Afaik, the PCE had drifted from Moscow already, being specially notorious since 1968, when they refused to endorse USSR reaction to the Prague Spring.
TLIAW: Memorias de nuestros padres
- Thread starter Nanwe
- Start date
Afaik, the PCE had drifted from Moscow already, being specially notorious since 1968, when they refused to endorse USSR reaction to the Prague Spring.
I love it, too! Keep it going!
About Cifuentes. Yes, I have that feeling about her, but perhaps the different path taken by Spain may have changed her mind, so, why not having her in UCD...
Thanks! Will do, although I think it's obvious that at this rate, this is not going to be a TLIAW
I honestly feel that unlike you are some kind of political version of Jimenez Losantos or Cesar Vidal (although given the latter is Protestant well...) the UCD is more of a home for any centre-to-right-wing politician than the AP. Officially it was the FAP, but it kind of sounds bad in English.
Thanks! I tried to emphasise the aspect that the PCE was the 'natural' and 'dominant' party of the left, because well, everyone thought it was at the time. The PSOE's triumph, while not a massive shock by the last polls, would have been unthinkable just in 1976. Also explains why Carrillo was so much more moderate than González, he was already playing the role of the statesman, because he expected to be one!
And only one word. Andalucia.
Wow, that's a big PCE!
Btw, have you given any thought to the Galicianist parties? For example IOTL the PSG (Partido Socialista Galego, Beiras's party) was very close to the 3% barrier (2.41%), but no cigar, which made the party collapse, and most left and went to the PSOE. With a more divided Socialist field, it might have a chance to get representation. Sadly, i don't know who would have been the MP. Probably Beiras, as there was no autonomic parliament yet.
Btw, trivia: Did you know that back in the day, the ex-mayor of Coruña, Paco Vázquez, infamous centralist, once was doubting between joining the PSOE or joining the PSG (which was openly nationalist)?
Jotabe you caught me. I'm afraid this TL is probably going to lack detail regarding Galicia and the Basque Country, since I don't know enough about either them, expect this one amazing quote I found: "Perder [la UCD] estas elecciones [autonómicas de 1981] sería como si cambiase el curso del Amazonas" from José Quiroga, the UCD's candidate to lead the Xunta.
This Christmas I want to buy a book on the Basque Country's Transition by Morán, alongside his 'El precio de la Transición', but I'm afraid I wouldn't even know where to start looking for details on Galicia. Although what you mention is really interesting. I was planning on writing later an academic excerpt regarding the mess of socialist parties in Catalonia, but I can also add a reference to the PSG.
My bad, yeah
Honestly, this post was written in between yesterday, when I was feeling really well, and today, when I had a massive hangover I didn't quite feel like checking over what I previously wrote. I'll change that, although these number are approximate, I'll probably try and figure out the division by province at the end of this to make the maps, and might rework the numbers a bit. But if the PSOE* gets representation is going to be 1 MP, probably in Madrid.Yes, as jotabe says, I haven't changed anything from OTL in that respect. The PCE was far from homogeneous, as it was home to anyone who wanted to fight the dictatorship and felt just remotely left-wing. And the PCE was, within the inherent paradoxes of Eurocommunism, like defending democracy in Spain and being best buds with Ceausescu, basically the most forward of either PCI or PCF regarding democracy and pluralism. The only one basic liberty they were less keen on was the freedom to create trade unions, they liked the idea of a single union. Which is obvious, they controlled the largest union, CCOO (Comisiones Obreras).
I'm not sure of your level of Spanish, but I suppose reading it must be very easy for a Portuguese, so you can check this article. It's going to download a file, I checked it, no viruses.
I thought it was a later course.
Thanks for the link, Nanwe.
Written Spanish is fairly easy to read (as long as one keeps in mind that similar words don't always mean the same). And I'm reading it as I reply to you.
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Completely understandable. I don't know much stuff myself, other than a few anecdotes. I couldn't even find out who was the first ones in the provincial lists of the PSG, so you can imagine how bad it is
But yeah, big mess of socialist-comunist parties in Galicia, as well. PSG, FPG, UPG...
