Two G3 'battlecruisers' instead of HMS Nelson, HMS Rodney and HMS Tiger (PoD 4pm 14/12/1921).

Two G3s are allowed in the Five Power Treaty.
During the discussions regarding the Five Power Treaty between 12 November 1921 and 6 February 1922, it became clear that the IJN were determined to retain Mutsu and that the British ships were, on average, the oldest. By 30 November 1921 the parties were in deadlock. To thrash out a compromise, the three main parties held a series of semi-clandestine meetings. Proceedings were recorded by Maurice Hankey, who was the only outsider present. On 14 December 1921 Charles Hughes (US), Arthur Balfour (UK) and Kato Tomosaburo (Jp) met in Hughes' home to debate the actual ships that would make up their agreed 5/5/3 ratio. One of their first agreements was to classify capital ships as pre-Jutland or post-Jutland, given that battle's effect on the appreciation of naval commanders to the threat of plunging shells fired at longer ranges.

Hughes proposed finishing USS Colorado and USS Washington. Balfour protested; the Royal Navy had nothing comparable and, even with all the changes during construction, HMS Hood wasn't the ship that would have been built to a purely post-Jutland design. If the US had their two new ships, he wanted two of the new battlecruisers that had just been laid down and a gradual replacement programme of older ships rather than a 10 year moratorium. Even Balfour wasn't aware that the 8" armour which had been openly ordered wasn't the ships' thick belt armour, but the deck plating. The belt was a massive 14" and the turret fronts 17½". The ships were armoured against 18" armour piercing shells, which were being developed by all three nations until the 16" calibre limit was agreed. These were not the battlecruisers they were being sold as. They were the very first modern fast battleships, as revolutionary as HMS Dreadnought had been 15 years previously but with the improvements well hidden below the skin.

Kato was impassive. He stated that he had received no specific instructions on that point but was personally in favour of adopting Balfour's counter-proposal.

Around 4pm Hughes insisted that the two new ships would disrupt his harmonious 'parity calculations' under the 5/5/3 agreement. Britain would have to scrap HMS Tiger, as well as those ships already agreed, or build to the 35,000 ton limit. Not knowing the true nature of the new design, Balfour considered the loss of HMS Tiger too great a sacrifice and reluctantly conceded.

 PoD

Balfour states that he is unable to do as Kato did and make that choice without consultation. The meeting adjourns. He receives a reply to the proposal from Beatty at the Admiralty.

"Sacrifice Tiger. Try to get incremental construction. No moratorium."

 Next

1) The further discussions around the "battleship holiday".
2) How the contracts with the shipbuilders changed after the PoD and what that meant for the costs of the G3 programme.

David.
 

CalBear

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Won't happen.

The RN insists on the G3, which were fairly obviously a massive step forward over the Admiral class, the Japanese are going to want to be able to complete the Amagi and Akagi as battlecruisers,. possibly the Atago as well. the U.S. will do the same with at least the Lexington class, except it will be at least three hulls in order to maintain the 5:5:3 tonnage ratio.

The Washington Treaty was complex balancing act, one that it was imperative for the UK and, to less obvious extent, Japan to get in place. The United States was going to simply bury both the IJN and RN in advanced ship classes, with absolutely no throttle in sight (the Congress was on a "Navy 2nd to None" mission and the U.S. treasury had the funding to accomplish it, demonstrated by the fact that the USN had all six Lexington class BC and all six South Dakota class ships actually under construction, at the same time while the Treaty was being discussed).

The U.S. was also reading everyone else's mail and knew exactly what their positions were, and exactly who had the whip hand (hint, it wasn't the British).
 
Its unlikely that this would happen but it would be a major win for the British.

Its also worth noting that wear and tear on battlecruisers was a resource to be used. Tiger was husbanded to a degree in the 20s (so that she would be still be in good shape when a conflict happened). If going to the scrappers Tiger would be run into the ground while the G3s are being built.

This would mean that other battlecruisers are less heavily used.
 
Well having two modern fast battleships in the 1920s will be a massive boon for the RN come WW2, especially if they only 'lose' the Nelsons (as much as I love those shooty oil tankers) and the Tiger.
 
Won't happen.

The RN insists on the G3, which were fairly obviously a massive step forward over the Admiral class, the Japanese are going to want to be able to complete the Amagi and Akagi as battlecruisers,. possibly the Atago as well. the U.S. will do the same with at least the Lexington class, except it will be at least three hulls in order to maintain the 5:5:3 tonnage ratio.

The Washington Treaty was complex balancing act, one that it was imperative for the UK and, to less obvious extent, Japan to get in place. The United States was going to simply bury both the IJN and RN in advanced ship classes, with absolutely no throttle in sight (the Congress was on a "Navy 2nd to None" mission and the U.S. treasury had the funding to accomplish it, demonstrated by the fact that the USN had all six Lexington class BC and all six South Dakota class ships actually under construction, at the same time while the Treaty was being discussed).

