US carriers more lucky

[mattep74]

Lets say that USA do not loses any carriers at Coral sea or Midway. Lexinton badly damaged and unable to take part of Midway, but take part at Guadacanal. Yorktown damaged as OTL at Coral sea and suffer less damage at Midway and get back to Pearl. Then at Guadacanal the American carriers are damaged but not sunk. Japanese carriers unk as OTL.

What happens in 1943 with USA having all pre war carriers remaining when the Essex come online? Enterprise will not have the same legacy, but what else will change?

 

[CV12Hornet]

Not much. The Japanese weren't coming out to fight, the Central Pacific campaign was as much dependent on the availability of oilers and amphibious shipping as carrier decks, and the US and Australians had few issues thrusting up the Solomons and New Guinea regardless.

About the only consequential change I can see is Victorious not doing her stint with the Pacific Fleet, which was very important for improving American fighter direction. And there's no guarantee the US won't pick it up anyway from some other source.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

The US having two extra carriers (Lexington and Yorktown) at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz will skew those battles. If in December the US also has Hornet and Wasp, the entire SW Pacific campaign would be accelerated 2-3 months

 

[Grey Wolf]

I would think you would get more strategic offensive options.

 

[CV12Hornet]

The US having two extra carriers (Lexington and Yorktown) at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz will skew those battles. If in December the US also has Hornet and Wasp, the entire SW Pacific campaign would be accelerated 2-3 months

They're not going to have those carriers at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, not with the beating both Yorktown and Lexington took. They might be able to get Lexington in-theater during November, and that's not nothing, but Yorktown's not getting there until December at the earliest. Likewise, Hornet's not getting back until at least March 1943.

Wasp is the only carrier that can get patched up at Pearl, which means a much shorter turnaround time for her. They probably could get her back in December.

I'm not convinced greater carrier strength is going to accelerate the SW Pacific campaign; carriers don't seem to have been the limiting factor in the speed of the advance. The New Georgia campaign didn't happen until June largely because there weren't enough ground forces in-theater.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

They're not going to have those carriers at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, not with the beating both Yorktown and Lexington took.

The OP sez

Lexinton badly damaged and unable to take part of Midway, but take part at Guadacanal.

"At Guadalcanal" means Eastern Solomons and/or Santa Cruz. Yorktown, damaged at Coral Sea and then surviving Midway, is probably out for the rest of the year.

Enterprise was damaged at Eastern Solomons, but was back for Santa Cruz OTL. Hornet and Wasp were sunk in the fall. ITTL some are damaged but none are sunk. With US having an extra carrier at Eastern Solomons, is it likely the Japanese would inflict more damage?

 

[CV12Hornet]

At Guadalcanal" means Eastern Solomons and/or Santa Cruz.

Does it? The campaign went on for another three months after Santa Cruz.

Enterprise was damaged at Eastern Solomons, but was back for Santa Cruz OTL

Yes, because she wasn't nearly as damaged as Lexington was, and she was still lamed. Enterprise took solely bomb hits. Lexington took two bombs and two torpedoes, the latter of which are exactly the kind of damage that can't be fixed at Noumea or Pearl and forces her to transit to the West Coast for a stay in drydock.

And yes, she still has this damage in this scenario, because the most likely way for her to survive is not take that avgas explosion that did her in.

 

[CT7834]

There are two issues with this timeline. The first is that with no carrier losses. The US Navy is going to be extremely reluctant in asking the Royal Navy for borrowing HMS Victorious. This may cause issues later as Victorious's presence helped the US Navy improve their fighter coordination. While at the same time the Royal Navy learned how to better use and coordinate their strike aircraft. Not saying that it won't resolve itself later. But it will be a long and possibly bloody process.

