The Abrams Memorandum
The decision to asign General Creighton Abrams the position of Army Chief of Staff in July of 1964 was taken during one of the most tumultuous eras in American history. Still reeling from the assassination of President Kennedy the year before, the American public struggled with political turmoil, facing major legislation on civil rights and the war on poverty. Civil unrest was at an all-time high, and American troops were increasingly becoming involved in a little known nation in Southeast Asia. Vietnam, formerly French Indochina. Population 70 million, split between two nations. South Vietnam, nominally Democratic, an American ally. North Vietnam, nominally communist, considered to be in the Soviet block. Communist rebels in South Vietnam, eventually loosely organized as the Vietcong, had begun making trouble way back in the mid-50s. By 1964 the US had already been involved for several years, at first covertly, and then during Kennedy's administration increasingly public, but under the veneer of "advising". By July there were thousands of American advisors in Vietnam.
Creighton Abrams had been an officer in the US Army since he was 22 years old. Serving in WW2, the Korean War, and in Europe at the height of the Cold War, amassing a litany of positions and promotions. By 1964 he was a Lieutenant General, in command of V Corps in Europe. When it came time to appoint a new Army Chief of Staff, Abrams' name was at the top of the list. On July 4, he was promoted to General and appointed to his new position. He immediately went to work. That August, US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin on the Vietnamese coast allegedly traded shots with North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Years later, it became clear that this skirmish was likely invented entirely, or at the very least blown completely out of proportion. Nevertheless, only days later the US Congress approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Lyndon B. Johnson to use conventional military force in Vietnam.
For years discussion of the crisis and guerrilla war in former French Indochina had focused on one central tenet. The domino theory. According to the theory, the war in Vietnam was just the first in a chain of events that had the potential to spread communism across the Asian continent. If one nation was to fall to communism, then another would fall, and another, and so on. Ultimately, so the theory went, the collapse of one nation presented an existential threat to the United States. Military force was to be used accordingly. While not all of those in power in the United States were necessarily proponents of the theory, it was clear that President Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson all found it compelling, and designed their Vietnamese policy with regards to the worst-case scenario. It wasn't until Johnson, however, that this translated into what amounted to outright war. US aircraft operating as part of Operation Pierce Arrow struck Vietnamese "torpedo bases" in the first real targeted air strikes of the war, and the US began planning for an extensive bombing campaign in North Vietnam.
It is important to keep in mind the origin of the conflict between north and south. When the French reoccupied the nation following the defeat of the Japanese, the people of Vietnam, represented by a guerrilla group known as the Viet Minh, began a guerrilla war against their rule. By 1954, with support from the People's Republic of China and possibly the Soviet Union, the Viet Minh had successfully dealt the French garrison forces a series of defeats, and forced them to the negotating table. Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel, and France withdrew from the region. In the north, the communist government led by former Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh began a series of land reforms, executing thousands. More than a million Vietnamese, mostly Catholic, fled the north for the south, while several hundred thousand revolutionaries moved from south to north. In the south, Ngo Dinh Diem, the South Vietnamese President, began a series of purges of political enemies, largely based on religion and "organized crime". In 1955 the staunchly Catholic Diem began arresting and purging communists as well, killing thousands and imprisoning thousands more. Minor insurgency activity was kept down between 1954 and 1957, when 'peace' finally reigned across the nation, despite incidents of "political violence", punishable by death. Peace, however, was shortlived, with the organization of the Vietcong in 1960. Largely operating on the premise of land reform, the Vietcong maintained heavy support among the rural population in South Vietnam, and began a campaign of insurgency that would begin a decade long war.
US helicopters supporting ARVN troops - 1965
The actual involvement of North Vietnam itself in the creation of the Vietcong is hotly debated, with some sources suggesting North Vietnamese involvement as early as 1956 fomenting the revolutionary activity, while others suggesting the Vietcong were part of a spontaneous communist movement in the South Vietnamese countryside. Either way, it's largely agreed that by 1959 the North Vietnamese were covertly supporting the South Vietnamese rebels, and by 1960 arms and troops were flowing in via the Ho Chi Minh trail from Laos, which North Vietnam had invaded in 1959 (in support of the communist Pathet Lao movement against the America-friendly Royal Lao government). By 1964 tens of thousands of North Vietnamese, including organized units from the North Vietnamese Army, had infiltrated South Vietnam. It was at this point that US military involvement stepped up. With 40,000 North Vietnamese and perhaps 100,000 Vietcong in the country facing a South Vietnamese army of nearly a million men and 16,000 American advisors, it was determined that still more needed to be done. After a series of skirmishes between American advisors and Vietcong in early 1965, a three-part bombing campaign was begun. Operations Flaming Dart and Rolling Thunder were designed to strike directly at North Vietnam, while Operation Arc Light was designed to support South Vietnamese operations against the Vietcong. Air losses were fairly significant, surprising US commanders. At the same time, Vietcong operations against US air bases in South Vietnam damaged and destroyed several aircraft, prompting the US to reinforce base security and deploy 3,500 Marines to South Vietnam, the first real US ground troops assigned to the country. By December of 1965, in response to a series of high profile defeats of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), that number had increased to 200,000.
