Well even if Japan surrendered before a Soviet Declaration of War, the Soviets would still probably make offensives against Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin under the guise of 'speeding up the liberation', unless the US and/or KMT beat them to it first.Because from what I got, Stalin and Russia not declaring war on Japan would have massive ramifications, including meaning Stalin would not be able to help out Mao as much if at all
Well even if Japan surrendered before a Soviet Declaration of War, the Soviets would still probably make offrnsives in Sakhalin, Korea, and Manchria under the guise of 'speeding up the liberation', unless the US and/or KMT beat them to it first.
Probably both. Truman was a little more weary about the Soviets than FDR. So, Truman would honor any previous agreements FDR made with Stalin, but seek to contain Soviet influence in Asia.Well, it’s not like he could just invade. Stalin’s a nut, but he’s not gonna do it, especially if he’d rather focus on Europe.
But, would Truman keep Stalin out of Japan or open different negotiations
Probably both. Truman was a little more weary about the Soviets than FDR. So, Truman would honor the agreement FDR made with Stalin, but seek to contain Soviet influence in Asia.
The Soviets had ambitions for Xinjiang as well; and if Manchuria is Communist, they would encourage Mao and the CCP to resume the Chinese Civil War.Granted, the agreement wasn’t really decided up onto Yalta so Truman would probably try a deal.
Probably a Communist Manchuria at most
Because from what I got, Stalin and Russia not declaring war on Japan would have massive ramifications, including meaning Stalin would not be able to help out Mao as much if at all
The Soviets had ambitions for Xinjiang as well; and if Manchuria is Communist, they would encourage Mao and the CCP to resume the Chinese Civil War.
Probably not a whole lot different in terms of the Pacific War. The uncertainty surrounding whether the atom bomb would work (which wasn't clear to the senior political leadership of the Allies at the time) and the desire to see Japan surrender as soon as possible at the minimum cost in American lives possible is going to override any questions about whether it's wise to give sanction to the Soviets, as it did IOTL.
The real change in Truman's attitude would really be at Potsdam. OTL, Truman was still trying to figure out how he would go forward as President and this included the question of the future relationship out with the Soviets. IATL, he'll have had a prior meeting upon which to form his initial impressions and then the many additional months of experience in between. But by then, it'll undoubtedly be too late: Truman did historically inquire with Marshall in the aftermath of Potsdam about the practicability about going back on the agreement at Yalta. Marshall's response was that the Soviets already possessed the military power to take everything agreed upon, so it was better that they have agreement's with the Russians to try and oblige them to stick with instead of giving Stalin free license to seize as much as he can.
I don't see how. What decided the Chinese civil war was who the Chinese people supported and Mao had that before the USSR set a single foot into Manchuria.
Historically, the Soviets had a communist Manchuria and yet tried to discourage Mao in resuming the Civil War, instead wanted him to negotiate with Chiang.
Fair enough. This WI is tied to a different WI, so I won’t get into too many details, but I am wondering what could go differently with China.
Maybe differing negotiations?
Something more substantial further back. The big issue came from the fact that the Nationalists burned the political cred they had with the Chinese peasantry (who made up the overwhelming mass of the Chinese population) during the course of the Sino-Japanese War and it's immediate aftermath whereas Mao had focused on building support among them and setting up base camps in the areas that the Japanese had occupied, but could not effectively control. That process was pretty irreversible by late-'44, at the latest, so your gonna need a PoD even further back if you want to avert it.
Hmmm... is there anything the US could do in like 1942 or 43 to try and avert that or no?
Unsure but doubtful. The overwhelming bulk of the dynamics that drove the communists political ascendancy that I'm aware of occurred within China itself. The idea that the US "lost" China was a favorite among the paranoid anti-communist conspiracists during the Cold War, but it was borne out of a worldview which ignores that other countries people have agency as well and it was really because of the choice of the Chinese people that the Chinese communists won.
I agree, Stillwell and others tried to persuade the KMT to change at least a few policies, and failed across the board. You may need a PoD in 1937 or further back to save the KMT in terms of support in the general population.
Fair enough. So basically China and so on would still end up in Mao’s thrall?
Any other potential changes or no regarding China, the rest of Asia or anything else in the Conference?
Well, there's the question of how the UN ends up. That was Roosevelt's pet project and something he put a lot of energy into the conference pushing and a lot of the work he did at the conference was spent on negotiating how the organization would look. Now Truman, out of the respect for Roosevelt's memory, will likely still pursue the UN as an agenda item but whether he'd put quite as much energy into it as Roosevelt did is an open question. As for what impact that would have on the shape of the organization, and hence it's own impact on history... well, I'm not sure.
Well, let’s just see the events will warrant more of a UN.
Beyond that, any other changes, like in Europe or the rest of Asia?
None I can really think of. Truman might try to take a somewhat harder line in regards to Eastern Europe then Roosevelt did, but since the Red Army are the ones in control there that really doesn't have any practical consequences.