The U.S. was also reading everyone else's mail and knew exactly what their positions were, and exactly who had the whip hand (hint, it wasn't the British).
Well I suppose the State Department minutes in the link below are the basis of the POD. Hughes apparently was willing to accept two "Super-Hoods" ie the G3s in exchange for scrapping four KGVs and Tiger in December 14. He backtracks in December 15 after Balfour has failed to jump on the offer. Well say Balfour does accept the minute the offer is made. Hughes can still backtrack I suppose but if an initial deal has been made it's quite a bit more difficult...

To quote

1684011543835.png


The entire document

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1922v01/d54
 
Won't happen.

The RN insists on the G3, which were fairly obviously a massive step forward over the Admiral class, the Japanese are going to want to be able to complete the Amagi and Akagi as battlecruisers,. possibly the Atago as well. the U.S. will do the same with at least the Lexington class, except it will be at least three hulls in order to maintain the 5:5:3 tonnage ratio.

It all but  did happen.

Everything I wrote up to the 4pm PoD is in the OTL and can be verified. Balfour took the decision he did, but Hughes and Kato had both acquiesced to him having the other option with no redress on their parts. All that happens in TTL is that Balfour seeks Admiralty advice. The PoD is Balfour's 4pm decision, TTL is the opposite side of exactly the same coin.
 
What would scrapping mean in this TL? Total scrapping, or reuse the hulls as something else, carriers? Save the guns and, or engines and boilers, again to use for other ships?
 
The Washington Treaty was complex balancing act, one that it was imperative for the UK and, to less obvious extent, Japan to get in place.

Japan, sure, they were running out of money. The UK could have kept going if it wanted to - four capital ships a year just meant reducing the national debt at a slower rate than ideal.

The United States was going to simply bury both the IJN and RN in advanced ship classes,

Maybe. If it developed a renewed interest in doing so, and if it ever came up with an advanced capital ship class.

with absolutely no throttle in sight (the Congress was on a "Navy 2nd to None" mission and the U.S. treasury had the funding to accomplish it, demonstrated by the fact that the USN had all six Lexington class BC and all six South Dakota class ships actually under construction, at the same time while the Treaty was being discussed).

That they were building ships, given that this is the US, is no guarantee that they'd get the money to keep building them, especially since the post-1920 Congress was rather less interested in picking a fight than its predecessor.
 
What would scrapping mean in this TL? Total scrapping, or reuse the hulls as something else, carriers? Save the guns and, or engines and boilers, again to use for other ships?

As in OTL, it means total disposal. The only change (so far) in TTL is Balfour making the alternate decision when he was given a choice by Hughes and Kato.
 
Well I suppose the State Department minutes in the link below are the basis of the POD.

William R Braisted's The United States Navy In The Pacific 1909 - 1922 is the main basis of the PoD. Other printed works and internet articles confirm the events. I haven't consulted any State Department records.
 
The real trick is getting the US and Japan to keep the deal when the true details on the G3s emerge.
Albeit given Congress's and the publics mood on large scale naval expenditure at the time(and honestly in general outside times of war) once the treaty had been signed and ratified not sure there would be the political will save maybe to complete the Washington and that's a big if.

What happens with Japan though that's a topic I don't know much about in terms of their political scene. Probably not pretty at all. Italy and France might use their allowed build tonnage early though and Damm the costs
 
But when do the details emerge, there comes a point where it's just too late to back out. I think the backlash would be held off until the London Naval treaty negotiations.
Yeah London treaty is going to be ugly. For one I really doubt the tonnage limits on destroyers, cruisers, and subs will remain what they where if they even happen which in the case of the admiralty they would have been happy with for the first 2 given they really wanted a lot of crusiers and only wanted total DD tonnage limits let alone the ones they got if subs got outright banned. Still probably see the clause basically for unlimited sloops still be a thing though.

Japan will almost certainly not be willing to demilitarize Hiei. The carrier tonnage allotment will be interesting as well albeit the under 10,000 tons doesn't count in terms of adding tonnage loophole Japan tried to use in otl will almost certainly still be plugged.


Only thing that could perhaps extend the building holiday ln capital ships sans the ones France and Italy have 70,000 tons in empty tonnage allotment and in theory can build whenever they want is the world economy being on fire. Which might very well allow that to happen.
 
<Author's Note>

Fellow authors,

One of the first few comments that I ever read on AH is one that I espouse wholeheartedly and try to remember if a poster makes my heckles rise.

I may have paraphrased, or concatenated two posts, but the plea was:

"We're here to have fun. This is entertainment, not warfare. Let that only be engaged in by our characters and their nations, not ourselves."