The other issue is TG 38.5/58.5. Aka the Night Carrier group. OTL was based around 2 carriers, either Independence and Enterprise or Saratoga and Enterprise. They would merge with other task groups during the day and separate out at night. With a larger number of pre-war carriers in addition to the Essex spam. Combined with the IJN being reduced to Kamikazes. Mitscher and Mc Cain Snr are going to find themselves with more carriers than they know what to do with.

 

[Pete55]

They're not going to have those carriers at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, not with the beating both Yorktown and Lexington took. They might be able to get Lexington in-theater during November, and that's not nothing, but Yorktown's not getting there until December at the earliest. Likewise, Hornet's not getting back until at least March 1943.

The USN was also really hurting for oilers; no way are they supporting a third CSG regardless of damage.

 

[naraic]

I wouldn't be surprised if one or more carriers ends up primarily as an aircraft ferry.

Now there are battles that would have been boosted with more land based air ferried in.

 

[Pete55]

There are two issues with this timeline. The first is that with no carrier losses. The US Navy is going to be extremely reluctant in asking the Royal Navy for borrowing HMS Victorious. This may cause issues later as Victorious's presence helped the US Navy improve their fighter coordination. While at the same time the Royal Navy learned how to better use and coordinate their strike aircraft. Not saying that it won't resolve itself later. But it will be a long and possibly bloody process.

I don't know that I rate this as a huge deal. Certainly there were lessons learned from the British, but there were as many lessons learned from the coral sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and the Danta Cruz islands. Moreover, the air attacks that proved especially dangerous in the second half of the war required different lessons to be learned anyways. It's different defending against random single Judy attacks and kamikazes then from massed alpha strikes.

The British were really as limited by their carrier designs as they were by lessons learned. Their CVs just were not designed for the same sortie speed and generation as the American or Japanese carriers were.

The other issue is TG 38.5/58.5. Aka the Night Carrier group. OTL was based around 2 carriers, either Independence and Enterprise or Saratoga and Enterprise. They would merge with other task groups during the day and separate out at night. With a larger number of pre-war carriers in addition to the Essex spam. Combined with the IJN being reduced to Kamikazes. Mitscher and Mc Cain Snr are going to find themselves with more carriers than they know what to do with.

Oh nooooo! Too many CVs! However will the Americans survive.

Sorry man, not to make fun of your point, but I think they'll find a way to handle this one.

I wouldn't be surprised if one or more carriers ends up primarily as an aircraft ferry.

Now there are battles that would have been boosted with more land based air ferried in.

Again, the issue is with oilers. A CV isn't crossing the Pacific without significant escort, meaning that at least one fast boiler needs to be dedicated to the formation.

 

[vl100butch]

let Ranger become an aircraft ferry in the Atlantic and use a couple of CVLs in the Pacific...

 

[CalBear]

You would see more aggressive raiding earlier in the war. IOTL Rabaul was not serious hit by carrier based air until November of 1943, with NINE fleet carriers operational along with the Japanese carrier force being effective gutted, with the Shokaku and Zuikaku and a couple of their light carriers still afloat.

With five, possibly six, decks, and not having had the Yorktown, shot out from under him Fletcher is more likely to remain on station allowing the amphibious group to fully off-load. There may even be an attempt to send three carriers to the Northeast of the slot to strike at Rabaul and/or Kavieng, something would short circuit Savo Island. The Butteflies of the Marines having full states of supply, and the SeeBees having all their equipment rather than a couple pieces of much smaller Japanese construction equipment are enormous, as would be the near continious presence of a couple U.S. carrier Task Forces ready to move against any Heavy Japanese traffic.

A faster victory at Guadalcanal not only open the possibility of a earlier kick-off to the Rest of Cartwheel, but it could potentially free up sufficient forces to take Tarawa before the Japanese began their defensive improvements in February of 1943.

 

[Pete55]

You would see more aggressive raiding earlier in the war. IOTL Rabaul was not serious hit by carrier based air until November of 1943, with NINE fleet carriers operational along with the Japanese carrier force being effective gutted, with the Shokaku and Zuikaku and a couple of their light carriers still afloat.

