and translations were published in Helsingin Sanomat and the literary magazine Nuori Voima. His first collection of poetry was “Tuuli ja Tähkä” in 1922. Kailas served in the army from 1923 until 1925. The ideology of the right-wing movements in Finland is strongly reflected in Kailas's poem “Rajalla” (On the Border). Like Kipling, Kailas saw an unresolved antagonism between East and West, seeing Finland as the guardian of Western culture on the Soviet border. In 1929, he was hospitalized due to schizophrenia, and he was also diagnosed with tuberculosis. He died in Nice, France in 1933, and was buried in Helsinki.

Rajalla (On the Border)

Raja railona aukeaa (Like a chasm runs the border)
Edessä Aasia, Itä. (In front, Asia, the East)
Takana Länttä ja Eurooppaa; (Behind, Europe, the West)
varjelen, vartija, sitä. (Like a sentry, I stand guard)

Takana kaunis isänmaa (Behind, the beautiful fatherland)
Kaupungein ja kylin. (with its cities and villages)
Sinua poikas puolustaa (Your sons defend you)
Maani, aarteista ylin. (My country, the greatest treasure)

Öinen, ulvova tuuli tuo (Nocturnal howling winds bring)
Rajan takaa lunta. (Snow from across the border)
— Isäni, äitini, Herra, suo (Lord, let my mother and father)
Nukkua tyyntä unta! (Sleep, calmly dreaming!)

Anna jyviä hinkaloon, (Fill the bins with grain)
Anna karjojen siitä! (Let the herds breed)
Kätes peltoja siunatkoon! (Let thy hand bless the fields)
- Täällä suojelen niitä. (I am here, protecting them)

Synkeä, kylmä on talviyö, (The winter night is dark and cold)
Hyisenä henkii itä. (There is an Icy breath from the East)
Siell’ ovat orjuus ja pakkotyö; (Over there is slavery and forced labour)
tähdet katsovat sitä. (the stars look down and see)

Kaukaa aroilta kohoaa (Far away on the Steppe rises)
Iivana Julman haamu. (The ghost of Ivan the Terrible)
Turman henki, se ennustaa: (A spirit of doom is at work, predicting that
verta on näkevä aamu. (the morning shall see blood)

Mut isät harmaat haudoistaan (The gray fathers rise from their graves)
aaveratsuilla ajaa: (Phantom steeds they ride)
karhunkeihäitä kourissaan (Bear spears in their hands)
syöksyvät kohti raja (Rushing to the border)

—Henget taattojen, autuaat, (Blessed spirits of the fathers)
kuulkaa poikanne sana — (Listen to your sons words)
jos sen pettäisin, saapukaat (if I should not keep my word, then come)
koston armeijana —: (as an army of vengeance)

Ei ole polkeva häpäisten (Their tread will not desecrate)
sankarileponne majaa (the resting place of your heroes)
rauta-antura vihollisen, - (From the iron-soled foot of the enemy)
suojelen maani rajaa! (I will protect your borders)

Ei ota vieraat milloinkaan (Strangers will never take)
kallista perintöänne. (your precious heritage)
tulkoot hurttina aroiltaan! (let them come like hounds from the steppes)
Mahtuvat multiin tänne. (they will find a place here under the soil)

Kontion rinnoin voimakkain (With a bears powerful chest)
ryntään peitsiä vasten (I charge against the lances)
naisen rukkia puolustain (defending your women’s spinning wheels)
ynnä kehtoa lasten. (and your children’s cradles)

Raja railona aukeaa (Like a chasm runs the border)
Edessä Aasia, Itä. (In front, Asia, the East)
Takana Länttä ja Eurooppaa; (Behind, Europe, the West)
varjelen, vartija, sitä. (Like a sentry, I stand guard)


Finland certainly had strong reasons for identifying with the west following the national awakening in the mid-19th century, and it had been actively emphasizing the need for national unity - which included stirring up an antipathy towards the Soviet Union in the early years of the independence period. This topic was also dealt with by propaganda directed outside Finland during the war. This propaganda was used to influence public (and government) opinion in other countries by emphasising that the Soviet Union’s attack against Finland was not only aimed at conquering Finland but towards the entire world and a worldwide revolution. Therefore, it was in the best interest of those countries to help Finland. This propaganda, thus, had a clear practical goal and, because we are expressly dealing with the best interests of Finland fighting a defensive war, it is understandable that the domestic newspapers also wrote about the need for help from foreign countries.

The ideological differences between the different Finnish newspapers did not differ on this – almost all Finnish newspapers soon came to reflect this viewpoint, regardless of their previous ideological perspective, There were, however, differences in the volumes of articles with this theme. This may also be explain by the desire to influence foreign opinion because liberal Helsingin Sanomat, the largest newspaper of the country and the newspaper whose content was most often translated and used abroad in the British Commonwealth countries and in the USA, included the most articles on this topic. This paper was owned by Elias Erkko – a former Foreign Minister – and opinions expressed in this paper were definitely followed abroad and through the foreign diplomatic missions in Finland.

Finnish Labour newspapers

The Labour Movement newspapers were expressly newspapers of the Social Democratic Party, which as one of the parties making up the government, condemned the Soviet Union’s attack as unequivocally as did other newspapers (the Finnish Communist Party was banned). When we examine the content of the SDP’s newspaper dealing with the enemy, the SDP’s worldview is brought up as well as the practical need to encourage the working class to defend the country. The need for national unity in a war of survival for Finland was emphasized as being essential to military success. Thus the Soviet Union was examined from a somewhat different point of view than that of the non-labour movement newspapers.

It was of course not particularly useful to appeal to the working class left with the memories of their defeat in the Civil War in 1918. What did appeal was the condemnation of the imperialism of the Soviet Union and Stalin, separating thus from the ideals of the Finnish labour movement, which were assumed to be shared by readers of the SDP-supporting newspapers. For this reason it was emphasised in the labour newspapers that the Soviet Union had violated the most cherished and central principles of the labour movement by attacking its small neighbour. This meant that the ideals of socialism and working class ideology that had emerged during the revolution were no longer honoured in the Soviet Union.

This indicates that the motives behind these articles were clearly different from those expressed by the non-socialists. Later in the War, the labour newspapers also attempted to influence their readers’ opinion by emphasising the social development that had taken place in Finland since independence. Always in the background was a need to emphasise that Finland was worth defending from the point of view of the labour class – and this idea was apparently influential. The basis for the success of this line of propaganda was created by the events that took place in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, particularly the purges of Finns in Karelia – and as these events were relatively well known in all groups in Finland, it was possible to use mentions of these to remind readers of what the working class was going to lose if Finland was defeated. There was no need for the non-labour newspapers to emphasise the more democratic and humane nature of the Finnish society in comparison to that of the Soviet Union. It was clear without stating this explicitly. Therefore, it was typically only the labour newspapers that made an effort to demonstrate the issue by presenting arguments.

The Words and Deeds of the Soviet Union as reflected in Finnish Media

From the beginning of the war, news and commentary were intertwined in newspapers, and newspaper reporters freely expressed their views of the enemy’s actions and character in the news pages and headlines. All the Finnish newspapers used content from the Soviet Union’s own propaganda and actions which generously reinforced the preexisting image of the enemy in Finnish eyes. When the war began, Radio Moscow proclaimed on 1 December 1939 that the people of Finland had raised a rebellion against the white government and said that a new Finnish Government had been established at Terijoki. This government, for its part, proclaimed that it had requested help from the Red Army to suppress Finland’s White Guard government and had signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Soviet Union on December 2nd. With this assistance, it was certain that every Finn now knew that the whole of national independence was at stake, not only some strategic territories on the eastern border.

The Finnish government apparently felt some degree of concern about the influence of the Terijoki government on opinions at the beginning of the war, influenced by a fear that the Soviet Union’s propaganda maneuver would appeal to at least some members of the extreme left. Such concerns proved to be without any basis as the Terijoki “government” was ferociously condemned by the labour newspapers in many editorials and commentaries. The non-socialist press also judged the Terijoki government to be a sub-standard move by the Soviet Union but of course, they did not need to feel similar worry about their readers’ views.

The entire Finnish press considered the Terijoki government an example of “typical” Soviet duplicity. When it promised the Finns an eight-hour workday, which Finland had already had for more than two decades, this poor knowledge of conditions in Finland was utilised in the Finnish press. Many more minor mistakes of the Soviet Union were also exploited to create a poor image of the Soviet enemy. Descriptive examples of these are provided by radio programs directed by the Soviet Union to Finland in which it was reported that Finns ran toward the Red Army soldiers at the borders to hug and kiss them. The Soviet Union’s Finnish-language programs commonly reported that soldiers of the Red Army had received a “hot” reception at the borders, apparently meaning friendly and warm. The non-socialist Finnish newspapers milked everything possible out of the double meaning of this Finnish word. For once “Ryssä” speaks the truth - they certainly received a “hot” reception – that is, they had came under heavy fire – and they would in the future also receive a “hot reception”, they wrote with amusement.

The aerial bombing carried out by the Soviet Union had a stronger effect on the image of the Russians as enemy than even the Terijoki government. There had been attacks against civilians in the Spanish Civil War, but in the Second World War, which started in September 1939, Germany, England and France had not carried bombing attacks against each other’s civilians (although the Finnish Press had reported on the German bombing of Warsaw and of Rotterdam). For this reason, the Soviet Air Force bombings of Helsinki and other cities awoke the old image of the Russian as a traditional enemy – and an enemy for whom the killing of Finnish civilians in war was characteristically and traditionally a Russian activity. The Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov said at the beginning of the war (and continued to repeat through January) that the Soviet Union had not bombed civilian targets in Finland. The Finnish newspapers reported this with anger and reported that Molotov had also said that rather than bombs, the Russian planes dropped bread to starving Finnish workers. When Soviet bombers circled in the sky they were, after that, referred to as “Molotov’s breadbaskets”- and it was reported to astonished readers that entire buildings had collapsed due to the weight of the Soviet bread. Similarly, the howling of alarm sirens came to be called “the voice of Molotoff”. It was in this way possible to utilise a person, Molotov, as an image at which to direct people’s feelings of hatred. Whether or not claims presented to the public by Soviet propaganda were created for their own domestic propaganda was naturally not deliberated during the war. On the other hand, when they were presented in radio broadcasting directed at Finland there might have been a desire to also appeal to the Finnish workers in some way.

The image of the Russian enemy in which evil deeds are seen as being due to the national character of the Russians first appeared in right wing and agrarian party newspapers. In this viewpoint, the negative image of the Soviet Union had strong roots in the atmosphere of the Independence and Civil War period, which was strongly coloured by a hatred of the Russians and the fear of communism. At Christmas 1939, when the Soviet air bombings recurred, the non-socialist newspapers further developed the Great Wrath theme in the emotional atmosphere of the war. They started to write about the “Holy Wrath,” in which Finland defended all western and Christian values against the Asian communist barbarians – Finland was fighting for the sake of all Europe. This was a view that was rapidly reflected in almost all of the conservative newspapers of both the western democracies and of countries such as Italy and Spain. In the conservative newspapers of Britain and France, much was also made of the fact that the Soviet Union and Germany were both cut from the same cloth – totalitarian states imposing their demands on smaller states by force of arms.

In the case of the extreme right, the enemy of Finland was also perceived as God’s enemy that should be destroyed so that Christian values would survive in the world. This tendency was to be found in the right wing’s image of the Soviet Union before the war, but as the war continued it became a view that was more widely shared than previously. From January 1940 on, when more frequent Soviet air raids occurred despite the strong defence put up by the Ilmavoimat, the enemy’s inhuman cruelty was constantly emphasised in the news headlines. Editorials emphasised a parallel between the new attacks and the similar experiences of previous generations who had been attacked by the same archenemy. The labour newspapers’ condemnation of the Soviet air raids was ferocious from the first days of the war. However, neither the Russian national character, the Great Wrath nor the archenemy issue were brought up when deliberating the air raids. Instead, what was emphasized was the target areas of bombing and Stalinist imperialism. It was reported in labour newspapers that the Soviet Union for some reason bombed areas where workers lived especially intensively. The non-socialistic newspapers wrote about this also, but this view was clearly emphasised in the labour newspapers. From the background, one can see a desire to influence workers’ feelings at the moment of distress with concrete facts. Apparently there was no absolute certainty at the beginning of the war that the entire working class would fight to defend the country against the Soviet Union. A comparison with non-socialist papers, which did not need have a similar concern with regard to their readers, also emphasises the differences. The non-socialist newspapers for example, were able to concentrate on proving through history the cowardly nature of the enemy, which may not have appealed to the leftist readers of the labour newspapers.

When the concern for maintaining national unity turned out to be groundless as the war went on, the portrayal of the Soviet Union’s war as a war against civilians became more uniform. This changed viewpoint affected the labour newspapers most, as from January 1940 on they wrote more and more articles describing the Russians’ as barbarians as well as Russia being Finland’s traditional archenemy. These characteristics however never as prominent during the war as they were in the non-socialistic newspapers. The condemnation of the system created by Stalin and its differentiation from the “real labour” ideology would continue as a theme of the labour newspapers for the Winter War and thereafter.

As was stated at the beginning, appropriate slogans and terms that portray an enemy as evil are easy to adopt and are a common theme of war-time propaganda. In the Winter War, the Soviet Union made this an easy task for the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus. The enemy who bombed civilians became “Ryssä” in the right wing and agrarian union newspapers from the beginning of the war. The spirit of defence was intensified by stating that “one Finn equals twenty ‘ryssä’”. The opinion-uniting influence of the war grew stronger in January 1940 when there were strongly worded articles and editorials about “ryssä” in all the newspapers. At that time, even Pohjolan Työ, an extreme leftist labour newspaper, headlined its news of bombings with the emotional statement “Nearly 7000 kg of bread dropped last week by “ryssä’s” flying devils on top of civilians.” At the same time, news reports according to which the Soviet Union frequently bombed hospitals, churches and ambulances transporting the wounded became more common. The slogan ”A red cross equals a bombing target in the enemy’s mind” was headlined in all newspapers and made headlines in foreign newspapers worldwide.

“The Land of Kolkhoz Slaves and Forced Labourers”

After December, analytical articles in newspapers often examined communism, the Russian people, leaders of the Soviet Union and Soviet society. In non-socialistic newspapers, in which the abolition of private property, kolkhozes, the banning of religion and the communistic doctrine had already been described prior the war as the greatest evil, it was possible to write these articles in an I-told-you-so-tone. The Soviet system was as rotten and violent as had always been said, although a lot more was written with specific details of oppression, dictatorship and misery. Much was also made of the discovery of the “slave camps” on the Kola Peninsula, the discovery of the many mass graves, particularly along the route of the White Sea Canal and especially of the murders and deportations of Karelian Finns within the Soviet Union that was now reported on in great and shocking detail. As one can imagine, reporting and discussion of these topics in the newspapers intensified the already strong will of defence. In principle, one can summarise the image of Soviet society in non-socialist newspapers with a statement that, for these newspapers, the Soviet Union was the land of kolkhoz slaves and forced labourers led by Stalin, a bloody dictator and a mass-murderer who exceeded the worst excesses of Genghis Khan.

There were some differences in the viewpoints stated. For example, newspapers of the Agrarian Union wrote for their readers explaining the misery in the kolkhozes and the shortages of food rather more than other newspapers did. Religious persecution was also a part enemy image spelled out by the Agrarian Union and right-wing newspapers’ as well as in the entire non-socialist press. The negative characteristics of the Russian workers was mostly written about in the right wing and the Agrarian Union’s newspapers, with the Russians described as, for example, “an uneducated horde”, “a horde of slaves without their own will”, and “eastern barbarians”. Differences of emphasis were found mainly in giving reasons for the evil actions of the Russians. For the extreme right, they were due to the Russian people’s inherent characteristics. When we move toward the centre, the view is expressed that the Russians eval actions resulted more from a lack of education and centuries of oppression. At first, the descriptions of liberal newspapers also included pity for the oppressed people of Russia. This pity disappeared completely as the war continued. For example newspapers of the Agrarian Union begun to write that the Russian people were themselves responsible for their own misery because they were unable to establish a better system. In this view, one can also see the effect of the nationalistic Finnish ideology emerging.

The leaders of the Soviet Union were criticized so strongly that in February 1940 censorship forbid the making of defamatory comments about Stalin as a person. The background to this prohibition were articles where Molotov was commonly described as “molottaa” (says stupid things). Stalin was described as “a despot and tyrant”, “a bloody dictator”, “Josef the Terrible”, the “Russians’ new God” or as the “old bank robber”, who in his lust for power had his people killed in abundance. The articles in the labour newspapers about the Soviet Union were rather more studied and analytical than those of the non-socialistic papers. The Russian people were also criticized rather less frequently than in the non-socialistic newspapers. This may have been because of the situation of Finland’s leftists after the Russian Revolution and the Civil War of 1918. In the early 1930s, extreme leftist workers still had idealised views of the Soviet Union. Although this image had started to crumble as a result of events occurring in the Soviet Union in the later 1930’s, images are generally long lived and one may assume they had not entirely disappeared in the late 1930s.

As the war went on, it became clear that Finnish workers were as strongly committed as any other Finn to defending their country on the frontlines, and that the Soviet propaganda had no effect on them. Regardless of this, or partly due to this, there was a desire in the labour newspapers to criticise conditions in the Soviet Union. It was certainly easier to influence those who possessed a right-wing way of thinking and shared an image of the Soviet Union as the enemy, even during peacetime, by appealing directly to their emotional image of Russia as the traditional enemy and an evil Communist state. Workers, for their part, were generally not receptive to this viewpoint and as a result, facts were emphasised in creating the image of the Russians as an enemy.

In January, February and March 1940, labour newspapers’ often long editorials presented more and more information of the enemy country’s condition based on accurate numbers. The labour newspapers described the Soviet Union’s shortage of housing, food and consumer goods, how much a Soviet worker was able to buy with his salary and how much he paid in taxes. And, above all, there were continual reminders that the rights of citizenship that all Finns enjoyed – such as the right to go on strike – were missing, conditions were generally miserable, and there was a lack of personal freedom in factories and kolkhozes. Much was also made of the horrors of the slave camps that had been uncovered, and the sufferings of innocent people who were guilty of no crimes. These newspapers constantly sought reasons why the revolution had developed in entirely the wrong direction. Stalin was most commonly presented as the guilty party. He was said to have changed the system created by Lenin into a violent dictatorship, which subsequently destroyed Lenin’s co-workers. This viewpoint was understandable because it left honorably intact the Finnish labour movement’s roots, which dated to the period of the Russian Revolution and, thus, it did not include elements that violated traditions. As the war continued, criticism was also focused on Lenin, who was now thought of as the founder of an extremist Soviet Union. Apparently the Workers were no longer offended by this and it was possible for the ideologies between Finnish socialists and non-socialists to draw closer.

