US victory in war of 1812 american gains

[JJohnson]

The British are parting with some valuable real-estate way to cheaply here, and in a spot where they historically controlled pretty much everything to boot.

That was just the price that I saw when reading about HBC. I'd bet the US would pay a few million pounds in compensation, at least, and possibly some kind of trade deal so that the UK could still economically exploit the region for its timber and furs.

 

[Derek Pullem]

Copenhagen was 1801, and it wasn't an attack on the city. It was an attack on the Danish fleet and if Nelson hadn't literally turned a blind eye it would of failed.

the assault on Cadiz in 1797 failed. It succeeded brilliantly though in 1702 and in 1587. Attacks on Cadiz in 1625 was an embarrassing failure, the attacks in 1640, 1656 and 1669 were more of the nature of cutting out expeditions

But all of them, including the successes, did very little damage to the city in any incidence.

American 1st and 2nd system coastal defense forts were pretty impressive... Fort McHenry was one. Most of these forts located in the Southern States put up creditable resistance in the Civil War against heavier guns, steamships and ironclads.

Seacoasts defenses were very strong against the warships in the Age of Sail. At best a sailing ship is going to make a speed not much faster than a walk while in a harbor, giving land batteries which don't have to contend with such things a rolling, and have effectively unlimited ammunition available plus furnaces to heat up shot a serious advantage. I don't readily recall a single instance of a city surrendering to a fleet except Copenhagen, and Nelson's are pretty rare. There was only one.

Washington DC in 1814 had no fixed defenses at all and its garrison were a few marines, some navy personnel at the Navy yard (which fought until overrun at Bladensburg), and a lot of untrained and ineptly commanded militia.

At Baltimore that same militia was better led and had nice (albeit hastily) dug entrenchments to fight behind and thus did to the British what American militia typically did when fighting behind entrenchments... inflicted serious British losses.

So the Royal Navy, even though it brought American coastal trade to a standstill (a key way of moving goods at the time with out crappy roads), blockaded most harbors to the point of uselessness (thus cutting off American income from tariffs, the key way the government was funded), and occasionally inflicted damage to undefended towns and villages did not have the desire or the ability to successfully assault a defended city.

Keep in mind DC in the 1812 was a glorified village... Georgetown was a bigger city and so was Alexandria. The big seaports were very well defended by forts like Fort McHenry and had large and often reasonably well trained militia available.

So no, the RN is not going to lay waste to American coastal cities.

Oh please!

Do some googling

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Copenhagen_(1807)

Britain did Copenhagen twice and the second was very much an attack on the city. The city was defended by 10,000 troops and attacked by 25,000 British and Allies. Oh and Nelson was dead by 1807! The expedition was led by the mediocre Gambier and Cathcart.

I agree the RN did not have the desire to assault an American city - but it had the capability.

 

[Alstein]

The US gaining anything in the war of 1812 would require them allying with Napoleon and a British total defeat. (as in Napoleon in London)

By 1812 this is ASB, and when it was plausible, the US wouldn't ally with Napoleon, so I think US gaining from victory in war of 1812 is ASB.

If the Americans won a total land victory- you'd see the British get serious.

 

[Nialironarm]

I still can't see Britain surrendering settler colonies to the US after the war of 1812.

A leasehold in China, an island in the North Sea gained at the end of the Napoleonic wars, Ionian Islands allowed to join an independent Greece (whose independence was achieved with British support) and Balearic Islands taken during the course of a war then returned in a peace settlement, are not examples of Britain surrendering existing colonies.

Even Oregon was a negotiated settlement.

The war of 1812 ended as it did because neither side really lost anything.

I really can't see Britain being happy to see the US benefit from their aggression. More will to continue the war on the part of Britain is not ASB.

 

[galveston bay]

Oh please!

Do some googling

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Copenhagen_(1807)

Britain did Copenhagen twice and the second was very much an attack on the city. The city was defended by 10,000 troops and attacked by 25,000 British and Allies. Oh and Nelson was dead by 1807! The expedition was led by the mediocre Gambier and Cathcart.

I agree the RN did not have the desire to assault an American city - but it had the capability.

