Ways for CSA to Win Civil War?

The thing I don't get - this is a statement of confusion - is why that appears to have had so little impact on Hood.

Joe did everything one could reasonably (in Hood's shoes) expect, and quite a bit more than Hood meritted as his junior corps commander. But Hood seems to have felt - at best - insatiable ambition, and at worst I'd call him one of the worst human beings to wear a gray uniform.

It's understandable to feel upset with one's commander at times.

But there's a huge gulf between Longstreet at Gettysburg and Hood in the Atlanta Campaign. Hell, there's a gulf between Longstreet towards Bragg (not one of Longstreet's finer hours as a human being or a subordinate) and Hood towards Joe.

So it makes me wonder how much Joe's charm worked on the other insubordinate cusses. You've studied him more than I have, and I'm not going to argue he wasn't charming in certain contexts (writing seems not to be one of them, at least in official correspondence) - but it's worrisome.

With Hood its a matter of naked ambition.

I dont think Hood could have asked for a more supportive boss than Joe, and there was very little else Joe could do to indulge Hood - he's already welcomed him with open arms and taken him into his intimate circle of friends and is treating him as his right arm, as the second in command of the army - but Hood wants to command the army and there's nothing Joe could do to change that mindset, especially considering he doesn't even know about it until after Kennessaw Mountain.

Hood was never interested in being a team-player with Joe, he was only ever interested in getting Joe's job, and it didn't matter to Hood how much of a backstabbing SOB he had to be to get it.

Wheeler never liked Joe because Joe wouldn't let him ride off into the sunset to go seeking the Federal Cavalry and have the big battles on horse-back with them. Instead Joe wanted Wheeler to scout for the enemy movement and guard his flanks - the mundane work of a cavalryman - Wheeler refused to do the first and did the second grudgingly, complaining to Bragg all the time.

Bragg, Wheeler and Hood later conspired with each other to compile a document explaining how, when, where and why Joe had failed as commander of the Army of Tennessee and how Hood would be a better commander - which is considerably appauling in the case of Bragg and Hood since Joe had never been anything but supportive of them to that time.
 
I would to a point defend Bragg, or at least say that what he did was not as objectionable, but Hood and Wheeler should have been shot pour encourager les autres.

Specifically,
Bragg has a right to look over Joe's record with a critical eye (perhaps not as hostile as he did, but in his position, examining Joe's record and reporting on it as he sees it is legitimate, whether Joe had more confidence in Bragg than Bragg did in Joe or not) - Wheeler and Hood . . .


Yeah, I'm going to say Hood was being a gigantic dick. Wanting Joe's job is bad enough - ambition in and of itself isn't wrong but Hood should really be focused on his own job, especially as he has no corps command experience to speak of (barely hours at Chickamauga) before this, so there's no legitimate basis for promoting him. Plotting behind his back when he's being welcomed as everything short of a son in law (or whatever)?

That's wrong on both personal and professional levels. :mad:
 
Hello Elfwine,

Joe did everything one could reasonably (in Hood's shoes) expect, and quite a bit more than Hood meritted as his junior corps commander. But Hood seems to have felt - at best - insatiable ambition, and at worst I'd call him one of the worst human beings to wear a gray uniform.

His qualities as a human being aside, Hood was a very good brigade and division commander. Careless off the battlefield, if you needed him to take that hill, he could take that hill.

And if he hadn't been promoted beyond that level...

But there's a huge gulf between Longstreet at Gettysburg and Hood in the Atlanta Campaign. Hell, there's a gulf between Longstreet towards Bragg (not one of Longstreet's finer hours as a human being or a subordinate) and Hood towards Joe.

Bragg had a knack for bringing out the worst in everyone.

It's only slightly mitigating that some of his subordinates had a lot of "worst" to bring out.
 
Hello Elfwine,

His qualities as a human being aside, Hood was a very good brigade and division commander. Careless off the battlefield, if you needed him to take that hill, he could take that hill.