”David and Goliath: the Image of the Red Army in the Finnish Press”

From the very first, the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus had put a great deal of thought and planning into how the Red Army as an enemy was to be portrayed, both in the Finnish Press and to foreign correspondents and the foreign media. There was of course a great concern that in any war with the Soviet Union, the Finnish military would be severely outnumbered with all the military resources of a major totalitarian state attacking the small Finnish military. Initial Finnish strategy was geared towards a strategically defensive war in which the Finns would be fighting against far larger forces. News releases from Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus would continually emphasise this, and also emphasise the need for assistance – of equipment, weapons, munitions and men. The Red Army’s skills and size would be continually mentioned, always in conjunction with the fact that the Finns were holding the line, undefeated, inflicting large losses on the Red Army in every battle. The continuing tactical successes of the Maavoimat in almost every action was downplayed, as were the astounding ratio of Red Army casualties to Maavoimat casualties.

Within the Finnish Press, there was an emphasis on the strong defensive fight being put up by the Finnish military. Within a few weeks however, events overwhelmed the ability of the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus to impose their own “spin” on the stories being published. The mid-December 1939 defensive victory at Tolvajärvi, the truly enormous losses inflicted on the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus, the limited but tactically highly successful counter-attack on the Isthmus of mid-December an the annihilation of the Soviet naval and marine force attempting to land near Petsamo were victories that the Finnish newspapers (and the foreign press) all emphasized. Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus was somewhat successful in ensuring that the Red Army’s mistakes and poor command were not emphasized, but with the stunning victories of January and February 1940 - especially the battles of Suomussalmi and Raate in early January, the slightly later capture of Murmansk and the rapid offensive in eastern Karelia that took the Maavoimat to the Syvari, Lake Onega and the White Sea, it was hard to portray the red Army’s military skills as anything other than sub-standard.

The emphasising of Finnish victories and the underestimation of the Red Army’s military skills was a view expressed in all Finnish newspapers, from late February on. Although Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus attempted to prevent newspapers from underestimating the enemy and overestimating Finnish victories, the right wing and the Agrarian Union’s newspapers and somewhat later all non-socialist newspapers were guilty of both. Many newspapers started to write that as a result of the war, the Soviet Union was more likely to collapse than Finland. When the situation of the time is taken into account, the description of the enemy’s poor military skills was discussed to some extent as an attempt to maintain the people’s will to fight, which may have been the real reason but was not really necessary. After all, Finland could not have been certain ar the beginning of the war that she was able to defend herself against a great power. The Soviet Union itself was prepared at most for a two-week war, which was a realistic assumption because nations such as Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland had either surrendered without a fight to Germany or they had collapsed instantly.

Furthermore, there was no certainty in Finland when the war started as to whether Finland’s own ranks would remain intact. In January, the situation was completely different - Finland had not just stopped a great power cold, but had also inflicted such severe casualties that the entire world looked on with admiration and wonder. As a result, instead of becoming divided, the cohesiveness of the Finns became ever stronger. An overreaction in the propaganda war was perhaps the result of this feeling of relief - Newspapers, including many of the major newspapers, reported that the Soviet military leaders had left their troops without supplies, did not take care of the wounded, had men killed left and right and, ultimately, sent them to attack at gun point. Therefore, it was possible to imply that the Red Army was close to collapsing.

The defensive propaganda of the early war took on more offensive tones as the Finnish strategic position strengthened. With the May 1940 offensive that took the Maavoimat back down the Karelian Isthmus to the outer suburbs of Leningrad, the tone of Finnish reporting became ever more strident – although in foreign newspapers the Battle of France, followed by the fall of France, virtually eliminated Finland and the Winter War from the headlines. But by then at least, the information war fought by Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus had been, for all intents and purposes, won. Large foreign volunteer contingents were in Finland, weapons and munitions had arrived or were en route, foreign support was assured and Finland was able to fight on, logistically secure. Many of the non-socialist newspapers held the optimistic view that the Soviet Union was going to lose the war and face societal collapse – despite the best efforts of the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus to rein in this over optimistic train of thought. Newspapers of the Agrarian Union and the right wing were the guiltiest of underestimating the Soviet Union. Newspapers of the labour class, in which the Red Army’s good equipment and training were occasionally described, were the least guilty of this underestimation. Even this late in the Winter War however, there was occasionally worry about underestimation of the Red Army – particularly in the Social Democratic newspapers, which feared that the underestimation would eventually prove costly by making foreign countries believe that Finland did not need any help and that the enormous resources of the Soviet Union remained a threat.

Therefore Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus continually reminded the media that it did not matter how wretched a Russian soldier may be and how badly he was led. Finland was dealing with a great power that had at its disposal unlimited reserves, as opposed to Finland’s small numbers. Despite this, the huge Soviet offensive of July 1940 that stretched along the entire front, from the White Sea to the Gulf of Finland, came as a shock to those who thought Finland on the verge of victory. Instead of victory and a negotiated peace, Finland was once more fighting desperately for survival and strict censorship had to be imposed to avert panic-stricken reporting of defeats and attacks made with overwhelming strength. In the event, despite the size of the attacks, the tactical skill of the Finnish military resulted in a series of annihilating victories over the Red Army. The Finnish newspaper reports of the time all exude a feeling of relief rather than of triumph – it was realized how narrow the margin had been, with victory the result of the skill and courage of every Finnish soldier – and newspaper reporting tended to reflect this rather clearly. The elation and sense of victory of a few weeks before had rapidly turned to incipient panic and then relief and a realization that getting out of this war was going to be just as much a strategic battle as winning the fighting so far had been.

At the same time as the Red Army attacked the Finns, Stalin had also decided to deal with the incipient problem of Estonia and a further massive offensive had simultaneously been launched against the Estonian armed forces. The five divisions of the Estonian Army together with the Estonian Air Force had put up a gallant resistance but found themselves driven back by sheer weight of numbers and firepower. The redoubt centered on Tallinn held out into late August 1940 but fell eventually - with a number of Estonian units fighting to the end to ensure as many civilians as possible could be evacuated to Finland. In this way, what amounted to personnel for two Divisions together with some 100,000 civilian refugees found themselves in Finland. This was reported with some sadness in the Finnish press - that the massive Red Army offensive that the Finns were facing precluded help from Finland being extended, other than from the Merivoimat, which carried out the evacuation from Tallinn under heavy fire (and later, from the islands of Osel and Moon). But it was only in the Finnish and Swedish Press that the situation of Estonia was reported extensively. In the rest of the world, a paragraph here and there was all that Estonia received. She would be forgotten for the next four years by all but the Finns.

The creation of the enemy image had succeeded rather too well

As a whole, Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus succeeded in its two-fold task of (1) influencing Finnish public opinion and maintaining the nation’s will to fight and (2) influencing foreign public opinion to generate support for Finland (which we will examine in the next Post).

Looking at Finnish public opinion, success was absolute - throughout the entire Winter War and thereafter, everybody in Finland felt that there was no alternative to fighting. Therefore, the readiness of the newspapers to maintain and support a “spirit of defence” existed across the entire political spectrum from the start. When we examine the image created of the Soviet Union, both the non-socialist and labour newspapers’ image of the Soviet Union was that Finland was dealing with a barbaric enemy. If the Soviet Union won, the enemy would not only conquer the country militarily, but would also destroy Finnish society, culture, religion and eventually the nation in its entirity. Each group of newspapers emphasised issues central to its own worldview. Therefore, details of the enemy image varied according to which issues were considered the most important in its own ideology. In point of fact however, the image became increasingly uniform as a result of the war and by the end of the war, those views that were originally held only by the right wing were adopted also across all other Finnish newspapers.

The image of military skill clearly shows how difficult it was to erase the self-admiration and, in reversal, the underestimation of the Russian enemy that emerged in January and February of 1940. The inferior enemy soldier as an archetype was created in Finnish newspapers without caution following the startlingly one-sided victories of the winter months. Thus when the major Red Army offensive of July 1940 burst against the Finnish defences, newspapers had succeeded too well in the creation of the image of the unskilled enemy and both the soldiers on the frontlines and the civilians at home were shocked at the resurgent strength of the Red Army. The attack began with a massive and successful Red Army crossing of the Syvari in late July, while a coordinated attack on the Karelian Isthmus was timed to coincide with the Syvari offensive. Initially threatening gains were made against the greatly outnumbered Maavoimat. Within a week, the Maavoimat had recovered and launched a four-day counter-offensive, driving the Red Army forces on the Isthmus back past their starting point. Stalin ordered Timoshenko to continue the offensive across the Syvari, but after initial deep penetrations, further attacks were decisively defeated; after which the Maavoimat counterattacked at the seam between two Red Army groups, crossed the Syvari, and advanced southward and westward towards Leningrad in over a week of heavy fighting while inflicting enormous casualties. At the same time the Ilmavoimat launched wave after wave of strikes against Red Army, Soviet Air Force and infrastructure targets, flying a higher sortie rate than at any other time except the early weeks of the Winter War.

For months the Finnish newspapers had described the enemy as militaristically extremely incompetent, its leaders as tormentors of their own people, its society as being on the brink of collapse, and its people as a mere mob afraid of the dictator. So the Finns were not psychologically prepared for the Red Army’s July offensive. Newspapers, and through them, their readers were themselves prisoners of an image of an incompetent enemy created for domestic use – and, it must be admitted, based on the early months the Red Army was incompetently led and trained, but by late summer 1940 major improvements in the enemy could be seen and this was reflected in a substantially more cautious viewpoint in the media from August 1940 on. Thus, the destruction of the Kremlin and with it a large proportion of the Politburo in the Ilmavoimat strike of September 1940 was not greeted with the elation that earlier victories had resulted in. The response was rather one of caution – would this attack merely spur the Russian monster into a renewed fury, or would it, as Mannerheim gambled, result in a new leadership and hopes of a peaceful conclusion to a war that, for Finland, could at best be a draw.

We now know the end result – the triumvirate that succeeded Stalin negotiated a peace agreement with Finland, one that satisfied neither completely but was at least tolerable. There were concessions made on both sides, and later, due to the extreme secrecy under which the talks were conducted, there would be much criticism in Finland of the Peace Treaty. The common view was that Finland had won victory after victory and suffered tremendous casualties in a war that the Soviet Union had started – and had won very little from her victories. In addition, a deep and abiding hatred of the Russians permeated Finnish society from top to bottom. Therefore, the terms for peace became upsetting news for the whole nation. It was for this reason that Marshall Mannerheim presented the terms of the peace agreement to the people of Finland. As Finland’s military commander, the architect of victory, he was the most trusted person in Finland and it was certain that every Finn would heed his voice. As indeed they did.

This did not mean the people of Finland were happy with the terms of the Peace Treaty. In this, Finland had succeeded too well in her creation of the enemy image which had at first been far from uniform. But by the end of the Winter War, there was a common view shared throughout Finnish society that Russia was indeed the historic enemy, an evil empire, the Red Army were indeed “hounds from the steppe”. And thus, while a peace agreement had been signed, the Finnish newspapers were united as one in agreeing that Finland must remain on guard, her armed forces strong, ready to again protect Finland in a world at war.

Raja railona aukeaa (Like a chasm runs the border)
Edessä Aasia, Itä. (In front, Asia, the East)
Takana Länttä ja Eurooppaa; (Behind, Europe, the West)
varjelen, vartija, sitä. (Like a sentry, I stand guard)


The above is based largely on http://herkules.oulu.fi/isbn9514266331/html/t857.html (Image Research and the Enemy Image: The Soviet Union in Finnish Newspapers during the Winter War (November 30, 1939 – March 13, 1940 by Sinikka Wunsch, Oulun Yliopisto) but adapted for this ATL.
 
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Hello, a great piece of text once again

Judging from the poem, I'm quite amazed how good Google Translator is (I presume you used it?) in finnish. Still there are some parts that don't quite sound right, and I have put the ones I think sound more correct there.


Öinen, ulvova tuuli tuo (Night brings the howling wind) Nocturnal, howling wind brings
Rajan takaa lunta. (Snow from across the border)
— Isäni, äitini, Herra, suo (Lord, let my mother and father)
Nukkua tyyntä unta! (Sleep, calmly dreaming!)




Mut isät harmaat haudoistaan (The gray fathers rise from their graves) But the grey fathers from their graves
aaveratsuilla ajaa: (Phantom steeds ride) Rides phantom steeds
karhunkeihäitä kourissaan (with bear spears in their hands)
syöksyvät kohti raja (Rushing to the border)
Anyways, keep up the great work, unfortunately I can't read this piece more thorough as I must go to study for my swedish test.
 
Hello, a great piece of text once again

Judging from the poem, I'm quite amazed how good Google Translator is (I presume you used it?) in finnish. Still there are some parts that don't quite sound right, and I have put the ones I think sound more correct there.


Anyways, keep up the great work, unfortunately I can't read this piece more thorough as I must go to study for my swedish test.

Kiitos Vepe, corrected my text a bit based on those comments of yours. And sadly, no, Google translate is not that good. I roughed about half of it out with google translate, got stuck here and there and then got a lot of help over at the axishistory forum from some of the Finnish members - there were about three major revisions and a lot of commentary to get it that good. But I think its a pretty good translation now - certainly has the right feel to it.

Good luck with the Swedish test :D
 
This time the allies wont let the Russians pull half the shit they did in OTL. The ruszki's image is truly wrecked.

No kidding! Wait until the Winter War when the Finns capture the camps and find the bodies - got a few choice photos for that one. All to real, unfortunately. Not forgetting, this was at the time that France and Britain viewed the USSR as an ally of Germany. And the Comintern was telling Communists in France and the UK not to fight Germany.
 
Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus and the influencing of opinion

Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus and the influencing of foreign public and Governmental opinion to generate support for Finland

When we examine the impact of the news media in influencing public opinion and foreign Governmental agendas, it is important to identify that there were differing objectives at work. For Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus, the key objective was to sway foreign Governments into supporting Finland through volunteers and material support, preferably of war materials. This was to be achieved in a number of ways – one of which was to exert influence and sway foreign public opinion through the aegis of the foreign correspondents in Finland. This public opinion then needed to be utilized to create actual pressure and exert influence on foreign governments in order to ensure that deeds matched the words of support uttered. In this, it is also important to understand that where foreign governments supported Finland materially, either through permitting or supporting volunteers and/or through the sale or donation of war materials, these foreign governments largely did so for their own national and political purposes.

This of course was a facet of the “Tietoasota” - the “Information War” - that Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus had planned and prepared for, even if it came as a surprise to many Finnish politicians. The planners of Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus were well aware of Lord Palmerston’s old adage as it related to Britain, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow”. The challenge for Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus was in ensuring that foreign governments believed that their interests would best be served by aiding Finland with material support. Within the western democracies, this was largely achieved by the generation of public support for Finland, which was rapidly translated into pressure on governments by support groups founded by “concerned citizens.” In many cases these support groups were initially founded by local Finnish immigrants and then expanded through prominent public figures who were willing to lend their name and their time to the cause of supporting Finland – men such as former President Herbert Hoover in the United States and Colonel Eric Campbell together with Dr. Lewis W. Nott in Australia.

In other countries, economic factors came into play. Italy being a prime example, where a surge of public opinion in support of Finland enabled Mussolini to boost his popularity by supporting Finland whilst at the same time earning significant amounts of foreign exchange in return for the sales of Italian military equipment and munitions (Italy would supply large amounts of military equipment to Finland through the early months of the Winter War). Likewise Britain, whilst supporting Finland for her own reasons (and at the same time assuaging British public opinion) charged a high price for the military equipment that she did sell to Finland. The USA was another case in point, as we will see when we come to consider US assistance to Finland in detail in a subsequent post. On the outbreak of hostilities between the USSR and Finland, the US restricted sales of military supplies to a cash on the barrel basis. In point of fact, very very few countries actually “donated” war material outright to Finland. Those that did were generally small countries with emotional ties to Finland such as Hungary, or smaller democracies such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa who did so for almost purely altruistic reasons.

As has been mentioned occasionally, by the late 1930’s, Finland was a major exporter of lumber and forestry products as well as a source for metals – Nickel, Copper and Steel in particular. The country had a sold financial reputation and had built up significant gold reserves over the period between 1934 and 1939. Trade links were well-established with a wide range of countries and Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus had also taken account of this in their planning. When Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus was mobilized as the threat of war loomed (and they were one of the first units which were), operational plans dictated that teams of Rintatiedotusupseeri (Information Officers) be dispatched to each of the Embassies and Consulates that Finland maintained abroad, in conjunction with Ministry of Defence Purchasing and Logistics Officers whose task was to negotiate the purchase and shipping of whatever military equipment could be procured on an urgent (and later, on an ongoing, basis). In the event, these Information & Purchasing Teams would remain stationed where they had been dispatched to for the duration of WW2, many of the personnel returning to Finland only in 1945 and 1946. They would never be large teams, but they would prove to be very effective indeed (as a note of interest, a small number of Osastu Karhu operatives would be inserted with each of the Information Teams to augment Osastu Karhu teams already in place).

And here we will do a quick aside on Osastu Karhu, although we will also look at this unit and its background in considerably more detail when we come to look at Finnish Special Forces units of the Winter War.

“Speak not the name of the Bear”

Perhaps the least known of the Finnish Special Forces units was the highly secretive Osasto Karhu (or Bear Force) – a name deliberately chosen for its many connotations. The symbolic role and position of the bear is very prominent in many of the world's cultures and peoples, but none more so than in Finnish mythology and folklore where the bear has a special place as the most sacred of animals, generally only referred to by euphemisms. Prior to the influence of Christianity, the bear was an integral part of religious practices, rites and ceremonies, including the ancient religious practice of bear worship.

