In Korea, Toyotomi's forces were defeated by conventional armies and navies, not guerilla warfare. If guerillas didn't stop the Japanese in Korea, why would they automatically stop the Japanese in the Philippines, aside from racist concepts of Philippine martial prowess? ("Race of assassins," really?) And given how the Spanish ships failed to prevent attacks by Lin Feng and Zheng Chenggong, I don't see why the the Spanish would actually do better against a force that's better organized than a group of mismatch pirates.
Toyotomi Strikes South
- Thread starter mcdo
- Start date
These places were not chosen randomly. They are all three quite valuable, but not because of anything they produced themselves. They were valuable because they were regional trade hubs. Let's look at a map of Japanese seaborne trade at this time period:
This map shows Japanese trade routes in the time period we are talking about. The circles indicate places where Japanese traders were stationed. As you can see, both Taiwan and Manilla are included.
Although Taiwan had some valuable trade goods even at this time--camphor, for one. But the main value of Taiwan was that it served as a crossroads for trade. Taiwan was where Southeast Asian goods, such as tropical hardwoods, would be traded for Chinese and Japanese products.
Manilla (or Luzon) is valuable for the same reason. It is where Chinese porcelian, Chinese tea, Japanese lacquerware, and New World silver changed hands. (Remember, this is long before the trade post at Canton.)
As you can see from the map, Japanese traders were already heavilly involved in the region. They realized the potential profit from capturing these areas, and controlling these trading posts.
(That's actually one thing I am thinking about. If Japan captures these trading zones, then the nation may never enter it's isolationist period. It would simply mean giving up too much profit. That would have HUGE implications down the road--a Japan that is still connected to the world may well "modernize" sooner.)
Please keep in mind, taking these areas is not my idea. It was something that was considered by Toyotomi (or his advisors). In the end, he decided to go for Korea and then the Ming Empire instead. I believe part of this decision was based on his desire to make his late master's dream (of conquering the Ming) come true. But it was something they considered. It could have gone the other way.
What? No. Japan was an established maritime power. Why would you think they only had galleys? Such ships were still used to fighting between local fiefs in coastal waterways and rivers, but they were far from all Japan could build.
Here is a picture of a Japanese ship from the time period:
It's actually larger than a standard European galleon of the time period, although it only has 8-12 cannons on board, due to a greater emphasis on cargo space. They also build and sailed Chinese junk style ships.
Rest assured, the Japanese are more than capable of transporting troops to any of these locations. In this time period, they were sailing those distances and much longer ones with regularity. Please see my map above.
I don't think the Chinese would bother to attack if Japan took Taiwan. They never did when the Dutch did, after all.
Spanish ships are much better than Japanese ships. But I question how many ships they can spare for such a far-away outpost at this time, even for a relatively important one. As others pointed out, they were busy with affairs on the continent at the time, and with British ships in the New World.
As for the threat of guerrilla warfare--you have to remember what time period we are talking about here. This isn't the modern age, where we take nationalism for granted. Whether the feudal overlord is Spanish or Japanese honestly won't matter too much to the local Filipinos, I think. Either way, it's a far-away power that doesn't concern itself too much with local affairs. The Japanese would likely set up trading posts, a naval harbor, and a few agricultural fiefs. None of that would affect the locals' day to day lives, really. At least, no more than the Spanish rule did, and not enough to create a full-scale rebellion. They might actually be seen as better, since they won't be constantly trying to convert them.
Well put, thank you. I agree.
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Race of Assassins is derogatory in Japanese terms bro, it actually means "Race of the Dishonourable". And also, Pirate attacks depends on surprise, in contrast, an organized Japanese Fleet can bee seen from the horizon, bottomline? The element of surprise can make or break an attack, if the Spaniards spotted you from a distance, they'll form a battle line, game over, either you cancel the attack and retreat, or lose many ships trying to board them. Also, conventional warfare is attrittion-intensive, and is dependent to massive manpower and logistics, The Sino-Korean allies won conventionally, because they have the numbers, as well as logistics to win the attrition. In contrast, Guerrilla Warfare is less dependent to logistics and manpower.
Private Trade Galleons alone are armed with more guns than the Japanese, and when necessary, will fight for Spain, a few dozens of them can do the job already, it all goes down to the tactics used.
