There are 2 reasons I keep on hearing why Gallipoli was an embarassing defeat for the british. 1. Ataturk's Genius, 2. Churchill underestimating his enemies. Personally, I think the campaign could be a success, or it might fail, like in OTL, but with way more casualties for the turks and slightly less for the brits
What if Churchill didn't under-estimate the Turks at gallipoli?
- Thread starter Wr1t3r
- Start date
Yeah. I've read that the Sultan and the Ottoman government were getting ready to leave Constantinople because the running of the Dardanelles looked like it was going to succeed before the Admiral in charge got too nervous he was destroying "the King's ships". But admittedly I did read that in a Churchill biography, so no clue if the author was downplaying other elements going on at the time.
I've always thought that if they did a "Gallipoli" style campaign in conjunction with the running of the Dardanelles, not separately weeks/months apart, then the campaign might have succeeded. Of course it might depend on if Bulgaria honors their treaty with the Ottomans sends troops to support them or decides to retake eastern Thrace that was lost during the 2nd Balkan War.
Of course my knowledge about everything could be completely inadequate that my answer is laughable.
You need a bit of both. You have to accept the coasts which frankly no one in that campaign wanted to do.
The navy didn't want to accept the cost if forcing the battle so they turned back and the invasion plan was put forward.
But then again the navy didnt want to pay the cost yo put the invasion troops down where they should have been closer to the goal.
Then when the troops landed and faced harder opposition instead of paying the admittedly extreme cost and pushing forward as fast as possible they tried yo be more careful and got bogged down into the stand still that lead to the defeete.
It is funny considering that in France the officers would keep pushing harder then they should have. But we basically have the opposite issue in this area.
Ideally they plan from day one to go for a combined mission. Sent in the sweepers and the big ships and pay the piper. Once you are more or less in control land the troops to take the whole mess.
The cost in ships and lives would have been extreme but that was simple reality in WW1. That sounds horrible but look at the loses they took for absolutely nothing gained.
It was like D-Day. Some of the beaches took HUGE casulaties to get off the beach. And considering this is WW1 with its higher butchers bill and that the ability to land the troops and supplies is much worse then what was worked out in WW2 the cost will be horrendous no matter what.
But if they had succedded it would have had a huge effect on the war. And very well may have saved more lives then it cost.
And pretty much all the navies in WW1 were gun shy. The cost and the amount of time it took to build new ships meant that no one was willing to use their navy fir what it was built for. Even at Jutland both sides were overly causious. Germany more so. And of course the argument can be made that the German Fleet was a horrible waste of money as it was hardly ever used. And never really used as fully as intended because of the amount it costs.
This is going to sound horrible. But the navy and the Army and the military and governments in general were much more willing yo kill 10000 soldiars and lose them and there equipment then they were willing to risk 1500 salers and their ship. Because the SHIP took yo long yo replace and cost to much. It is cherp to replace a soldier. a couple months training and you are hood to go. A battleship was expensive and hard to replace.
So when the Navy was involved we tend to see caution in WW1.
The navy didn't want to accept the cost if forcing the battle so they turned back and the invasion plan was put forward.
But then again the navy didnt want to pay the cost yo put the invasion troops down where they should have been closer to the goal.
Then when the troops landed and faced harder opposition instead of paying the admittedly extreme cost and pushing forward as fast as possible they tried yo be more careful and got bogged down into the stand still that lead to the defeete.
It is funny considering that in France the officers would keep pushing harder then they should have. But we basically have the opposite issue in this area.
Ideally they plan from day one to go for a combined mission. Sent in the sweepers and the big ships and pay the piper. Once you are more or less in control land the troops to take the whole mess.
The cost in ships and lives would have been extreme but that was simple reality in WW1. That sounds horrible but look at the loses they took for absolutely nothing gained.
It was like D-Day. Some of the beaches took HUGE casulaties to get off the beach. And considering this is WW1 with its higher butchers bill and that the ability to land the troops and supplies is much worse then what was worked out in WW2 the cost will be horrendous no matter what.
But if they had succedded it would have had a huge effect on the war. And very well may have saved more lives then it cost.
And pretty much all the navies in WW1 were gun shy. The cost and the amount of time it took to build new ships meant that no one was willing to use their navy fir what it was built for. Even at Jutland both sides were overly causious. Germany more so. And of course the argument can be made that the German Fleet was a horrible waste of money as it was hardly ever used. And never really used as fully as intended because of the amount it costs.