***
Extract from "The development of devolution in post-Francoist Spain" by Ana María Sánchez Pérez
In the process of constitution-making that followed the June 1977 elections, most matters had been settled beforehand in the Spanish society, quite democratically and economically mature by the end of the dictatorship shows, at least compared to previous attempts at developing a genuine democratic framework, such as 1869 and 1931.
The issues that had traditionally split Spanish socio-political élites, such as the issue of monarch vs. republic, the relationship between the State and the Church or the particular origin of sovereignty had been relatively settled (1). The Constitution of 1978 reflects that, the majority of these issues being agreed upon in the Constitutional Commission (2), the main question to be tackled by the parlamentarians was that of the precise organisation of the State, or more accurately, the degree of devolution to be allowed and the special status (or lack thereof) of the Catalan, Basque and Galician 'nacionalidades'.
Prior to the elections of 1977, the position of Moncloa was to emulate the Italian or the Second Republic's model of organisation. As a result, the three historical regions would obtain a higher degree of autonomy and a special status within the territorial system, whereas the 'ordinary' regions would lack legislative competencies but would enjoy a certain degree of administrative autonomy to adjust legislation to regional needs. In this way, it emulated the difference in French administrative law between 'décentralisation' and 'déconcentration'. However, following the election, and perceiving the very different positions held by society, the other parliamentary forces and most importantly, by important sectors of the party.
Meanwhile, the PCE put forward a more decentralised model of organisation, although with two important caveats: It sought to maintain the organisation and the jurisdiction of labour and economic relations at the national level and defended the relatively complicated process of forming an Autonomous Territory put forward by the Constitutional Commission. That is to say, that it sought to emulate the process of forming an autonomy of the 1931 Constitution, creating a de facto, but not de iure, differentiation between the historical and non-historical regions.
The end-result of the constituent process was a one-size-fits all territorial system, with 'autonomous territories', provinces (although these could be eliminated) and municipalities. All the autonomous territories would be entitled to the same competencies - which were not laid down in the Constitution, which only established the exclusive competencies of the central government. In order to obtain the status of autonomous territory, a series of neighbouring provinces (with "cultural affinities", according to the Constitutional text) needed a two-third of the municipalities comprising the majority of the population of each province to demand it or for the Government to propose in the name of the 'general interest'. Although this last measure was only been taken in the case of the creation of the Region of Madrid in 1985.
The new Constitution, while relatively ambiguous on the exact composition of powers for the territories - left to the various regional Statutes - did create a solid division of the administrative structure of the State, with a three tiered-system (with the possibility to being reduced to two or a new intermediary one) as well as established a "right to autonomy" within the limits of the exclusive competencies of the State and without infringing the "unity of Spain and the solidarity between its peoples". In order to round up the constitutional settlement of the organisation of the State, the Constitution would provide for the creation of a territorial upper chamber (3), with considerable powers to stop the interference of the Government on regional autonomy, by requiring two-thirds or three-fifths majorities in order for the Government or the lower chamber to impose its criteria or to force the regional territories' Councils of Government to act against their own will, although it did not provide for a similar mechanism with regards to the Constitutional Court, which is elected half by the lower and half by the upper chamber.
The Constitution's final text was voted by the Cortes and received a near-unanimous support, with the sole exception of 4 deputies from AP, the one PSOE deputy and the deputy from EE, showing the consensus developed amongst all parties - and despite reticence of both PS and PNV - on the territorial model, the liberties protected and codified in the text and the role - and nature - of the head of state.
In the process of constitution-making that followed the June 1977 elections, most matters had been settled beforehand in the Spanish society, quite democratically and economically mature by the end of the dictatorship shows, at least compared to previous attempts at developing a genuine democratic framework, such as 1869 and 1931.
The issues that had traditionally split Spanish socio-political élites, such as the issue of monarch vs. republic, the relationship between the State and the Church or the particular origin of sovereignty had been relatively settled (1). The Constitution of 1978 reflects that, the majority of these issues being agreed upon in the Constitutional Commission (2), the main question to be tackled by the parlamentarians was that of the precise organisation of the State, or more accurately, the degree of devolution to be allowed and the special status (or lack thereof) of the Catalan, Basque and Galician 'nacionalidades'.