25,000 troops is a land assault, not a naval one ... he was implying a purely naval assault. Which is why I excluded it. The attack on Baltimore numbered only around 4,000, and it failed to take the city from around 7,000 militia. Note that the British had allies in 1807 against the Danes. They would have no such allies in an attack on American cities. The attack on New Orleans, the biggest attack the British could muster, had only 11,000 men.

The available militia strength of Boston, New York, Philadelphia (the principal American ports) would easily match that, and all three had 1st and 2nd system forts

 

[Alstein]

Well we can't have the British running amok seratim torching the Eastern Seaboard in turn. It wasn't the British modus operandi or desirable considering they had to either capture those ports as bases or trade with them after the war.

The British only bombarded Copenhagen as a means to prevent the Danish fleet from falling into French hands after all, it wasn't as though in response to the Continental system they went around torching every sea-port in Europe.

TBH for Britain to get more invested in the war you'd need a POD with Napoleon captured in December 1812, which might then rouse British ire towards the Americans who attacked them unexpectedly, which then frees up considerably more strength for the British to operate with in North America.

If Nappy had been captured, and the French weren't given a reasonable peace, they prob would have fought on, with Nappy II as Emperor and a regent (would Marie Louise be regent, or someone else like Davout or Eugene?)

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The US gaining anything in the war of 1812 would require them allying with Napoleon and a British total defeat. (as in Napoleon in London)

By 1812 this is ASB, and when it was plausible, the US wouldn't ally with Napoleon, so I think US gaining from victory in war of 1812 is ASB.

If the Americans won a total land victory- you'd see the British get serious.

You'd need either a seriously crushing victory by US forces and Napoleon still rampaging in Europe for territorial concessions I'd agree. The Americans were lucky at Ghent OTL since the British could have stripped off quite bit of excess territory and the US couldn't have said boo.

The US wasn't quite stupid enough to attack Britain when they weren't distracted after all.

If Nappy had been captured, and the French weren't given a reasonable peace, they prob would have fought on, with Nappy II as Emperor and a regent (would Marie Louise be regent, or someone else like Davout or Eugene?)

I actually started a thread on this yesterday

 

[Matteo]

25,000 troops is a land assault, not a naval one ... he was implying a purely naval assault. Which is why I excluded it. The attack on Baltimore numbered only around 4,000, and it failed to take the city from around 7,000 militia. Note that the British had allies in 1807 against the Danes. They would have no such allies in an attack on American cities. The attack on New Orleans, the biggest attack the British could muster, had only 11,000 men.

The available militia strength of Boston, New York, Philadelphia (the principal American ports) would easily match that, and all three had 1st and 2nd system forts

Of course. And what do the militia do against the RN's cannon balls ? They defend with baseball bats to send them back against the ships ?

If the brits want to let coastal cities in ruins, they do like they showed they could do. And the militias can just watch the show.

 

[TRH]

Of course. And what do the militia do against the RN's cannon balls ? They defend with baseball bats to send them back against the ships ?

If the brits want to let coastal cities in ruins, they do like they showed they could do. And the militias can just watch the show.

The first attack on Copenhagen avoided their forts to focus on the fleet, and the second involved a large ground assault. Are you just going to ignore the fortifications that existed in American ports, then? Or are the British going to land whole divisions to try an attack overland? Neither worked too well OTL, so which is it?

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Of course. And what do the militia do against the RN's cannon balls ? They defend with baseball bats to send them back against the ships ?

If the brits want to let coastal cities in ruins, they do like they showed they could do. And the militias can just watch the show.

The first attack on Copenhagen avoided their forts to focus on the fleet, and the second involved a large ground assault. Are you just going to ignore the fortifications that existed in American ports, then? Or are the British going to land whole divisions to try an attack overland? Neither worked too well OTL, so which is it?

Just to quibble in on the argument; the RN cannot reduce the East Coast cities to ashes seriatim in a concentrated campaign, it's not possible for ships to utterly ruin cities that way without a sincere expenditure of effort. So the RN cannot go from city to city bombarding them to rubble. That isn't even as effective as the blockade!