And about that Vassalage matter, maybe they will, maybe they won't. however, I doubt the Spaniards will be happy for this.
I doubt the Spaniards will be happy, either, but what can they do about it?
If they can get privateers to fight for them, they will use them to secure their holdings in the New World from English attacks, not in East Asia.
There aren't "dozens of ships" to spare, at least not for a while. Not even privateer's ships, especially in the South Pacific.
If you think that is too unrealistic, though, what do you think will happen if Japan conquers and holds Okinawa and Taiwan?
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Okinawa and Taiwan are easier to handle, with no competiotion, their problems would most probably diseases, but that's it.
Ah, yes, those sneaky pirates with their invisible ships, unlike Japanese navies, which fail to employ the element of surprise. Wait, that's not true.
It would also be a poor choice to predicate Spanish resistance to Japanese invasion on Spanish fleets intercepting all of the Japanese transports. Even when Korea basically achieved that, Korean ships didn't manage to stop Toyotomi from landing thousands of men for his second invasion of Korea. I won't disagree that conventional warfare is dependent on manpower and logistics (massive is a subjective word), but so is guerilla warfare, since all warfare depends on manpower and logistics. This doesn't really weak Japan's hand either. In 1588, Spain planned to invade England with 30,000 men, under the Duke of Alba. That is approximately 10% of the forces that Toyotomi Hideyoshi deployed for his planned conquest of Korea (he invaded twice, so of course there's some overlap between 160,000 he sent in 1592 and 140,000 he sent in 1597) which is even more shocking when you realize that Toyotomi mainly used the forces drawn from southern Japan, since his nominal allies in the east never sent their forces to Korea (for example, Tokugawa Ieyasu didn't send troops to Korea, and I'm pretty sure he alone had more than 30,000 soldiers). I'm not saying Toyotomi can just force the eastern lords to submit with a wave of his hand, but my emphasis is the fact that, for a conventional war, Toyotomi does have massive manpower and logistics, and that Japan as a whole still has more men available.
These numbers will help in a conventional campaign. In Taiwan, where the Spanish had their colonies (later, not during Toyotomi's lifetime), Spanish resistance to the Dutch was based out of the forts. I see no reason why the Spanish would change their mentality to go for guerilla warfare, and I don't see why the native Philippine inhabitants must embrace a costly guerilla warfare campaign on behalf of their Spanish overlords. Most likely, the Spanish would huddle beneath their walls and cut their losses once the Japanese take over the largest fortresses. Yes, I know the walls of Manila were now made up of stone at around, but the Japanese have experience dealing with stone walls too.
I will not say anything about the Japanese language bit since I don't know how to speak Japanese.
It would change the entire dynamic of the second half of the second millenium.
The key fact of the period 1500-1900 - the Age of Sail - was that Europeans had the broad seas to themselves. There was local small-craft activity in the Indian Ocean and Far East, and harassment from the Barbary pirates. (The Barbary pirates and Turkey, for this purpose, are practically European.)
But it was European ships which went everywhere. This dominance was achieved in large part by the default of the chief potential competitors: China and Japan.
Consider this: during the Age of Sail (and imperialism and colonization), there was a general perception of humanity divided into two classes: "white men" and "natives". That is, the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas, Oceania, Africa, South Asia, and East Asia, and the whites who came to all these places from Europe.
Japan became the first non-European country to reach peer status, and when Japanese began to visit such places, they were often viewed as another kind of white man.
If Japan does not isolate, that structure never arises. Japan is a large country (equal to France and Britain combined, roughly). And (IMO) if Japan was engaged in large-scale foreign commerce early in the Age of Sail, then Japan would participate in the expansion of oceanic commerce over the next two hundred years, with a presence around the world comparable at least to France or Britain. It wouldn't require a massive effort by Japan, anymore than the European manifestations did - it's just what happens with a successful seafaring nation.
One huge question is: does Japan get accepted as a peer among the maritime nations? I.e. are they treated as "white men"? Is Japan recognized as a "Westphalian" nation? Can Japanese ships call at European ports on the same terms as ships from other European countries?
This has huge consequences for the way Europeans view the world. And indirectly for other peoples, too - instead of "natives" versus "white men", it will be "natives" versus "white men" and Japanese. And Japan will never become Europeanized as in OTL.