Prior to the elections of 1977, the position of Moncloa was to emulate the Italian or the Second Republic's model of organisation. As a result, the three historical regions would obtain a higher degree of autonomy and a special status within the territorial system, whereas the 'ordinary' regions would lack legislative competencies but would enjoy a certain degree of administrative autonomy to adjust legislation to regional needs. In this way, it emulated the difference in French administrative law between 'décentralisation' and 'déconcentration'. However, following the election, and perceiving the very different positions held by society, the other parliamentary forces and most importantly, by important sectors of the party.
Meanwhile, the PCE put forward a more decentralised model of organisation, although with two important caveats: It sought to maintain the organisation and the jurisdiction of labour and economic relations at the national level and defended the relatively complicated process of forming an Autonomous Territory put forward by the Constitutional Commission. That is to say, that it sought to emulate the process of forming an autonomy of the 1931 Constitution, creating a de facto, but not de iure, differentiation between the historical and non-historical regions.
The end-result of the constituent process was a one-size-fits all territorial system, with 'autonomous territories', provinces (although these could be eliminated) and municipalities. All the autonomous territories would be entitled to the same competencies - which were not laid down in the Constitution, which only established the exclusive competencies of the central government. In order to obtain the status of autonomous territory, a series of neighbouring provinces (with "cultural affinities", according to the Constitutional text) needed a two-third of the municipalities comprising the majority of the population of each province to demand it or for the Government to propose in the name of the 'general interest'. Although this last measure was only been taken in the case of the creation of the Region of Madrid in 1985.
The new Constitution, while relatively ambiguous on the exact composition of powers for the territories - left to the various regional Statutes - did create a solid division of the administrative structure of the State, with a three tiered-system (with the possibility to being reduced to two or a new intermediary one) as well as established a "right to autonomy" within the limits of the exclusive competencies of the State and without infringing the "unity of Spain and the solidarity between its peoples". In order to round up the constitutional settlement of the organisation of the State, the Constitution would provide for the creation of a territorial upper chamber (3), with considerable powers to stop the interference of the Government on regional autonomy, by requiring two-thirds or three-fifths majorities in order for the Government or the lower chamber to impose its criteria or to force the regional territories' Councils of Government to act against their own will, although it did not provide for a similar mechanism with regards to the Constitutional Court, which is elected half by the lower and half by the upper chamber.
The Constitution's final text was voted by the Cortes and received a near-unanimous support, with the sole exception of 4 deputies from AP, the one PSOE deputy and the deputy from EE, showing the consensus developed amongst all parties - and despite reticence of both PS and PNV - on the territorial model, the liberties protected and codified in the text and the role - and nature - of the head of state.
Notes:
(1) This is a slight simplification. While it was the territorial question - and the exact nature of the Senate - what arose more controversy and debate in the Constituent Cortes, it was not the only question. Civil liberties for example, and their precise listing, were also important. For instance, the PCE proposed the legalisation of both divorce and abortion in the constitutional text, whereas the PSOE proposed to ban non-public schools. These proposals were unacceptable to the UCD, which for instance wanted the Constitution to recognise the liberty of education (the right to open Catholic schools basically), the liberty of entrepreneurship or define marriage as between a man and a woman.
(2) TTL formed by 9 people, as opposed to 7. Two UCD members (Cisneros and Herrero Rodríguez de Miñón), two PCE (Turé and someone else), and one each for AP, PS, Catalan Minority, PNV and for Tierno Galván's PSP.
(3) TTL's Senate is formed by 10 members for each Autonomous Territory, plus another for every 500,000 inhabitants (or fraction over 250,000) within the limit that the biggest region's representation can not double the representation of the smallest. I haven't done the math yet. The Senate's composition would be determined by the legislative assemblies of the Autonomous Territories in a proportional manner to their own composition.