This is going to sound horrible. But the navy and the Army and the military and governments in general were much more willing yo kill 10000 soldiars and lose them and there equipment then they were willing to risk 1500 salers and their ship. Because the SHIP took yo long yo replace and cost to much. It is cherp to replace a soldier. a couple months training and you are hood to go. A battleship was expensive and hard to replace.
So when the Navy was involved we tend to see caution in WW1.
Four decades ago I sat through one of many school room lectures on amphibious warfare. This particular two hour session deconstructed both Gallipoli operations in detail. Churchills fuzzy thinking was the least of the problems. For several previous centuries the British had been the masters of the combined operations, the littoral warfare. Suddenly the became to poster child of how not to do it. There were a variety of reasons for that, but one is that several of the wrong men were in charge. The same mistakes in this one applied to a land operation would have resulted in a equally barfed up land offensive.
I don't think the failure was down to Churchill underestimating the Turks, but rather the low priority the operation got. Had it been launched when intended, and as intended, there would have been fewer troops opposing the landed forces. Whether this could have allowed the peninsula to be cleared is an interesting avenue, but certainly an earlier landing wouldn't have hurt the chances of a breakout.
The general idea - outflanking an otherwise impenetrable front - did make strategic sense, and especially when there was a reasonable chance of bringing a few hundred thousand Greek troops on board. That may never have been diplomatically realistic, but was a tempting prospect.
Other factors like misjudging the number of mines, misjudging the effectiveness of aerial mine spotting, and using civilian mine sweeping crews also played a part, as did Government reluctance to risk obsolete ships with skeleton vrews (that could be saved quite easily if the ships did take a hit) using up ageing ammunition on a potentially worthwhile target.
I'll agree it went wrong, and that Churchill was the man to carry the can for it (even if some of the problems may have been the result of the actions of others) but it looks less like underestimation of the Turks, and more like overoptimism and a failure to deal with those who wanted everything prioritised fir the Western Front.
For sure if it had worked as intended, it would have potential for a big change even without Greek participation. Even if it still took months to get the fleet through to threaten Constantinople, the threat of it once Gallipoli had been cleared would cause major headaches for the Turks and Germans.
The general idea - outflanking an otherwise impenetrable front - did make strategic sense, and especially when there was a reasonable chance of bringing a few hundred thousand Greek troops on board. That may never have been diplomatically realistic, but was a tempting prospect.
Other factors like misjudging the number of mines, misjudging the effectiveness of aerial mine spotting, and using civilian mine sweeping crews also played a part, as did Government reluctance to risk obsolete ships with skeleton vrews (that could be saved quite easily if the ships did take a hit) using up ageing ammunition on a potentially worthwhile target.
I'll agree it went wrong, and that Churchill was the man to carry the can for it (even if some of the problems may have been the result of the actions of others) but it looks less like underestimation of the Turks, and more like overoptimism and a failure to deal with those who wanted everything prioritised fir the Western Front.
For sure if it had worked as intended, it would have potential for a big change even without Greek participation. Even if it still took months to get the fleet through to threaten Constantinople, the threat of it once Gallipoli had been cleared would cause major headaches for the Turks and Germans.
To answer the question the OP asked…. what if Churchill didn't under estimate the Turks.
We have two asnwers
1) The answer to the asked question.: Nothing changes, Why? Contrary to popular opinion Churchill was not the ONLY person involved in planning this. Nor was he 100% in charge. And they were advised on at least two seperate ocations durring the planning that they didnt have enough troops involved. Yet they ignored this advice. So if we JUST have Churchill realize that the Turks are not going yo roll over, thrn nothing will change as the rest if the folks involved will still under estimate the Turks.
2) if we answer what i think the OP ment to ask. What happens if the Planners (including Churchill ) dont under estimate the Turks. Here we have two possible out comes
A) The attack never happens. This is the simgle most likly out come. Why? Because to truly ensure the attack goes off against the Turks requires three things that GB does not have enough of. 1) Troops. The attack should have had Tens of thousands of more troops. One early suggested was 100 thousand plus troops. A request durring the fighting was fir something like 90 thousand more troops. This is a total that GB just cant/wont spare to a ”side show”. The second thing they dont have enough of is transportation. Both the ships to get that many troops there and the ability to land that many troops in any practical way in any reasonable amount of time. and the third thing that GB does jot have is the ability to support that many troops that far from a major base. The logistics of that is simply beyond what they could commit to this battle.
