Was modern Japanese militarism inevitable? Could it have been prevented?

Did it start with the rise of the shogunate itself in the late 12th century? The Meiji government had a strong military influence because "Almost all leaders in Japanese society during the Meiji period (whether in the military, politics or business) were ex-samurai or descendants of samurai, and shared a set of values and outlooks." This thread talked about how the shogunate system could have been prevented, with some suggesting a stronger civil service system and/or a stronger Emperor. But is it necessary to prevent the shogunate?

Is it also possible for Japan to have a stronger democratic tradition? (bolded for emphasis)

Well Japan actually was a relatively liberal Parliamentary Democracy during the Taishō period of 1912-1926.

What ended up leading to the militarism and Ultra-Nationalism was the economic collapse and subsequent political changes of the Great Depression.

In the end their are two options, though one would require a late 19th century PoD.

A. Have Japan become a full Parliamentary Democracy earlier, with the Diet gaining full power while the Oligarchs and Genrō are deprived of power (which is what happened OTL), thereby giving the Parliamentary system and Democracy longer to root themselves as fundamental and core parts of government.

B. Have the Great Depression not happen, happen later or affect Japan in such a way that while it is hurt, it's not as bad as everyone else and it uses the period to focus on Economic, rather than military/territory growth.
 
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If the Emperor had managed to keep the Army under control as well as control the fighting between the Army and Navy then yes. But he didn't/couldn't...
 
Did it start with the rise of the shogunate itself in the late 12th century? The Meiji government had a strong military influence because "Almost all leaders in Japanese society during the Meiji period (whether in the military, politics or business) were ex-samurai or descendants of samurai, and shared a set of values and outlooks." This thread talked about how the shogunate system could have been prevented, with some suggesting a stronger civil service system and/or a stronger Emperor.

Is it also possible for Japan to have a stronger democratic tradition? (bolded for emphasis)

We've talked about this, I don't know why you keep asking the same question. Japanese militarism of the 20's and 30's is more a "recent" invention, that didn't quite gel with previous military states. The Shogunates of the Kamakura and Muromachi periods were feudal societies, ruled by either landholders and later warrior aristocrats, and usurpers. The Tokugawa saw those warriors and sometimes farmers atrophy into glorified bureaucrats, that existed that way into the Meiji era.

Japanese militarism had its roots in copying European methods and mindsets of the late 1800's that is they needed, industry and colonies for industry and they needed to get them by any means necessary.
 
Without WWI, the Great Depression likely does not happen nor does the Japanese economy drop out with the end of the Great War and the profits being made. Liberal democracy was succeeding...and then the economy collapsed leading to extremism when the government couldn't provide answers. Likewise, WWI presented easy victories that increased Japanese adventurism as well as further ingrained Japanese hatred for the West as the Allies refused to see Asiatics as equals. The war also weakened Europe's ability to curb Japanese aggression. If you want to stop militarism as well as distrust/animosity with the West, prevent WWI.
 
Yes. Very little is inevitable. It may be easier or harder to evit, but other than the heat death of the universe, all outcomes can be avoided at some point in time.
 
A Lot as could radicalaze those too, i think militarism was even a consequence of the Tokugawa era the genro tried to control but failed
Part of Japan's militarism in the interwar was from an internal view that Japan was on par with the Western Powers (thanks to their victory over Russia), a fact that the Western Powers denied with the rejection of the Racial Equality Proposal, and thus justified in its imperialistic pursuits, which were denied by the final treaty that the Japanese public felt was unfair to the victors (despite Japan's impeding default from war expenses). The Russo-Japanese War, after all, paved the way for Japan to finally cement control over the Korean peninsula and claim supremacy over NE Asia. Russia winning that might infuriate nationalists but it'll be followed by an economic crisis in Japan due to the costs of the war (not covered by Russian indemnities) and there's no 'stab-in-the-back' sort of deal in the aftermath of the war (that certain parties sold the Empire of Japan out). Japan will be forced to recover economically (probably have indemnities leveraged against it), see itself shut out of mainland NE Asia, and have 0 returns from its militaristic pursuits (which would fatally weaken future militarist movements). It'll be perceived as a middling power by the West in the meantime and would not be able to gain quite as much from future peace deals (like with Germany's concessions in China), so its imperial adventures would garner far fewer rewards than OTL, which in turn weakens the internal perception of militarism in Japan. After all, if war with Great powers brings nothing but debt and stinging defeat, why go to war with them at all?
 
