Two common but inconsistent views about interwar Europe - Poll

[Rich Rostrom]

I'm going to list two common arguments, that in my view, are logically mutually exclusive, and shouldn't be held by the same person. Let me know which of the two views you hold, or if you believe you can reconcile them.

A) Often with a perspective focused on Versailles and the settlement of WWI, focused on its structural flaws (German dissatisfaction, end of Allied unity, US and Soviet isolation), a second European war of German revenge is seen as the most probable and difficult to deflect outcome.

Oh yeah... by 1930, every German boy had heard so much about the fun of trench warfare that they wanted to try it themselves. Not!

Whatever resentment Germans felt over Versailles, it was lot less than the trauma of the war - millions of men killed and mutilated, the nation's wealth exhausted, ending in starvation on the home front. (The repulsive concoctions which served as ersatz food and drink in 1917-1918 would discourage any warmonger.)

B) Often with a perspective focused on European popular opinion and universal dread of war among Allied, American, Italian and German publics, and the unique role of Hitler, WWII is portrayed as a freak event that no one except Hitler wanted.

Not quite true, but it took Hitler's messianic recklessness and absolute power to take Germany to war. The further involvement of Italy was due to the arrogance and folly of Mussolini (and the early success of Germany); the involvement of Japan was due to the mania of the Japanese militarist cult.

C) Some combination of the two.

A - not true, B - true. C - not logically possible.

But D - a second World War could have been initiated by a power other than Germany. Specifically, the USSR. I don't believe the USSR would have remained quiescent forever.

By 1939, the USSR had built up the largest land and air forces in the world. It's argued that this was only because of Germany's build-up under Hitler, but the USSR viewed itself as the base of revolutionary war against all non-socialist governments. In the 1920s and 1930s the USSR was too weak for open war, and by 1940 was checked by Germany.

If there was no "Third Reich", Germany and the Western powers would have been far less armed than OTL, and sooner or later the USSR would try something. A Soviet-Japanese alliance may seem improbable, but no more so than the Soviet-Nazi alliance of OTL. One could also see the USSR taking advantage of anti-colonial unrest in the Middle East and India.

All this could happen in the mid 1940s.

 

[interesting...]

I would say a war was more likely than not, but a war wasn't inevitable and a world war certainly wasn't. Although a large scale conflict was going to happen eventually, just could be much later and involve completely different people.

 

[sloreck]

Historically Prussia/Germany had always been at odds with Austria (Habsburg Empire) and so Anschluß was in no way inevitable. Once France was out of the Rhineland, the western border was fine - as has been mentioned its only the Polish corridor that is an issue. Now France and the UK have commitments to Poland OTL but absent Hitler/Nazis 1933-1939 this may not be the same, and the Czechs and the Hungarians both had issues with the Poles so you could see a conflict where Germany has as least tacit support from those two.

The overall French desire to "keep Germany down" which drove the Versailles Treaty was simply not feasible long term. Therefore, German "revanchism" was inevitable but it could have been satisfied without OTL's WW2 - basically doing what they did OTL as far as Rhineland, rearmament (although with limits like the naval agreement) would satisfy that. In that case, and with 2 of Poland's other neighbors supporting Germany to one extent or another, I doubt France & UK wil "die for Danzig".

As far as Japan goes, their thinking was so nutso that even if France/UK/Netherlands were not so concerned/weakened I doubt they would have pulled back in China enough to make the USA happy. Once they decide to go against the USA they have no choice but to go for the British/Dutch oil, because if the USA embargoes Japan (and they will) the UK & Holland won't go against the USA.

 

[raharris1973]

Someone said these two statements, which, back-to-back, seem contradictory to me:

No German government except Hitler would have taken the risk at angering France and the UK he took. A German-Polish War would have remained just that, probably erupting over Danzig.

How could a German-Polish War occur and "not risk angering France and the UK"?

How plausible is a German-Polish war that doesn't get very ugly real fast?

How plausible is a German-imposed settlement on Poland that isn't seen as unacceptably harsh/aggrandizing by France and the UK?

Why would Poland yield territory in any settlement while it has A) any territory and army left to fight with, and B) any hope of outside intervention on its behalf?
The Poles certainly can hold hopes, even if they are unrealistic. That is likely to motivate stubborn resistance that the Germans feel compels increasingly forceful blows against Poland. The more that happens, the harder it gets for France and Britain to stand still.

Much as I enjoyed Henry Ashby Turner's speculation, I find many a bit too overoptimistic about how plausible it would be to contain any German hot war into a small war not eventually involving great powers.

In my book, any war between the British and French empires and Germany is enough to qualify as a WWII, because A) this is the same as the core line-up for WWI, Britain and France have global empires, would involve them and would have a global blockade policy and Germany would have at least some naval (and covert political) means of retaliating against them. They probably wouldn't be effective but there would be inevitably worldwide effects from these three belligerents' actions.

 

[eliphas8]

Someone said these two statements, which, back-to-back, seem contradictory to me:

How could a German-Polish War occur and "not risk angering France and the UK"?

How plausible is a German-Polish war that doesn't get very ugly real fast?

How plausible is a German-imposed settlement on Poland that isn't seen as unacceptably harsh/aggrandizing by France and the UK?

.

Simple, take the people behind OTLs appeasement, and give them a Germany that can be appeased and largely avoid wider conflict. Hitlers greatest achievement was bringing this conflict to war, when practically everyone on the other side was looking to avoid exactly that.