B) Alternatively t he attack could be reworked. If the planners look at the above point(s) they may look for alternatives. A better combined attack perhaps. If you land the troops closer together and in a better location and then send in the war ships perhaps you will force the Turks to split their attention. Thus the ground assult may go better and you may have less artillery to go after the fleet. And maybe knowing that this is a joint operation we get better command on the ground and they push forward instead of standing around looking for orders. At the same time maybe the Fleet presses on not wanting to be out-shown by the Army.
Frankly i think the most likly outcome of not underestimating how hard this would be is simply that the whole idea is dropped as not being worth the cost.
We have two asnwers
1) The answer to the asked question.: Nothing changes, Why? Contrary to popular opinion Churchill was not the ONLY person involved in planning this. Nor was he 100% in charge. And they were advised on at least two seperate ocations durring the planning that they didnt have enough troops involved. Yet they ignored this advice. So if we JUST have Churchill realize that the Turks are not going yo roll over, thrn nothing will change as the rest if the folks involved will still under estimate the Turks.
2) if we answer what i think the OP ment to ask. What happens if the Planners (including Churchill ) dont under estimate the Turks. Here we have two possible out comes
A) The attack never happens. This is the simgle most likly out come. Why? Because to truly ensure the attack goes off against the Turks requires three things that GB does not have enough of. 1) Troops. The attack should have had Tens of thousands of more troops. One early suggested was 100 thousand plus troops. A request durring the fighting was fir something like 90 thousand more troops. This is a total that GB just cant/wont spare to a ”side show”. The second thing they dont have enough of is transportation. Both the ships to get that many troops there and the ability to land that many troops in any practical way in any reasonable amount of time. and the third thing that GB does jot have is the ability to support that many troops that far from a major base. The logistics of that is simply beyond what they could commit to this battle.
B) Alternatively t he attack could be reworked. If the planners look at the above point(s) they may look for alternatives. A better combined attack perhaps. If you land the troops closer together and in a better location and then send in the war ships perhaps you will force the Turks to split their attention. Thus the ground assult may go better and you may have less artillery to go after the fleet. And maybe knowing that this is a joint operation we get better command on the ground and they push forward instead of standing around looking for orders. At the same time maybe the Fleet presses on not wanting to be out-shown by the Army.
Frankly i think the most likly outcome of not underestimating how hard this would be is simply that the whole idea is dropped as not being worth the cost.
Germaniac
Donor
As others have noted, the plan was to run the fleet up the Bosporus, regardless of losses, and force the Ottomans to surrender by putting the Capital (and only real center of any industry or war production) under the direct threat of Naval Guns. While I don't have any sources to back me up on this apart from Dan Carlin, losing these old pre-dreadnoughts was seen as acceptable losses to the admiralty and had they pushed they would have succeeded (though there would have been even more losses than expected).
It would be looked back on, historically, as a silly idea that cost the lives of thousands of sailors... but would have at least knocked Constantinople out of the War and probably the Ottomans as a whole. Historians would attack Churchill for not accounting for the Ottoman fortresses and not providing for an accompanying land invasion in Gallipoli, leading to the loss of more ships than needed. It would be viewed as a Pyrrhic victory and Churchill will likely lose his job under some other pretext...
It would be looked back on, historically, as a silly idea that cost the lives of thousands of sailors... but would have at least knocked Constantinople out of the War and probably the Ottomans as a whole. Historians would attack Churchill for not accounting for the Ottoman fortresses and not providing for an accompanying land invasion in Gallipoli, leading to the loss of more ships than needed. It would be viewed as a Pyrrhic victory and Churchill will likely lose his job under some other pretext...
Straight up the belly? Not sure if that was the best idea.
*I know "Naval Gauntlet" is what it was supposed to be.
Germaniac
Donor
The point was that they were using old ships no longer useful for frontline service and would likely be scrapped after the war regardless. They were expendable… but their crews didn’t agree.
Its worth noting again the lead ships of the flotilla were at the last minefield. Once that was past there were negligible defenses. No significant artillery along the rest of the Bosporus, few war ships, few to none pesky torpedo boats. There were good reasons the Ottoman government was on the edge of departure.