While the bear held a feared and sacred status with the people, it was also hunted and killed. If a man killed a bear, this was regarded as both a sign of status and prestige within the community. The killing of a bear was followed by a great feast, Karhunpeijaiset (the Celebration of the Bear) where the bear was "sacrificed" as part of the ceremony, and was honored at this sacred banquet. A substantial part of the celebrations consisted of demonstrating the high level of respect and profound esteem with which the bear's spirit was held by the people, thus convincing the bear's spirit that it had died accidentally and hadn't been murdered. After the feast, the bear's skull, which was thought to embody the soul of the bear, was attached high up on a pine tree, called a kallohonka, so that the bear’s spirit would be released back to the sky from where it originated, and then return to the earth and to the forest. In Finnish, the word for bear is karhun, or "king of the forest". Because the bear was considered such a sacred animal, the ancient Finns were very careful, reticent, and even unwilling to orally verbalize and refer to the bear "spirit" directly in speech. There is an ominous and foreboding element to the folklore of the bear; the bear "spirit" might be referred to as "friend", but among many etymological substitutes for the word "bear" in the culture were such names as mesikämmen, or "honeypaws." Today, the bear is designated as Finland’s national animal.

At the time then, Osasto Karhu seemed a fitting name for the most secretive of the secret Finnish direct action units – and Osasto Karhu was certainly a unit which would never be directly spoken of. Even now, no official information has ever been released on this unit or its activities, although a small number of books have been published documenting the accounts of surviving members and their activities in the Winter War and WW2. Indeed, such is the continuing deep cover of this covert action unit than at the current time, the Finnish Police anti-terrorist unit is named Osasto Karhu, further muddying and confusing the waters with regard to the history of this unit.

Osastu Karhu had its origins in the Finnish Security Service (Suojelupoliisi / Skyddspolisen, abbreviated as SUPO). SUPO had been established in 1935 as a Department of the Etsivä Keskuspoliisi (Police Investigation Service or EK), itself first established in 1919. While the activities of EK were fairly well known, if little publicized, the establishment and operations of the Suojelupoliisi were kept completely secret. The Branch’s activities were intended to be external to Finland and were focused on two areas - espionage and, in times of war, “direct-action” missions. Espionage activities were low-key, there was no large budget for spying but small teams, sometimes only a single individual, were maintained overseas in key locations, largely to monitor Soviet economic activity and NKVD activity emanating from Soviet embassies and trade missions. In general, despite the small size of the operation, SUPO were very professional and had developed their own expertise without reference to other countries, and thus were largely unknown to the intelligence operations of the major powers, including the USSR and Germany. The information garnered by these units would in fact be key to the numerous and highly damaging attacks carried out on Soviet merchant shipping outside of the Baltic by Osasto Karhu units over the course of the Winter War. This information was also used to carry out assassinations world-wide of key personnel in Soviet Trade Missions and Soviet Front Companies who suffered numerous “accidental deaths” within a few days of the start of the Winter War.

riekkiesko.jpg

Image sourced from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... i_Esko.jpg
Esko Riekki, Head of the Secret Police of Finland (Etsivä Keskuspoliisi = EK) from 1923-1948. Riekki was described as “efficient, tireless and skilful but …. also ruthless in an indiscriminate way. … He was later considered to be guilty of many excesses during his career.” Riekki was the inspiration and guiding hand behind the formation of Osastu Karhu and while not involved in the details of selection, training or operations, he supplied the ethos of ruthless direct action that was to be the Unit’s trademark. Soviet activities outside the USSR during the Winter War were severely curtailed by Osastu Karhu, so to were the activities of those trading with or actively supporting the Soviet Union, often in an abrupt and brutally terminal fashion.

SUPO also kept as close a watch as was possible on American, British and European companies dealing with the USSR, particularly those with military implications such as the Ford assembly plant outside Nizhni Novgorod (renamed Gorky in 1932) that opened in 1931. In this, the Finns had some cause for real concern. The general design and supervision of construction, and much of the supply of equipment for the gigantic plants built in the USSR between 1929 and 1933 was provided by Albert Kahn, Inc., of Detroit, then the most famous of U.S. industrial architectural firms. No large construction program in the Soviet Union in those years was without foreign technical assistance, and because Soviet machine tool production then was limited to the most elementary types, all production equipment in these plants was foreign.

handlerx.jpg

Image sourced from: http://preservedtanks.com/Handler.ashx? ... 435&Size=E
In May 1929 the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the Ford Motor Company. Under its terms, the Soviets agreed to purchase $13 million worth of automobiles and parts, while Ford agreed to give technical assistance until 1938 to construct an integrated automobile-manufacturing plant at Nizhny Novgorod. Production started in January 1, 1932, and the factory and marque was titled Nizhegorodsky Avtomobilny Zavod, or NAZ, but also displayed the "Ford" sign. GAZ's first vehicle was the medium-priced Ford Model A, sold as the NAZ-A, and a light truck, the Ford Model AA (NAZ-AA). NAZ-A production commenced in 1932 and lasted until 1936, during which time over 100,000 examples were built. In 1933, the factory's name changed to Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod, or GAZ, when the city was renamed after Maxim Gorky; similarly, models were renamed GAZ-A and GAZ-AA.

As an example, during its six years of existence between 1920 and 1927, the The All-Russian Co-operative Society (Arcos) based in the UK did approximately £100,000,000 in trade between Britain and Soviet Russia. Soviet sources indicate that 300,000 high-quality foreign machine tools were imported between 1929 and 1940. These machine tools were supplemented by complete industrial plants: for example, the Soviet Union received three tractor plants (which also doubled as tank producers), two giant machine-building plants (Kramatorsk and Uralmash), three major automobile plants, numerous oil refining units, aircraft plants, and tube mills. In sectors such as oil refining and aircraft, where further construction was undertaken at the end of the decade, we find a dozen top U.S. companies (McKee, Lummus, Universal Oil Products, etc.) aiding in the oil-refining sector and other top U.S. aircraft builders aiding in the development of the Soviet aircraft sector (Douglas, Vultee, Curtiss-Wright, etc.).

In the years 1917-20 a variant of the modern "bridge-building" argument was influential within policymaking circles. The Bolsheviks were outlaws, so the argument went, and had to be brought into the civilized world. For example, in 1918 a statement by Edwin Gay, a member of the U.S. War Trade Board and former Dean of the Harvard Business School, was paraphrased in the board minutes as follows: “Mr. Gay stated the opinion that it was doubtful whether the policy of blockade and economic isolation of these portions of Russia which were under Bolshevik control was the best policy for bringing about the establishment of a stable and proper Government in Russia. Mr. Gay suggested to the [War Trade] Board that if the people in the Bolshevik sections of Russia were given the opportunity to enjoy improved economic conditions, they would themselves bring about the establishment of a moderate and stable social order.”

At about the same time American businessmen were instrumental in aiding the formulation of the Soviet Bureau, and several hundred firms had their names on file in the bureau when it was raided in 1918. Hence there was Western business pressure through political channels to establish trade with the Soviet Union. Then as now, no one appears to have foreseen the possibility of creating a powerful and threatening enemy to the Free World. There was widespread criticism of the Bolsheviks, but this was not allowed to interfere with trade. In sum, there was no argument made against technical transfers while several influential political and business forces were working actively to open up trade and this continued through the 1920’s and 1930’s. There was nothing Finland could do about this and indeed, Finnish firms and the Finnish Government were as eager to trade with the USSR as anyone – the Oil Barter agreement of the mid-1930’s was evidence for this, if any was needed. Many in the Finnish Government saw trade with the Soviet Union as indeed a way of “building bridges” and “building partnerships.” These delusions would be corrected, in Finland for a short period at least, although they would continue to maintain themselves elsewhere.

However from a military perspective, SUPO was tasked with monitoring the implications of Soviet industrial development as well as of imports into the Soviet Union and this they did very effectively, using their sources and contacts to elicit details on western-built plants and their capabilities. Beyond monitoring, no further action was carried out – but at the start of the Winter War, SUPO had very very accurate and up to date knowledge of firms exporting to the Soviet Union, what they were exporting, key factories and their locations and layouts in the Soviet Union, Soviet merchant shipping in use and the like. This information was of course made available to the direct-action branch of SUPO as well as to the military planners on an ongoing basis.

Within SUPO, the “direct-action” missions were the responsibility of the secretive unit within the Branch named “Osasto Karhu” (Bear Force), a unit so little-known and so well-disguised that even today much that is written about this unit and its activities in the Winter War and in WW2 is surmise and conjecture – and much of that surmise and conjecture is confused with the operations of Osastu Nyrkki (Fist Force), the elite behind-the-lines direct action unit of the General Headquarters. Osastu Karhu itself drew its men largely from the elite units of the Maavoimat – including from Osastu Nyrkki - and the selection process was as secretive as the unit. Men would be assessed, security checks performed and then would come a quiet approach and a rather obliquely phrased request by a senior officer as to whether they would be interested in serving Finland in a “special way.” Men were never able to apply for this unit - you were invited only if they thought you were good enough.

Once potential candidates for the unit accepted the invitation, they went through a rigorous selection process, still without being told about the unit. Only if they passed selection would they be told of the unit and its mission. At this stage they would disappear from their units – not for nothing did the men of Osasto Karhu refer to themselves as the Armeijayön ja Usva. Once admitted, they received further training in infiltration techniques, deep reconnaissance, signals intelligence, foreign language skills, how to pass as a citizen of a foreign country, professional driving, boat-handling, swimming, close quarter fighting, knife fighting, pistol shooting, unarmed combat, assassination techniques, forgery, sniping, explosives and demolition, sabotage, etc. The men of Osastu Karhu were organised into small operational detachments, usually of ten or less men, as well as small support detachments. With the ever-present focus on the Soviet Union as a threat, their chief objective was to determine how to respond to an attack from the Soviet Union in unexpected ways that would deeply hurt the Soviets. As we will see when we come to look at the Winter War, they would more than succeed in this goal.

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Image sourced from: http://karhunvartijat.net/ryhmat/up_kuvat/miekka01.jpg

However, the unit’s first real success had been a “black operation” carried out as far back as the Spanish Civil War. In October 1936, the Spanish Republicans had secretly shipped four hundred tons of gold reserves from Cartagena to the Soviet Union in the face of Franco's advancing army, with the agreement that part of it would stay in Moscow to pay for Soviet aid. In May 1936, shortly before the start of the Civil War, the Spanish gold reserves had been recorded as being the fourth largest in the world. They had been accumulated primarily during World War I, in which Spain had remained neutral. The reserves constituted mostly Spanish and foreign coins - the amount of actual gold bullion was insignificant, as the reserves included only 64 ingots. The value of the reserves was noted at the time by various official publications. The New York Times reported on August 7, 1936, that the Spanish gold reserves in Madrid were worth 718 million U.S. dollars, corresponding to 635 tonnes of fine gold.

The legality of the gold transfer to Moscow by the Republicans has been hotly debated – suffice it to say that it took place. On September 13, 1936, a confidential decree from the Ministry of Finance which authorized the transportation of the gold reserves of the Bank of Spain was signed, on the initiative of Minister of Finance of the time, Juan Negrín. Less than 24 hours after the signing of the decree, on the morning of September 14, 1936, members of the Spanish Carabineers and various militiamen, sent by the Ministry of Finance, walked into the Bank of Spain. The appropriation operation was led by the Treasury Director-General and future Minister of Finance under the government of Juan Negrín, Francisco Méndez Aspe. He was accompanied by Captain Julio López Masegosa and 50 or 60 metallurgists and locksmiths. The vaults where the reserves were kept were opened, and over a number of days, Government agents extracted all the gold. The gold was placed in wooden boxes, and transported in trucks to the Atocha railway station, from where it was then transported to Cartagena.

The city of Cartagena was chosen because, in the words of historian Angel Viñas, "it was an important naval station, adequately supplied and defended, somewhat distanced from the theatre of military operations and from which the possibility of transporting the reserves through a maritime route somewhere else was available.” The gold was heavily escorted and was transported via railway, according to witnesses of the events. A few days after the extraction of the gold from the Bank of Spain, Bank functionaries retrieved the Bank's silver, valued at approximately 20 million U.S. dollars at the time. On October 15, Negrín and Largo Caballero decided to transfer the gold from Cartagena to Russia. On October 20, the director of the NKVD in Spain, Alexander Orlov, received a ciphered telegram from Stalin, ordering him to organize the shipment of the gold to the USSR. Orlov agreed on the preparations with Negrín. Orlov responded that he would carry out the operation with the Soviet cargo ships that had just arrived in Spain. On October 22, 1936, Francisco Méndez Aspe, Director-General of the Treasury and Negrín's "right hand man”, came to Cartagena and ordered the nocturnal extraction of the majority of the gold-containing boxes, of an approximate weight of seventy-five kilograms each, which were transported in trucks and loaded onto the vessels Kine, Kursk, Neva and Volgoles.

The gold took three nights to be loaded, and on October 25 the four vessels set out en route to Odessa, a Soviet port in the Black Sea. Four Spaniards who were charged with guarding the keys to the security vaults of the Bank of Spain accompanied the expedition. Out of the 10,000 boxes, corresponding to approximately 560 tonnes of gold, only 7,800 were taken to Odessa, corresponding to 510 tonnes. Orlov declared that 7,900 boxes of gold were transported, while Méndez Aspe stated there were only 7,800. The final receipt showed 7,800, and it has not been known whether Orlov's declaration was an error or if the 100 boxes of gold disappeared. What is now known is that a small Osasto Karhu team was in Cartagena, primarily to track Soviet activities and had become aware through their own observations of the activities of the Soviet ships that clandestine loading activity was taking place. Applying their training in clandestine action in a most practical way, the Osasto Karhu team had managed to slip away with 100 boxes – which they later found to contain 75kgs of gold per box. How they achieved this was never spelt out in detail but “some Russians died.” Smuggled out of Spain, the gold proved a useful addition to Osasto Karhu finances – “and it was a good training exercise” one the participants is recorded as saying.

As with almost all the Finnish military, Osasto Karhu maintained only a small cadre of permanent personnel, although joining the unit required considerable dedication and commitment of personal time. A very small number of overseas Finns had also been recruited into the unit, although almost always as a source of intelligence and support, rather than as direct action operatives. A small unit, at the start of the Winter War Osasto Karhu consisted of around 500 men – operating in some 35 units of between 10 and 15 men each. The unit was mobilized early in early summer 1939 as a precautionary measure and began operational planning and intense refresher training immediately. Dispersal of the unit to overseas postings began almost immediately, some of the teams shipping out disguised as crew on Finnish owned and operated cargo ships, In this, the large Finnish merchant marine proved useful, as the ships also permitted the concealed carriage of weapons, explosives and equipment. Others were inserted, as mentioned, as part of the Information Teams being sent to embassies and consulates.

As mentioned, we’ll go on to look at Osasto Karhu in detail in a subsequent post. Suffice it to say for now that many Osastu Karhu operatives were inserted via the Information & Purchasing Teams.

Next Post: Returning now to the dispatch of the Information & Purchasing Teams overseas
 
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Returning now to the dispatch of the Information & Purchasing Teams overseas

Returning now to the dispatch of the Information & Purchasing Teams overseas

While Finland had a limited number of embassies and consulates abroad in 1939 (there were 20 Finnish embassies, of which four were outside Europe, and an additional six consulates), these were all limited in their effectiveness and in the work they could carry out by small staff numbers (in 1935 the Foreign Ministry had a staff of 77, while missions abroad employed only slightly more than 100 people). Finnish missions were in place in Argentina (Buenos Aires), Australia (Sydney), Belgium (Brussels), Britain (London), Canada (Ottawa), Czechoslovakia (Prague), Denmark (Copenhagen), Estonia (Tallinn), France (Paris), Germany (Berlin), Hungary (Budapest), Italy (Rome), Japan (Tokyo), Latvia (Riga), Lithuania, Norway (Oslo), Poland (Warsaw), Romania (Bucharest), Spain (Madrid), Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland (Berne), the USA (Washington DC and New York), the USSR (Moscow) and Yugoslavia (Belgrade),

Public Relations work in embassies and consulates prior to the Winter War had been largely improvised, with ambassadors given pretty much a free hand. Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus had planned and out together a war-information training program for diplomatic personnel but in mid-1939, this had largely not been implemented. Appointment of diplomatic personnel took place at infrequent intervals and with substantial travel times and costs involved in returning personnel to Finland, this training was not at the time a high priority. Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus war plans made provision for the immediate dispatch of Information Teams to each of the overseas diplomatic posts if war seemed imminent, with the size of the teams roughly correlated to their likely importance to the Finnish war effort. (This in fact meant that the largest teams were dispatched to Stockholm, Oslo, Washington DC, London, Paris, Berlin and Rome – to these locations also went senior Finnish politicians or military personnel with “connections” that could be utilised).

When the Information Teams arrived in-country, their first task was to confirm target audiences and carry out a systematic consideration of what should be the shape of information activity and operations for each country. The general concept was that in the event of war with the USSR, public relations and lobbying should not be carried out on an ad-hoc basis, but should be on a soundly planned footing, with specific objectives. Ground-work was started almost immediately teams arrived in-country, and in this the relationships that had been cultivated by the existing diplomatic personnel were critical, as were business relationships and past contacts. Thus, the initial arrivals of the Information Teams at each post saw a flurry of diplomatic, business, political and social contacts, not something that the Finnish diplomatic missions were generally noted for.

One can observe several parallel activities underway from July 1939 on: the commissioning of articles in foreign newspapers and publications, contacts with local journalists and politicians, contacts with commercial firms with whom Finnish companies did business, contacts with Finnish immigrant groups and societies, the immediate cultivation of “influential” local citizens who it could be anticipated would support Finland in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. The “progressive” nature of the trade union and social welfare situation in Finland was also utilized to make contacts with Unions and workers organizations whilst the Social Democrat Party’s links, however tenuous, with other socialist parties were used to build “political” relationships. The presence within each of the Information Teams of two or three Finnish politicians (inevitably minor players within Finnish politics) representing the various flavours of Finnish politics enabled the teams to start building a relationship with similarly minded political parties in the democracies. Conversely, in Italy the right-wing Finnish political party which had already-close ties with Mussolini’s regime, the IKL, were utilized with considerable success. In Spain, ties that had been established informally during the Spanish Civil War were brought into play.