It's not the depression or Western thought, plenty of states were also affected by them both but remained non-aggressive, the real reason as usual was domestic politics and government. Interwar Japan was a fusion of capitalism and feudalism with severe inequalities that created famine-like conditions for the serfs during the depression as the better off Japanese willingly passed on the pain to the powerless, this combined with a conscription system that favored elites and the middle class through exemptions and bribes meant that the army was overwhelmingly staffed by oppressed peasants for whom the young parliament, liberalism, and capitalism were perceived as the cause of their plight; a view encouraged to direct hatred away from the people exploiting them. It was the same elites that favored the army's invasion of Manchuria and more later for profit and personal gain without any moral justification. There's nothing about racial equality as we know it, Japan was quite eager to exploit and brutalize "lesser races", and it was more about being a superior race (if one among several) above the mundane than anything about equality. Moral justification came after military aggression, as evident with the invention of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity.
 
Have the Americans not be absolute dickwads with perry and just let the Japanese be in isolation.

Somebody else would pry them open in a few decades, at which point Japan will be even further behind and likely to meet the fate of commercial-political subjegation rather than getting the space for self-strengthening
 
There's nothing about racial equality as we know it, Japan was quite eager to exploit and brutalize "lesser races", and it was more about being a superior race (if one among several) above the mundane than anything about equality.
The Racial Equality Proposal was about wanting to be seen as equal to white people, but not other Asians.
 
Just have Germany bat for Japan instead of the Triple Intervention makes a huge difference. Japan felt like it got slapped in the face and watched as everyone else broke into Chinese markets but scoffed at Japan doing the same thing. This probably gives Japan a more sane approach to China.
 
Have the Americans not be absolute dickwads with perry and just let the Japanese be in isolation.

If America doesn’t do it the British will if neither of those two do it the French will if the French don’t do it the Russians would and Japan would be carved up like China
 
If America doesn’t do it the British will if neither of those two do it the French will if the French don’t do it the Russians would and Japan would be carved up like China
Well, to be fair, it does kill Japanese militarism (in the cradle). Can't have Japanese militarism if there is no Japan to be militaristic.

But back to the OP, in short, no, Japanese militarism could have been prevented. When it became inevitable and for what reasons, that's more contentious, I imagine.
 
nterwar Japan was a fusion of capitalism and feudalism with severe inequalities that created famine-like conditions for the serfs during the depression as the better off Japanese willingly passed on the pain to the powerless, this combined with a conscription system that favored elites and the middle class through exemptions and bribes meant that the army was overwhelmingly staffed by oppressed peasants

So interwar Japan had high inequality and a much higher mini coefficient compared with postwar Japan? Was this high inequality compared with the US or poorer parts of Europe or Latin America, or was it simply much higher than the generation before, so it seemed particularly illegitimate?

Somebody else would pry them open in a few decades, at which point Japan will be even further behind and likely to meet the fate of commercial-political subjegation rather than getting the space for self-strengthening

I think many would argue that a few decades is pushing it. I agree in general that a late opening disadvantages Japan in power political terms, with it potentially becoming a colony, protectorate, or just more generally "third world" like Siam.

But if that is the case, I think there is a sliding scale, and a small delay might make for "sweet spot" where there are not opportunities to be successfully aggressive, but Japan is capable of guiding its own destiny to a considerable degree and not having to be under unequal treaties for too long.