However, by extension we can't assume that each RN assault on a city was destined to fail in conjunction with the Army. It is conceivable both Baltimore and New Orleans could have fallen[1] to the British assaults, but on its own that doesn't mean the British could seize every city on the American Coast as they pleased. At the very best they could have seized Baltimore and Washington and been in total command of Maryland and northern Virginia, which would have been a crushing blow to the US. New Orleans was a poorly thought out expedition.

[1] Far more likely Baltimore though, the men from the New Orleans expedition would have been much more useful elsewhere.

 

[zoomar]

I think that the best possible scenario for the US in the War of 1812 is that the British agree to end impressment and compensate ship owners for seizures prior to the outbreak of the war.

Even if the US takes Upper and Lower Canada, from Lake Huron to Quebec City, I don't see how it would be possible to capture Halifax.

If the US does manage to seize most of Canada, that won't stop the Royal Navy from laying off the US coast and raising hell indefinitely. The US can capture Canada, but it can't hurt Britain itself. Britain, however, can attack the US directly.

I suppose that it might be possible for peace negotiators to set a fixed western boundary for British Canada--say, the western end of Lake Superior. Britain might agree to make no claims west of that point. But it's pretty far fetched.

If you want an American Canada at this point, then the best means of producing one would be Napoleon winning rather than losing on the Continent.

I think this is quite reasonable. Few Canadians wanted to be part of the US, so I think the US would be willing to consider any conquests in Canada items for dealing at the peace conference in exchange for better reparations. I suppose its possible for some slivers of land to be obtained, but it would be a much more farsighted move for the Americans to insist on the fixed western boundary of British North America as mentioned above.

 

[Matteo]

Just to quibble in on the argument; the RN cannot reduce the East Coast cities to ashes seriatim in a concentrated campaign, it's not possible for ships to utterly ruin cities that way without a sincere expenditure of effort. So the RN cannot go from city to city bombarding them to rubble. That isn't even as effective as the blockade!

However, by extension we can't assume that each RN assault on a city was destined to fail in conjunction with the Army. It is conceivable both Baltimore and New Orleans could have fallen[1] to the British assaults, but on its own that doesn't mean the British could seize every city on the American Coast as they pleased. At the very best they could have seized Baltimore and Washington and been in total command of Maryland and northern Virginia, which would have been a crushing blow to the US. New Orleans was a poorly thought out expedition.

[1] Far more likely Baltimore though, the men from the New Orleans expedition would have been much more useful elsewhere.

I know.

I do agree, of course.

And strategic ally one does not need to put all coastal cities to ruins in order to reach its strategic goals.

"Here is one. Did you understand of do you need a second lesson ?"

"There is the second one. Do you want to go on or to throw the towel ?"

... Etc

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I know.

I do agree, of course.

And strategic ally one does not need to put all coastal cities to ruins in order to reach its strategic goals.

"Here is one. Did you understand of do you need a second lesson ?"

"There is the second one. Do you want to go on or to throw the towel ?"

... Etc

Well even reducing one city to ashes is both difficult and generally not worth the effort. Far more likely for an inland invasion to seize one in conjunction with a bombardment to weaken the cities defences.

Really if the British had succeeded in seizing both Baltimore and Washington and funneling 20,000 men into Maryland it would be effectively game-over for the US since it's a strategic loss and a big blow to national pride that would probably lead to Madison suing for peace.

Far more effective than torching potentially valuable trade partners, and one which doesn't expose the RN to potentially significant casualties.

 

[galveston bay]

Of course. And what do the militia do against the RN's cannon balls ? They defend with baseball bats to send them back against the ships ?

If the brits want to let coastal cities in ruins, they do like they showed they could do. And the militias can just watch the show.

the only regulars at Baltimore were the ones in Fort McHenry, the entire remaining force was militia and it stopped General Ross cold (well dead in his case). At New Orleans, the majority of the defending force was militia as well, with only 3 small regiments (a few hundred in all) of Regulars. They stopped the British in a bloody slaughter as the British attacked militia dug in behind entrenchments

The entire force at Bunker Hill was militia... as was most of the troops at Saratoga. In the right circumstances American militia did extremely well.