The strategy of the North Vietnamese was fairly complex in its design and execution, drawing on the same tried and tested tactics communists across the world, particularly those in China during the long Chinese Civil War, had used to defeat more powerful reactionary groups. These tactics included probing and ambushing ARVN units in order to draw out the Americans, and then dealing a decisive blow to the American troops who came out to meet them. The Vietcong also planned, in the longer term, to draw the US away from the coastal urban centers, where they were in a position of strength, and into the rural inland, where the Vietcong maintained heavy support among the peasant population. These tactics had been used during the war against France, ultimately proving extremely successful in defeating the stronger nation and forcing it to withdraw. South Vietnam, on the other hand, was a mess. In 1963 the Kennedy administration had allowed a group of dissatisfied military plotters to overthrow President Diem, and the South Vietnamese government had been unstable ever since. This was a phenomenon that would continue for much of the early war, and has been cited by historians as one of the many problems that would hinder US progress in the nation. As for the American government, there appeared to be some dissonance as to exactly why the Vietcong hadn't just rolled over and given up. US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, an analytical mind, seemed to focus only on the statistics of the fight. The US, after all, was the more powerful entity. It wasn't even close. But things still were not going America's way.
Throughout 1965, American troops had maintained a defensive strategy in South Vietnam, allowing the ARVN to take up the primary effort of combatting the Vietnam. Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William Westmoreland, wanted to change that. He felt that an offensive operation, driven by large unit operations designed to find and destroy Vietcong guerillas would solve what he felt was a losing trend. This strategy manifested itself in the Battle of Ia Drang, the first major conflict between US troops and NVA units in the Vietnam War. After some fighting between the ARVN and NVA in the Ia Drang valley in the north of the country, intelligence determined the location of three NVA regiments in the area. The 3rd brigade of the 1st cavalry division was deployed, and on 14 November 1965 the battle began. Fighting was intense from the outset, and 308 Americans died over the course of 4 days. A further 527 Americans were wounded, and 4 were missing. The US claimed 3500 North Vietnamese dead, though the number is likely significantly lower in reality, and the battle ended with both sides claiming victory. Ultimately, the United States did not maintain control over the Ia Drang valley, and suffered heavy casualties withdrawing from its landing zone. Though the battle afforded an opportunity to test close-air support, close-in artillery, and air mobility operations, it also proved the fortitude of North Vietnamese forces and the ability of the NVA to inflict American fighters. The battle was part of what is now called the Pleiku Campaign, an abortive campaign designed to reveal and annihilate Vietcong and NVA units.
In December 1965, Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams traveled to South Vietnam and spoke with some of those involved in the Battle of Ia Drang and the Pleiku Campaign. He stayed for just over a week, before returning to the United States. Not long after, classified correspondence was issued from his office. This correspondence is now referred to as the Abrams Memorandum. It didn't become public information until the leak of the top secret Pentagon Papers in 1971. "Ia Drang was a failure" it stated bluntly. "In a practical assessment, the fighting did not accomplish any single strategic goal in South Vietnam. Destroying Vietnamese is not a strategic goal." Abrams cited the cost in casualties and materials (several helicopters shot down and dozens damaged) during the battle. "The NVA divisions involved appear to have been able to retreat partly intact. They will be rebuilt". Abrams cited the innacuracy of the body counts, and the perverted vision of reality they were portraying to the American people, and criticized the use of body counts to describe victory in the battle. "This is not the point. Three thousand dead Vietnamese is not a victory. It is a number." Abrams concluded: "A new strategy will be needed in South Vietnam." Although the memorandum did not present any new suggestions, something Abrams would rectify in later correspondence with MACV, it is still credited with being the basis of the war strategy that would ultimately allow the US to win the Vietnam War.
), not the controversy.