(2) TTL formed by 9 people, as opposed to 7. Two UCD members (Cisneros and Herrero Rodríguez de Miñón), two PCE (Turé and someone else), and one each for AP, PS, Catalan Minority, PNV and for Tierno Galván's PSP.
(3) TTL's Senate is formed by 10 members for each Autonomous Territory, plus another for every 500,000 inhabitants (or fraction over 250,000) within the limit that the biggest region's representation can not double the representation of the smallest. I haven't done the math yet. The Senate's composition would be determined by the legislative assemblies of the Autonomous Territories in a proportional manner to their own composition.
For reference, I actually mostly just took the original draft of the Constitution, as published in January 1978. Since most changes were done precisely because the PSOE was the most unhappy partner, whereas the PCE was much more conciliatory, I think the final text TTL would be much closer to the original draft than OTL's. I have not included any reference to the Basque and Navarrese fueros, but these would be included in the disposiciones part of the text, although it would still not recognise its historic and pre-constitutional character, I believe.
Very interesting, Nanwe.
Just something that needs clarifying, regarding the autonomous territories - that's largely limited to Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, n'est-ce pas? If so, then that does hark back to your idea aeons ago about the original territorial setup during the Transition where only those areas which gained autonomy during the Second Republic (plus Galicia, just because) would regain their autonomy while everyone else was stuck with the plain-vanilla unitarian status. Or are you emulating the café con todos system of OTL though in a more organized way? As such, is Spain going full-blown federalist (à la Canada or Belgium) or is de facto federalist without using the word (i.e. OTL Spain or South Africa)?
Just something that needs clarifying, regarding the autonomous territories - that's largely limited to Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, n'est-ce pas? If so, then that does hark back to your idea aeons ago about the original territorial setup during the Transition where only those areas which gained autonomy during the Second Republic (plus Galicia, just because) would regain their autonomy while everyone else was stuck with the plain-vanilla unitarian status. Or are you emulating the café con todos system of OTL though in a more organized way? As such, is Spain going full-blown federalist (à la Canada or Belgium) or is de facto federalist without using the word (i.e. OTL Spain or South Africa)?
I wonder how will you tackle the situation of RTVE in this scenario, which includes the possibility of regional public broadcasters, if there's such.
Thanks!
It does not need qualifying yet
It was not my ideas though, it was the idea from Fernández Miranda and Moncloa, as I mentioned in the post. I am indeed emulating (well, actually I'm just copying OTL's original redaction) of a model whereby to become an autonomous territory all you need is to met the criteria (provinces with cultural similarities that border each other) and have 2/3 of the municipalities containing 50%+1 of the population of each supporting it. Then all you need is for the deputies from those provinces, organised in an 'ente preautonómico' to draft a Statute and voilà. It is still a harder process than OTL, though. However, once you obtain it (and I think all regions would, because the pressure for autonomy was strong), the system is less chaotic than OTL, with a proper Senate and some degree of institutionalisation of the autonomous state and its pseudo-federal character as opposed to OTL's approach of "let's devolve without guaranteeing that the central state won't bypass it whenever it has an absolute majority".I already thought about it, to be honest. But I am not quite sure how to write it down, I might just do it in passing references.
Always a pleasure.
It does not need qualifying yet
That sounds like it could work. I like it. I wonder how many of those autonomous territories are OTL or are new for TTL. (For example - La Rioja.)
Need a hand?
Just to nitpick
but Galicia indeed obtained autonomy during these Second Republic... It just happened that it was fully occupied by the Nationals.Just to nitpick
But of course.
Dicho y hecho
The elections of 1977 marked a new era for Spain. For the first time in forty years a democratic governed Spain, it was nonetheless a right-wing one, and Spain would still have to wait some time until a left-wing President sat in Moncloa. Nevertheless, the new government, if largely formed by either former Francoist minister or secretaries and moderate opposition leaders, had a very different set of policy goals than the previous ones. First and foremost was the drafting of the new Constitution, but it was also accompanied by a series of important measures, such as the Amnesty Law, the agreements with the social agents and the opposition regarding the economic situation, which was spiralling; as well as a plethora of other legislative measures. All this in a period of two years until new legislative and local elections were called for March and April 1979 respectively.