What it did badly at was attack, or fight in the open field. Neither of which is required to defend a city.

So you were saying again?

 

[galveston bay]

Well even reducing one city to ashes is both difficult and generally not worth the effort. Far more likely for an inland invasion to seize one in conjunction with a bombardment to weaken the cities defences.

Really if the British had succeeded in seizing both Baltimore and Washington and funneling 20,000 men into Maryland it would be effectively game-over for the US since it's a strategic loss and a big blow to national pride that would probably lead to Madison suing for peace.

Far more effective than torching potentially valuable trade partners, and one which doesn't expose the RN to potentially significant casualties.

supplying it how? For one thing Ross had no cavalry, and it is extremely difficult to bring cavalry by water. Not to mention the vast amounts of fodder, wagons, and other supplies needed to keep such a large army going. He also had no significant artillery, and no way to move it.

In short he needs a port, and they were extremely well protected.

I am also sure he would have loved to have 20,000 men, but they were busy defending Canada, remaining as an army in being in the Low Countries to act as a bargaining chip with the talks underway in Europe over what to do with Europe after Napoleons exile to Elba, or in various other places doing the usual imperial duties.

The British also lacked cavalry at Lundys Lane, where at least they had Canada to draw from and nor much of an artillery park. Of course there was no cavalry at New Orleans and most of the artillery was hauled in from the Navy, and in small numbers and will little ammunition.

Why is cavalry important? It is what armies of the day used to scout with, and to forage. Artillery is of course obviously a concern as well. If he had both, he would have bagged all the fleeing militia at Bladensburg that escape to regroup and defend Baltimore, and artillery in quantity would have knocked those entrenchments down.

But the reality of logistics is what determines how campaigns go. Your proposal is no more realistic than the US Army and militia overrunning Canada in 1812 or 1813. Both require a huge departure from established events.

 

[galveston bay]

really though I think both sides did about as well as they could in the war with the means available. It was really on the second major war for the United States, and chronic ill preparedness was an American tradition until the 1980s. Not that the British could scoff much, it took them several years before they had an army that could face the French in the field (first really successful battle was not until after 1807).

At sea, the RN essentially locked up the American coast, although not so well as to keep American privateers from inflicting serious damage on the British merchant marine, or the occasional American frigate inflicting serious damage.

The British made a strong effort with all the troops that could be spared to launch a counter invasion on the United States. It failed on two fronts in New York in bloody fighting, it was smashed at New Orleans (and this was the strongest force), and while it burned down the national capital (an undefended village), it failed at the really important goal, which was taking Baltimore, which was a primary port of those said privateers.

American invasions of Canada were for the most part a fiasco and an illustrative lesson on military incompetence. The US was running out of money and the ability to raise it by 1814, while the British were massively in debt, war weary, and there was a real question of what it would have done in the 100 Days had not ended at Waterloo.

So for the Americans to do better or the British to do better in either case, requires significant departure from what happened in OTL.

And both of those to a very large degree require changes in the events in Europe.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

supplying it how? For one thing Ross had no cavalry, and it is extremely difficult to bring cavalry by water. Not to mention the vast amounts of fodder, wagons, and other supplies needed to keep such a large army going. He also had no significant artillery, and no way to move it.

In short he needs a port, and they were extremely well protected.

You will note I put emphasis on this alternate British strategy being based purely around concentrating forces in an effort to seize Washington and Baltimore in conjunction so as to force a peace treaty on the US on favourable terms to Great Britain.

I am not suggesting in any way that this was possible with the British overall strategy and correlation of forces as it stood OTL in 1814.

sI am also sure he would have loved to have 20,000 men, but they were busy defending Canada, remaining as an army in being in the Low Countries to act as a bargaining chip with the talks underway in Europe over what to do with Europe after Napoleons exile to Elba, or in various other places doing the usual imperial duties.