And if he hadn't been promoted beyond that level...

Truthfully, Hood's reputation as a division commander reminds me of Reynolds's reputation. It's taken for granted, and I'm sure there's a basis for it, but it seems to come up short when I try to think of specific examples.

But certainly going beyond that was definitely beyond his talents - and his inability to administer or organize (including having staff officers capable of picking up the slack) is damning at higher levels where the difference between a well run, well organized unit is the difference between an effective one and an ineffective one. Sheer valor is not enough.
Bragg had a knack for bringing out the worst in everyone.

It's only slightly mitigating that some of his subordinates had a lot of "worst" to bring out.
I don't think we can blame Bragg for his subordinates not even doing their basic duty as soldiers and obeying orders or informing him of what they were doing when he needed to know that (Polk in Kentucky).

Sure, Bragg was a disagreeable guy. But a soldier who decides that because his superior is grating and bad tempered that undermining his authority is acceptable behavior has no business being a soldier except in the ranks. You don't have to like your commander to obey his orders.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
With Hood its a matter of naked ambition.

Quite true, but I also think there is more to it. I think Hood was disturbed on a deep, psychological level on account of the terrible wounds he received at Gettysburg and Chickamauga and his torrid courtship of Sally Preston. By 1864, he was basically a tortured soul.

Hood was never interested in being a team-player with Joe, he was only ever interested in getting Joe's job, and it didn't matter to Hood how much of a backstabbing SOB he had to be to get it.

It may even be worse than that. I have often wondered if the projected counter attack at Cassville was "thrown" by Hood in order to deny Johnston a major victory. Yes, a brigade of Yankee cavalry had appeared in a threatening position (Johnston was wrong when he lated said that the brigade didn't exist), Hood certainly overreacted by ordering his entire infantry corps to retreat as a consequence of it.

Wheeler never liked Joe because Joe wouldn't let him ride off into the sunset to go seeking the Federal Cavalry and have the big battles on horse-back with them. Instead Joe wanted Wheeler to scout for the enemy movement and guard his flanks - the mundane work of a cavalryman - Wheeler refused to do the first and did the second grudgingly, complaining to Bragg all the time.

If Wheeler had done his job properly, the Army of Tennessee could have held Rocky Face Ridge for considerably longer than they did IOTL. Of course, much blame here also must lie with Johnston, who should have seen the importance of Snake Creek Gap much earlier than he actually did.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I don't think we can blame Bragg for his subordinates not even doing their basic duty as soldiers and obeying orders or informing him of what they were doing when he needed to know that (Polk in Kentucky).

Yes and no. Of course, it is the responsibility of subordinates to obey the orders of their superiors and Polk and others are greatly at fault for not following Bragg's orders. But one of the most important roles of an army commander (just as the boss of a company or the principal of a school) is the creation of cohension, trust and an atmosphere conducive to teamwork. Bragg abjectly failed to do this and the atmosphere of distrust and rancor that prevaded the Army of Tennessee is more Bragg's fault than anyone else's.
 
Hello Elf,

Truthfully, Hood's reputation as a division commander reminds me of Reynolds's reputation. It's taken for granted, and I'm sure there's a basis for it, but it seems to come up short when I try to think of specific examples.

My sense is that his ceiling was probably as (a good) brigade commander, in a world where there was enough military talent to go around, and he was given time to grow into the role.

He was horrible at staff work, and sometimes insubordinate. But his reputation was built on battles like Eltham's Landing, Second Bull Run, and the West Wood. As I said, he was a man who, if you needed that hill taken, would take that hill (if it could be taken at all), and do it without hesitation. He was hard charging, and inspired his men. Even qualities like that were not always easy to find. And even allowing that many of his men were Texans, it was still a valuable trait to have at that point.

But certainly going beyond that was definitely beyond his talents - and his inability to administer or organize (including having staff officers capable of picking up the slack) is damning at higher levels where the difference between a well run, well organized unit is the difference between an effective one and an ineffective one. Sheer valor is not enough.