The Constitution would be the result of a difficult compromise between the various political forces and which would especially difficult given that, had the UCD desired to (and it was tempted), it had the numbers to draft a right-wing Constitution with solely the votes of the People's Alliance. Instead, however, the cooperation between Suárez and Carrillo (and their respective lieutenants) would ensure a Constitution that reflected a consensus on the key features of the system, left some thorny issues relatively ambiguous to be later determined by ordinary legislation (or by organic laws). For instance, on the issues of divorce and abortion or the strict definition of marriage, which the UCD sought to constitutionally prohibit for the former and define as between a man and a woman in the latter, the PCE was in the ideological opposite, instead seeking a more nebulous interpretation of marriage (1) and seeking to constitutionally protect the right to divorce and to abort.
The Constituent Legislature was also marked by the ongoing economic malaise that characterised the Spanish economy until it hit rock bottom in the period 1979-1982. Although during 1977, the economy had managed to recover and grow to about 3% annually (a far cry from the growth rates before 1973), the economy was in grave danger of falling through an inflationary spiral (in 1977 inter-annual inflation stood at 27%), which only exacerbated social conflict at a time of increasing unemployment and fight for wage increases to match prince increases. Fuelling this conflictive time was the amateurism of the economic agents, in particular of the employers, who were used to the traditional corporativism of the Francoist period would have to come to terms with the newly legalised and powerful unions. The government would also undertake a devaluation of the peseta and took measure to prevent capital flight and together with the Banco de España built a system of bank support to prevent bankruptcies.
The response was, to set up a series of minimum on political and economic matters, as part of a rapprochement between the Government and Carrillo and Felipe González, the General Secretary of the PS as well as the various economic agents, namely the CEOE, CCOO, USO and UGT. These minimum accords were termed 'Pactos de la Moncloa' by the press. It consisted of a double set of measures, both political and economic. Politically, it laid down a series of principles later to be codified in the Constitution, such as syndical liberty, freedom of press, elimination of 'censura previa' (2) and the decriminalisation of marriage separation, adultery and the figure of the 'amancebamiento' (3). On the economic side, following the Pacts, unions and employers agreed on a moderation of wage and prince increases, in an attempt to slow the inflationary spiral. It worked, if Spain remained prone to inflationary bouts into the 1990, it would not again reach the quasi-Latin Americans levels of the mid-1970s.
The economic policy of the Constituent Legislature would be dominated by Professor Enrique Fuentes Quintana, a renowned economist associated to the newspaper Arriba and placed on the centre-left of the political spectrum. The professor, before being dismissed by Suárez due to personal differences, would undertake the much-needed fiscal reform that had been avoided by the Francoist regime and which had been a key part of the UCD programme for the 1977 elections. The fiscal reform included the introduction of a (more) progressive income tax rates, the fight against fiscal evasion and a revamp of the overall fiscal system in general, allowing for the future expansion of the State. As a result of these reforms, and in an interesting anecdote, the high levels of income inequality that characterised the tardofranquismo went down during the economic crisis of 1974-1982.
During the legislature too, the first process of devolution started with the creation of the various pre-autonomic entities for Galicia, Navarra, the Basque Country and Catalonia. These entities, formed by the deputies elected from the constituent provinces (or province in the case of Navarra) were tasked with the draft of the regional Statutes that would govern their respective regions and which should be in accordance with the upcoming constitutional text. In Galicia and Navarra, the UCD would be the majority party in the respective process of drafting (or in the case of Navarra, of updating the fueros), whereas it would be the PSUC-PCE for Catalonia and the PNV in the three provinces of the Basque Country. The regional elections would have to wait until 1979 (Navarra), 1980 (Catalonia and Basque Country) and 1981 (Galicia).
