What did the French in 1940 think defeat would look like?

[white crowe]

The events of 1940 were obviously deeply shocking to France and the wider world but, while they likely thought the balance of power favoured them, they must have expected some serious attempt by Germany to win the war.

Were there any ideas in French military circles what this might have looked like?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thats a really deep question, I'd recommend the following English language studies:

Shire 'The Third Republic'

Horne 'To Lose a Battle'

Chapman 'Why France Fell'

Chapman 'Seeds of Disaster'

Jackson 'The Fall of France'

Paxton 'Vichy France'

Jackson 'The Dark Years'

At some risk of distortion of the subject I'll venture the following.

Defeat was a academic question used by the Defense ministry and military to determine what the needed to avoid it. That is they considered what they thought were the German capabilities and then how to defend or destroy those.

There were others who's politics drove them to see defeat as a distinct possibility. ie: Conservatives who claimed anti Catholicism weekend France, or that liberal ideas endangered France. Most did not think this way, but there were Cassandras predicting dire consequences, either from true belief, or to push political agenda.

Most military & political leaders saw a destructive war ahead, but were confident the French military would prevail. The difference among this group being how costly victory might be.

Venturing deeper into the weeds. The military leaders were surprised by the rapid Polish defeat. That seems to have shaken the confidence of some in a fundamental way. ie: Georges the commander of the North West Front may have had some sort of mental breakdown between the 14th & 17th May. There are a couple others who's decisions or lack of decision in the critical first days is curious. Others performed well & acted as aggressively or decisively as might be expected. So we can't say there was a problem across the board with all the French Army leaders.

One other point comes from examinations of the early policies of Petains regime in 1940 & 1941. Both Paxton and Jackson make the point Petains government assumed negotiations for a long term treaty to replace the Armistice would start in the autumn of 1940 & a treaty be in effect by the spring of 1941, ending the war officially. Pertain and company were disappointed when negotiations were not initiated. A offer to start was made, but Hitler was not interested at the moment. He wanted to defeat both Britain and the USSR so he could dictate a peace treaty from a position of absolute power. France could just sit on it in the meanwhile.

 

[Exostrike]

Obviously no one writes out how they are going to be defeated but I suppose you can identify the big fear in the allies' actions. That a fast mobile German army would overrun Belgium and the Netherlands before allied troops could arrive at natural defensive positions and move across the Great European Plain into northern France, once again putting the war on French territory with all the disruption and destruction that would bring and threating the channel ports . As such they overcommitted to Belgium and lost the reserves to deal with the German attack at Sedan

 

[Captain Homicide]

This isn’t perfectly relevant but I wonder how France would have developed under Nazi control if the Reich won the war and dominated continental Europe.

 

[A Piece of History]

This isn’t perfectly relevant but I wonder how France would have developed under Nazi control if the Reich won the war and dominated continental Europe.

Just look at Vichy France. It was a anti-democratic, clerical-fascist state which stripped away everything having to do with liberalism.

Révolution nationale - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Philippe Petain himself had so much personal power that one of his officials even remarked that a French leader hadn't had so much power since Louis XIV.

 

[spkaca]

I speculate some - perhaps especially the older generation - may have had the precedent of 1871 in mind. That might even have been attractive to some on the French Right - pay an indemnity, lose some territory maybe, but get the opportunity to shoot a lot of their domestic political opponents. I think a lot of the defeatists had totally unrealistic expectations of how the Nazis would behave.

 

[Captain Homicide]

In WW2 who was a worse person between Pétain and Laval?

 

[liomarcus]

hello

as a french guy i now a little about the topic, and i m happy to share some of the good work about it.

The best way to understand what happen is to read the book "the strange defeat " by Marc Bloch

L'Étrange Défaite — Wikipédia

fr.wikipedia.org

Everything is there well describe by sommeone in the middle of the combats



And another one a documentary this time is "les grandes batailles"

The part about french defeat the first of the list


In this doc you have the futur Maréchal Juin talking about what i saw in the HQ of the french army during the defeat

" EXTRACT (on a phone line) : the front has collapse, that s bad my friend "

Old generals were more interesting by the dessert than by follow army on a map. this particular extract is after 54.21. And everything is say there by Maréchal Juin (the one who take the pass around of Cassino . The troops do there job but generals over 70 don t.

Sorry but it s all in french

 

[yulzari]

If you look at the 1870 War and The Great War the expectation was for a peace agreement, loss of minor territories and a further big reparations bill. After which all would go back to near normal.

 

[stodge]

The events of 1940 were obviously deeply shocking to France and the wider world but, while they likely thought the balance of power favoured them, they must have expected some serious attempt by Germany to win the war.