With five, possibly six, decks, and not having had the Yorktown, shot out from under him Fletcher is more likely to remain on station allowing the amphibious group to fully off-load. There may even be an attempt to send three carriers to the Northeast of the slot to strike at Rabaul and/or Kavieng, something would short circuit Savo Island. The Butteflies of the Marines having full states of supply, and the SeeBees having all their equipment rather than a couple pieces of much smaller Japanese construction equipment are enormous, as would be the near continious presence of a couple U.S. carrier Task Forces ready to move against any Heavy Japanese traffic.

A faster victory at Guadalcanal not only open the possibility of a earlier kick-off to the Rest of Cartwheel, but it could potentially free up sufficient forces to take Tarawa before the Japanese began their defensive improvements in February of 1943.

Wait up! This is all logical, but I'm still stuck at the US finding oilers before the horde starts pumping out in 43.

Of course, I'm finding it a little difficult to get a read on where the ships all were.

There were a dozen Cimarron class at the beginning of the Pacific war. Neosho was sunk along with one other. Two more were converted to CVE hulls in 42. Now, I think that other hulls may have been used as both oilers and replenishment ships, and it may have been possible to use normal merchant ships as "slow" oilers, but supporting fast moving groups is certain to be tricky with 10 knot supply ships.

Given that the USN was able to supply a VERY large ship contingent in the Solomons chain by Fecember, something like 50+ DD, a dozen cruisers, 2-3 BBs and at least a pair of CVs, I could be reading the situation wrong. This did come after a major supply build up at island bases in the region however.

I dunno, Calbear. I could be totally nitpicking out of context here. Certainly the USN was happy to be quite aggressive with their CVs when they had enough of them (I mean, the pre Midway use of Carriers is a series of one raid after another). My only question is if they would have been able to do so.

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This all said, if they can supply them, this allows CSGs to strike further into the Island chain, seriously limiting the ability of IJN ships to tun in under the cover of darkness. Had carriers been nearer during 1st Savo for instance, while they wouldnt have mattered much at night they almost certainly would have claimed a cruiser or two the next morning. Suddenly Tokyo express DD runs are liable to get hit before nighttime falls from a CSG group operating further West then usual.

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All this aside, Yorktown is going to have the best crew on the planet. They performed the best of any carrier in the battle at Midway, Hiryu included, and showed a vast improvement over their previous performance at the Coral sea. Yorktowns air attack would have been sufficient to overwhelm the KBs defense regardless of the other strikes and every attack on Yorktown was gutted. (Submarine excluded)

 

[Sanderford]

The first thing to come to mind for me, is "more lucky" likely means Lexington and Yorktown do not get schwacked at Coral Sea, and Saratoga doesn't eat a torpedo. The Americans have five carriers at Midway, instead of three, thus outnumbering the I.J.N. forces in terms of flight decks and planes.

Imagine a battle order in which Admiral Fletcher has all three of the Yorktown-class carriers, and the two Lexington-class sisters sail under Admiral Spruance.

Can you say striking power? Because I can.

 

[McPherson]

They're not going to have those carriers at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, not with the beating both Yorktown and Lexington took. They might be able to get Lexington in-theater during November, and that's not nothing, but Yorktown's not getting there until December at the earliest. Likewise, Hornet's not getting back until at least March 1943.

Wasp is the only carrier that can get patched up at Pearl, which means a much shorter turnaround time for her. They probably could get her back in December.

I'm not convinced greater carrier strength is going to accelerate the SW Pacific campaign; carriers don't seem to have been the limiting factor in the speed of the advance. The New Georgia campaign didn't happen until June largely because there weren't enough ground forces in-theater.

Tankers and marines were the limiters.