The Constitution would be the result of a difficult compromise between the various political forces and which would especially difficult given that, had the UCD desired to (and it was tempted), it had the numbers to draft a right-wing Constitution with solely the votes of the People's Alliance. Instead, however, the cooperation between Suárez and Carrillo (and their respective lieutenants) would ensure a Constitution that reflected a consensus on the key features of the system, left some thorny issues relatively ambiguous to be later determined by ordinary legislation (or by organic laws). For instance, on the issues of divorce and abortion or the strict definition of marriage, which the UCD sought to constitutionally prohibit for the former and define as between a man and a woman in the latter, the PCE was in the ideological opposite, instead seeking a more nebulous interpretation of marriage (1) and seeking to constitutionally protect the right to divorce and to abort.
The Constituent Legislature was also marked by the ongoing economic malaise that characterised the Spanish economy until it hit rock bottom in the period 1979-1982. Although during 1977, the economy had managed to recover and grow to about 3% annually (a far cry from the growth rates before 1973), the economy was in grave danger of falling through an inflationary spiral (in 1977 inter-annual inflation stood at 27%), which only exacerbated social conflict at a time of increasing unemployment and fight for wage increases to match prince increases. Fuelling this conflictive time was the amateurism of the economic agents, in particular of the employers, who were used to the traditional corporativism of the Francoist period would have to come to terms with the newly legalised and powerful unions. The government would also undertake a devaluation of the peseta and took measure to prevent capital flight and together with the Banco de España built a system of bank support to prevent bankruptcies.
The response was, to set up a series of minimum on political and economic matters, as part of a rapprochement between the Government and Carrillo and Felipe González, the General Secretary of the PS as well as the various economic agents, namely the CEOE, CCOO, USO and UGT. These minimum accords were termed 'Pactos de la Moncloa' by the press. It consisted of a double set of measures, both political and economic. Politically, it laid down a series of principles later to be codified in the Constitution, such as syndical liberty, freedom of press, elimination of 'censura previa' (2) and the decriminalisation of marriage separation, adultery and the figure of the 'amancebamiento' (3). On the economic side, following the Pacts, unions and employers agreed on a moderation of wage and prince increases, in an attempt to slow the inflationary spiral. It worked, if Spain remained prone to inflationary bouts into the 1990, it would not again reach the quasi-Latin Americans levels of the mid-1970s.
The economic policy of the Constituent Legislature would be dominated by Professor Enrique Fuentes Quintana, a renowned economist associated to the newspaper Arriba and placed on the centre-left of the political spectrum. The professor, before being dismissed by Suárez due to personal differences, would undertake the much-needed fiscal reform that had been avoided by the Francoist regime and which had been a key part of the UCD programme for the 1977 elections. The fiscal reform included the introduction of a (more) progressive income tax rates, the fight against fiscal evasion and a revamp of the overall fiscal system in general, allowing for the future expansion of the State. As a result of these reforms, and in an interesting anecdote, the high levels of income inequality that characterised the tardofranquismo went down during the economic crisis of 1974-1982.
During the legislature too, the first process of devolution started with the creation of the various pre-autonomic entities for Galicia, Navarra, the Basque Country and Catalonia. These entities, formed by the deputies elected from the constituent provinces (or province in the case of Navarra) were tasked with the draft of the regional Statutes that would govern their respective regions and which should be in accordance with the upcoming constitutional text. In Galicia and Navarra, the UCD would be the majority party in the respective process of drafting (or in the case of Navarra, of updating the fueros), whereas it would be the PSUC-PCE for Catalonia and the PNV in the three provinces of the Basque Country. The regional elections would have to wait until 1979 (Navarra), 1980 (Catalonia and Basque Country) and 1981 (Galicia).
Notes:
(1) Honestly it's 1977 Spain, the idea of gay rights is a thing, the idea of gay marriage is not. I suppose the PCE TTL (or the PSOE OTL) just saw no reason to define as between a man and a woman something that was just so "damn obvious" as that man and woman were the objects of marriage.
(2) Translates as 'previous censure'. It means that the government could censor press before it printed its materials as opposed to afterwards. In any case, the Pacts also stipulated that the executive could not censor a posteriori either, and this matter was left to the courts.
(3) Not the same as divorce. Separation means that the couple lives apart. Amancebamiento was the legal term for people in a sexual relationship outside marriage.