Since starting this thread, the replies and reactions have ranged from appreciation and support, through caution and constructive criticism, to outright anti-British repudiation from a poster who has either not read, or doesn't understand, the OTL.

To reference (fairly) modern pop culture, the Point of Divergence in this ATL is a “Sliding Doors moment”. A tiny change, in this case Arthur Balfour using the transatlantic cable to contact the Admiralty instead of making a decision alone, leads to consequences which are far larger than their simple beginning.

Please read the story in the spirit in which it is offered and, although I know it can be difficult, without your educated knowledge of the G3 design and without your 100 years of hindsight. Only their Lordships of the Admiralty, a few senior Fleet Admirals, the Directorate of Naval Construction and the senior management at the shipyards knew what the G3 design really was. Everyone else, including Balfour himself, thought it was a state-of-the-art battlecruiser and nothing more.

<end Author's Note>

Summary so far:

Hughes, Balfour & Kato meet at Hughes' home.
They agree to divide capital ships pre- or post-Jutland. HMS Hood is, uniquely, considered trans-Jutland.
The RN have no post-Jutland ships.
The RN have four new ships on order which are called battlecruisers and are similar in length, beam, displacement and (design) speed to HMS Hood. Armour has been ordered with a thickness similar to battlecruiser belt armour.

Kato (Jp) will not give up Mutsu, but is prepared to offer Settsu instead.
Hughes (US) demands Colorado and Washington if Mutsu survives.
Balfour (UK) protests that these three ships are all post-Jutland designs.
Hughes offers two of the new RN design, then hesitates and says HMS Tiger must be scrapped with other agreed tonnage or RN will have an excess.
At the design displacement, the RN would have 46,000 long tons excess over the 5/5/3 relationship, but in far older ships. If the new ships were reduced to 45,000 tons the excess would only be 40,000 long tons, less than the displacement of trans-Jutland HMS Hood.
Hughes puts a firm offer on the table: Britain can build two 35,000 ton ships and keep HMS Tiger, or two 45,000ish ton ships but lose HMS Tiger.
Kato indicates he wouldn't object to Hughes' offer if Balfour took it.

Point of Divergence:

OTL: Balfour alone makes the decision to keep HMS Tiger. ATL: Balfour consults the Admiralty that afternoon (evening in Britain) who tell him to sacrifice HMS Tiger.

Continuation of ATL:

Next morning Kato and Balfour arrived at the Hughes residence. Once seated with refreshments, Arthur Balfour opened proceedings.

“Thank you for providing us with a way to resolve our impasse, gentlemen. Their Lordships would like me to accept your generous offer of completing two of our new battlecruisers. It just remains for us to determine a timetable for future construction. Charles, I understand that your Colorado and Washington are currently fitting out and that you will pledge not to complete West Virginia?”

“That's right, Arthur, even though she's three-fourths done.”

“I believe Mutsu is similarly close to completion?“

“Yes.” responded Kato.

Balfour looked briefly into the eyes of his two counterparts. “We are prepared to slow our construction schedules and, indeed, defer entirely one ship for a period of two years if your governments are able to offer the same. Following the completion of the last of these five ships around 1928, we propose that design work and preparation of materials be restarted but that no other capital ships are laid down before the end of 1931.”

Hughes gave an odd kind of cough, whilst Kato looked as inscrutable as ever. Slowly and imperceptibly, the Japanese nobleman nodded. The two visitors looked across the table at Charles Hughes.

“Slow the fitting out of Colorado and halt all work on Washington for two years before resuming at that slow pace?”

“Yes, Charles. Do we have an agreement?”

Hughes looked strained for a moment, then his face cleared and in a determined voice he replied, “Goddamnit, Arthur, I think we do.”

Committee room of the Board of the Admiralty, 11am Tuesday 20 December 1921.

“There is possibly an agreement at the international conference,” stated the tall, bearded admiral. “DNC needs to do a little more work next week but we think the overall payments to the shipbuilders are going to total just over half the figure that we gave you in October.”

The treasury official looked unimpressed. “Eight million pounds? Plus your own costs, which will bring the total to fifteen million for two ships. You changed Hood's design a score of times and we didn’t pay much over just six million.”

“It won't be quite that much and it will be 14½ million over seven years instead of 29 million over four years. I'm sure you can sell that to the Chancellor.”

“Let me see the detailed workings.”

“I've told you, DNC hasn't finished them yet. What we're doing is pairing the firms. One pair completely on the Clyde and one pair with a Clydebank yard working with a Tyneside yard. When we looked at their capabilities, it was a natural fit which, coincidentally, puts the lowest tender with the highest. There will need to be some allowance for transportation of components, but the average tender of the separated pair was lower than that of the pair in proximity. Those are the matters that DNC will consider next week, but if I had to give you a guess then I'd say it's an extra £8,000 spread over seven years to save me from having smaller and slower ships in the fleet and you from the consequences of the companies laying off half the men in the shipbuilding industry in 1926 or 1927.”