The major disappointment was in Berlin. Germany was a country with which Finland had long had close ties, economically and militarily as well as political. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had been an unwelcome introduction to German Realpolitiks and the Finnish representatives in Berlin worked furiously to determine what was happening. Finland had already been leaked the secret protocols regarding the Baltic States & Finland, both from the USA and from German sources who strongly disagreed. The messages received were conflicted, but what it seemed to boil down to was that Hitler had a working arrangement with Stalin and while Finland could expect no official help from Germany, discreet unofficial assistance could be arranged, and in this “unofficial assistance” Goering seemed to be Finland’s biggest asset. As we will see, some unofficial German assistance would indeed be forthcoming, until events escalated the tensions between Finland and Germany to a point where even Goering would no longer lend his protection to any such schemes.

The Information Teams at the foreign diplomatic posts went into overdrive in the short time they had available before the war actually broke out. Articles in newspapers, journals and periodicals were printed, bought, commissioned, suggested, or supported in several ways. Publications directly written by Information Team (mostly previously prepared and then rapidly adapted in the spot) writers were spread through the embassy connections. Direct commissioning of foreign authors in order to produce articles seemingly free of official propaganda took place also. In many cases this was achieved through utilizing writers with sympathetic views towards Finland (this became rather more prevalent after the Winter War actually broke out). In France for instance, the Information Teams had to cater to the voracious appetites of a notoriously venal daily press and additional funding was provided for this. Ambassadors and Consuls acted through their networks of contacts, while whatever Finnish organizations, or organizations that might be sympathetic to Finland, were contacted and assistance asked for. In many of the countries, it was possible to put in place the groundwork for “Support Finland” organizations. As a result, most of the immediate pre-war publicity regarding Finland dovetailed nicely into the image of Finland that Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus wanted to spread.

After the USSR actually attacked Finland, the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus publicity campaign stepped into high gear, with remarkable results. The Winter War dominated headlines worldwide (although the lack of news from the “Phony War” also helped in this). Support organizations sprang into being seemingly overnight, the in-country Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus Information Teams provided guidance, assistance and speakers. Country-specific campaigns sprang into being – to raise funds for Finland, to exert pressure on the Government to send aid, unions and churches spoke out against the aggression of the USSR, large public gatherings took place where speeches supported Finland, the Finnish Ambassadors initiated urgent meetings with Government Ministers and Prime Ministers while the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus Information Teams ensured there were in all the local newspapers together with demands for support of Finland. All in all, the campaign was better organized and run than many political or advertising campaigns, and the results were, as we will see, surpassingly effective in raising local support and turning this into effective influence for Finland’s benefit..

In the following posts, we will look at the impact that the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus Information Teams had in a number of countries from which volunteers were dispatched and from which assistance was provided, most notably the USA and Australia (countries for which more historical information in available than others. We know for example, that there was large scale support for Finland in Hungary, with much fund-raising activity, but unfortunately very little information on this survived WW2 and the post-war Communist government. This unfortunately precludes using Hungary as an example).

On the outbreak of the Winter War, the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus Information Teams also encouraged foreign correspondents and politicians of influence to visit Finland. Given the distances and travel time involved, it goes without saying that these were from journalists and politicians / diplomats from, or already in, Europe and North America. Every assistance was given to these “foreigners of importance” to reach Finland, down to ensuring priority seating on the Finnish airline flights from America, London, Berlin, Oslo and Stockholm. The first day of the war in Finland saw about fifty additional foreign journalists arrive to join those few that were already in the country. Many more arrived within the next few days. Most expected a situation similar to Poland, with Finnish resistance to collapse within a few days, perhaps a few weeks at best. None expected the Finnish military to put up the fight that they did.

“Foreign guests” were free to meet whomever they pleased, but they were also largely dependent on their hosts, and many were all too happy to have their traveling organized for them. Certainly none expected the expert handling and facilitation that they received from the Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto – who, as well as running the Press Centre at the Hotel Kämp as the central coordination point, had established ancillary Press Centres in Viipuri, Oulu and in the north, at Rovaniemi. Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto also organized and provided accommodation and on arrival, assigned each foreign war correspondent a personal “minder” from the pool of Tiedotusupseeri (Information Officers) whose task was to assist and “guide” the war correspondents. The results of this were not to the dislike of the Finns, and the articles of almost all the correspondents dovetailed nicely into the image of Finland and to the overall “story” that the Valtioneuvoston Tiedotuskeskus and Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto wanted to spread.

The reportage brought back by the photographer Therese Bonney for instance (who had arrived in Helsinki shortly before the Winter War broke out), was a mix of things obviously arranged for her (meeting Jean Sibelius, Väinö Aaltonen, being shown around Helsinki, the Finnish army, the construction of the Olympic stadium, model sanatorium and sports facilities in Tuusula, etc) and things that every Frenchman would have instinctively associated with Finland (hard-working women, saunas, nature, etc). There is an obvious correspondence involved in these immediate pre-war articles between what the foreigner wanted to find and the way their Finnish chaperons tried to show the best of the country. After the Winter War broke out, the immediate focus of the foreign correspondents was of course the war itself. As mentioned, most correspondents had expected Finland to fall quickly and it was only after the War had been underway for a few days, with heavy fighting and strong resistance reported by those already there, that the major news media organizations began to send out correspondents, including thirty from Britain alone.

The fact that the conflict took place in a time when news agencies had invested in wide networks of war correspondents but other fronts were rather quiet was an added reason for the attention. Correspondents were fascinated by many different aspects of the war – the huge imbalance of forces, the skilled and stubborn resistance of the Finns, the obvious commitment of every Finn to the fight, the unbelievably one-sided casualties in the early battles. Correspondents were also fascinated by the arctic aspect of the war. The snow, the cold climate and soldiers on skis wearing white camouflage made for a novel and exotic experience. Many correspondents chose to cover the battles in Lapland, although the decisive struggle was being fought on the Karelian Isthmus, in the southeastern part of Finland. These war correspondents showed a genuine interest in the turn of events, and the skilful assignment of untypically talkative Tiedotusupseeri appointed to work with the foreign correspondents assisted in engaged many of the war correspondents strongly at an emotional level.

As has been mentioned, the Tiedotusupseeri appointed to work with the foreign press had a remarkably fluid role and great care was taken to appoint personnel with the characteristics necessary to work comfortably with foreigners whilst at the same time ensuring that information of military importance was not included. As such, Tiedotusupseeri tended to be rather less taciturn than the norm, and included a large number of women, all of whom had to have completed military training and special courses on how to identify and deal with militarily significant information. They also needed to ensure that the image conveyed was that which the Finnish military wished to be conveyed in the event of a war. It was stressed to “minders” that manipulation of the media should not be overt but carried out subtly, as much as possible by letting the “facts” speak for themselves. After the war actually started, the Soviets assisted this effort almost as if they were working to the same plan as the Finns – the random bombings of Helsinki and other cities in the early days of the war, with numerous civilian casualties and buildings destroyed and in flames, was fodder for the foreign journalists, many of whom had seen similar death and destruction unleashed in Spain and had written furiously and passionately on this topic then.

The Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto was well aware of this from their own analysis of the Spanish Civil War and used this to advantage from the start, ensuring that foreign correspondents were informed of the bombing of civilian targets, and organizing trips for the journalists, giving them opportunities to discover the damage and interview affected civilians. The impression of a total war being carried out, with all of Finland’s people, both military and civilian, under attack from a ruthless USSR whose tactics echoed those of the Fascists in Spain and Poland very quickly became part of the overall picture of the Winter War. As Virginia Cowles would write in one of her early reports from Finland:

“Twenty-four hours later, I took a trip along the coast to Hango. Here I saw for the first time what continuous and relentless bombing was like. The deep quiet of the snowbound countryside was broken by the wail of sirens five or six times a day as wave after wave of Soviet bombers sometimes totalling as many as five hundred came across the Gulf of Finland from their bases in Estonia, only twenty minutes away. All along the coast I passed through villages and towns which had been bombed and machine-gunned; in Hango, the Finnish port which the Soviets demanded in their ultimatum, twenty buildings had been hit, and when I arrived, ten were still burning.

It is difficult to describe indiscriminate aerial warfare against a civilian population in a country with a temperature thirty degrees Fahrenheit below zero. But if you can visualize farm girls stumbling through snow for the uncertain safety of their cellars; bombs falling on frozen villages unprotected by a single anti-aircraft gun; men standing helplessly in front of blazing buildings with no apparatus with which to fight the fires, and others desperately trying to salvage their belongings from burning wreckage if you can visualize these things and picture even the children in remote hamlets wearing white covers over their coats as camouflage against low-flying Russian machine-gunners you can get some idea of what this war was like."


The stoic response of the Finnish civilians to these attacks was grist to the mill for the foreign journalists, making for memorable quotes that stuck in the minds of foreign readers of the newspaper articles that were churned out nightly (most of the British reporters for example worked for Morning papers, thus their articles needed to be filed by 9pm in the evening to make the morning papers, where they would be read and then talked about in the office or the factory). Every evening the press room of the Hotel Kämp overflowed with correspondents from a dozen different capitals, arguing, doubting, grumbling, questioning. The telephone rang continuously. From one end of the hotel to the other you could hear journalists shouting their stories across Europe to Stockholm, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Paris and London, and even across the Atlantic to New York. Much to everyone's annoyance, New York was the only connection so distinct you could hear as well as though you were sitting in the next room. Virginia Cowles usually telegraphed her stories to London, but they were often delayed for five or six hours, and occasionally she was forced to telephone.

“The line was so bad I had to repeat every word three or four times and I hate to think what the charges must have been. Some of the delay, however, was due to the fact that the Sunday Times telegrapher couldn't understand my American accent; once in desperation, I handed the telephone to Eddie Ward. "I say, is that really Mr. Ward speaking? Why, I heard you over the radio only an hour ago. And am I really talking to Helsinki? By Jove! What's it like there? Pretty cold, eh?" The official communiqué was issued every evening about eight o'clock and there was always a mad scramble among the big agencies as to who got the news over the wires first. All of them put in telephone calls to Amsterdam, Stockholm and Copenhagen blitz calls at nine times the normal rate. Once the Associated Press hung on to the telephone for twenty-five minutes waiting for the communique to be issued. Five minutes after hanging up in despair a call came through for the United Press, and at the same moment a boy walked into the room with the communique. Black looks were exchanged. As a matter of fact, all calls that came through seemed to be for the United Press, and I learned later this was due to a very handsome arrangement with the Hotel Kamp telephone operator.”

On short notice, it was impossible to improve the telecommunications situation, but the Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto worked hard to ensure all else that was possible was done to assist the war correspondents in their work. Censorship was rapid at the Hotel Kämp, rather more so than when you were filing reports from outside Helsinki, but the process itself was somewhat mysterious – the censors were invisible people who lived behind barred doors. No one ever saw them. Your appointed Information Officer took your copy to them and when it came back within a few minutes (for the censorship was extremely prompt) red penciled you might as well complain to God for all the good it did, although the Information Officer’s were all very helpful and would make suggestions as to what would not make it past the censors, which speeded things up considerably once you knew what they were looking for.

The reports filed by British correspondents such as Hilde Marchant and Giles Romilly that we have seen earlier were fairly typical of the short articles that made it into the British papers on a daily basis, while longer and more “thoughtful” articles by reporters such as John Langdon-Davies would appear regularly throughout the war. Correspondents such as Martha Gellhorn and Jessica Mitford would write more human interest stories. All the British newspapers (and in generall, all foreign newspapers) were supportive of Finland to a greater or lesser extent and, as has been mentioned, during the period of the “Phoney War,” the “Winter War” dominated the headlines on a daily basis. While the Fall of France and then the great air battles of the summer of 1940 came to dominate the British Press, the ongoing struggle between Finland and the Soviet Union remained in the news throughout and once more made the front pages as the great battles of August 1940 raged on the outskirts of Leningrad and along the Syvari. The death of Stalin at the hands of the Finns, the ensuing emergence of a leadership triumvirate to rule the USSR and the rapidly-concluded peace agreement between Finland and the USSR would make the front pages in September and October 1940, after which Finland faded from view, relegated to being the subject of (unfortunately perhaps for the British military, incorrect) analysis from newspaper writers such as B. H. Liddell-Hart and books by a number of the war correspondents such as john Langdon-Davies and his “Finland: The First Total War” who had “been there.”

For the Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto, conveying the right image and creating the right publicity was the subject of ongoing analysis throughout the war. Finland must be portrayed as fighting heroically against huge odds, as indeed it was, but at the same time the image conveyed must contain the message that with help, Finland could indeed hold of the might of the Soviet Union, if not forever, for a considerable length of time. Early in the war, many foreign governments held the view that Finland could not hold out long enough for military aid and volunteers to arrive – and this was a myth that Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto worked hard (and successfully) to dispel. Much was made of the victories in the north and in eastern Karelia, much also was made of the slow retreat on the Isthmus and the enormous casualties being inflicted on the Red Army, the sudden counterattacks, the ability of the Finnish artillery to counter the Red Army guns. Much was also made of the devastating attacks on the Soviet Navy and the fight for supremacy in the skies that the Ilmavoimat was slowly winning. And always, the refrain went, “we need help with guns, ammunition, aircraft, food, volunteers, whatever you can send.”

The commitment of Finland to fight on regardless of the cost was emphasized again and again, as was the involvement of the entire population in the war effort. The Lotta women working at the front as medics, nurses, signalers, drivers, cooks and in combat roles as AA-gunners stunned the foreign correspondents who were not used to seeing women near the frontlines, even in the Spanish Civil War. Their work alongside the fighting men received special attention. So to did the work of the teenage girls and boys in uniform, the girls organizing and looking after refugees from the Isthmus and border areas, manning searchlights, AA guns, working as Air Observers, caring for the wounded, the boys, many of them working in factories taking over adult jobs so that the men could join the fight, working in military depots, unloading railway wagons crammed with military supplies. Other women had taken over civilian jobs, looking after the children, working in factories, providing services that needed to be continued. To the foreign correspondents, this was visibly an entire nation at war. Everything, the efforts of every single person, was dedicated to the war effort. Much was also made of the early foreign units, the Italian Alpini Division, the Hungarians and Spanish Divisions on the way, the early arriving ANZAC Battalion and their eagerness to join the fight.

Press cuttings from the Finnish newspapers of the time reveal just how heavily people were hit by the stories of the "Frenzied assaults of the enemy" and the long columns of death-notices for the killed in action. Hence the Finns also read gratefully the opinions of the world in the international press and of the steady arrival of various units of foreign volunteers. That, and the military successes of the Finnish military, offered comfort. "Now if ever is the opportunity for friends of freedom and democracy to stand up and do something for their beliefs", urged Webb Miller of UP, one of the most famous correspondents of his day, in December 1939, trying to encourage the formation of an "International Brigade" of volunteers. "The eyes of the world are watching with admiration this small nation that defends itself against a bullying giant". This of course, was exactly the sentiment and feelings that the Finns hoped to arouse internationally – along of course with material assistance. The Swedish writer Sven Stolpe, speaking in January 1940 said that "Finland is currently the soldier of humanity, and no people can have a greater task to carry out than the Finns".

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The Swedish writer Sven Stolpe in 1929

Before the outbreak of hostilities, Finland had been just a splash of colour on the map for much of the world, but the Winter War made Finland much much more than that. Hence Tapio Vilpponen displayed an impressive prescience when he wrote in Helsingin Sanomat on January 25, 1940: "There can be no doubt that the continuing positive propaganda towards our country will create for us an ever-richer soil in our interaction with other nations." One of American correspondent David Bradley’s more enduring memories was of being down at the railway station, seeing the trains leaving for the front. "There were boys and even some girls sitting there waiting, 17 and 18 year old boys and girls wearing uniforms and carrying rifles, a few older men among them, but mostly boys and girls just waiting for trains to take them to the fighting. When I'd seen those kids, I didn't need any book-learning to know what heroes were."

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David Bradley, who became known to Finns as a correspondent covering the Winter War, died on January 7th 2008 at his home in Norway, Maine in the United States at the age of 92 years old. He was born on February 22nd, 1915. Bradley was the last living foreign correspondent who had covered the Winter War and had reported on the war for the American Lee Syndicate and the Wisconsin State Journal. After the Winter War Bradley studied medicine at Harvard University and went on to serve in the US military. In 1946 he was sent to the Pacific to take radiological measurements at Bikini Atoll. Bradley was among the first American scientists to warn Americans about the health hazards of nuclear radiation. Bradley left the military and continued to work against nuclear armament in his speeches and his writings. He was elected to the House of Representatives of the State of New Hampshire, where he served from 1955 to 1959, and again from 1973 to 1975. He returned to Finland to teach the English language and American Literature at the University of Helsinki from 1960 to 1962. He wrote a book, “Lion among Roses” about his experiences in Finland.

The ongoing reporting of Finnish victories, the stubborn fight they were putting up, the news of the foreign volunteers arriving, all inspired men and women in other countries to demand that their own governments do something to assist Finland. In the self-governing democracies of the British Commonwealth – Australia, Canada, South Africa, Rhodesia, a ground-swell of public opinion supported the sending of volunteers to join the fight. In the USA, there was a mixture of support for Finland opposed by a wary isolationism that rejected any involvement in European wars. In other countries there was also strong public support for Finland – in South America, in Japan, in France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway. But all of this meant very little if it was not translated into guns, munitions, aircraft and men to fight. And in this, the Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto faced a certain fact – the war in Finland was receiving much media attention. The lone struggle of a plucky and hopelessly outnumbered Finland against Stalin's armies made a good story, particularly when accompanied by images of white-clad soldiers on skis fighting in the snow supported by the Lotta’s. But this would only last as long as the war in Europe remained a “phoney” war – and the Finnish General HQ knew enough about the German military to be convinced that the Phoney War would not last forever – and when the war ceased to be “phoney”, Finland and its struggle would disappear from the news. And with that disappearance, the fickleness of foreign public opinion would mean there would no longer be public pressure on governments to assist Finland.