(2) Translates as 'previous censure'. It means that the government could censor press before it printed its materials as opposed to afterwards. In any case, the Pacts also stipulated that the executive could not censor a posteriori either, and this matter was left to the courts.
(3) Not the same as divorce. Separation means that the couple lives apart. Amancebamiento was the legal term for people in a sexual relationship outside marriage.
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Que viene el lobo
Traditionally, schoolchildren are taught in Spanish History classes that the Transition roughly lasted roughly until around 1981, when the LOAPA (1) and the LOREG (2) were passed. This is essentially an incorrect view. Although it can be argued that these key legislative pieces were of great importance and required considerable consensus between the Government and the opposition parties, the Transition's consensus was essentially killed by the double elections of 1979: The general election of March 1st and the local elections (as well as to the Juntas Generales of the Basque Country and of Navarra's Foral Assembly (3)) of April 3rd. The double election would require the major parties to present themselves in opposition to each other both at the national and at the local level, with the resulting increase in parliamentary hostility, which despite the personal friendship between Suárez and Carrillo (or really Suárez and everyone but Fraga) meant that the UCD and the PCE started to drift towards an Italian-like situation with two main political forces facing each other on the opposite end of the political spectrum and would consolidate a derechización (4) of the UCD with an increased presence and influence of the populares and especially of the democristianos, namely Álvarez de Miranda and Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón.
Perhaps the best example of the increasing polarisation of the political sphere are the political speeches of the various candidates to the elections, and in particular those for the local elections where the governing right-wing feared - as it would come to happen - that the combined forces of the Communists and some of the socialist parties, especially the PSP/FPS would result in left-wing city councils in the large cities of the country. For instance, and perhaps the best known example was the televised speech by Suárez on the eve of the April 3rd local election, where the Prime Minister decried the Marxist nature of the PCE, no matter how the party tried to hide it in its message and in its statutes. He warned against the Marxism and anti-clericalism of the party and reminded Spaniards that the party did not hide its support for such damaging ideas as its commitment to abortion or divorce and insisted that the PCE's final goal was created a Marxist society, hence taking advantage of the innate anti-communism of many Spaniards resulting from forty years of Francoist education and propaganda. (5)
To a large extent, this hostile approach failed, the electoral arithmetics in the local elections largely worked against the UCD. Instead, however, the UCD managed a great feat for the elections of 1979, riding the constitutional wave and despite a very slight decrease in the total percentage of votes, UCD gained just enough seats to obtain the absolute majority, at a 175 seats, at least given the abstention of HB deputies. The result was considerable a great personal success for Suárez, whose position was bolstered, and for the party in general. However, it also meant that from that moment onward, the main opposition to the Government's policy would come from the party's growing right-wing. The election were a failure for the PCE, which lost two seats, at the expense of the PS, whereas the great loser of the general election was AP, which now somewhat more moderate than in 1977, saw its small representation in Parliament further reduced.
Within AP then, a internal crisis erupted resulting in two key events: The move of Areilza (who joined AP just in time for the elections) to the UCD and the resignation of Fraga, which led to a grave internal crisis within the party, from which it would not come out until 1982.