The British had, by 1814, managed the diversion of +\- 30,000 troops to North America, and by wars end there were nearly 40,000 (give or take) troops organized in the theatre. My suggestion is not impossible with a changed British strategy.

sThe British also lacked cavalry at Lundys Lane, where at least they had Canada to draw from and nor much of an artillery park. Of course there was no cavalry at New Orleans and most of the artillery was hauled in from the Navy, and in small numbers and will little ammunition.

This of course why I am proposing an alternate strategy in 1814, not what was possible with the forces available OTL as it happened.

sWhy is cavalry important? It is what armies of the day used to scout with, and to forage. Artillery is of course obviously a concern as well. If he had both, he would have bagged all the fleeing militia at Bladensburg that escape to regroup and defend Baltimore, and artillery in quantity would have knocked those entrenchments down.

Of which I am well aware.

sBut the reality of logistics is what determines how campaigns go. Your proposal is no more realistic than the US Army and militia overrunning Canada in 1812 or 1813. Both require a huge departure from established events.

Hence why again I am proposing an alternate strategy the British could have pursued in order to end the war on favourable terms, one which the British might have been able to pull off if they had put their minds to it.

What I am not suggesting is that the British could seize or demolish any American city along the coast at their pleasure.

 

[galveston bay]

that is a pretty major departure, but I think ultimately the logistical difficulties are going to be overwhelming. They were in the Revolution and little has changed for the invader. The Americans may not have money, but they have good logistics.

Concentrating that 40,000 men is not easy... there is still an American army of good quality in upper New York State in 1814 (and it took 2 years to build up those British forces you are discussing). So a significant force must be left to watch them, as well as defend the British naval bases on the lakes

So reduce that force in size. The acquisition of sufficient horses, oxen and wagons will be much more difficult. They cannot be transported by sea in quantity in this era, so armies must acquire them locally or there is a severe shortage, not only for logistics, but also to move artillery or mount cavalry.

Those will not be provided by the Americans nor will they be acquired in Baltimore or Washington. So in effect this army will find itself in the same position as Clinton was in New York. Tied to a fixed point and essentially under a land blockade in short order so that all supplies must come by sea. Which adds further the already serious cost to the British exchequer.

So while a problem, not an insolvable one, and a further lesson that conquering even part of North America is really difficult.

It took the Union Army 4 years, railroads and steamboats to conquer the Confederacy, and it didn't have to move animals in large numbers by sea.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

that is a pretty major departure, but I think ultimately the logistical difficulties are going to be overwhelming. They were in the Revolution and little has changed for the invader. The Americans may not have money, but they have good logistics.

The British were capable of mounting inland offensives in each war, and in this case have far superior logistics to the Americans with the best interior highway in North America in the form of the St. Lawrence. The Americans are stuck moving everything overland and it hurt their ability to wage war in 1812 quite seriously, not as seriously as the outright incompetent command issues but enough to prevent any of the invasions from having a good chance of victory.

Concentrating that 40,000 men is not easy... there is still an American army of good quality in upper New York State in 1814 (and it took 2 years to build up those British forces you are discussing). So a significant force must be left to watch them, as well as defend the British naval bases on the lakes

So reduce that force in size. The acquisition of sufficient horses, oxen and wagons will be much more difficult. They cannot be transported by sea in quantity in this era, so armies must acquire them locally or there is a severe shortage, not only for logistics, but also to move artillery or mount cavalry.

Not quite, 10,000 men would be more then sufficient to defend Canada, the US Army is a spent force by this period and after 1813 was never in a position to seriously threaten Canada and was incapable of offensive action, and the militia were hardly a factor anymore with call ups regularly failing to produce results. The concentration of perhaps 6,000 men to seize Washington and 14,000 to seize Baltimore and march inland could not be contested by a counter attack into Canada.

The acquisition of horse and wagon would be something which would need to be dealt with, but this is not an insurmountable task should the British choose to pursue such a strategy.

But still, it is less distance for an army to march over better and more developed infrastructure from Baltimore to Washington than it is from Queenston Heights to Toronto! I think it makes the task more than a tad easier.

Those will not be provided by the Americans nor will they be acquired in Baltimore or Washington. So in effect this army will find itself in the same position as Clinton was in New York. Tied to a fixed point and essentially under a land blockade in short order so that all supplies must come by sea. Which adds further the already serious cost to the British exchequer.

