What if Eichelberger had taken command of the US 1st Army?

[phil5775]

In the summer of 1943, Lt. General Robert Eichelberger, commander of the 8th US Army in the Pacific, was under consideration to be the commander of the US Army forces in Britain and to lead them in the D-Day invasion. George Marshall inquired about his availability, but Douglas MacArthur refused to let him go, for whatever reason.

If Eichelberger had gone to Europe, would the American assault on Omaha beach have gone differently? He was much more knowledgeable than Omar Bradley in amphibious doctrine, having more actual experience as well as more combat experience in general. He would have applied Pacific doctrine to the assault, i.e. more and longer naval gunfire support, and may have dismissed the use of the DD tanks, instead focusing on the LVT's which were available in Britain at the time.

 

[Aber]

I can only see 2 months combat experience at division level for Eichelberger with no amphibious landings, while Bradley has Corps command experience in Tunisia and Sicily?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... while Bradley has Corps command experience in Tunisia and Sicily?

About two months worth of actual combat as well. Bradley did have the amphib portion of Operation Husky for his experiece, but he had little other direct experience or training. His stateside training was a brief three or four day canned familarization exercise as division commander. Beyond that he did have two months combat experience fighting Germans and their tanks.

Eichelberger had commanded US I Corps in 1942, & replaced Stilwell as commander of US forces in the intended Gymnast/Torch operation. In preparation for that he commanded the ground force in corps size amphibious training exercises under the tutalage of Admiral Hewitt. Eichelberger took the staff of I Corps to the South Pacific at MacArthurs request for a corps HQ & commander. After bailing out the 32d Div at Buna he carried through the campaign commanding a combined US Australian 'group' with the I Corps staff. Of course all that was against Japanese & in pestilent forests & swamps.

I suspect Eichelberger was the better of the two, but given the overall situation of the Neptune operation and the Normandy campaign his performance may have been 'different' but no better in result than Bradleys.

 

[Aber]

Agreed. The suggested more and longer naval gunfire support is also problematical in Normandy, as it allows the Germans more time to respond and in particular move panzer divisions closer.

Omaha beach may be perceived to be a failure, but IIRC casualties were lower than planned, and the defences had been effectively pierced in a few hours.

 

[phil5775]

Agreed. The suggested more and longer naval gunfire support is also problematical in Normandy, as it allows the Germans more time to respond and in particular move panzer divisions closer.


The intent of the longer naval barrage is to prevent the Germans from responding. Sustained gunfire would suppress the German guns, except perhaps for the ones deeply entrenched in the concrete pillboxes, but would do damage to the machine gun and mortar nests at the edge of the beach. As for the panzers, they weren't moving anywhere until dark anyway. They too would be prime targets for the naval guns as well as for the Allied fighter-bombers, who wouldn't have been limited by the low cloud ceiling.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The naval gunfire program for the US beaches were something Bradley was led to & not from him. Yes with insistence the preparatory fire could have been longer & slightly more effective. What was needed tho was greater intensity in the half hour before H Hour & a shorter time between cessation and the first wave onto the beach. Admiral Hewitt did what he could in this regard, but what he had was all provided to him. The heavy bomber attack was a effort to provide that last minute surge of intense fires, as was the rocket bombardment launched from sea, and the few dozen DUKW mounted howitzers. Who would think that all three extra preparatory fire methods would fail? Or that all the DD tanks would fail to reach the beach their five minutes ahead of the infantry? Or that every Naval Gun Fire Spotting Team would be hors combat in ten minutes of setting foot on the beach.

This last was in my view the most severe failure of the fire support for the infantry/engineers assaulting Omaha Beach. The NGF spotting teams assigned to each of the six assault battalions ceased transmitting at H hour and as far as I have been able to determine that radio frequency was dead for nearly two hours. The revival of communications with the NGF ships shortly before 08:30 had a great deal to do with renewed progress against the German resistance nests.

It is not clear that Eichelberger would have brought anything different from his experience in the Pacific that would have changed much of this. Maybe more research into Eichelbergers experince in the PTO would suggest one way or the other.

..... As for the panzers, they weren't moving anywhere until dark anyway. They too would be prime targets for the naval guns as well as for the Allied fighter-bombers, who wouldn't have been limited by the low cloud ceiling.

The 21st Pz Div did move during daylight on the morning of 6th June, as did all the other Pz Div & mobile units ordered to march. They attempted to do so on the 7th June as well. It took two days of constant harrasment to understand things were different than on the Russian Front.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Agreed. The suggested more and longer naval gunfire support is also problematical in Normandy, as it allows the Germans more time to respond and in particular move panzer divisions closer.

Judging from German accounts suprise was lost about two minutes after the first paratroop sticks touched down. Commanders were rousted from bed before 02:00, the alarm had reached all the billets by 02:30. On Utah & Omaha Beaches at least the company commanders were reporting their men in place by 05:00 and some were being dispatched to the field kitchens for breakfast. I cant recall exactly when the alarm reached the 21st Pz Div, but it was certainly long before dawn.

Omaha beach may be perceived to be a failure, but IIRC casualties were lower than planned, and the defences had been effectively pierced in a few hours.

Some riflemen on the far left flank or east end of O Beach reached the bluff crest about 07:30, a hour or less after they touched shore. At about 08:30 the German regimental commander responsible for the sector reported to the division HQ by telephone; that several of his companies were no longer reporting, enemy infantry were among the defenses behind the beaches, and his reserves were not of use. He my have had other complaints I cant recall at the moment.

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

Admiral Hewitt did what he could in this regard, but what he had was all provided to him.