Or do the European-Japanese relations turn hostile, with Japan seeking sole control of the western Pacific and perhaps more, and Europeans excluding Japan from other oceans?
Ah, I wasn't aware of this before. I wonder whether this might still provoke a Chinese response; AFAIK, a large part of the Chinese intervention in the Imjin War was due to China needing to preserve its status as the strongest power in the region. If the Dutch or Spanish take Taiwan, they're only marginally more prominent, but an expansionist Japan is directly a challenge to Chinese dominance. Taking Taiwan is also a challenge directly, in a sense as well, because the Ming always derived a great deal of their income through trade with the Dutch and Spanish. Taking Taiwan is a direct challenge to that as well. So where the Ming were apathetic to the Dutch in Taiwan, I think they might not be so apathetic to Japan.
Ironically, this might help speed up the fall of the Ming Dynasty anyways. OTL, a combination of disinterested Emperors and the cost of maintaining suzerainty over a traditional tributary state (Korea) badly weakened the Ming Emperors. This is liable to be worse for both sides.
As Mcdo said, Taiwan is a hub for trading, plus there's a modest amount of gold, camphor, more deer than people, and lots of valuable timber.
Taiwan would not be an easy target at all. No country controlled the entire island until the Japanese in the 20th century, and it took the Japanese a decade with modern weapons and very clever manipulation of tribal rivalries to do so. What Hetalia said about the Philippines can easily apply to Taiwan. This was before the Taiwanese began assimilating to Chinese culture due to Chinese migration. The tribes were used to fighting, being nearly constantly at war with each other. Fighting was such a way of life that to become a man in many tribes, boys were required to bring back a head from a rival village. Their idea of war was to sneak up on the enemy while they weren't paying attention, which was why old Taiwanese villages were enclosed with impenetrable bamboo thickets. There was no honor in the Japanese sense-honor was coming back to the village with the heads of your enemies. The samurai would most likely find themselves beheaded in the middle of the night unless they had something valuable to trade.
That beg the question, how powerfull was the Kingdom of RyuKyu before the 'mainland lords' seize it...
Actually, it was a combination of both. The Koreans lost most of the initial battles against the Japanese because the latter were better trained, although they were stalled multiple times because guerrillas, led by generals such as Gwak Jae-u and Kwon Yul, continued to roam the countryside. In addition, the naval battles were extremely one-sided, with only one Japanese victory. Most of the guerrilla campaigns were not recorded, but some, such as conflicts in Ichi and Jeongamjin, prevented the Japanese from invading Jeolla in the first invasion. The two generals also came up with ideas to fool the Japanese into retreating without confronting them directly. For example, in Jinju, Gwak Jae-u attempted to make his reinforcements seem larger by ordering his men to make noise, although he only brought 3,000. Later, in Dokwang, Kwon Yul ordered his men to pour rice onto their horses to make it seem as if they were washing them with water when viewed from a distance, and both strategies caused the invaders to retreat.
Meanwhile, most of the conventional victories on land for the Korean side occurred in the north, when the Chinese began to gradually send reinforcements over time. Even though many of the initial battles were essentially sieges, the Koreans were unable to defend themselves efficiently mostly due to the lack of training, along with low numbers. However, Haengju, which was under Kwon Yul's command, was a notable example in which the defenders won, even though they were outnumbered around 10:1.
In other words, while the Japanese eventually suffered from numerous conventional defeats, causing them to retreat altogether, they were also stalled and defeated by hit-and-run attacks on both land and sea various times beforehand, which severely disrupted their supply and attack routes throughout the two invasions.
What if the Portuguese get wind of the Phillippines option and decide to persuade Toyotomi to go in for a joint attack? Under the Treaty of Saragossa, the Phillippines and Japan were within the Protuguese sphere. His relations with the Portuguese were not all that unfriendly, and if I remember correctly, it was about this time that all Spanish priests were expelled from Japan, with only Portuguese being allowed to proselytise. Despite the fact that at this time Portugal and Spain were technically united, that fact never seemed to change the ongoing struggles between the two countries' colonial forces in East Asia.
This would be only four years after the disaster of the Armada, so Spain isn't exactly flush in fighting ships. Besides, this is the main focus of Portuguese colonialism at the time, while for Spain it's the ass-end of Empire. If the Portuguese hit the southern islands while the Japanese strike Luzon, it's a done deal. The Spanish would need at bare minimum two years to put together the forces needed to take the islands back and transport them there.