And i doubt that a land invasion was truly possible at that time and at that distance. The US and GB and their Allie’s had a hard time in WW2 pulling off major landings from the sea and that was with improved tactics, much better technology including better landing craft and radios to keep command and control sort of working and all of this backed by the huge US industrial and logistics systems,
Considering how many troops the Turks could bring yo the fight I am not convinced that it was possible to take Constantinople from the land with a seaborne invasion At that time.
Considering how many troops the Turks could bring yo the fight I am not convinced that it was possible to take Constantinople from the land with a seaborne invasion At that time.
The British were successful at amphibious/littoral/combined operations for several centuries. There was no fundamental reason they could not have made a successful effort in this case. Other than the leaders screwed it up. Among other items...
Security was bad. Information on what the Brit Army and Navy were up to flowed from Egypt to Instambul. Sloppy security practices and hostile members of the Egyptian population meant the Ottomans did not need a first class spy network.
Unity of command was bad. What passed as a joint command/HQ was ineffective and the Army/Navy That created disconnects or friction within the operating plan and uncoordinated decisions during execution.
Speed was lacking. Preparations were lackadaisical, and execution was much slower than necessary.
A rehearsal of the landing phase was attempted, but badly and incompletely done. What flaws in the landing plan were revealed were not effectively corrected.
Lateral communication or information flow between the scattered landing groups was near non existent. The landing force commander & his staff managed to create a discombobulated information flow between themselves and the several landing force commanders.
Maneuver was botched. The landing plan led the assault groups into strong points. That the Ottomans had installed a field army in the Dardanelles was not effectively recognized by the plan.
None of these or the other mistakes were inevitable. The Brits regularly avoided making messes like this in the 19th Century or earlier. Why the Army and Navy flag rank officers botched this one has been the subject of several books. In the 1920s and 1930s most armies and navies took a look at the Gallipoli campaign, frequently in a formal school study program. Since the 1940s in depth study has fallen off, but reviewing the existing literature provides some insights to the multiple bad decisions.
Security was bad. Information on what the Brit Army and Navy were up to flowed from Egypt to Instambul. Sloppy security practices and hostile members of the Egyptian population meant the Ottomans did not need a first class spy network.
Unity of command was bad. What passed as a joint command/HQ was ineffective and the Army/Navy That created disconnects or friction within the operating plan and uncoordinated decisions during execution.
Speed was lacking. Preparations were lackadaisical, and execution was much slower than necessary.
A rehearsal of the landing phase was attempted, but badly and incompletely done. What flaws in the landing plan were revealed were not effectively corrected.
Lateral communication or information flow between the scattered landing groups was near non existent. The landing force commander & his staff managed to create a discombobulated information flow between themselves and the several landing force commanders.
Maneuver was botched. The landing plan led the assault groups into strong points. That the Ottomans had installed a field army in the Dardanelles was not effectively recognized by the plan.
None of these or the other mistakes were inevitable. The Brits regularly avoided making messes like this in the 19th Century or earlier. Why the Army and Navy flag rank officers botched this one has been the subject of several books. In the 1920s and 1930s most armies and navies took a look at the Gallipoli campaign, frequently in a formal school study program. Since the 1940s in depth study has fallen off, but reviewing the existing literature provides some insights to the multiple bad decisions.
Amphibious landings in 1700s and early to mid 1800s are NOT the same thing as an amphibious landing in WW1. GB had been successfull with is calvery and it other troops before WW1 but they got hung up like everyone else in France.
Past history was no NO help in WW1. Technology had cause a huge change in wars.
The artillery, the accuracy of modern guns. the spead and power of modern rifles. and of course the machine gun all made things much more dificult to advance in WW1 then in the past. The Crimean and the American Civil War started to show this trend but during WW1 it was at its peak. And the amount of ammunition and supplies needed in WW1 was drastically different than what was needed in say 1812.
So I stand by my belief that a successful invasion on the scale it would have been required to order to take Constantinople is just not feasible at that time. Especially as GB was sinking so much into the war in France, And the fight vs German subs and raiders,
Past history was no NO help in WW1. Technology had cause a huge change in wars.
The artillery, the accuracy of modern guns. the spead and power of modern rifles. and of course the machine gun all made things much more dificult to advance in WW1 then in the past. The Crimean and the American Civil War started to show this trend but during WW1 it was at its peak. And the amount of ammunition and supplies needed in WW1 was drastically different than what was needed in say 1812.
So I stand by my belief that a successful invasion on the scale it would have been required to order to take Constantinople is just not feasible at that time. Especially as GB was sinking so much into the war in France, And the fight vs German subs and raiders,
It didn't help that the officers in charge of the Gallipoli operation weren't the first team, who were busy in France and the North Sea.