What was needed was to ensure large enough commitments of men and material early in the war so as to ensure support would continue, if only for the reason that large numbers of foreign volunteers had been committed and their loss would be a public relations disaster for the governments that had, even if reluctantly, supported and even organized their dispatch. To achieve this commitment, an even higher news profile generating greater public pressure on the foreign governments was needed – as were active support organizations in the countries concerned. How to achieve this publicity and ensure it was always in a favorable light had been the subject of considerable analysis within the Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto in the year prior to the war. And yet again, the Spanish Civil War had provided an inspiration and an answer. While large numbers of foreign correspondents had reported on the Spanish Civil War, there had also been a considerable number of authors who had actually fought as volunteers with the International Brigades. George Orwell, W.H. Auden, Spender, Day Lewis, MacNeice

This, combined with the desire of many reporters to “report from the frontlines” had led Puolustusministeriön Tiedostustoimisto to come up with a new concept – “Embedding” – which was implemented at the outbreak of the war. In an at the time unique approach, selected foreign journalists who accepted the risk were “embedded” in carefully chosen Finnish military units together with their Finnish “minders” who were fluent in the language of the foreign journalists and who were also “combat soldiers”. In this, the inability of almost all the foreign journalists to understand Finnish measurably assisted in the Finns skilful manipulation of the foreign media to their advantage. From experience in the Spanish Civil War, it was theorised that first-hand accounts from the front more often than not resulted in positive news reports – and in the Winter War this was proven, with the foreign journalists releasing unanimously astonished and admiring reports of the Finnish soldiers fighting against impossible odds in the harsh sub-zero temperatures of the Finnish winter – and winning. Virginia Cowles, the svelte blonde Bostonian journalist, found herself in perhaps the most challenging, dangerous and indeed, terrifying, position she would ever face as a journalist in WW2 when she was embedded in an Osasto Nyrkki (“Fist Force”) special forces unit tasked with an attack on a Soviet airfield deep behind the frontlines.

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Virginia Cowles in Finland (on left behind desk, Martha Gellhorn seated next to her in the center): Aged only 29 at the time of the Winter War, Cowles was a correspondent for Hearst newspapers in the United States. She had interviewed Mussolini in Rome, been flown personally by Air Marshal Balbo over Libya (“I know,” he said, having failed to entice her to fly for a second time, “the trouble is you don’t like my beard”), had tea with Hitler in Nuremberg (where Unity Mitford told her enthusiastically: “He says it’s very exciting to have the whole world trembling before him”). She had been to Soviet Russia, covered the Spanish Civil War (from both sides) where she had lunched with Ernest Hemingway and “the chief executioner of Madrid”, been falsely reported by Kim Philby as kidnapped in Spain, covered Czechoslovakia in October 1938 and, later, reported from the Polish border, as the Germans rolled in. Now she was in Finland covering the war between Finland and the Soviet Union. As with almost every other journalist in Finland, impartial and objective reporting was cast aside as she wholeheartedly supported the cause of Finland. She would see in the New Year of 1940 standing beside Marshal Mannerheim at his “mysterious headquarters hidden deep in the Finnish forests” at Mikkeli, where she entertained the Marshal by singing “Run, Rabbit, Run.”

At the time, the Winter War was also making a major impact in the media. The 1940 play “There Shall Be No Night” by American playwright Robert E. Sherwood was inspired by a moving Christmas 1939 broadcast to America by war correspondent Bill White of CBS. The play was produced on Broadway in 1940, and won the 1941 Pulitzer Prize for Drama. The 1940 American film “Ski Patrol” features a Finnish reserve unit defending the border against Russians. The film took great historical liberties in its storyline and was photographed by the Hollywood master Milton Krasner. In addition, a considerable number of books for the British and American markets were written on the subject immediately after (and some even before) the war ended.

At the end and within a year after the Winter War – late 1940 and1941 – quite a number of books were also published in the Soviet Union. Given the death of Stalin and the political succession that had taken place, the books were very narrowly focused on military history and operations, but they had did have a carefully controlled and strong political message. The overall campaign was disastrous, so the literature found its pride in details of particular battles and encounters and in heroic soldiers. For example the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line was represented as a "legendary" performance by the Red Army, as was the defence of Leningrad and the battles on the Svir. Timoshenko, in the biographical film of the same name, was portrayed as the heroic general fighting to the last against the savage Finnish onslaught and an inspiration to his men to do the same.

In fiction, the 1940 boy's adventure story “Biggles Sees It Through” by W.E. Johns is set during the final stages of the war. In a “fictional” work that is in reality a thinly veiled biography, albeit with many of the events adapted to serve the agenda of the British government, Squadron Leader James Bigglesworth, the leader of the Squadron of RAF Volunteers, flies reconnaissance raids from a base in Finland in a Bristol Blenheim bomber on missions for the British Security Intelligence Service, and encounters a Polish scientist with secret papers on new aircraft alloys, plus von Stalhein, his old World War I enemy, who is working with the NKVD.

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Frontpiece from “Biggles Sees It Through” – “The Gadiator swept up in a tight half-roll”

There were also a considerable number of books on the war published by western journalists who had “been there.” Almost all of them were critical of the Soviet Union and sympathetic to the Finnish cause. Even after the war had drawn to a close, favorable portrayals of the Finns continued to emerge, a classic example being Virginia Cowles’ hagiographical book “Hero: The Life and Legend of Colonel Jussi Härkönen,” about Eversti Jussi Härkönen, the founder and commanding officer throughout the Winter War and WW2 of the Maavoimat’s elite Osasto Nyrkki (“Fist Force”) special forces unit.

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Osasto Nyrkki 4WD “Bantam Gun-buggy”, photo taken from “Hero: The Life and Legend of Colonel Jussi Härkönen” by Virginia Cowles (Gummerus, 1949).

Her prologue – “There is a full moon shining down on the snow-clad forests of eastern Karelia. Overhead you can hear the drone of Soviet bombers whilst behind us the sounds of the frontline battle are muted thunder. Deep in the rear of the Red Army, the men of the Finnish Army’s Fist Force drive through the snow. Their mission – to attack a Soviet airfield packed with bombers being used to attack Finnish cities….” – sets the scene. “On nights like this,” she continues, “you wonder how future historians will visualise the majesty of this small country. Will they understand how violently Finland fought, how valiantly her soldiers died: how calmly her people lived in the midst of the world’s first total war?

In the book she was fiercely critical of America for having “shrunk from our obligations” to support Finland – “a small democracy fighting for her life against an evil totalitarian regime” - to the fullest extent possible. As Finland “….struggles for survival and America refuses to provide war materials and equipment to assist her, shiploads of aircraft engines, machine tools and munitions with which the Soviet war machine will create weapons to use against this gallant country leave our shores for the USSR …….” Strange to say of a book written at one of the darkest times in WW2, and of the grimmest subjects, its chief note is one of gaiety. Virginia Cowles was young and well-connected. As an attractive woman in an almost totally male world, she was treated chivalrously and allowed an access that, nowadays, even top television reporters would envy. “What a fine thing it was,” she writes at one point, “to be a female of the species.” She had the most marvelous time in Finland over the months of war, and she does not solemnly pretend otherwise.

The sheer oddity of the Winter War fascinated her. There is a brilliant description of a midnight dinner laid on by Osasto Nyrkki deep in the Russian forests so that she and another reporter could dine in relative comfort while watching the Finns as they attacked, overran and then blew up a huge Red Army supply dump, and another of the difficulty of keeping warm in freezing Finland in a house which, at the time, was on fire. Equally, though, Cowles reports all the horror with direct human sympathy — the poor, distracted Karelian refugee desperate to get on the Helsinki train with her to find her children who had been evacuated earlier, the Australian Volunteer Battalion cook who makes her breakfast near the frontline on the Syvari one day and is dead in battle the next, the little lost Estonian refugee boy coming to the reception desk of the Helsinki hotel she was staying at late in 1940 after Tallinn had fallen to the Red Army saying, “Minu isa on piloot.” All such vignettes are the more effective because they are not dwelt on, and the physical description of Soviet atrocities is restrained. This is clear, unaffected reportage, and the book is a delight to read for that alone.

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“Minu isa on piloot.”

What is also likable about the book however, is its more dated aspect — its romantic devotion to Finland and to the heroically portrayed characters of Colonel Jussi Härkönen and Marshal Mannerheim (always an imposing and aristocratic background figure throughout the book). As a child, Virginia Cowles loved the stories of the Knights of the Round Table and of other heroic figures such as Sir Francis Drake, Clive of India and so on. After arriving in Helsinki, she thought “Finland seemed a wonderful land where all the men were very brave and wore splendid and beautiful uniforms[!]”. This impression was reinforced on meeting Marshal Mannerheim. “I was impressed by his imposing and aristocratic presence and his military bearing. He looked to me the way I had always imagined a true commander of brave men should look…..” Cowles was most struck, especially when she later compared the way Finland fought successfully against overwhelming odds with the rout of France, by the way the Finnish soldiers naturally respected the great Marshal, and the way the officers, NCOs and men worked together in battle. “Hardly an order was ever given. It was as if every one of them knew what was expected of them and what to do under every circumstance. A gesture, a nod, and an entire Platoon or Company would begin to move, easily, rapidly and silently through the snow and the forest, white-clad ghosts invisible and inaudible from even a few feet away.”

She also noticed and described Finnish “Sisu” – the sometimes suicidally stubborn refusal of the Finnish soldiers to give in to the Red Army, no matter how outnumbered they were, as well as their sardonically humorous outlook on the ongoing war. She repeated in one news piece she filed the request of one Finnish officer after the annihilation of the Red Army’s 44th Division, “ask Stalin to send another couple of Divisions, we could do with some more equipment.” Long afterwards she would write “….it was only after seeing the outcome of these and other battles that I came to truly realize just how much the Finnish Army had achieved, how many casualties they had inflicted on the Red Army and how little it had cost them. And it was then that I began to believe that as long as the world continued to aid Finland with military equipment and with ammunition, Finland could never be beaten.”

Towards the end of her book, she writes “Of all the days I spent in Finland, I remember August 15th 1940 the best. The Red Army had launched a huge attack on the Finns along the entire front, from Leningrad all the way to the White Sea. On this day the Ilmavoimat shot down a record number of one hundred and eighty Soviet planes. I had been driven down from Viipuri to near the front on the Karelian Isthmus with Vincent Sheean and from where we were we near Terijoki we tried to piece the drama together like a jigsaw puzzle. In almost the whole range of the sky there was action. To the right we could see a plane falling like a stone into the sea, leaving a long black plume against the sky; to the left, a bomber going down in flames; and directly above, a fighter, diving down on one of the bombers and suddenly a tiny fluttering parachute as one of the pilots baled out; and all the time the crackling noise of the anti-aircraft guns' fire and the white bursts of smoke against the sky and the white contrails of the aircraft everywhere. And underlying all other sounds was the continuing rumble of the artillery coming from the direction of distant Leningrad, like muted thunder that never ceased.

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“….near Terijoki we tried to piece the drama together like a jigsaw puzzle. In almost the whole range of the sky there was action.”

Finland would emerge from obscurity again only in early 1944, once more making the headlines as she joined the Allied and launched the invasion of Estonia, with Finnish/Polish/Allied forces driving rapidly southwards along the Baltic littoral. A number of leading war correspondents who had become confirmed “Fennophiles” over the course of the Winter War would attach themselves to the Finnish forces for the remainder of WW2. Their reports would contrast the “lightning war” waged by the Finnish and Polish generals together with General George Patton (“sidelined to Finland by Eisenhower and eternally grateful for it”) with the “plodding advances” of Bradley and Montgomery on the “other front”.

Virginia Cowles herself returned to Finland in late 1944 and, together with Martha Gellhorn and other journalists, would accompany the Maavoimat on its drive southwards through the Baltic States and in to Poland. She would be flown into Warsaw by the Ilmavoimat as the German siege was broken, reporting on the duplicity of the Soviets as the Red Army refused to assist the Polish Home Army as it battled to hold Warsaw. She would enthrall America and Britain with her reports on the Relief of Warsaw by the Finnish and Polish Armies as well as her ongoing “Reports from the Spearhead” as the Finnish-commanded Army of the North rampaged through northern Poland, in to Germany and onwards to Berlin.

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“Raising the Flag over the Reichstag” - a historic World War II photograph taken during the Battle of Berlin on 2 May 1945, by an unknown Finnish Propagandaliitto photographer assigned to accompany Virginia Cowles together with her “minder.” It depicts several Maavoimat soldiers raising the flag of Finland atop the German Reichstag building. Accompanying the article filed by Cowles on the Fall of Berlin to the Finnish Army, the photograph was instantly popular, being reprinted in thousands of publications. It came to be regarded around the world as one of the most significant and recognizable images of the war. Virginia Cowles was the first Allied Reporter to reach Berlin at the end of the War.

The Fall of Berlin was the final major offensive of the European Theatre of World War II and ended as a race to the centre of Berlin between the Soviet Red Army and the Finnish Maavoimat. Starting in early January 1945, the Maavoimat/Polish/Baltic States Army and attached Allied (British, Commonwealth and US) Divisions and the Red Army had conducted parallel drives westwards, breaching the German front on the Vistula and Oder and rapidly advancing westwards through Germany, averaging 30–40 kilometres a day. The Maavoimat and attached allied units under their command were aided in their advance by the relative willingness of German forces they faced to surrender or withdraw without putting up a serious fight – although on the occasions when they did so, they were hammered mercilessly. By contrast, the German forces facing the Red Army tended to fight to the best of their ability. The Red Army was however prepared to take far heavier casualties in order to maintain the speed of their advance so in the end, the advancing armies remained neck and neck to the end. The battle for Berlin lasted from late on 20 April 1945 until 2 May 1945 and was one of the bloodiest in history for the Germans and the Red Army. Not so for the Finns.

The Maavoimat originally had no intention of participating in the battle or of advancing into Berlin. At the commencement of the battle, the Red Army advanced into Berlin from the east and south while the Maavoimat remained stationary along the northern border of the city – with large elements of the Maavoimat continuing to advance westwards, occupying northern Germany and forcing the German III Panzer Army and the German XXI Army situated to the north of Berlin to retreated westwards under relentless pressure until they were eventually pushed into a pocket 20 miles (32 km) wide that stretched from the Elbe to the coast. To their west was the British 21st Army Group, to their east were the Finns and to the South were the Americans – while a Merivoimat naval task force and Rannikkojääkärit units moved to liberate Denmark. The Finnish military command saw no reason to lose large numbers of Finnish lives in order to take a city which was bound to fall and was not especially interested in the “prestige” resulting from the taking of the city. During 20 April 1945, the 1st Belorussian Front commanded by Marshal Georgy Zhukov started shelling Berlin's city centre, while Marshal Ivan Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front had pushed from the south through the last formations of Army Group Centre. The German defences mainly consisted of several depleted, badly equipped, and disorganised Heer and Waffen-SS divisions. Within the next few days, the Red Army rapidly advanced through the city and reached the boundaries of the city centre where close-quarters combat raged. At least 125,000 German civilians perished in the fighting together with some 100,000 German soldiers. The Red Army would lose some 81,000 dead another 280,000 wounded together with 2,000 armoured vehicles destroyed. Throughout the fighting, endless columns of civilians filed northwards towards the Maavoimat positions, passing through to relative safety.

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Throughout the fighting for Berlin, German civilians filed towards the Maavoimat positions in a continuous stream, desperate to escape the vengeance of the Red Army.

It was the German civilian refugees that would indirectly lead to the Maavoimat moving into Berlin in force. On April 29th, Red Army forces near the Maavoimat positions began to attack and massacre a large German civilian refugee column that was snaking its way out of Berlin and through the Maavoimat lines, passing through the (Estonian) 31st Field Infantry Division commanded by Estonian Army Major-General Nikolai Reek. Reek ordered his Division to move to protect the civilians and, leading from the front as was often his wont, he was killed when Red Army units opened fire on the unit he was accompanying. With Reek’s death in action at Russian hands, the Estonian 31st Division responded with an all-out attack on all Red Army units in their vicinity on the north-east of Berlin, at the same time calling in Polish and Ilmavoimat close air support – which was always quick to respond to any aggressive moves towards Finnish/Polish/Allied units by the Red Army. At the same time, the Polish 1st Armoured Division and the Maavoimat’s 8th Infantry Division joined the fighting in support of the 31st Division. The Red Army units reeled backwards under the sudden and overwhelmingly violent onslaught. Only the personal and forceful intervention of Kenraaliluutnantti Oesch prevented the situation from escalating further.

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“Kenraaliluutnantti Oesch prevented the situation from escalating further”: The Fall of Berlin in 1945. Kenraaliluutnantti Lennart Oesch (right) and his chief-of-staff Eversti Valo Nihtilä (destroyed or captured Red Army materiel in the background). Nihtilä is shaking hands with the 2IC of the 31st Estonian Division who has assumed command on the death of Major-General Nicholas Reek.

However, in a move to prevent further unnecessary civilian casualties and deeply annoyed by the temerity of the Red Army’s attack on Maavoimat units, Kenraaliluutnantti Oesch ordered the Polish 1st Armoured, two Polish and four Finnish Infantry Divisions to move into Berlin. There was no resistance from the German military, those who were encountered surrendered immediately (and gratefully, it might be added) to advancing Maavoimat/Polish Army forces. Within two days, with almost no opposition, the Maavoimat had reached the center of Berlin and on the afternoon of 1 May, the Finnish Flag was raised over the Reichstag. Cowles documented the events surrounding the flag-raising in the articles she filed, writing that “I asked a rhyma of soldiers who happened to be passing by to help with staging of the photo shoot. Four of them climbed up onto the roof with the flag I gave them and 18-year old Private Ilvari Länsivuori from Helsinki attached the flag to the flagstaff. With him were Private Pekka Ronkainen, Sergeant Jorma Tiilikainen and Private Yrjo Kankkunnen, all from Karelia. It was an historic moment and one I found deeply satisfying.”

German military units in Berlin fighting the Red Army slowly withdrew or were forced northwards where they were not overwhelmed, fighting desperately to enable the escape of German civilians towards the Finnish lines. During, and in the days immediately following the assault, in many areas of the city, vengeful Soviet troops (often rear echelon units) engaged in mass rape, pillage and murder. This too was reported on by Virginia Cowles, although at the time American and British newspapers were (not for the first time) being prevented from printing stories that cast the Soviets in a poor light. Meanwhile, the Maavoimat was in the process of hastily setting up camps for the refugees. Most Germans, both soldiers and civilians, were grateful to receive food issued at Maavoimat Field Kitchens which began on Kenraaliluutnantti Oesch’s orders.