 

[Dorozhand]

In my book, any war between the British and French empires and Germany is enough to qualify as a WWII, because A) this is the same as the core line-up for WWI, Britain and France have global empires, would involve them and would have a global blockade policy and Germany would have at least some naval (and covert political) means of retaliating against them. They probably wouldn't be effective but there would be inevitably worldwide effects from these three belligerents' actions.

Without any Asian or American powers involved, much less fronts, it isn't a world war, it's a Western European War with some colonial fighting (or none, as Germany doesn't have any colonies left).

 

[LeX]

A clash between Germany and the USSR/Russia in Eastern Europe is probably inevitable even without ToV.

 

[GeoJuggernaut]

World War Two in Europe could have taken a much different turn, and perhaps even been a minor war up until 1938. World War Two in the Pacific was inevitable, however.

 

[LeX]

World War Two in the Pacific was inevitable, however.

No it wasn't. Very likely, but there are ways it could have been avoided up to about 1939.

 

[raharris1973]

World War Two in the Pacific could have been avoided up through June 1940 at least, possibly June 1941.

World War Two in China might be another story. But even then, the background wasn't set until the Chinese Nationalist expedition began in 1926.

 

[Steve Brinson]

I feel that it was incredibly likely to happen, but I also feel that it being avoided would not necessarily be ASB.

 

[raharris1973]

Slideaway brought up an interesting point that may highlight the importance of the Polish-German Nonaggression Pact of 1934:

As it were, Hitler himself seemed to acquiesce to Poland's borders in 1934 with the 1934 non-aggression pact, without any blowback from the military. (And this was well before Hitler had completely consolidated his rule.) Relations between Poland and the Nazi regime were actually fairly good for several years. That suggests that a real rapprochement was possible.

This reminded me of that Pact and its probable utility in lulling many neighbors.

Meanwhile, Mikestone turns the question on its head in a very novel manner. The question is why appeasement was policy for such a short time, rather than why was there an appeasement policy at all?

This was always the big problem about the ToV - not that the Germans disliked it (how often does a defeated power like the peace treaty?) but that many in the former Allied countries thought it unjust and/or impractical, so that once the wartime passions had a few years to cool, the will to enforce it was almost wholly lacking.

The remarkable thing is not that there was an era of appeasement, but that it was so relatively short. This was largely the doing of Hitler himself, whose behaviour (esp toward the Jews) caused many on the left to abandon pacifism, while his occupation of Prague only six months after Munich convinced people right across the spectrum that no deal could be made with him. A less extreme German government could probably have got away with far more.

I think that phrasing the question this way is very interesting and worthy of discussion. I honestly don't know how much anti-Jewish persecutions weighed in to Europe's turnabout against appeasement.


But it makes me wonder if while appeasement of Germany was the "surface current" in history for some of the 1930s, there always was a "deep current" of anti-German containment that ultimately won out when Hitler pressed his luck too far. Appeasement may never have been a real strategy or policy, but just a self-soothing song and dance his enemies needed to perform for their own domestic and internal psychological satisfaction before putting the main emphasis on fighting.

It also makes me wonder if all Hitler's peaceful gains from 34 through 39 were just purchased with time he borrowed by shelving the Polish Corridor issue for those 5 years. Without the Polish-German Nonaggression Pact, would Hitler's other peaceful conquests have been tolerated?

 

[TFSmith121]

Hitler did not come to power in a vacumn, however;

There were some deep waters of German nationalism and structural economic issues (obviously the Depression was a huge factor, but there were others) at play, however.

Given the unresolved issues of the Great War (including, simply, an intact "Germany"), the potential for playing one or more of the Central European and Eastern European nations off each other, and the very real potential for conflict between the Soviet Union and the West in general, it seems a little too "great man" to argue there would not have been a major war absent Hitler (or someone very much like him, I suppose).

I mean, a peaceful, stable Central Europe where all the political decision-makers saw what was at risk would have made for a far less tragic Twentieth Century - and after 1914-18, you'd think they would have - but it also seems like Europe had to face a true Armageddon before nationalism on the Continent would be truly dead and buried.

Somewhat fatalistic, I know; but given the historical example...

Best,

 

[yboxman]

If conventional war is avoided until 1945

The question can be parsed down into three sections:

1. Was the fall of democracy likely in Germany?
2. Was the rise of Hitler in Germany (as opposed to a Millitary Junta, communists or more conservative right wing clique) likely?
3. Given the rise as a non-democratic, actively revanchist regime in Germany was war avoidable?

I would say that #1 is likely simply by examining what happened over the rest of Europe. Democracy was simply not doing too well anywhere. Even French Democracy was nearly overthrown between 1934-1936.

#2 was not likely- but it's worth bearing in mind that Hitler was not the most extreme contender for the throne (Rohm, Strasser). Some manner of far right regime either allied with or controlled with the millitary and conservative forces seems likely- that's what happened in Austria, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Rumania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland...

#3 ALL German politicians were revanchists, even the SD. The question is what price and how many risks they were proposed to take to correct "injustice". So let's assume a best case scenario. A relatively moderate right wing regime takes power in Germany, avoids rearmamanet madness and bides it's time. But then, absent the massive expenses of rearmamanet Germany develops nuclear weapons around 1945-1948. It did, after all, have a early lead in physics and absent extermenational persecution of it's Jews the lead is even greater.

I can't see that situation as NOT leading to some conflict.