That's a good point, and some of Chuchill's descriptions of last minute changes and general disorganisation support that.
However, the evacuation went very well, so there must have been some good organisers in theatre. Perhaps the success of the evacuation was because they were allowed to get on with it without interference.
yea this was the B team and the plan kept changing. But the reality is that while they could have done better then they did They were just not going to achieve the goals with the numbers that they had. If you give them the choice leaders then you will simply get farther inland before they get bogged down. Either way we are sitting here today in 2024 debating why it failed. IOTL they hardly got off the beaches because of bad leadership of lack of leadership when they lost communications. And several other factors such as wrong landing site for some of them and so on.
In an Alt history with better leaders they get off the beach. They may even join up. But as history shows the Turks had competent enough leadership and numbers enough that they will ultimately bottle up the invaders before they can get to the City.
In an Alt history with better leaders they get off the beach. They may even join up. But as history shows the Turks had competent enough leadership and numbers enough that they will ultimately bottle up the invaders before they can get to the City.
That all applies very well to the landing as executed. A pity I did not save the lecture notes from the class on this of 1982. So many items I can't remember The bulk of the criticism there was aimed at planning and preparations reaching back to when the first attempt needed. Two or the items I do recall were: the point about speed in standing up the operation - getting ready, and security. That the Ottomans had good information the British were coming allowed them to concentrate field forces with some confidence. Proper security, never mind a functional deception operation, would have left the Ottoman commanders still wondering where or even if the Brits would strike again.
Beyond that the lack of speed in preparation allowed the Ottomans time to bring those forces to the Dardenells, bring them up to strength, and prepare defenses.
This was I believe was a major point of the lecture. The Brit leaders had screwed themselves out a victory long before the first soldier stepped into a landing boat. The landing force needed to cross the beach weeks earlier, before the Ottoman defense solidified. As a number of historians have pointed out, the Ottoman leadership was was ready to give up the Bosphorus, Istanbul, and the rest of it and move the government inland when the first ships only attempt was made. A weak crops landed then, or within a few weeks would have had a better chance of success than the larger army sent later.
Say the ships alone go ahead to ride or die, and the Ottoman government skips town for inland.
Inland to where? Inland to Thrace in Europe? Edirne/Adrianople? Or inland in Anatolia to Bursa or even Ankara?
Flight of govt leadership, and ship bombardments and fires would lead to mass panics and civilian flight from the city, making for a mess and prestige hit for Ottoman authorities.
The Ottoman authorities at that point could do a suing for peace in general, or fight on from their new inland capital.
If suing for peace in general, are they just saying unconditionally, or seeking terms, and likely to try to hold old for peace terms on a territorial status quo ante bellum basis (pre-war borders) or a territorial uti possedetis basis (everybody keeps what they got right now) or a set of extensive territorial concessions to the Entente based on what all expected the Entente could easily or inevitably seize? [the battle lines at this stage of 1915 had the Ottomans in control of most of their pre-war territory, in the Palestine theater, actually in occupation of some Egyptian Sinai, having only lost very small bits of land in northeast Anatolia along the border, and some of southeastern Iraq north of Basra and Kuwait]
If the Ottomans either seek general terms, or do not, but continue resistance for the time being, just from an inland capital, they could leave Constantinople bombarded and practically defenseless except for whatever pitiful batteries get suppressed there quickly by ship fire. Or, they could proclaim Constantinople an open city, to try to get it spared bombardment from that point on.
Continued bombardment and destruction of crowded Constantinople quarters when it's clear the city is defenseless could become a PR problem for Britain and the Entente, not just a martial embarrassment for the Ottomans, especially if the British Fleet continues with a destructive bombardment of residential quarters after an Ottoman proclamation of it as an "open city".
Of course the British might be a couple weeks from having sizable, self-sufficient landing parties at hand to take occupation of even an open city, because there will be plenty of infantry and police around.
Things could get messy, if the Ottomans, as a ruse of war, accepted a naval landing party from ships then bumrushed it to take hostages.
If the Ottoman government is running things from an inland capital, and the ships are dominating the straits, but it is still taking many weeks to assemble an adequate landing party to secure the shores of the straits, would the Ottomans in either Thrace or Anatolia or both use the time to rush concentrate artillery into coastal positions against the ships of the fleet and start striking them?