No argument on any point. Well said.

I don't think we can blame Bragg for his subordinates not even doing their basic duty as soldiers and obeying orders or informing him of what they were doing when he needed to know that (Polk in Kentucky).

Sure, Bragg was a disagreeable guy. But a soldier who decides that because his superior is grating and bad tempered that undermining his authority is acceptable behavior has no business being a soldier except in the ranks. You don't have to like your commander to obey his orders.


First off: Most of the leadership of the AoT deserved cashiering, on the spot. Round up some experienced sergeants if you have to. That entire command structure was a train wreck for most of the war. The problem went well beyond Bragg. Most of his generals could be fairly described as a mutinous lot. You can start with Polk (who had no business being back in the military, save as a chaplain) and work your way down from there.

But when you have an officer who seems to have enemies of almost everyone he works with, I think you have to say he's a big part of the problem. Those traits were already much in evidence even in the old army (the fragging incidents, etc.). The explosive temper, the remarkable ability to wound other men unthinkingly . . . And when you add in the fact that tensions were not nearly so bad once Joe Johnston took over . . . I think that says something about Bragg, and it's not a good thing.

But in the end, he couldn't win, even when he had a chance to, and even when he had subordinates who might and could carry out his orders. I know you like Bragg better than most, so I'll just say that he was not without his talents - and not without excuses - but he was just too often his own worst enemy. And he stayed in power largely because Jeff Davis didn't have anyone obviously good to replace him with - though I think he too quickly overlooked Hardee.*

I suppose this is one of the remarkable things that made Lee such an effective commander - to me. We can debate his flaws - we know he had them. But in an army absolutely filled with hotheaded, prickly, egotists - often amateurs - Lee somehow managed to keep them loyal and effective, if they had any ability at all (and if they didn't, they got shipped off quietly somewhere else, at least while he had the luxury early in the war).

_____

* Which brings me back to the subject of this thread. I doubt that Hardee was brilliant enough to have salvaged the West, had he been promoted to replace Bragg after the post-Stones River revolt - he would still have to work with a lot of bad generals, and a terrible strategic situation and worse logistics. But he strikes me as the one man with the requisite experience at corps command and basic leadership capability to have been reasonably passable as a commander of the AoT at that point. It's always been striking to me that he was never given the chance, given how awful the alternatives were.
 
Yes and no. Of course, it is the responsibility of subordinates to obey the orders of their superiors and Polk and others are greatly at fault for not following Bragg's orders. But one of the most important roles of an army commander (just as the boss of a company or the principal of a school) is the creation of cohension, trust and an atmosphere conducive to teamwork. Bragg abjectly failed to do this and the atmosphere of distrust and rancor that prevaded the Army of Tennessee is more Bragg's fault than anyone else's.

I would disagree. When Bragg's subordinates are failing to act like soldiers, Bragg has every reason to be hostile and unfriendly to those who - if Davis actually had supported him as much as he supported say, Lee - should have been removed for the good of the army, or at least disciplined.

And more to the point (than Bragg being wronged personally), there is no basis for "cohesion, trust, and an atmosphere of teamwork" to be created under such circumstances. Had Bragg's subordinates acted like soldiers, most of the reason for Bragg's ill will towards them disappears (I say most because there are occasions such as him blaming Breckinridge for being late to the Kentucky invasion when it wasn't his fault).

But for instance, take this (despite the error on Breckinridge's rank).

http://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/5296

Obviously Bragg's line about "You Kentuckians" is inappropriate. But a good subordinate would swallow that and move on. Not . . . justify Bragg's bad attitude.


Hello Elf,

My sense is that his ceiling was probably as (a good) brigade commander, in a world where there was enough military talent to go around, and he was given time to grow into the role.

He was horrible at staff work, and sometimes insubordinate. But his reputation was built on battles like Eltham's Landing, Second Bull Run, and the West Wood. As I said, he was a man who, if you needed that hill taken, would take that hill (if it could be taken at all), and do it without hesitation. He was hard charging, and inspired his men. Even qualities like that were not always easy to find. And even allowing that many of his men were Texans, it was still a valuable trait to have at that point.