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Photo sourced from: http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_uy4vuBbsXMk/S ... %2B001.jpgCowles was a great admirer of Kenraaliluutnantti Karl Lennart Oesch – and she knew many Generals: “Oesch, the Polish General Anders, the Finnish General Hugo Osterman and George Patton made a great team. They complemented each other admirably. Oesch knew when to rein Anders, Osterman and Patton in and when to give them their heads, while Patton, Anders and Osterman respected each others abilities as well as Oesch’s abilities as a “fighting Commander. Oesch, Anders, Osterman and Patton were an unbeatable combination.

In those areas which the Maavoimat had captured and even before the fighting in the centre of the city had stopped, the Finnish Command took measures to start restoring essential services, as did the Soviets in their sector. Almost all the transport in and out of the city had been rendered inoperative, and bombed-out sewers had contaminated the city's water supplies. The Finns and Soviets both appointed local Germans to head each city block, and began organizing the cleaning-up. After the capitulation the Soviets went house to house, arresting and imprisoning anyone in a uniform including firemen and railway-men – as awareness of this grew and the fighting died away, a trickle of German civilians crossing from the Soviet controlled zone into the Finnish controlled zone became a torrent, and then a flood.

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Virginia Cowles: “Days of Wine and Shrapnel”: Born in Vermont, USA, Virginia Cowles (1910-1983) became a well-known journalist in the 1930s with her columns appearing on both sides of the Atlantic. Her autobiography, “Looking for Trouble” covers with brio her reporting of the main events between 1935 and 1940. In his memorial address, Nigel Nicolson recalled the first time he met her, “her appearance was doubly startling: that she should be there at all at so critical a moment; and that she was the most beautiful young woman on whom, until then, I had ever set my eyes.”

Before and during the Second World War she covered the Spanish Civil War, the Winter War, the rout in France, the Middle East, the Italian campaign, the liberation of Paris, and the Allied invasion of Germany. In 1945 she married the British politician and writer Aidan Crawley. She wrote many biographies including “Winston Churchill; the Era and the Man”, “Edward VII and His Circle”, “The Romanov’s”, “The Phantom Major” about David Stirling and the SAS and “Hero: The Life and Legend of Colonel Jussi Härkönen.” It is indeed interesting to contrast her studies of David Stirling and the SAS vis-à-vis Jussi Härkönen and Osasto Nyrkki and the background that is perhaps unintentionally revealed. The SAS were peculiarly British, an elite unit that emerged from the war unplanned and largely unwanted, pushing their way in, developing techniques and tactics as the unit evolved as a fighting force, very much in the British tradition of such units which came and went with each major war. The SAS would be no exception, largely disappearing in the aftermath of WW2 only to re-emerge a decade later when circumstances again called for such a unit.

Osasto Nyrkki by way of contrast had been conceived and developed to meet an identified need – a similar need that the SAS met for the British – but with a great deal more foresight, planning and development. It was no coincidence then that the British Volunteers from the 5th Battalion Scots Guards, who were trained by and fought with Osasto Nyrkki in the Winter War, would be the founders of almost all the British Army’s elite units of WW2. And Osasto Nyrkki itself would remain in existence after WW2, as secretive and close-mouthed as ever, but now also feared by Finland’s enemies, training and preparing for the next war, whatever that might be.

As the war progressed, many of the “star” reporters moved back to Britain and France, some (such as Martha Gellhorn) sooner rather than later, but many remained and continued to report favorably on Finland and on the Russo-Finnish War. However, with Norway and then the Fall of France and the Battle of Britain, Finland became superceded in the news by larger and more world-shattering events. Even the Finnish intervention in northern Norway, their seizure of the Finnmark and the acceptance by the Germans of this as a fait accompli where they had driven the British and the French out, even this failed to make front pages news. The emphasis was on the defeat suffered by the British and the French in Norway, the fact that the Germans preferred not to take on Finland, a small country already fighting the USSR, in the Arctic spoke volumes about the capabilities of the Finnish military – just as the defeat of the British and French forces spoke volumes about their capabilities – as the Fall of France would all to clearly make even more evident. “Most of the press corps vanished. The story had dried up", said David Bradley, one of the reporters who stayed to the end. “The Finns and the foreign volunteers continued to fight but they didn’t make the front page anymore until those final days when they succeeded in killing Stalin and bringing the war to an end. Those reporters that stayed were back on the front pages again for a few days after that. But when it was obvious that a peace treaty was being concluded, almost all the foreign press left, there was no real news in a peace treaty.

Regardless, the foreign press had served its purpose, large volunteer contingents were in place, large amounts of military aid had been forthcoming and regular convoys laden with food, munitions and weapons arrived in Lyngenfijord, Petsamo and the now Finnish-held port of Murmansk from the factories of the USA and Canada. Shipments would continue to arrive up until the peace agreement with the USSR, although primarily from the USA and paid for in hard cash as Canadian factories switched to delivering their output to a British Army which had lost most of its equipment in France and at Dunkirk. And the remnant of foreign war correspondents would continue to file their reports throughout the war, their great coup and their reward for staying the course being the momentous reports on the surprise Ilmavoimat raid on the Kremlin and the death of Stalin and a significant portion of the Politburo who had been meeting with him on that flame-filled night.

It’s difficult to imagine a more significant event in the first year of WW2,” Bradley said. “You have to remember that this was September 1940, the Soviet Union and the Nazi’s were partners, they were brothers-in-arms, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had led to the dismembering of Poland, many in fact had questioned why Britain and France had chosen to declare war only on Germany and not on the USSR as well, they were both equally guilty, accomplices in crime as it were. So the news of Stalin’s death, it wasn’t greeted as a tragic loss as it would have been after the Germans turned on the USSR and they became our ally, it was greeted rather as a significant achievement, a victory against the totalitarian states that dominated Europe, a great victory. And it was a real turning of the tide for Finland, the triumvirate who succeeded Stalin were far more rational, far more sensible. And after what had happened, they preferred o negotiate a peace agreement with the Finns because it was obvious there would be no easy victory over the Finns and that Hitler and Germany was the real threat. Which was of course what the Finns had hoped for.”

Carl-Adam Nycop, a Swedish reporter, spoke at length of the sensation that followed on the announcement of the peace terms. "We looked at the large map on the wall of the press-room and drew in the new borders. The Finns had given back almost everything the had won, they had even made some minor concessions on the Isthmus and in return that had got a large chunk of eastern Karelia, actually it was a huge chunk, Forests and Swamps, somebody said rather bitterly, and the border up by Petsamo had moved eastwards quite a bit but the Karelian Heartland, the land of the Kalevala, Lake Äänisen, the dream of a Greater Finland, had all evaporated. There was relief, relief at the Peace, relief that Finland had stayed intact, that the Karelians and the Ingrians would be allowed to come to Finland but there was also sadness. One of the Press Centre staff was sobbing in a corner. I tried to talk to a few people in the park in the morning, but they were too shocked. I understood why really, they had fought so long and so hard, so many soldiers and civilians had died, they had won the whole of what many considered to be their true homeland, the Greater Finland of the more ardent nationalists, and now they were giving it up. It was Mannerheim that carried the day with his speech, I think if anyone else had announced those terms there would have been a revolution, but everyone listened to Mannerheim and they would do whatever he asked them to. You could tell, even over the radio you could tell, that he wasn’t happy about it. But if anyone knew the Russians, he did and everybody knew that too."

And so, while there sadness and a lot of bitterness at the Russians, a bitterness that did not disappear as the Siege of Leningrad by the Germans would illustrate, when the Finns would not open their borders to permit any shipments through. Although they did offer that children could be evacuated through Finland but the Soviet leadership did not permit that. But while there was a great deal of sadness and bitterness, there was also relief that the war was over and that Finland had lost nothing, nothing except the lives of her soldiers and of the dead civilians. There were no victory parades, nothing to celebrate the end of the war – largely because when the war was done and the ceasefire had been declared, the Finns had to clean up the mess, repair the destruction, house the refugees. The Soviet Union ceded thousands of square miles of territory in Eastern Karelia to Finland, and around 200,000 Karelian Finns and Ingrians (and a few others that got mixed in with them) were deported by the NKVD over the border into Finland, regardless of their wishes, many of them had been sent to Siberia and they’d been sent all the way back without being told what was happening, they only found out when the trains rolled across the border and they were unloaded. And there were also the 50,000 odd prisoners from the NKVD camps on the Kola, not many of them wished to be returned to the Peoples Paradise and the Finns weren’t going to send them back if they didn’t want to go – they had seen the camps – and the burial sites. So they just gave them Finnish citizenship and that was that. Resettling them and the Ingrians and the Karelians and over 100,000 Estonian refugees was a huge amount of work. And with the rest of the world at war, there were no friends, nobody to come to their assistance, nobody able to do a damned thing and Sweden, which was probably the only country that could have helped, didn’t help much at all, although many individual Swedes did. The Finns had to do it all themselves. And they did."

Notes on Sources

For accounts of the Press in Finland, I’ve used a number of books as sources, many of which have been referenced in the preceding Posts. The first is indeed by Virginia Cowles (“Looking for Trouble,” which has a couple of chapters on her reporting from Finland). The second is Martha Gellhorn’s “The Face of War” (together with her articles from Colliers Weekly and a couple of different biographies – Caroline Moorehead’s “Martha Gellhorn: A Twentieth Century Life” being the best of the two I read). John Langdon-Davies wrote a very good book on the Winter War, “Finland – The First Total War” which is more about the war than the War Correspondents, but still useful as a source - as is Geoffrey Cox’s “The Red Army Moves” if you can find a copy (I couldn’t find a copy to buy, I had to get it via an inter-library loan).

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Geoffrey Cox’s “The Red Army Moves” – excellent source material by a New Zealand journalist - if you can track a copy down….

Cheryl Hocker’s “The Accidental Journalist”, as well as containing some fairly comprehensive information on Edmund Stevens, is also a good source for commentary on other journalists in Finland at the time. A further book, “The Warcos: The War Correspondents of WW2” by Richard Collier has a very good section on war reporting during the Winter War and the War Correspondents who were there. This book formed the foundation for my Posts on this subject and led me to a lot of further reading on the subject. Paul Preston’s “We Saw Spain Die” has comprehensive information on many of these War Correspondents and is a really interesting book to read as well. There are also a couple of Finnish books on the subject which, perhaps fortunately (given the time it takes me to translate and work out the content) I didn’t get my hands on. But if you’re interested they are“TK-Miehet” about Finnish Military Information Companies in the (Continuation) War and “Talvisota Muiden Silmin” (The Winter War through the eyes of Others) by Antero Holmila

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“TK-Miehet” about Finnish Military Information Companies in the (Continuation) War

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“Talvisota Muiden Silmin” (The Winter War through the eyes of Others) by Antero Holmila. The Winter War drew wide international attention and Holmila's book looks into how foreign press viewed the conflict, with examples covering ten countries and three continents. The articles from Greece, Japan, Hungary and Great Britain show that foreign press emphasised and marvelled at the unity of the Finnish nation. Holmila says: "It is important to acknowledge that they did this for their own national and often political purposes." War loomed over the world and all countries were preparing for it. "Finnish history writing is limited by the fact that it is written by Finns. The language sets such strong barriers. What would have become of the history of Vichy, France if it had been left to Frenchmen to study?" asks Holmila. Unfortunately, Holmilla’s book is available only in Finnish…..

And lastly, for those who don’t know too much about the Winter War and Finland, don’t try and look for a copy of “Hero: The Life and Legend of Colonel Jussi Härkönen” by Virginia Cowles – you won’t find it – this one was invented for this ATL. For the brief mentions of the Soviet prison camps on the Kola and the NKVD slave ships (which existed) – see “Stalin's Slave Ships: Kolyma, the Gulag Fleet, and the Role of the West” by Martin J. Bollinger.

Next Post: Australian Aid to Finland
 
The Flag!!! Arggh!!!

I think that you should darken the flag color a little bit... It was too bright to be true...:D

But anyway, I'm open to any thread about the Finns, especially Blowing-Ivans-Till-Kingdom-Come Finns, 'cause it was another reason not to mess with them... :D:D:D:D

EDIT: Listening Ievan Polka right now... :D :D :D
 
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Australian Aid to Finland

Australian Aid to Finland

As we know, Australia sent two full Infantry Battalions of volunteers to Finland for the Winter War together with sufficient volunteers to form supporting units for what would become the Commonwealth Division, a Divisional-sized Field Hospital, Medical personnel and Ambulance Units sufficient to support three Brigades. Australia was also instrumental in sending the personnel for a composite New Zealand/Australian Field Regiment (of Artillery). Finally, Australia (with some limited contributions of personnel from New Zealand and South Africa) would also send sufficient military personnel to establish two Brigade Headquarters units (Canada provided personnel for a third) together with the personnel for the Headquarters units of the “Commonwealth Division” that Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Rhodesia and Canada would jointly agree to forming from the disparate collection of volunteer units dispatched to Finland from within the British Commonwealth. Australia would not forget Finland after the Winter War – as well as ongoing shipments throughout WW2 of large quantities of grain, mutton, kangaroo tails and wool for uniforms (albeit on ships of the Finnish merchant marine) - and in 1944, Australia would send a full Infantry Division (as would New Zealand) to fight with the Finns against Germany. While herself short of military equipment and unable to provide weapons and munitions to Finland in the Winter War, Australia would, with New Zealand, also pay for a number of artillery pieces and shells from the UK to be sent to Finland. Australia would also ship a considerable number of Ford Trucks to Finland (paid for through the “Buy a Ford for Finland” fund-raising campaign that was wildly popular with the Australian public, as we will see).

The interesting question one must ask is, why would a country on the far side of the world, with almost no connections with Finland, make such a major commitment to assist a small and almost unknown country in Scandinavia when Australia itself was only just beginning to expand its military for the war against Germany. In considering this question, we will first take a quick look at the state of the Australian armed forces in late 1939, at the same time delving a little into Australian politics and history, primarily World War One and the inter-war years and then take a quick look at the history of Finns in Australia. After that, we’ll look in rather more detail at how Australia reacted to the Winter War. What swayed Australian public and governmental opinion to the extent that the country made the contribution that it did to assist Finland and just what was the full extent of the assistance given by Australia (for it would not be just men to fight)? We’ll consider all of these questions in this and the next couple of Posts.

The state of the Australian armed forces in late 1939

As with Canada and New Zealand, Australia at the end of World War One was in the possession of a well-honed and highly experienced military, blooded in battle in disparate fronts around the world. The AIF had grown through the war, eventually numbering five infantry divisions, two mounted divisions and a mixture of other units. When the war ended, there were 92,000 Australian soldiers in France, 60,000 in England and 17,000 in Egypt, Palestine and Syria. Overall, 421,809 Australians served in the military in WW1 with 331,781 serving overseas. Over 60,000 Australians lost their lives and 137,000 were wounded. As a percentage of forces committed, this was one of the highest casualty rates amongst the British Empire forces. fter the War ended, some Australians soldiers in Europe went on to serve in Northern Russia during the Russian Civil War, although officially the Australian government refused to contribute forces to the campaign. HMAS Yarra, Torrens, Swan and Parramatta served in the Black Sea during the same conflict. Elsewhere, in Egypt in early 1919, a number of Australian light horse units were used to quell a nationalist uprising while they were waiting for passage back to Australia. Despite shortages in shipping, the process of returning the soldiers to Australia was completed rapidly and by September 1919 there were only 10,000 men left in Britain waiting for repatriation. On 1 April 1921, the AIF was officially disbanded. Most of the men of the AIF said good-bye to the army without regret, but there were enough who remained committed to the military to provide a strong cadre of officers, NCOs and men for the re-formed Citizen Force, some of them because they liked the military lifestyle and some out of a conviction that the army they trained or its successor would be called upon to fight again.

Gallipoli and the battles on the Western Front, in which Australian Troops took heavy casualties, made a lasting impression on the Australian psyche, one that has lasted down to the present day. Australian and New Zealand troops landed on the Aegean side of the Gallipoli peninsula near the end of April 1915, and fought there through December 1915, when the troops were evacuated. The Australians lost 8,500 men killed in those few months, New Zealand lost 2,700 – and both the Australians and the New Zealanders placed the blame for these (and the enormous casualties later suffered on the Western Front) firmly on the unthinking, callous and hidebound British Generals. For Australians and New Zealanders, the campaign has been seen as a key moment in a growing sense of national identity. In the context of the Great War, the Gallipoli campaign had little impact but for the men who were there, their families and countless New Zealand and Australian communities, the effects would last for generations, becoming a core part of the ANZAC mythos and permeating the national cultures of both countries.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXaq_CRkOII
In the immediate aftermath of World War One, the dead were remembered with a considerable amount of sentimentality: Ray Kernaghan & “Suvla Bay”

In order to advocate for the many thousands of returned servicemen and women many organisations for former servicemen sprang up, te most prominent of which was the Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial League of Australia (now the Returned Services Association, or RSA – an Australian and New Zealand icon, particularly in rural areas) which had been established in 1916. Following the war this organisations’ political influence grew along with its numbers, which by 1919 were estimated to be at around 150,000 members. Also in the immediate post-war period, a noticeable number of ex-soldiers entered the political arena in the Australian Parliament, mostly as MPs for the Nationalist Party (and only one as an MP for the Labour Party, which had successfully fought against Conscription in 1916 and 1916). These new MPs (and others in the Nationalist and Country Parties believed that Australian should maintain her links with Britain, and that the Australian military should be maintained at sufficient strength to preserve an effective nucleus for the Armed Forces in the event of another war.

The Australian Labour party, on the other hand, had been reshaped during the war by two historic struggles which overshadowed any other conflicts the Labour movement had experienced. These were the successful campaigns against conscription for overseas service in 1916 and the strikes of 1917. The expulsion from the Labour Party of those members who supported conscription for foreign service had it with a hard core of uncompromising Labour leaders in whose eyes the vital struggle of their period was that between employers and workers – in their eyes the war that had just ended was merely a conflict between two "capitalist" groups . To some of them a khaki tunic was a symbol of "imperialism." Were not British soldiers in 1920 being employed against the newly-born socialist republic of Russia, against the nationalists of India and, closer still, against Irish patriots struggling for their independence (almost a third of the members of the Labour Party were Irish, or of Irish descent)?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZvARRdJnm-8
One the left, there was a long-lasting bitterness around the scale of the casualties and the loss of life in an “imperial” war. Eric Bogle’s “Green Fields of France”

In 1920-21, the militia numbered 100,000 compulsorily enlisted men of the 1899, 1900 and 1901 classes, practically untrained, and was equipped with the weapons which the A.I .F. had brought home from Europe and the Middle East – and little else. There was a cadre of 3,150 permanent officers and men, which was about 150 more than there had been in 1914. In the defence debates of 1921, some Labour MP’s advocated going farther than mere reductions and entirely abolishing the army and navy ; others argued that the Australian did not need to begin military training until war began ; "if the war proved anything," said Mr D. C. McGrath (Labour) "it proved that young Australians many of whom had not previously known one end of a rifle from another were, after training for a month or two, equal to if not superior to any other troops" General Ryrie, the Assistant Minister for Defence at the time, disagreed.