Possibly the most valuable potential thing would be to boost Japan's potential victims. If Korean opening and reform could be accelerated to keep pace with Japan, Korea could remain truly independent rather than an expansionist platform for Japan, and the two countries could cancel each other out and preoccupy each other to the point that neither expands.

Likewise, WWI presented easy victories that increased Japanese adventurism

The thing is though, the Japanese populace did not seem heavily engaged in WWI like in the war with Russia, and then afterwards, when the military pushed a forward policy in the Russian Civil War that had somewhat messy and expensive results, the Japanese public turned massively against the intervention. An irony is that the casualties and expense of their intervention in the Far East of Russia was far less than they would deal with in Manchuria and China from 1931 onward.

There was a definite intergenerational mood swing or pendulum and not straight-up militarist continuity from Tokugawa, Meiji, or even the 1905 war. [not that I am saying you are making that argument]

as further ingrained Japanese hatred for the West as the Allies refused to see Asiatics as equals.

I wonder if American immigration restrictionists could have made Japan feel less insulted, and still drastically limited Japanese aggression, by just putting Japan under a tight national origins quota like Europe. The year ultimately adopted in the 1920s US picked 1890 as the base year. With an 1890 baseline, prior to the acquisition of Hawaii and the great bulk of Japanese immigration to the U.S., Japanese immigration would have been set at a minuscule level, certainly lower than any European countries except for maybe a place or two in the Balkans. The Japanese could be told they are not being singled out for exclusion, just put under the same rules as everybody else.

Just have Germany bat for Japan instead of the Triple Intervention makes a huge difference. Japan felt like it got slapped in the face and watched as everyone else broke into Chinese markets but scoffed at Japan doing the same thing. This probably gives Japan a more sane approach to China.

This could be the outcome, in theory. The other alternative though is that not having the setback of the Triple Intervention just accelerates Japanese militarism and navalism because in the absence of the intervention the Genro are not reminded of the need to be somewhat careful and restrained. Although it could potentially lead to a disastrous defeat a generation before OTL's Hiroshima, Japan lucking out and getting to keep the original Treaty of Shimonoseki may be pretty emboldened. It will probably not have a reason to tangle with Russia for awhile, but Japan may think it could get away with messing with weaker western powers like the Spanish or Dutch. Japan may do more to defend its honor and interests in Hawaii.
 
So interwar Japan had high inequality and a much higher mini coefficient compared with postwar Japan? Was this high inequality compared with the US or poorer parts of Europe or Latin America, or was it simply much higher than the generation before, so it seemed particularly illegitimate?
Absolute inequality was a big part of it, at the time being poor in Japan meant starving and scrounging ferns, moss tripe, and pine roots to stay alive; being poor in America meant shitty meals and humiliating welfare.
 

Kaze

Banned
Taisho Period could be a departure? The Japanese experimented with limited democracy. As a reaction to the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia, the militarists and nationalists started taking power exacerbated by the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake.
Violent coups were staged - Violent coups took place, and the Army in effect unilaterally, the decision to invade Manchuria - thus World War Two began.

If we could continue the Taisho uninhabited - it might be possible to have a fully democratic Japan.
 
Would losing to Russia in 1905 be able to put a stop to it?

Absolute inequality was a big part of it, at the time being poor in Japan meant starving and scrounging ferns, moss tripe, and pine roots to stay alive; being poor in America meant shitty meals and humiliating welfare.

A combination of these two factors could IMO result in a Communist revolution in Japan instead of Russia in the second decade of the 19th Century as food shortages grow more acute. The Japanese People's Republic could certainly have a degree of revolutionary militarism but it would certainly be different than the quasi-fascist concepts usually implied by "Japanese militarism" in the context of the 1920s through '40s.
 
You'd also have to change the culture of the IJA, an army where midranking and junior officers go around whacking civilian and military superiors, and starting their private wars, is not going to be a good thing for a parliamentary democracy.
 
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