“Hrrmnph,” grunted the treasury official. “Now you're just being melodramatic.”

Notes:

In OTL, completely new (O3) designs were needed. The two ships were laid down in 1922 and commissioned in 1927. In TTL, HMS Invincible will be commissioned in 1926 and HMS Indomitable in 1928.

DNC was the shorthand for Director of Naval Construction, at this time Sir Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt.

Chancellor is short for Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance Minister), at this time Sir Robert Horne.

Next:

The reaction in the shipyards.

David.
 
Nice thread, I will be following.

Having the G3 Battlecruisers being constructed would be a good to see.

What would had happened with the HMS Tiger? Is it possible to sell for a third party navy or is it going to the scrapyard? It's a great ship too.
 
Nice thread, I will be following.

Having the G3 Battlecruisers being constructed would be a good to see.

What would had happened with the HMS Tiger? Is it possible to sell for a third party navy or is it going to the scrapyard? It's a great ship too.

Thank you, @minhow

HMS Tiger is retained until a few weeks after  Dom is commissioned. Then, like her half-sisters, the Cat will be put to sleep on or around her 14th birthday. Either simple scrapping or armaments testing and yes, I know, it's six years too early.

Sneak spoiler: Hood remains as 1BCS flagship.
 
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In TTL, HMS Invincible will be commissioned in 1926 and HMS Indomitable in 1928.

Only nitpick I'd have would be that they're probably still called Nelson and Rodney, given the combination of following on from the cancelled Admirals and being by far the most powerful ships the RN will have for quite a while.
 
All that happens in TTL is that Balfour seeks Admiralty advice. The PoD is Balfour's 4pm decision, TTL is the opposite side of exactly the same coin.
Balfour did actually consult the Admiralty, in the person of his Admiralty appointed naval advisor. Chatfield was his main advisor and it appears that he had access to Dreyer. And Balfour did actually consult with Chatfield prior to making his decision on the G3’s. I understand that Chatfield, though initially resisting the loss of the G3’s, came around to the idea in exchange for British legacy tonnage being used for new standard tonnage. If this is the case, it appears that Balfour did not follow through with this, but basically gave in with no compensation despite gaining acceptance for 2 G3’s.

To be honest, I don’t have an extremely high view of Chatfield. Particularly at Washington. He earlier suggested that to save Tiger and keep the G3’s, Renown should be sacrificed. IMO this was a stupid piece of advice. Despite the love for Tiger on this board she was a coal-fired ship with obsolescent guns and had almost a full 4 years of war service behind her. And with hindsight she would be scrapped anyway a few years later while Renown was a fairly new 15”, oil fired BC.who would give good service in WW2. So perhaps a fair portion of the blame should fall on Chatfield for the G3’s demise.

Regardless, having recieved advice from the Admiralty representative assigned to him, Balfour would, unfortunately have no reason to seek advice from the Admiralty in London. And if he did Beatty seems likely to back up Chatfield.
 
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Finance note:

For those of you who are really enjoying this and would like some OTL background to get your teeth into whilst you're waiting for the next scene tomorrow (or maybe Tuesday).

The actual lowest tenders accepted in October 1921 were:

William Beardmore & Company, Dalmuir - £3,786,332 (with machinery subcontracted to Vickers Ltd., Barrow-in-Furness)
John Brown & Company, Clydebank - £3,879,000
Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering, Govan - £3,900,000
Swan, Hunter & Wigham Richardson, Wallsend - £3,977,175

...a total of £15,542,507 for four hulls, superstructure and machinery. Other contracts were issued or expected which would share work around the British shipbuilding and armaments industries. All four  A barbettes and 15 of the 37 gun barrels (4×9 + a spare) were to be supplied by Vickers Ltd.   B were split between John Brown and Armstrong-Whitworth (who were also responsible for 13 barrels), whilst  X barbettes would be sent from Cammell Laird in Birkenhead, Cheshire. William Beardmore would produce the remaining 9 barrels needed.

Similar arrangements existed for the supply of armour plate, rangefinding and gunnery control, wireless and telegraphy equipment, galley stoves, and all the other minutiæ of a 'tween-wars capital ship.

The total cost of approximately £29,000,000 was to be spread over the financial years Apr1921/Mar1922 to 1925/6. In  TTL, £14,500,000 is projected to be spread from 1921/2 to 1928/9, a considerable easing of pressure on the naval budget and a stimulus to the economy in a period where depression lurked too close by.

Naming note:

That is a plausible alternative, but I have seen other evidence that the  I names were chosen as another layer in the deception of 'just some more battlecruisers, nothing to see here, move along now'.
 
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