This would be only four years after the disaster of the Armada, so Spain isn't exactly flush in fighting ships. Besides, this is the main focus of Portuguese colonialism at the time, while for Spain it's the ass-end of Empire. If the Portuguese hit the southern islands while the Japanese strike Luzon, it's a done deal. The Spanish would need at bare minimum two years to put together the forces needed to take the islands back and transport them there.
A lot of good responses, guys. Thank you very much!
I will discuss my take on the Invasions of Korea a bit further down. But I think you have made a good point here, and I wanted to emphasis it. Toyotomi has a lot of forces at his disposal.
Yes, I think it's likely that the Spaniards will stay on the defensive, especially given how outnumbered they will be. In reality, it may be easy enough for them to reach an accommodation with the Japanese. Toyotomi (or his advisers) considered conquering Luzon, not the entire archipelago.
Some fiefdoms to reward loyal retainers would be most welcome, but the important thing is to control the trade center. However, while both Japan and Spain want to control the trade, they both also want to trade. It's not in Japan's interests to push the Spanish out completely, so that they do not trade in Manilla anymore. They simply want that trade to occur on Japanese terms.
Even if the Japanese are completely successful, I would not be surprised if it ended in an uneasy truce--Japan controlling Luzon in the north, and the good harbor at Manilla, and the rest of the island staying in Spanish hands.
No one on this board will admit to knowing any Japanese. Twice now I have started Japanese conversation threads over in NPC, and both times it died quickly from lack of interest. Last time, it was really just me and LeoXiao. I know some of you speak some Japanese! Don't be so shy, people!
I see where you are coming from. I agree that part of the reason China responded to the Korean invasions was because they didn't want Japan to grow too powerful, and upset the balance of power. But I think before Japan invaded Korea, they weren't seen as any sort of a threat. An invasion of Taiwan--itself an island on the periphery of the known world, to the Ming--just isn't as threatening.
To put it in European terms (which may or may not be more familiar to you, I don't know) Japan trying to conquer Korea was as threatening to China as, say, the Barbary Pirates trying to take over Italy. It would be surprising that they were trying it at all--and that they were doing well. It would be threatening, too, because if they managed to conquer it, it would destabilize central Europe and give them a springboard for expansion into HRE holdings. Japan establishing trade ports on Taiwan is like the Barbary Pirates taking over Corsica. It's surprising, and something that bears close attention. But it's not a threat to the nation itself, and also it's less of a dramatic shift in power, so it's less destabilizing.
Also, I think this is much better for the Ming overall, since they won't have the expense of a campaign in Korea. Gaining Taiwan and the Ryuukyuu islands and/or Luzon is certainly "worse" for the Japanese than gaining Korea would be. The difference is, this might actually be possible.
You make a good case, and I'm glad to have a Taiwanese viewpoint on this. Upon further reflection, I think it is impossible for the Shogunate to establish full control over Taiwan at this period in history. I don't think anyone could have, really. But for our purposes, Japan doesn't need to. They need only to establish forts to control the trade, and to protect merchants. If the Dutch and Spanish could do that on the other side of the world, then I think the Japanese can, too.
Here's an interesting thought: historically, only a little bit later than the time period we are talking about, many Chinese men came to Taiwan from Fujian. They mostly arrived as single men, and often married local women. It created an interesting hybrid culture that only disappeared later when much larger populations arrived from China and began living lives closer to what they would have done in China.
What if Japanese men begin settling in Taiwan for the same reasons. What impact will it have on the Japanese, to have this influx of Taiwanese aboriginal cultures? More importantly, what changes for the aborigines, to have Japanese cultural influence instead of Chinese? What do you think?
However, I think the population is just too small compared to Japan to allow them to really hold out. It's probably the only one of the three places we are talking about where Japan could exercise outright control, instead of just trading ports and forts.
In other words, the Japanese advantage on land was not enough to overcome the tremendous Korean advantage on the water.
I will discuss my take on the Invasions of Korea a bit further down. But I think you have made a good point here, and I wanted to emphasis it. Toyotomi has a lot of forces at his disposal.