Agreed. I think division command is iffy just because Hood's examples at that level are much, much shorter - and his terrible administrative ability undoubtedly hurt his division's overall effectiveness more so (relative to its potential) than it did at brigade level.

Still, as you said, if you needed a hill taken, send for Hood.

No argument on any point. Well said.

First off: Most of the leadership of the AoT deserved cashiering, on the spot. Round up some experienced sergeants if you have to. That entire command structure was a train wreck for most of the war. The problem went well beyond Bragg. Most of his generals could be fairly described as a mutinous lot. You can start with Polk (who had no business being back in the military, save as a chaplain) and work your way down from there.

But when you have an officer who seems to have enemies of almost everyone he works with, I think you have to say he's a big part of the problem. Those traits were already much in evidence even in the old army (the fragging incidents, etc.). The explosive temper, the remarkable ability to wound other men unthinkingly . . . And when you add in the fact that tensions were not nearly so bad once Joe Johnston took over . . . I think that says something about Bragg, and it's not a good thing.

I don't agree here. Bragg was a stern disciplinarian - we can argue on if the word "martinet" applies - and someone who had high expectations. And he's dealing with a group of subordinates who, as you acknowledge, were mutinious.

I'm sure Bragg didn't help matters, but the thing is, it's not his job to be on friendly terms with his subordinates. His subordinates are supposed to act like soldiers whether they'd want to spend more than five minutes in his company in any other setting. And they didn't.

But in the end, he couldn't win, even when he had a chance to, and even when he had subordinates who might and could carry out his orders. I know you like Bragg better than most, so I'll just say that he was not without his talents - and not without excuses - but he was just too often his own worst enemy. And he stayed in power largely because Jeff Davis didn't have anyone obviously good to replace him with - though I think he too quickly overlooked Hardee.*


I suppose this is one of the remarkable things that made Lee such an effective commander - to me. We can debate his flaws - we know he had them. But in an army absolutely filled with hotheaded, prickly, egotists - often amateurs - Lee somehow managed to keep them loyal and effective, if they had any ability at all (and if they didn't, they got shipped off quietly somewhere else, at least while he had the luxury early in the war).

I agree. Bragg - and we can and probably will continue to debate how much to blame him for how much that played a role in the atmosphere of the AoT - very much lacked that quality of keeping hotheaded, prickly egoists focused on something other than picking fights with each other and him.

Although I would note that Lee had a better crop (Even early on) than Bragg did in that regard. Polk was the greatest soldier Lincoln had after Grant, bar none. This is true before Bragg being, in a word, unpleasant has had a chance to say, alienate Breckenridge.

That's why I blame Bragg's subordinates. Bragg has this problem in the Kentucky campaign, before his subordinates have any reason to regard him as incorrigibly hostile or mean spirited. And it goes downhill from there.

Certainly Bragg had no charm to speak of, but this is not an army that got tired of continual abuse at this point.

_____

* Which brings me back to the subject of this thread. I doubt that Hardee was brilliant enough to have salvaged the West, had he been promoted to replace Bragg after the post-Stones River revolt - he would still have to work with a lot of bad generals, and a terrible strategic situation and worse logistics. But he strikes me as the one man with the requisite experience at corps command and basic leadership capability to have been reasonably passable as a commander of the AoT at that point. It's always been striking to me that he was never given the chance, given how awful the alternatives were.

I am inclined to agree. Hardee comes off to me as Longstreet lite - which is unfortunately nearly as good as we can get in the AoT (Cleburne only being at division level and we already covered him).

On the same note, I'd say Bragg should have been a staff officer. Bragg had a gift for things outside tactics and people skills, or at least enough talent to stand out.

Put him in a position where his brain can make up for his mouth and his awkwardness in the heat of action, and everyone in gray benefits.
 