Were there any ideas in French military circles what this might have looked like?

This is a really interesting question.

The Wehrmacht offensive against Poland in September 1939 must have been (or should have been taken as) a real wake-up call for both the French and British. This was a new type of warfare with armour supported by artillery and air power quickly overcoming immobile or semi-immobile formations.

Yet the French put their trust in the most immobile formation of them all - the Maginot Line. The fact the line was incomplete and didn't reach to the Channel was a big issue but it drove French planning. Rush into Belgium if the Germans tried a repeat of 1914 while the Maginot Line seemingly prevented a repeat of 1870.

The problem was the whole mentality was based on two false premises - first, it was wholly defensive as symbolised by Maginot. The notion of a swift armoured thrust from the border to the Rhine just wasn't in French thinking. Second, it was based on the notion of deterrence - now, that's something we've lived with since the 1950s but in the 1930s it meant an impenetrable barrier to German military expansion west. The plan was simple - stop the Germans in Belgium and with British reinforcements push the Germans back to their own territory.

Again, this was the mindset of 1914 - the mindset of the trench and slow-moving infantry being butchered over the ground. The French had built a 5* trench - the Germans would go round it.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I speculate some - perhaps especially the older generation - may have had the precedent of 1871 in mind. That might even have been attractive to some on the French Right - pay an indemnity, lose some territory maybe, but get the opportunity to shoot a lot of their domestic political opponents. I think a lot of the defeatists had totally unrealistic expectations of how the Nazis would behave.

Thats clear in their written statements, records of their verbal statements, and their policies 1940-1941. By mid 1941 the Collaborationist were still clinging to the idea of a eventual peace treaty and a 'independent' France in a German dominated Europe. Retaining the Empire was part of that fantasy.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

This is a really interesting question.

The Wehrmacht offensive against Poland in September 1939 must have been (or should have been taken as) a real wake-up call for both the French and British. This was a new type of warfare with armour supported by artillery and air power quickly overcoming immobile or semi-immobile formations.

They did take note, but drew some bad conclusion. More important there was no longer time sufficient to retrain the Army Only three of the six DLM existed, the four DCR lacked half their planned battalions. Training of the older reservists was grossly incomplete.... The Air Force had competed barely a third of its equipment. in May 1940. In training the Allies were 6-8 months behind the German, and some six months short in essential reequipment.

Yet the French put their trust in the most immobile formation of them all - the Maginot Line. The fact the line was incomplete and didn't reach to the Channel was a big issue but it drove French planning. Rush into Belgium if the Germans tried a repeat of 1914 while the Maginot Line seemingly prevented a repeat of 1870.

That had been driven by budget constraints imposed by the legislature since the 1920s. The army was short funds for over a decade & had a 'economy' choice made for them by the Chamber of Deputies. Given the choices and political pressures of the the late 1920s the legislature made the decision for what they thought would be more efficient/lower cost route.

The problem was the whole mentality was based on two false premises - first, it was wholly defensive as symbolised by Maginot. The notion of a swift armoured thrust from the border to the Rhine just wasn't in French thinking. Second, it was based on the notion of deterrence - now, that's something we've lived with since the 1950s but in the 1930s it meant an impenetrable barrier to German military expansion west. The plan was simple - stop the Germans in Belgium and with British reinforcements push the Germans back to their own territory.

This derived originally from the poor support of the the former Entente partners for the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty. The Occupation of the Rhineland was a political disaster for the French, and illustrated how the national army doctrine was the high cost and very clumsy way to impose their will on Germany. Unwilling to pay for a army that would be capable of easily dominating Germany the French, in general & not just a few leaders, chose a different path. Post war its been popular to focus blame on the Army leaders, but those were chosen by the government, which was executing policies reflecting the desires of mostly conservative voters. Other leaders might have chosen a better path, but they were not voted in.

Again, this was the mindset of 1914 - the mindset of the trench and slow-moving infantry being butchered over the ground. The French had built a 5* trench - the Germans would go round it.

Doughty in 'Seeds of Disaster' examines how the French military doctrines evolved from 1914, and then from those of 1918. Much of that doctrine matched the successful doctrines of the US Army of 1944-45, but the funds to train the Army to those standards were lacking in the 1930s. In 1940 they were making a frantic effort to train they mass of reservists, but were too far behind the Germans who had spent the previous two years writing bad checks to fund a aggressive training program. The Germans had spent four to five months in the winter of 1939-1940 going through a complete 'work up cycle' preparing for their spring offensive. The French army was just reaching the point where it could start something that advanced and ambitious.