Yes, I think it's likely that the Spaniards will stay on the defensive, especially given how outnumbered they will be. In reality, it may be easy enough for them to reach an accommodation with the Japanese. Toyotomi (or his advisers) considered conquering Luzon, not the entire archipelago.
Some fiefdoms to reward loyal retainers would be most welcome, but the important thing is to control the trade center. However, while both Japan and Spain want to control the trade, they both also want to trade. It's not in Japan's interests to push the Spanish out completely, so that they do not trade in Manilla anymore. They simply want that trade to occur on Japanese terms.
Even if the Japanese are completely successful, I would not be surprised if it ended in an uneasy truce--Japan controlling Luzon in the north, and the good harbor at Manilla, and the rest of the island staying in Spanish hands.
I think "assassin" is considered dishonorable by anyone's standards.
No one on this board will admit to knowing any Japanese. Twice now I have started Japanese conversation threads over in NPC, and both times it died quickly from lack of interest. Last time, it was really just me and LeoXiao. I know some of you speak some Japanese! Don't be so shy, people!
Excellent analysis, thank you. This potentially has much bigger knock-on effects than I had thought. I wish I could see this as a flesh-out TL going far into the future. It would be very interesting. Maybe someday I'll write it...
I see where you are coming from. I agree that part of the reason China responded to the Korean invasions was because they didn't want Japan to grow too powerful, and upset the balance of power. But I think before Japan invaded Korea, they weren't seen as any sort of a threat. An invasion of Taiwan--itself an island on the periphery of the known world, to the Ming--just isn't as threatening.
To put it in European terms (which may or may not be more familiar to you, I don't know) Japan trying to conquer Korea was as threatening to China as, say, the Barbary Pirates trying to take over Italy. It would be surprising that they were trying it at all--and that they were doing well. It would be threatening, too, because if they managed to conquer it, it would destabilize central Europe and give them a springboard for expansion into HRE holdings. Japan establishing trade ports on Taiwan is like the Barbary Pirates taking over Corsica. It's surprising, and something that bears close attention. But it's not a threat to the nation itself, and also it's less of a dramatic shift in power, so it's less destabilizing.
Mmm, but Japan doesn't want to supplant Spanish and Portuguese traders, it just wants to be able to tax them, to profit from that trade. That may diminish the profitability of the trade to the Ming Empire, but it's not a threat to their coffers. It just means that a trade they didn't control before anyway is now under the control of someone else.
Also, I think this is much better for the Ming overall, since they won't have the expense of a campaign in Korea. Gaining Taiwan and the Ryuukyuu islands and/or Luzon is certainly "worse" for the Japanese than gaining Korea would be. The difference is, this might actually be possible.
You make a good case, and I'm glad to have a Taiwanese viewpoint on this. Upon further reflection, I think it is impossible for the Shogunate to establish full control over Taiwan at this period in history. I don't think anyone could have, really. But for our purposes, Japan doesn't need to. They need only to establish forts to control the trade, and to protect merchants. If the Dutch and Spanish could do that on the other side of the world, then I think the Japanese can, too.
Here's an interesting thought: historically, only a little bit later than the time period we are talking about, many Chinese men came to Taiwan from Fujian. They mostly arrived as single men, and often married local women. It created an interesting hybrid culture that only disappeared later when much larger populations arrived from China and began living lives closer to what they would have done in China.
What if Japanese men begin settling in Taiwan for the same reasons. What impact will it have on the Japanese, to have this influx of Taiwanese aboriginal cultures? More importantly, what changes for the aborigines, to have Japanese cultural influence instead of Chinese? What do you think?
It was quite wealthy, and Shuri Castle is a formidable defensive structure.
However, I think the population is just too small compared to Japan to allow them to really hold out. It's probably the only one of the three places we are talking about where Japan could exercise outright control, instead of just trading ports and forts.
Agreed. I won't speak too much on this, as the Imjin War is not really on-topic here, interesting though it is. But personally, I would put a bit more emphasis on the naval battles than you seem to be doing. The Chinese reinforcements helped a lot, but as you said, the defenders were still greatly outnumbered. I think their victories can largely be attributed to the loss of supplies and guerrilla warfare greatly reducing the combat effectiveness of the Japanese.
In other words, the Japanese advantage on land was not enough to overcome the tremendous Korean advantage on the water.