Hewitt was not at Normanady. He commanded 8th Fleet in the Mediterianan. British Admiral Bertram Ramsey was teh overall naval commander. Alan Kirk commanded teh US forces. John Hall led teh navy at Omaha.

 

[TFSmith121]

GS Patton had more amphibious experience in 1944 than either of them

He had commanded the Western Task Force/I Armored Corps/Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet for TORCH and the 7th Army for HUSKY.

Putting aside the obvious issue of FORTITUDE, I think a Patton-Hewitt-Keyes-Bradley command team might have been very effective for the Western Task Force during OVERLORD.

Notwithstanding the fact that 1st Army (V and VII corps) was well established ashore and moving forward by the afternoon of D-Day; as brutal as the Omaha assault was, it - and Utah - were both clear successes.

Both owed a lot to having general officers (Cota and Roosevelt, respectively) on the scene early on.

Best,

 

[NoOneFamous]

He had commanded the Western Task Force/I Armored Corps/Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet for TORCH and the 7th Army for HUSKY.

Putting aside the obvious issue of FORTITUDE, I think a Patton-Hewitt-Keyes-Bradley command team might have been very effective for the Western Task Force during OVERLORD.

Notwithstanding the fact that 1st Army (V and VII corps) was well established ashore and moving forward by the afternoon of D-Day; as brutal as the Omaha assault was, it - and Utah - were both clear successes.

Both owed a lot to having general officers (Cota and Roosevelt, respectively) on the scene early on.

Best,

Patton was not going to get the 1st Army or command the landing, he was still in the dog house over the slapping incident.

 

[TFSmith121]

Patton was "redeemed" in 1943

There is a reason he was in the UK for Fortitude, as opposed to an assignment like the Central Defense Command like Fredendall - GSP was named CG of 3rd Army in January, 1944.

Having said that, I understand the DDE-Bradley-Patton dynamics; however, it is quite clear that Patton would have been a better choice for OVERLORD than Bradley or Eichelberger, in the same sense that Bradley was a better choice than Eichelberger in 1943.

Best,

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Alan Kirk commanded teh US forces. John Hall led teh navy at Omaha.

I meant to say...

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Having said that, I understand the DDE-Bradley-Patton dynamics; however, it is quite clear that Patton would have been a better choice for OVERLORD than Bradley or Eichelberger, in the same sense that Bradley was a better choice than Eichelberger in 1943.

Strictly from the stand point of practical experience Mark Clark would have been a better candidate for Op. Neptune than Bradley, Patton, or the others proposed here. He had first planned a division size amphib op in November-Dec 1939 which was executed in January 1940. Later in 1942 he had been involved in planning the Op Torch landings, the early planning for Op Husky (before Patton took over as 7th Army commander) and was further involved in planning that at Ikes level. Then went on to plan and execute operations Avalanche and Shingle.

If you want someone with Clarks level of experience, but a better combat record, then Krueger would have been a good choice. He had proved years earlier he knew how to get the most out of Patton, and handled a long series of difficult operation in the South Pacific. I cant say he would have brought much more direct experience from the PTO than Eichelberger, but he did develop a credible track record.

 

[Aber]

Of course nobody has mentioned Patch, who did arrive in Europe after Corps level combat command in the Pacific...

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

But Patch did get a army in Europe, and did well with it. His experience with amphibious operations in the Pacific was none or nearly none. So, no advantage over Eichelberger, Patton, Clark or many others in that skill set.

 

[TFSmith121]

Planning experience is helpful, but operational

experience trumps. GSP was the most experienced by far.

Best,

 

[Aber]

But Patch did get a army in Europe, and did well with it.

Agreed, but IIRC his Pacific experience was not used in the Overlord planning, and it took him some time to get an Army in combat - highlighting that Eichelburger was not going to get command of First Army, as suggested in the opening post.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Agreed, but IIRC his Pacific experience was not used in the Overlord planning, ...

That was one of my points, Patch had little or no combat experience at amphib. ops from the Pacific. After the Guadalcanal campaign ended he was ordered back to the US and a corps command there. Collins did remain in the PTO a few months longer and commanded the 24th ID for the New Georgia landings. Still not much compared to the experince of Clark, Patton, or Krueger.

 

[TFSmith121]

If GSP is the designated CG for 1st Army, with

Keyes and Bradley as his corps commanders, it is possible Terry Allen is still CG of the 1st Division, with either TR Jr. OR Clarence Huebner as ADC.

That also raises the possibility that the US assault divisions may be something other that the 1st, 4th, and 29th...the 9th "Old Reliables" under Manton Eddy seems like a likely choice for GSP.

Given an RA focus, the 29th might not be in the first wave, either. The 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 8th would presumably all have been available...so maybe the 1st, 4th, and 9th on D-Day?

Best,

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The 9th ID did have a bit more combat experience than the 29th, conversely the 29th had done little else but train for the beach assault. some people argue they were overtrained if that is possible. Maybe the experince of the 9th ID would have allowed it to overcome the failures in fire support better. The 1st ID suffered slightly less in casualties than the 29th ID, and infiltrated between the enemy strongpoints a bit faster, but that may have in part been circumstances and not combat experience.

The failures in fire support that occured on Omaha Beach were so far out of the hands of the Army leaders that it seems irrelevant who would be in charge. Not much Patton could have done about all the NGF spotting teams gunned down in a few minutes, or the 8th Air Force missing its targets by 2-3 kilometers.

Perhaps some expert on Patton can point to specifics he might have done differently in planning or preparation? Or any other alternate leader? My thoughts revolve around the timing and details of the preparatory fires, and on different/better fire support communications.