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Major General Sir Granville de Laune Ryrie KCMG, CB, VD (1 July 1865 – 2 October 1937), Assistant Minister for Defence from 1920 to 1922. Ryrie worked as a jackaroo (trainee farm manager), and eventually managed his own property. He was also a good heavyweight boxer. He served in the Boer War, where he reached the rank of Major. He was elected to Parliament in 1906 and again in 1911. At the start of WW1, he was promoted to Brigadier-General, and was given command of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, part of the Anzac Mounted Division, with whom he took part in the famous charge of the Australian Light horse in the battle of Beersheba. After returning to Australia, Ryrie remained a Member of Parliament. In 1920, he was made an Assistant Minister for Defence. In 1927, when he was appointed the Australian High Commissioner in the UK, where he remained until 1932 when he returned to Australia. As Assistant Minister of Defence, Ryrie (who was among the few who believed another war to be possible within a generation) pressed the need for military training and the necessity for maintaining a cadre of skilled officers and men . "Germany", this veteran soldier said, "is only watching and waiting for the day when she can revenge herself".

The Ministers who brought forward the modest defence plans of 1920 and 1921 were described by some Labour members as "militarists" and "war mongers". "We must carefully guard", said the newly-elected Mr Makin (Labour) "against the spreading in the body politic of the malignant cancer of militarism." To be fair, many conservatives also advocated reduced defence expenditure at the time. While the Washington Conference negotiating naval strengths was still in session, the Australian Prime Minister, Hughes, had promised Parliament that, if the naval reductions were agreed upon, the defence vote would be substantially reduced . In the following year, nearly half of the ships of the Australian Navy were put out of commission, and it was decided to reduce the permanent staff of the army to 1,600, to maintain the seven militia divisions (five of infantry and two of cavalry) at a strength of about 31,000 men—only 25 per cent of their war strength—and to reduce training to six days in camp and four days at the local centres a year. Seventy-two regular officers out of a meager total of some 300 would be retired. In the army the sharp edge of this axe was felt most keenly by two relatively small groups. The first was the small Officer corps - careful selection, thorough technical training and moulding of character by picked instructors, followed immediately by active service, had produced an officer corps which, though small, was of fine quality. Before and during the war of 1914-18 each young officer saw a brilliant career ahead of him if he survived. The reductions of 1922 dashed these hopes. It was unlikely that there would be any promotion for most of them for ten years at least. Until then they would wear the badges of rank and use the titles attained on active service, but would be paid as subalterns and fill appointments far junior to those that many of them had held for the last two or three years in France or Palestine .

Even more rigorous had been the reduction in rank of the warrant officers, some of whom had become Lieutenant-Colonels and commanded battalions in the war . They were debarred from appointment to the officer corps — the Staff Corps as it was now named — entry to which was reserved to pre-war regular officers and graduates of Duntroon, and became, at the best, quartermasters, wearing without the corresponding pay and without hope of promotion the rank that they had won in the war. Australia’s defence now became tied to the proposed construction of a naval base the naval base at Singapore – not without opposition from the Labour Party As a consequence of the 1923 conference, the Bruce-Page Government decided to buy two 10,000-ton cruisers and two submarines at a cost of some £5,000,000, whereas, over a period of five years, only £1,000,000 would be spent on additional artillery, ammunition and antigas equipment for the army. In these five years expenditure on the navy aggregated £20,000,000; on the army, including the munitions factories, only £10,000,000; on the air force £2,400,000. The strength of the permanent military forces remained at approximately 1,750, whereas that of the navy rose, by 1928, to more than 5,000.

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Stanley Melbourne Bruce, 1st Viscount Bruce of Melbourne, CH, MC, FRS, PC (15 April 1883 – 25 August 1967) was Prime Minister of Australia from February 1923 to 1929. Born in Melbourne, his father was a prominent businessman. He was educated at Glamorgan (now part of Geelong Grammar School), Melbourne Grammar School, and then at Cambridge University. After graduation he studied law in London and was called to the bar in 1907. He practised law in London, and also managed the London office of his father's importing business. When World War I broke out he joined the British Army, and was commissioned into the Worcestershire Regiment, seconded to the Royal Fusiliers. In 1917 he was severely wounded in France, winning the Military Cross and the Croix de Guerre. He was invalided home to Melbourne, and became involved in recruiting campaigns for the Army. His public speaking attracted the attention of the Nationalist Party, and in 1918 he was elected to the House of Representatives as MP for Flinders, near Melbourne. His background in business led to his being appointed Treasurer (Finance Minister) in 1921. The Nationalist Party lost its majority at the 1922 election, and could only stay in office with the support of the Country Party. However, the Country Party let it be known it would not serve under incumbent Prime Minister Billy Hughes. This gave the more conservative members of the Nationalist Party an excuse to force Hughes (whom they had only tolerated to keep the Australian Labor Party out of power) to resign. Bruce was chosen as Hughes's successor, after which a conservative coalition government was formed.

With his aristocratic manners and dress – he drove a Rolls Royce and wore white spats – he was also the first genuinely "Tory" Prime Minister of Australia. Bruce formed an effective partnership with Page, exploiting public fears of Communism and militant trade unions to dominate Australian politics through the 1920s. Despite predictions that Australians would not accept such an aloof leader as Bruce, he won a smashing victory over a demoralised Labour Party at the 1925 election. Throughout his term of office, he pursued a policy of support for the British Empire, the League of Nations, and the White Australia Policy. His government was reelected, though with a significantly reduced majority, in 1928. Strikes of sugar mill workers in 1927, waterside workers in 1928, then of transport workers, timber industry workers and coal miners erupted in riots and lockouts in New South Wales in 1929. Bruce responded with a Maritime Industries Bill that was designed to do away with the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and return arbitration powers to the States. On 10 September 1929, Hughes and five other Nationalist members joined Labor in voting against the Bill. The Bill was lost by 34 votes to 35 when the Speaker abstained, bringing down the Bruce–Page government and forcing the1929 election. Labor, now led by James Scullin, won a landslide victory, scoring an 18-seat swing—at the time, the second-worst defeat of a sitting government in Australian history. Bruce was defeated by Labor's candidate Jack Holloway in his electorate of Flinders, making him the first sitting prime minister to lose his seat.

After his 1929 defeat, Bruce went to England for personal and business reasons, contesting the 1931 election from that country as a member of the United Australia Party (a merger of Bruce's Nationalists and Labor dissidents). He won his seat back and was named a Minister without portfolio in the government of Joseph Lyons. Lyons immediately dispatched Bruce back to England to represent the government there, following which he led the Australian delegation to the 1932 Ottawa Imperial Conference. When Bruce sailed for the UK and then Ottawa in June 1932, his career in politics was over. Well before his return, Lyons offered him the high commissionership in London and when Bruce endeavoured to defer his decision, Lyons forced the issue in September 1933. At Ottawa Bruce consolidated his reputation as a tough negotiator. From there he went to London to renegotiate Australia's debt. Blocked by a government embargo on the raising of new capital, Bruce used his old City contacts to break through. As Australian High Commissioner in London from 1933-45, Bruce secured a solid reputation as an international statesman, travelling between London and Geneva while crisis succeeded crisis and the League of Nations floundered. When Turkey sought revision of the Straits Convention in 1936 Bruce was accepted unanimously as president of the Montreux conference and his chairing of it was widely acclaimed.

Meeting as an equal with British ministers in Geneva, it became easier in London to get access to senior ministers and to confidential information which enabled him to be accepted as an adviser to the British government in his own right, while also acting as the main adviser to the Australian government. His technique was to send a situation-appraisal to his Prime Minister with prior warning of the decision he might need to take, so that in most instances the decision when made was as Bruce advised. During the Abyssinian crisis Bruce was a reluctant supporter of sanctions and among the first to advise reconciliation with Italy after partial sanctions had failed to save Abyssinia. The key to peace in Europe he thought was to detach Italy from Germany. He urged the British to recognize this and to formulate clearly their intentions regarding Germany's claims. France, he repeatedly warned, would drag England into a European war: France would neither concede anything to Germany nor take effective action to block her, would not fight for Czechoslovakia, and could not assist Poland. An “unfulfillable guarantee” to Poland was of utmost danger. In the last days before the war Bruce desperately tried to avert that disaster.

His concern throughout was for the repercussions on Australia of Britain's situation in Europe and her lack of policy on China: Bruce recognized that the real danger to Australia lay in a Pacific war coinciding with a European war. As early as 1933 he was warning Australian ministers that the Royal Navy might not be available when needed: nevertheless he continued seeking assurances that it would. In 1938 he began negotiations for large-scale aircraft production in the Dominions, seeking guaranteed orders and technical assistance from England to make an Australian plant viable. In December 1938 on his way to Australia and in May 1939 on his way back, Bruce had seen the American president. The conversations dealt with the likelihood of American support if Japan moved south, but the president regarded a public commitment as premature. When war started Bruce and Prime Minister (Sir Robert) Menzies were in complete agreement that Australia should not commit its forces to a European war while Japan's intentions were unclear. Foreseeing the rapidity with which Poland would be over run, Bruce had tried to mobilize support for a clear definition of peace aims, hoping thereby to avert the destruction of Europe. Meeting with little success, he had put his hopes on Churchill, only to find he had no aim but to smash Germany. Throughout the “phoney war” Bruce pursued this issue beyond the tolerance of erstwhile admirers in high circles.

Bruce regarding the New Zealand High Commissioner’s support for an ANZAC volunteer unit to fight in Finland alongside the Finns as an unwelcome distraction and was not a supporter of the move – however, he did follow instructions from Menzies to assist New Zealand despite his own misgivings as to the policy being followed. He advocated strongly against any further Australian support being offered, but was over-ruled. The success of the Finns, and the considerable publicity accorded the successes of the Australian Volunteers in Finland led to a further reduction in Menzies’ reliance on Bruce. Nevertheless, Bruce continued on as High Commissioner, loyally serving every wartime Australian government. He joined the War Cabinet in 1942 but had little influence, to his chagrin he found he was invited only on selected occasions and in August 1945 his retirement was announced. In 1947 he became the first Australian created a hereditary peer when he was made Viscount Bruce of Melbourne. He was also the first Australian to take a seat in the House of Lords. Bruce divided the rest of his life between London and Melbourne. He represented Australia on various UN bodies, was the chairman of the World Food Council for five years and was appointed as the first Chancellor of the Australian National University, a position he held from 1951 until 1961. He died in London on 25 August 1967, aged 84.

During this period the strength of the militia varied between 37,000 and 46,000 and it was a nucleus which did not possess the equipment nor receive the training "essential to the effective performance of its functions". It lacked necessary arms, including tanks and anti-aircraft guns and there was not a large enough rank and file with which to train leaders to replace those hitherto drawn from the old A .I .F.—a source of supply which had dried up . In the regular officer corps of 242 officers there was a "disparity of opportunity and stagnation in promotion, with retention in subordinate positions, cannot lead to the maintenance of the active, virile and efficient staff that the service demands". The only mobile regular unit for example was a section of field artillery consisting of fifty-nine men with two guns. In the long debates on the naval proposals of the Bruce-Page Government, the defence policy of the Labour Opposition was defined . Whereas the Government's policy was to emphasise naval expenditure, Labour 's proposal was to rely chiefly on air power and the extension of the munitions industry . However, the Labour party was to be in office for just over two years in the period between the wars. Consequently Australia's defence policy closely followed the principles set down in 1923 – these emphasised ultimate reliance on the British Navy to which Australia would contribute an independent squadron as strong as she considered she could afford, and a reliance on the base at Singapore, from which the British fleet would operate in defence of British Far Eastern and Pacific interests . At the same time a nucleus militia, air force, and munitions industry would be maintained.

The army did not share in the comparatively small increases that were made in the defence vote each year from 1924 to 1928 . The effectiveness of the militia continued to decline while the tiny permanent force together with militia officers and men carried on staunchly despite discouragement and a lack of any material reward. However, the system whereby each young lieutenant spent a year with the British Army in the United Kingdom or India, and a number of more-senior officers were always overseas on exchange duty or attending courses at British schools helped to keep the officer corps from stagnation. Gains in equipment were microscopic: in 1926 the army obtained its first motor vehicles—five 30-cwt lorries, one for each military district except the Sixth (Tasmania), and eight tractors for the artillery; in 1927 four light tanks arrived. Nor could the army comfort itself with the reflection that, when the need arose, it could commandeer even enough horses, because, the breeding of working horses had so declined that Australia was not only losing her export trade in army horses but it was doubtful whether there were enough suitable animals in the continent to mobilise the seven divisions . To the militia officers these circumstances were equally discouraging, and the fact that they were willing to devote their spare time to so exacting a hobby—and a keen officer had to give all his leisure to it - was evidence of uncommon enthusiasm for soldiering and, in most instances, an impelling desire to perform a public service.

http://http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7chLYm2t7ps
By the late 1920s, the numbers of horses in Australia had seriously declined, such that not only was Australia losing her export trade in Army Horses (the famous Walers), it was highly doubtful that there were enough horses available to meet all the transport requirements of the mobilized seven divisions of the Australian Army. This contrast with the situation in WW1, where Australia exported hundreds of thousands of horses for use by the military in the Middle East, Africa and Europe. More horses than men died in WW1.

Peace-time military service conferred little prestige - indeed, an Australian who made the militia a hobby was likely to be regarded by his acquaintances as a peculiar fellow with an eccentric taste for uniforms and the exercise of petty authority. Soldiers and soldiering were in particularly bad odour in the late 'twenties . From 1927 onwards for four or five years, a sudden revival of interest in the war that had ended ten years before produced a series of angry war novels and memoirs of which Remarque's “All Quiet on the Western Front”, Robert Graves' “Good-bye to All That” and Arnold Zweig's “The Case of Sergeant Grischa” were among the most popular. Whether this criticism was right or wrong, these books and the plays and moving pictures that accompanied them undoubtedly did much to mould the attitude of the people generally and particularly of the intelligentsia to war and soldiers, and produced rather widely a conviction that wars are always ineffectual, are brought about by military leaders and by the large engineering industries which profit by making weapons, and that if soldiers and armaments could be abolished wars would cease. It was, however, not so much a desire for disarmament, and for the peace which was widely believed to be the sequel to disarmament, but another factor that was to produce substantial and sudden reductions in the armies and navies of the world. In October 1929 share prices in New York began to collapse; soon the entire world was suffering an acute economic depression.

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Australian Militia in the Inter-war years

The Labour Party had taken office in Australia in October 1929 for the first time since the conscription crisis of 1917, and the day after the first sudden drop on the New York Stock Exchange. Before the full effects of the distant catastrophe were apparent, the new Ministers who, harking back to an old controversy, had promised the electors that if the Labour party was returned it would abolish compulsory training, ordered (on 1st November 1929) that conscription be suspended, and cancelled all military camps arranged for the current year . At the same time the new Prime Minister, Mr Scullin, instructed the Defence Committee to submit an alternative plan for an equally adequate defence. There would, he said, be no discharges of permanent staff . Accordingly the Defence Council submitted a plan, which was eventually adopted, to maintain a voluntary militia of 35,000 with 7,000 senior cadets. The reaction of Mr Roland Green (Country Party) who had lost a leg serving in the infantry in WW1 was an indication of the feelings that were aroused. Green made a bitter speech in the House of Representatives recalling that Scullin and other Labour leaders, including Messrs Makin, Holloway and Blackburn, had attended a Labour Party conference in Perth in June 1918 when a resolution was passed that if the Imperial authorities did not at once open negotiations for peace, the Australian divisions should be brought back to Australia, and calling on the organized workers of every country to take similar action . "As a result of that attitude", said Green, "Labour was out of office in the Commonwealth for thirteen years, largely because of the votes of the soldiers and their friends. During all that time the party nursed its hatred of the soldiers, and now it is seeking revenge"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTm5uXcTrt8
Gallipoli became a core part of the ANZAC mythos, permeating the national cultures of both countries. Part of that myth was the pervasive image of the British General’s as butchers – an image that would result in Australia (and New Zealand to a lesser extent) ensuring it’s Divisions could if necessary refuse to participate in British operations if an action was seen as against Australia’s interests – something that would occur a number of times in WW2: This image is perhaps best portrayed in popular Australasian culture in Eric Bogle’s “The Band Played Waltzing Matilda”

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James Scullin, (18 September 1876 – 28 January 1953), Australian Labor politician and the ninth Prime Minister of Australia. Scullin joined the Labor Party in 1903 and became an organiser for the Australian Workers' Union. In 1913, he became editor of a Labor newspaper in Ballarat, the Evening Echo. Scullin stood for the House of Representatives in 1906 but lost. In 1910 he was elected to the House but was then defeated in 1913 and went back to editing the Evening Echo. He established a reputation as one of Labor's leading public speakers and experts on finance, and was a strong opponent of conscription. After World War I he came close to outright pacifism. In 1922 he won a by-election for the safe Labor seat of Yarra in inner Melbourne, and in 1928 he was elected Labor leader. He was Prime Minister of Australia from 1929 to December 1931, when his government was defeated in a landslide swing to the Opposition. He remained as leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party until 1934, after which he resigned but remained in Parliament as a backbencher until 1949.