Well, I know this isn't really related to the thread, so I apologize for the aside, but I usually feel obligated to defend my ideas.
I won't dispute the idea that naval hit-and-run tactics contributed greatly to the Korean victory. In fact, if I had to list the factors of Korean victory, I would probably list it as: 1) Korean navies (still conventional). 2) Korean field armies with Chinese assistance. 3) Korean guerillas. Korea managed to win because of the first two, while the third is a contributing factor, but not decisive enough to sway the entire conflict by myself. I see where you're coming from. It's just that I disagree.
Yes, I know Korea guerillas burned food supplies rather than turn them over to the Japanese. But that's really only a problem if Korean navies are intercepting supply shipments from Japan. Yes, I know guerillas harassed Japanese lines of communication, so they probably couldn't stay established north of Pyongyang. But they were already as far north as Pyongyang in the first invasion, and the Japanese were repulsed by normal, conventional armies. Yes, the Korean militias were brave. But that can be applied to most people who take up arms in defense of their homeland, and in many cases, they weren't successful: Haengju is the exception, but examples like Chinju, where the militia was insufficient and the city fell, or Ulsan, which I don't think was ever taken, show how it would be impossible to dislodge Japanese forces through forces in the style of the Righteous Armies. It is funny that you mention Chinju: after all, this city fell to the Japanese. As for Cholla, let's not forget that during the second invasion, it was occupied. Yes, I know there's some ambiguity over what constitutes a Korean guerilla force versus a Korean conventional one. For the same of everybody else with an eye on the topic, I'll go with an ad hoc definition that a guerilla force is less organized, while conventional forces are the ones with heavy weaponry and who fought alongside the Chinese.
Unless the Japanese were defeated in open battle by Chinese and Korean armies and navies, guerilla tactics alone are insufficient. I think a good analogy might be World War II's Eastern Front: local guerillas made things difficult for invading forces, but conventional armies were ultimately responsible for defeating and dislodging the invaders. So, no, I take the viewpoint (rather contrarian, it seems, to the thread consensus so far) that Japanese forces were defeated mainly by conventional armies, and that Chinese and Korean forces would probably have won even without the assistance of guerilla warfare.
That's true. Japan really only needs to take control of the plains. The mountains could be left for the natives, as was done for centuries OTL.
The hybrid culture you're referring to "died out", if you could really call it that, much later than you think. Siraya was spoken up until the 19th century, and Pazeh at least until the 20th. Many rural villages follow different customs and worship different gods than the Taiwanese in the cities. I think part of the reason the plains cultures declined so fast was that the Chinese were strongly patriarchal, and the earliest groups to contact the Chinese were mildly matriarchal, so the majority of Chinese-aboriginal children would grow up in a Han-dominated household. It didn't help that the Han and the aborigines lived in separate communities once migration from China picked up.
I doubt there would be much change in Japan as a whole. For the Japanese living in Taiwan, I'm not really sure. Many more loanwords from the Formosan languages for sure, and maybe some food items. As for Japanese influence on the aborigines, I don't think it would be much better for the aborigines depending on how many Japanese immigrate. I mean, Taiwan has had limited contact with the Japanese and Chinese for centuries with little change in their culture. If they adopt Japanese agriculture, you could see an increase in the aboriginal population.
I think that you misread my post. My point was that the naval battles, which I will not specifically mention here, were a key component of the "guerrilla" fighting, as their main purpose was to disrupt supply lines. There might have been a few conventional naval conflicts, but they were generally rare, as the outnumbered Koreans sought to distract the naval invaders from landing and aiding their counterparts on land, instead of confronting them directly for the sole purpose of permanently crippling their ability to fight.
It's related in a roundabout way, as I don't think that the Japanese would be willing to send around 200,000 troops to a single region in order to conquer it, suggesting that it would send a much smaller force, then be bogged down for a while by guerrillas, who would probably operate in a similar way from harsh terrain.
That's fine, but I would argue that the Korean navies prevented the Japanese ones from aiding their armies by disrupting supply routes, so they were somewhat secondary.