With five, possibly six, decks, and not having had the Yorktown, shot out from under him Fletcher is more likely to remain on station allowing the amphibious group to fully off-load. There may even be an attempt to send three carriers to the Northeast of the slot to strike at Rabaul and/or Kavieng, something would short circuit Savo Island. The Butteflies of the Marines having full states of supply, and the SeeBees having all their equipment rather than a couple pieces of much smaller Japanese construction equipment are enormous, as would be the near continious presence of a couple U.S. carrier Task Forces ready to move against any Heavy Japanese traffic.

Fletcher would still probably wind up in Alaska. He was badly injured (concussion from a shell fragment at Eastern Solomons) and needed rest and recuperation after almost a year of fighting the Japanese at the tip of the spear. Also, Alaska Command was really screwed up, I mean to the point where Buckner and the Navy were more at war with each other than the Japanese. The King factor was another major issue because King was receiving bum reports (R.K. Turner.), but the USN did need a good battle commander up north to handle the Navy side of the inter-service fight and Fletcher actually brought a lot of gravitas to that problem. The Army was not going to be able to push Fletcher around the way they razzed Theobald.

 

[McPherson]

I don't know that I rate this as a huge deal. Certainly there were lessons learned from the British, but there were as many lessons learned from the Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and the Santa Cruz islands. Moreover, the air attacks that proved especially dangerous in the second half of the war required different lessons to be learned anyways. It's different defending against random single Judy attacks and kamikazes then from massed alpha strikes.

This. (^^^)

The British were really as limited by their carrier designs as they were by lessons learned. Their CVs just were not designed for the same sortie speed and generation as the American or Japanese carriers were.

Well, that was more a difference in doctrine and operational art approach than due to carrier design. The RN thought the aircraft carrier defense was in armor (dive bombers); the Japanese thought it was in find the enemy first and sink the enemy first, and the Americans at first thought like the Japanese and then finally developed their fleet air defense onion (outer ~ fighters, middle ~ fighters and dive bombers and inner AAA guns) to be a little more "British" except that the "armor" was an actual fleet integrated air defense system which evolved and not due to some mystical USS Robin, but more likely from LantFlt, the Battle of Britain observer reports and the US Army Fighter Tactics School via the ROCAF.

 

[CalBear]

Tankers and marines were the limiters.

Fletcher would still probably wind up in Alaska. He was badly injured (concussion from a shell fragment at Eastern Solomons) and needed rest and recuperation after almost a year of fighting the Japanese at the tip of the spear. Also, Alaska Command was really screwed up, I mean to the point where Buckner and the Navy were more at war with each other than the Japanese. The King factor was another major issue because King was receiving bum reports (R.K. Turner.), but the USN did need a good battle commander up north to handle the Navy side of the inter-service fight and Fletcher actually brought a lot of gravitas to that problem. The Army was not going to be able to push Fletcher around the way they razzed Theobald.

Fletcher probably would still wind up out of the front line.

The key is, at least as far as this specific question goes, is just how much more effective the carrier forces could be in second half of 1942 into late 1943 without the loss of four decks.

 

[TonyA]

Gee guys, with all these extra big decks just itching to get into the fight, couldn't the Sangamons come out to play as oilers, self protecting ones at that?

 

[McPherson]

The key is, at least as far as this specific question goes, is just how much more effective the carrier forces could be in second half of 1942 into late 1943 without the loss of four decks.

Lessons learned from battle damage and air operations (staff incompetence) revisions will still have to be digested and the fleet has to figure out the dud captain/admiral (Browning/Mitscher/Turner/Noyes/Pownall) problem. Then there is the oft mentioned tanker shortage and the historic slaughter of the veteran USNAS cadres during the ferocious 1942 aircraft carrier battles that has to be remedied. Four decks actually does not help much if those factors are not immediately addressed. It is like the torpedo crisis. If the innate USN organization and doctrine problems that brought about their air staff planning inefficiency, the needless pilot slaughter to make up that deficiency, the logistics snafus, and fleet command and operational art problems are not solved first, then the four additional decks are just four additional decks. The fundamentals were more the problems rather than lack of decks.