The question, to my mind, is not so much whether Seward would win - I think there's pretty good reason to think that any reasonably viable Republican would have won - but whether his election would still have caused the Deep South to secede.

The Deep South would secede if any candidate opposed to the spread of slavery was elected. That means any Republican candidate. That also means they secede Stephen Douglas wins, since the northern Democrats had refused to give the south a blank check on slavery. And that also means they secede if Bell wins, since he had opposed the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the LeCompton Constitution.
 
The Deep South would secede if any candidate opposed to the spread of slavery was elected. That means any Republican candidate. That also means they secede Stephen Douglas wins, since the northern Democrats had refused to give the south a blank check on slavery. And that also means they secede if Bell wins, since he had opposed the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the LeCompton Constitution.

No, they wouldn't have seceded in those cases given they, or at least their party, did not stand for abolition in the same way the Republicans did. There certainly will be plenty of opposition, and the fire-eaters would do their best to stir trouble and promote secession, but in either of the cases you presented, any such movement would be far more divided than the one we witnessed in OTL.
 

No, they wouldn't have seceded in those cases given they, or at least their party, did not stand for abolition in the same way the Republicans did. There certainly will be plenty of opposition, and the fire-eaters would do their best to stir trouble and promote secession, but in either of the cases you presented, any such movement would be far more divided than the one we witnessed in OTL.

They didn't need to stand for abolition in the same way the Republicans did given that the Republicans had about the most moderately anti-slavery platform that could be called anti-slavery and they took it as intending immediate incitement of "servile insurrection".

So given that, distorting Douglas and Bell sufficiently to argue that they were "little different" wouldn't be very hard.
 
1. Oklahoma/Sequoyah/etc is *very* likely to remain in Confederate hands after any sort of outcome where the Confederacy exists. Following the Battle of Honey Springs in 1863 the area is a hotbed of guerilla resistance and loaded with Native Americans who by vote seem to make it clear that they prefer Richmond to Washington.

2. Delaware being part of the CSA is not happening without intervention from the Almighty, a Kilrathi battle fleet, a TARDIS, or Tunguska on New York City in 1861.

3. Getting Maryland into the CSA requires serious maneuvaring early in the war, it also means you'd need a near-perfect series of victories to end the conflict no later than early 1862 *and* get the US to agree to a plebiscite, good luck

4. I concur with the earlier poster that Tennessee has to be held. There is a chance for Bragg and Kirby to take Louisville in 1862, which would shore up the Confederate shadow government in the process (it was run off by Unio forces shortly thereafter), and the Ohio makes a great defensive barrier. But if you can not reclaim Nashville (or prevent its fall in the first place), it becomes near impossible to have Kentucky in the CSA without major effects elsewhere unless it can vote its way out. Again, it would require the Union to agree to that

5. Arizona and New Mexico are a sideshow but ultimately worth little on the conference table as they are distant and underpopulated. Union forces would ask for a high price to let them go even if they are held by the CSA.

6. West Virignia is largely in CSA hands until mid-1863 and even after that some of it was in Rebel hands. If nothing else it would be more likely for Charleston to return to the fold than for Maryland to be admitted into it.
 
The war could have happened anytime from about 1820 on. If it had happened earlier then about the 1860's, the South would have had the resources to win, or at least hold on longer.
 
6. West Virignia is largely in CSA hands until mid-1863 and even after that some of it was in Rebel hands. If nothing else it would be more likely for Charleston to return to the fold than for Maryland to be admitted into it.
That little panhandle that creeps up between Ohio and Pennsylvania would nearly cut what was left of the Union in two. Would that border really have been kept?
 
That little panhandle that creeps up between Ohio and Pennsylvania would nearly cut what was left of the Union in two. Would that border really have been kept?

That panhandle would've probally been ceded to the US, since that area was highly unionist, and one of the first areas to reject Confederate authority. Indeed, most of the Northwestern part of the state was unionist, with the more southern regions having divided loyalties.
 
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