The abolition of compulsory military training resulted in the burden of carrying out the new government’s policies falling upon the same small and over-tried team of officers, both professional and amateur, who had tenaciously been maintaining the spirit and efficiency of the citizen army through nine lean years and now had even leaner ones to look forward to. They "rose to the occasion" and in the first four months of 1930 their recruiting efforts produced a new militia of 24,000, with an additional 5,300 in the volunteer senior cadets—a relic of the big, well-organised cadet force in which all boys of 14 to 17 had formerly been given elementary military training. The numbers increased gradually, between 1931 and 1936 the number of militiamen fluctuated between 26,000 and 29,000. This strength, however, was about 2,000 fewer than that of 1901 ; the permanent force too stood at about the same figure as it had twenty-nine years before. In 1901, when the population of Australia was 3,824,000, the permanent forces had been 1,544, the partly-paid militia and unpaid volunteers 27,400. In June 1930, when the population was 6,500,000, the permanent forces totaled 1,669 and the militia 25,785.

The abolition of compulsory training had been based purely on political doctrine but within a few months the depression resulted in still more severe reductions in the three Services. Defence expenditure was reduced from £6,536,000 in 1928-29 to £3,859,000 in 1930-31 and hundreds of officers and men were discharged from all three services. Further discharges were avoided only by requiring officers and men to take up to eight weeks' annual leave without pay. A number of regular officers resigned, others transferred to the British or Indian Armies.

However, before the world had emerged from the depression, signs of war appeared in Asia and Europe. In 1931, Japan had begun to occupy Manchuria, in 1933, Hitler’s National-Socialist movement gained power and Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Before this critical year was over, the need for repairing the armed services was being canvassed by politicians and publicists in Australia . Brig-General McNicoll, one of a group of soldiers, professional and citizen, who had been elected to the Federal Parliament in 1931 when the Labour party was defeated, declared that "a wave of enthusiasm …. has passed over Australia about the need for effective defence". This was perhaps an exaggeration, but nevertheless, there was undoubtedly evidence of some alarm and of an increasing discussion of foreign affairs and their significance to Australia. The response of the United Australia Party, successor to the Nationalist party and now the Government, was cautious. The Government considered that its first responsibility was to bring about economic recovery. Between 1933 and 1935 the defence vote increased only gradually.

The Government adopted its policy ready-made and with little amendment, from the Committee of Imperial Defence. A weakness of this body was that it contained no permanent representatives of the Dominions. Such representatives might be summoned to advise on business that closely affected their governments, and would attend during Imperial conferences, exchange of senior officers in all Services, and the attendance of Dominions' officers at the English staff colleges and the Imperial Defence College somewhat strengthened liaison and encouraged discussion of higher policy. But, if Australian and New Zealand officers at those colleges frequently expressed disagreement with British military policy towards the problem of Japan, for example, that fact was not likely to affect the plans of the Committee of Imperial Defence, whose permanent members, secretary, four assistant secretaries (one from each Service and one from India) were servants of the United Kingdom Government . The committee carried out continuous studies of Imperial war problems but without an influential contribution from the Dominions. It shaped a military policy which carried great weight with Dominion ministers ; yet in the eyes of Dominion soldiers the committee could justly be regarded as a somewhat parochial group, since it was possible that none of its members had ever been in a Dominion or in the Far East .

Within Australia an outcome of dependence on advice from London and the consequent failure to develop a home-grown defence plan was that successive ministers failed also to work out a policy which, while integrated with the plans of the British Commonwealth as a whole, reconciled the differing viewpoints of the army and the navy. Always the ministers' aim seemed to be to make a compromise division of the allotted defence budget (invariably too small to be effective) among three competing services. Both Government and Labour defence theories were strongly criticised. The Government policy was attacked by some Government supporters as well as by the Labour Opposition on the ground that it disregarded that the British Navy did not, and could not spare a sufficient force to command Eastern seas, that Britain lacked the military and air power even to defend her own bases in the East, and therefore that Australia should take what measures she could to defend herself. Labour's policy was denounced because it left out of account that Australia's fate could and probably would be decided in distant seas or on distant battlefields. Gradually those members of the Labour party who had begun to inform themselves upon defence problems discovered that leaders of Australian military thought were able to go part of the way with them .

In their ten-years-old argument against Naval doctrines and particularly against the Singapore thesis the Australian Army leaders had adopted a position not far removed from that which the Labour party was reaching. Thus, when Admiral Richmond, the senior British naval theorist of his day, attacked, in the British Army Quarterly, a theory of Australian defence that resembled the Labour party's in some respects, his argument was countered (in the same journal) by Colonel Lavarack, then Commandant of the Royal Military College, Duntroon. And when, in 1936, a lecture which had been given to a small group of officers sixteen months before by Colonel Wynter, the Director of Military Training, came into the hand of Mr Curtin, leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party, he read it, without betraying its authorship, as a speech in the House, presumably as an expression of the policy of his party. This incident and another similar occurrence in the same year added greatly to the resentment felt by the regular officer corps towards the right-wing political leaders. The copy of Wynter's lecture, which contained substantially the same argument as he had published in an English journal ten years before, had been handed to Curtin by a member of the Government party who, like others of that party, was critical of the Government's defence policy . Four months later Wynter was transferred to a very junior post. One month after Wynter 's demotion Lieut-Colonel Beavis, a highly-qualified equipment officer with long training and experience in England, who had been chosen to advise on and coordinate plans for manufacturing arms and equipment in Australia was similarly transferred to a relatively junior post after differences of opinion with a senior departmental official.

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John Joseph Curtin (8 January 1885 – 5 July 1945), Australian politician, served as the 14th Prime Minister of Australia. Labor under Curtin formed a minority government in 1941 after two independent MPs crossed the floor in the House of Representatives, bringing down the Coalition government of Robert Menzies, resulting in the September 1940 election. Curtin led federal Labor to its greatest win with two thirds of seats in the lower house and over 58 percent of the two-party preferred vote, and 55 percent of the primary vote and a majority of seats in the Senate at the 1943 election. Curtin led Australia when the Australian mainland came under direct military threat during the Japanese advance in World War II. He is widely regarded as one of the country's greatest Prime Ministers. General Douglas MacArthur said that Curtin was "one of the greatest of the wartime statesmen". Curtin died in 1945. It was Curtin’s decision that would see an Australian Division sent to fight alongside the Maavoimat in 1944 and 1945. It was an unpopular decision with many on the left wing of the Labour Party. Ben Chifley, who succeeded Curtin as Prime Minister and who led the Labour Party to victory in 1946, would later say about fighting alongside Finland “It was a decision that was not supported by the Left of the Party, but it was one that resonated with the people of Australian, who still remembered “plucky little Finland” and the part that Australians played in the Winter War - and it certainly helped the Labour Party in the elections of 1946 with the returned soldiers vote.”

From 1935 onwards, defence was becoming a topic of major interest in the newspapers and reviews . More books and pamphlets on the subject were published between 1935 and 1939 than during the previous thirty-four years. Expenditure on defence was slightly increased year by year, and there was an awareness in political circles that there was a growing public opinion in favour of more rapid progress. For the army the three-year plan (for the years 1934-35 to 1936-37) included the purchase of motor vehicles on a limited scale, increased stocks of ammunition, and "an installment of modern technical equipment". The Army could not mobilise even a brigade without commandeering civil vehicles, and now had to base its plans on the assumption that it would be engaged, if war came, against armies (such as the German) whose weapons belonged to a new epoch.

After the Imperial Conference of 1937, Australian Army leaders now pressed for accelerated expenditure on the equipment of the field army, even if it meant rearming the coast defences more slowly, arguing that coast defences might be taken in the rear if the field army was not converted into an effective force. As the threat of war became more apparent so the Labour party, under Curtin's leadership, based its defence policy, at the technical level, more and more definitely on the doctrines of those military and naval critics who contended that Australia first and foremost must prepare defence against invasion during a critical period when she might be isolated from Britain and the United States. The Government leaders however, stood firmly by the decisions of 1923—a "fair contribution" to an "essentially naval" scheme of Imperial defence. Defence expenditure continued to rise year by year, in 1935-36 it reached £7,583,822, which was the largest in any year since WW1. In the next year, the figure rose to £8,829,655. In 1938 (when taxation was increased for the first time since 1932) defence spending rose again.

In 1935, for the first time since the depression, the Army’s budget was raised to approximately the sum that it had received in the mid 1920’s. A relatively young officer, Colonel Lavarack, was promoted over the heads of a number of his colleagues and made Chief of the General Staff . The army whose rebuilding he had to control consisted of 1,800 "permanent" officers and other ranks (compared with 3,000 in 1914) and 27,000 militiamen (compared with 42,000 in 1914). Its equipment had changed little since the A.I.F. had brought it home from France and Palestine ; and it was equipment only of the seven divisions, not for the many supporting units that are needed for an army based on seven divisions—such units had been provided in the war of 1914-18 by the British Army . It lacked mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns; it lacked tanks, armoured cars, and a variety of engineer and signal gear; it had inadequate reserves of ammunition. In recommending how the moderately-increased army vote be spent Lavarack's policy did not differ materially from that laid down fifteen years before by the Senior Officers' Conference of 1920; broadly it was for training of commanders and staff first, equipment next, and, lastly, the training (or semi-training, for that is all it could be) of more militiamen. Full mobilization would bring into the field the five infantry and two cavalry divisions, 200,000 men in all not allowing for reinforcements . To produce such a force would demand an exacting national effort; on the purely military level it would be necessary, for example, for each brigade of three nucleus battalions not only to bring itself to full strength but to produce a fourth battalion. (The army at that time was still planning on a basis of four battalion brigades). The leaders were thus faced with the problem of making plans for a full mobilisation which would entail expanding each so-called brigade of perhaps 900 partly-trained and poorly-equipped militia, without transport, into a full brigade of some 3,600 fully equipped and mobile infantrymen.

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Australian 1930’s Militia Magazine - from 1937

Plans for full mobilisation were based on the assumption that the enemy (Japan) would attack at a time when Australia was isolated from British or American naval aid and would seek a quick decision . The enemy, using carrier-borne aircraft, would, it was assumed, first attempt to destroy the defending air force and to impose a blockade . He would then occupy an advanced naval and air base somewhere outside the relatively well-defended Newcastle-Sydney-Port Kembla area. When his main force was ready he could move overland from this advanced base, whence his force would receive the protection of land-based aircraft, or he could make a new landing farther south . The Australian mobilisation plans provided for the concentration of the greater part of the army in the vital Newcastle-Port Kembla area; the army could not be strong everywhere. It was seen that the accomplishment of even such a modest plan of military defence would take years to achieve despite the larger funds that the Government was then allotting . The sum of £1,811,000 was spent on the army in 1935-36, £2,232,000 in 1936-37, £2,182,000 in 1937-38 ; but one battery of 9.2-inch coast defence guns with its essential equipment cost £300,000, a battery of anti-aircraft guns with its gear and ammunition cost £150,000 . In fact, until the crises of 1938, the army received only enough to repair some of the deficiencies it had suffered under since 1918. The army leaders, in whom the years of parsimony had produced a distrust of politicians, were resolved to spend such funds as they received on something that the politician could not take away from them if the crisis seemed to have passed and the army's income could be cut again . Thus there was this additional reason for giving priority to guns and concrete rather than men and training: that if the vote was again reduced, the guns and concrete would remain.

In the first two months of 1938, events in Europe and China began to move too rapidly to permit leisurely rearmament. Evidence of the alarm that was felt by the Australian Government was provided a month later when the Government announced that it proposed to spend £43,000,000 on the fighting Services and munitions over the next three years. This was more than twice what had been spent in the previous three years. The army would receive £11,500,000, the air force £ 12,500,000 and the navy £15,000,000. Since 1920 the navy had year by year received more money than the army; now, for the first time, the air force too was promised a larger appropriation than the army's. Compared with the sum it had been receiving before, the army's new income, though the least of the three Services’, was astronomical. In December 1938, after the Munich crisis the newly appointed Minister for Defence announced that the total of £43,000,000 for defence would be increased by an additional £19,504,000 to be spent during the three years which would end in 1941. As a result of a recruiting campaign directed by Major-General Sir Thomas Blarney, the militia was increased in numbers from 35,000 in September to 43,000 at the end of 1938 and 70,000, which was the objective, in March 1939 - 22,000 more than the conscripted militia of 1929.

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Men in Melbourne collecting recruitment papers

The promise of funds, the successful recruiting campaign and later, the taking of a national register (which was vehemently resisted by trade union organisations as being a step towards military and industrial conscription) sufficed to give citizens the impression that something was being done . It was too late, however, to achieve before war broke out what was far more important than these parades and promises, namely adequate equipment. Machines and weapons which the Australian Army, like the air force, had ordered four years before had not been delivered from British factories, which were fully employed in a last-minute effort to equip the British Armed Forces.

What had been achieved by twenty years of militia training? There were in 1914 and again in 1939 three kinds of armies. The long service volunteer regular armies of Great Britain and the United States were able to attain a high degree of unit efficiency, though this was offset by the higher commanders' lack of experience in handling large formations. Next in order of efficiency came the large conscript armies of which, in Europe, the German had for generations been the model. With an expert general staff and, in each formation, a strong cadre of professional officers and NCOs, and a rank and file trained for periods ranging up to two or three years, these immense armies were able to move and fight at short notice. In a third category fell the militia armies maintained by nations influenced by a desire for economy or a belief, real or imaginary, in their relative security. Some of these nations—the Swiss for example—managed to create relatively effective militias by insisting on a period of initial training long enough to bring the recruits to a moderate standard of individual efficiency . But in the Australian militia (the British Territorial Army, New Zealand Territorial Army, the Canadian Militia and the United States National Guard fell into much the same category) the recruit lacked this basic training and had to acquire his skill as best he could during evening or one-day parades and brief periods in camp. In Australia, in spite of the brevity of the annual training given to the enthusiastic volunteer militiamen, they were made to undertake complicated and arduous exercises. It was decided that to spend one camp after another vainly trying to reach a good standard of individual training was likely to destroy the keenness of young recruits and was of small value to the leaders.

However, so far as the aim of the Australian system had been to produce an army ready to advance against an enemy or even to offer effective opposition to an invader at short notice it had failed. At no time, either under the compulsory or the voluntary system, had the militia been sufficiently well trained to meet on equal terms an army of the European type based on two or three years of conscript service, and experience was to prove that perhaps six months of additional training with full equipment would be needed to reach such a standard . However, it would be wrong to conclude that the system had not achieved valuable results, and that the devoted effort of the officers and men who had given years of spare-time service had been wasted. The militia had not and could not make efficient private soldiers, but it did produce both a nucleus of officers who were capable of successfully commanding platoons, companies and battalions in action, and a body of useful NCOs. These men were fortunate to have been trained by highly-qualified professional and citizen soldiers who had seen hard regimental service in the war of 1914-18 and were able to hand down to them the traditions of the outstanding force in which they had been schooled (to that extent the militia owed its effectiveness more to the old A .I.F. than to its own system).

And it should not be imagined that, because units were trained for only a week or two a year, the militia officers received no more experience than that. They generally gave much additional time to week-end and evening classes, to tactical exercises without troops and to reading, and the keenest among them attained a thorough knowledge of military fundamentals. A large proportion (but not always large enough, particularly in some city infantry units) were men of good education, and leaders in their professions. Genuine enthusiasm for soldiering was demanded of them, and there were few who did not suffer disadvantages in their civilian work because of their military service. Indeed, an important factor in the small attendances of other ranks at camps was the frequent inability of men to obtain leave from unpatriotic employers (and they were in a majority) except on prejudicial terms such as curtailment of annual vacations and delay in promotion and an efficient officer had to give to military work much time that he could otherwise have spent profitably on his civilian business.

The larger question of what had the Australian Government done between the wars to enable the military to carry out its responsibilities can be summarized briefly? In the inter-war period Australia had become a fully-independent nation, an enhancement of status in which she took some pride. Her population had increased by nearly two million people and her industrial equipment had been vastly elaborated. There had been a corresponding increase in her responsibilities as a member of the British Commonwealth; and the military leaders of the UK had declared that in a major war the immediate help of trained, equipped forces from the Dominions would be needed. Yet in 1939 Australia possessed an army little different in essentials from that of 1914. It was fundamentally a defensive force intended if war broke out to go to its stations or man the coastal forts and await the arrival of an invader. History had proved and was to prove again the futility of such a military policy. The measures that had been taken in the few years of "re-armament" were insignificant in the face of the threat offered by two aggressive Powers, one of which desired to master Europe, the other East Asia.

Next Post: Australian Enters WW2
 
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Good point about the horses. There must have been a long awkward period for most military forces from WW1 to WW2, trying to transition
 
Good point about the horses. There must have been a long awkward period for most military forces from WW1 to WW2, trying to transition

The Allies didn't really transition until WW2 - remember that the BEF commandeered large numbers of civilian vehicles for the Divisions sent to France. Australia, as above, had virtually nothing, NZ and Canada likewise. Germany never really did mechanize - a large percentage of the Heer relied on horse transport thru to the end of WW2. The Red Armyr relied largely on the US for trucks, concentrating their own manufacturing on tanks and the like.

In this scenario, Finland is an unusual case in that the Finns have a reasonable number of trucks in service as of late 1939, and have organised themselves such that almost all civilian trucks can be mobilized into the Maavoimat in the event of war. Logging trucks and all :D. But on the outbreak of WW2, no one country really was mechanized to any great extent - even the Finns still relied to a large degree on horses, even in this ATL.

Hence the Australian "Buy a Ford for Finland" campaign.
 
Just a little nitpick. Finnish flag over Berlin looks really wrong. Arms of the cross should be at least two times wider.
 
The Allies didn't really transition until WW2 - remember that the BEF commandeered large numbers of civilian vehicles for the Divisions sent to France. Australia, as above, had virtually nothing, NZ and Canada likewise. Germany never really did mechanize - a large percentage of the Heer relied on horse transport thru to the end of WW2. The Red Armyr relied largely on the US for trucks, concentrating their own manufacturing on tanks and the like.

In this scenario, Finland is an unusual case in that the Finns have a reasonable number of trucks in service as of late 1939, and have organised themselves such that almost all civilian trucks can be mobilized into the Maavoimat in the event of war. Logging trucks and all :D. But on the outbreak of WW2, no one country really was mechanized to any great extent - even the Finns still relied to a large degree on horses, even in this ATL.

Hence the Australian "Buy a Ford for Finland" campaign.

I was talking to Dad about the family farm some time ago and he said that they mechanised largely around WW2, but that this was not complete till after the War. They got rid of a lot of the horses and teams in the late 1930s, but kept using them for the High Country mustering until the 1970s. IIRC most of the horse support infrastructure or specialist support staff on the farm went away during the War and never really came back.
 
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