Whereas the general election led to a victory for the moderate centre-right, the local elections showed an entirely different political picture, with the capital, Madrid and the other main cities of the country, such as Barcelona, Valencia or Sevilla, where although the UCD came first in most of them (not in Barcelona though), without the disadvantages of the electoral system, the left could muster a majority together resulting in the election, for instance, of Ramón Tamames as mayor of Madrid or Josep Miquel Abad in Barcelona (6)
Perhaps the best example of the increasing polarisation of the political sphere are the political speeches of the various candidates to the elections, and in particular those for the local elections where the governing right-wing feared - as it would come to happen - that the combined forces of the Communists and some of the socialist parties, especially the PSP/FPS would result in left-wing city councils in the large cities of the country. For instance, and perhaps the best known example was the televised speech by Suárez on the eve of the April 3rd local election, where the Prime Minister decried the Marxist nature of the PCE, no matter how the party tried to hide it in its message and in its statutes. He warned against the Marxism and anti-clericalism of the party and reminded Spaniards that the party did not hide its support for such damaging ideas as its commitment to abortion or divorce and insisted that the PCE's final goal was created a Marxist society, hence taking advantage of the innate anti-communism of many Spaniards resulting from forty years of Francoist education and propaganda. (5)
To a large extent, this hostile approach failed, the electoral arithmetics in the local elections largely worked against the UCD. Instead, however, the UCD managed a great feat for the elections of 1979, riding the constitutional wave and despite a very slight decrease in the total percentage of votes, UCD gained just enough seats to obtain the absolute majority, at a 175 seats, at least given the abstention of HB deputies. The result was considerable a great personal success for Suárez, whose position was bolstered, and for the party in general. However, it also meant that from that moment onward, the main opposition to the Government's policy would come from the party's growing right-wing. The election were a failure for the PCE, which lost two seats, at the expense of the PS, whereas the great loser of the general election was AP, which now somewhat more moderate than in 1977, saw its small representation in Parliament further reduced.
Within AP then, a internal crisis erupted resulting in two key events: The move of Areilza (who joined AP just in time for the elections) to the UCD and the resignation of Fraga, which led to a grave internal crisis within the party, from which it would not come out until 1982.
Whereas the general election led to a victory for the moderate centre-right, the local elections showed an entirely different political picture, with the capital, Madrid and the other main cities of the country, such as Barcelona, Valencia or Sevilla, where although the UCD came first in most of them (not in Barcelona though), without the disadvantages of the electoral system, the left could muster a majority together resulting in the election, for instance, of Ramón Tamames as mayor of Madrid or Josep Miquel Abad in Barcelona (6)
Notes:
(1) The Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico, or 'Organic Law of Harmonisation of the Autonomic Process. An Organic Law, later declared unconstitutional in 13 of its 28 articles that sought to make a more orderly process of devolution. We'll get there later.
(2) Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General, or Organic Law of the General Electoral System, essentially the electoral law for general elections. TTL it will be passed in 1981, as opposed to OTL's 1984. It will also be different, but again, we'll get there soon enough.
(3) So, without going into much detail: The Basque provinces (and Navarra) enjoy so called "foral" rights, which include actually having competencies and being governed by a democratically elected assembly, known as Junta General or Parlamento Foral in Navarra. The results of the 1979 elections in the 3 Basque provinces combined returned 228 seats, of which 103 were PNV, 38 from HB, 28 from PCE-EPK and 26 from UCD, 14 from EE and 11 from PS amongst others. In Navarra, the elections returned 70 seats, 23 held by the UCD, 13 by UPN (a splinter from the UCD), 10 by the PCE and 9 by HB amongst other minor forces, including one Carlist!
(4) Right-wing-isation? A right-wards shift.
(5) This is largely similar to what Suárez did in 1979 with the PSOE, since however moderate González and parts of the leadership were, the party's statutes were quite revolutionary. González then decided that no mentioning of Marxism nonsense would get in his way and went out of how way to change any mention of it in the party. He held an extraordinary Congress and failed, so he resigned to pressure the militants to hold a second Congress in which he got his way and managed to strengthen the party's leadership vis-à-vis the rank-and-file to prevent such things from being on the way of the PSOE reaching power.
(6) The UCD candidate for Barcelona's mayoralty was Carlos Güell de Sentmenat. As in the Güell of the Parc Güell industrialists. In comparison to today's PP, the UCD seemed to have a very high amount of notables in their rnaks.
Sorry about the belated response. It is essentially going to very welcome. The general understanding of most people is that although theoretically all the territories are equal (the concierto and cupo vasconavarro aside), some regions will be more equal than others, because that is fine by the UCD too. We'll get to the division within the party itself on this issue. But for the time being, and except for ETA, for the time being, people are quite satisfied with autonomy, although things will (like OTL) kind of get out of hand requiring the LOAPA and later its watered-down verison (as OTL).
Just to nitpick
Well, it obtained it through electoral fraud
Keep it up, Nanwe!
Thanks for the support!