As stated above, the Korean navies technically did not directly confront the Japanese ones in order to completely destroy their fighting capabilities, but in order to prevent them from reaching their objectives. Jinju was attacked twice, so I mentioned the first case in order to show how the guerrillas managed to hold out and prevent more Japanese forces from heading north, delaying them significantly, and it was one of several examples. The first and second invasions also differ significantly in substance, as the Japanese were forced to bypass Jeolla in the first one in order to head north, allowing the Korean navies and guerrillas to attack and resupply from that region, while the second invasion was limited to Gyeongsang and Jeolla, allowing supplies and reinforcements to be effectively stationed in the north, not to mention the Japanese objectives.
Again, I'm arguing that a combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare contributed to the invaders' eventual defeat. Although the former eventually provided the final blow, the latter was crucial in order to stall the Japanese significantly and eventually prevent them from taking de facto control of the peninsula, along with allowing reinforcements to arrive from the north. I'm not going to directly state whether the guerrilla tactics can prevent the Japanese, with less troops, from taking islands in the Pacific, but considering how they had a harder time in the countryside and were forced to bypass several remote regions, there might be significant delays in islands further south as well.
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Of course that could mean Japan might get European allies of its own
I'm wondering if the Japanese could ally themselves with the Dutch later on. IOTL they had a quite good relationship and in 1630's the Dutch were even ready to support a possible Japanese attack to Luzon (in some form, I don't know details). Even if Japan already controls Taiwan and the Philippines, they could be a useful ally to the Dutch against Portugal and other Europeans in the region.
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
IOTL the Dutch had a special status with regards to how they deal with the Japanese. There is a reason why the port of Nagasaki was used by Dutch traders. Although down the road the Japanese could get another European ally as well. In terms of geography, Russia would be the only plausible candidate.
elkarlo
Banned
True. But the invasion of Korea required more resources than was available to a rather war torn Japan. Grabbing a couple islands to keep his vassals happy while recovering is a good idea. Esp from a Monday morning QB
As I said before, I think this is off-topic. Therefore, despite that fact that you raise many good points, I will only devote a little bit of space to it. Sorry. Maybe you should make a thread about it elsewhere? It is certainly an interesting debate topic.
In essence, my opinion is this: it is true that Toyotomi's armies in Korea were only defeated by conventional forces. If they had not been there, Japan may well have won the day. Guerrilla armies and the like could only do so much. However, I still think that the guerrilla armies (and their naval brethren) were the key to Korean victory. Not because they defeated the Japanese on their own, but because (through supply line disruptions and hit-and-run tactics), they reduced the Japanese forces' fighting effectiveness to the point where they could be defeated by Ming Chinese and Korean conventional forces.
Let me try to give an example. Let's say Germans are driving on a USSR position in WWII. Before they get there, the German units are decimated by IL-2 and other Russian air assets. Afterwards, the Russian army drives the Germans back. The Russian soldiers, not the planes, enabled the final victory. The planes could not drive back the German troops on their own. But without those planes reducing the German force's unit cohesion, morale, etc., the Russian troops would not have been able to drive them back. In the Imjin War, the guerrilla forces are the Soviet air power.
Anyway, we fundamentally agree. Our only disagreement is on the relative importance of these two factors in the Japanese defeat.
Indeed. I do think it's interesting that the map I posted shows Japanese traders based in near modern-day Kaohsiung. Weren't the European forts farther north?
That's interesting. Perhaps in this TL, the hybrid and indigenous cultures might last longer. At least, if fewer Japanese arrive than did Chinese, or if they arrive more slowly.
There are a handful of modern Japanese words that seem to have come from Ainu and Ryuukyuu languages. You never can tell.
I believe I did misread you, and I apologize.
I don't know if the Japan of this period is really able to ally.
However, if they do become a more significant presence in the regional trade, and remain there, then they would have the money and motive to develop a large navy to defend that trade. I mentioned before that Japanese ships tended to have only 8-12 cannons on board, despite their large size. This is because they did not have gun decks (all the below-deck room was for cargo), they just kept cannons along the railings. But to defend trade, they will need to develop bigger ships, that can stand up to the Europeans.
I could see them expanding their ties with the Dutch to develop such knowledge (an earlier "Dutch learning", perhaps?). Perhaps the seeds of alliance could start there. Of course, an extended conflict with any one of the European powers could well put them into a de facto alliance with another.
elkarlo said:
This would also help in refilling Japan's coffers (which had been depleated in years of warfare), instead of putting them under further strain.
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