Not really, unless there is a truly massive army waiting outside of Baltimore nothing save scorched earth tactics and a gradual withdrawal would prevent the British from linking up with the forces in Washington and aiding their provision trough forage like all armies of the day were still doing. They would be able to take a considerable number of resources on the march to Washington.

Somehow I am skeptical of the State Governors obeying such an order given by Madison versus a demand he sue for peace.

So while a problem, not an insolvable one, and a further lesson that conquering even part of North America is really difficult.

It took the Union Army 4 years, railroads and steamboats to conquer the Confederacy, and it didn't have to move animals in large numbers by sea.

The point is that the British do not have to conquer[1] any part of America, they merely need to (in this strategy) keep up the blockade, take the capital, and by seizing Baltimore provide a corridor for supply and occupation of that area. With an army sitting on the capital and in all likelihood demands for peace in the US then it's just practical that such an operation would force an end to the war on British terms.

This is an operation the British may be able to pull off which does not require a significant change from OTL or in Europe to make plausible save in terms of strategy.

There are ways it could fail, but it would be well within the capabilities of the British to force peace with such an operation and discontent within the US at the time was such that peace would be more likely than not.

[1] I'm quibbling on conquer here but what I mean is the British do not need to seize and pacify any area any longer than it takes to force a peace treaty. If they outright tried to reconquer the region yes it would be a catastrophe, but that is not what they are (or were) trying to do in the War of 1812.

 

[galveston bay]

the St Lawrence River is great to defend Canada, but does not lead into US territory. Lake Champlain is what you need to invade the US, and then advance south along the Hudson (which is what the Battle of Lake Champlain prevented)

The Americans held Lake Erie and a naval arms race was underway (the Americans were even working on a double decker) on Lake Ontario so those are out while Lundys Lane and Niagara in 1814 by that apparently spent American force were a bloody draw as US and British regulars found they were evenly matched (finally after 2 years for the Americans)

The US Army on this front was actually finally a capable and dangerous force, as General Drummond openly admitted.

That massive army has to eat while its in Maryland, and while reasonably prosperous, this region of Maryland is not the breadbasket found further north. It was mainly tobacco plantations and supported a decent but not overly large population. As to state governors, Cochrane had been raiding Maryland shore villages and farms for a year already, so the locals are getting pretty angry about it already.. but angrier at the British.

So once the British have Baltimore and Washington, then what? Neither is the most important region of the US in terms of taxes, food production, productivity or wealth. Those would be either further north or further south. Philadelphia and the Delaware River valley, or New York and its environs, or Boston for what served as industry at this date as well as wheat and corn, while further south for the wealthier cotton and tobacco plantations (and wealth).

So once this army eats everything up, while under pretty steady harassment (which had already become a problem for British naval parties)

As to the capital, Congress and the President escaped and would easily make for either Richmond or Philadelphia. Most of the records made it out too. The British burned some buildings and a lot of furniture plus a nice naval yard when DC fell. But that was it. Ross complained about lacking cavalry and artillery. While this is a region known for just about every gentleman being an excellent rider, and Virginia is right next door. Not up to charging a British square but ideal for harassing foraging parties and wagon trains.

So this army isn't going anywhere.

It is also notable that the Hartford Convention and New England calls for secession ended after the burning of Washington, because they felt it was their capital too.

And then a few months latter, should this army stay through the winter, Napoleon escapes from Elba and the British have traded Maryland for a renewed threat from the "Monster"

And still haven't conquered the US or likely brought it to terms.

Meanwhile Brown and Scott have recovered, still have a decent army in New York, while there is no threat to New Orleans (a far more important place) and what have the British really gained? Other than occupying the north woods of Maine and part of Maryland, burned down Baltimore (Cochrane really wanted that) and Washington, they hold nothing of decisive value. Neither the industrial heartland (such as it is) or the really valuable cotton production territory to the south.

And American privateers are still capturing large numbers of British merchantmen, and the costs of the war continue to go up