2.11: The Grand Alliance
XI: The Grand Alliance
Michiel ten Hove, Grand Pensionary of Holland
Michiel ten Hove, Grand Pensionary of Holland
1689 was supposed to be a difficult year for France. As the year began, France found itself ill-prepared for a serious war. In 1688, Louis XIV and Louvois had allowed their agents in the east and in the British Isles to delude them into thinking that a repeat of the War of the Reunions was possible, but this time against the likes of the Holy Roman Emperor and the Dutch Republic rather than Spain. The French thought that the Germans were weak and without the will to fight, and they expected that William of Orange would embroil himself in a new series of English civil wars. Instead, in the face of a French assault, the Germans rallied and declared a Reichskrieg, a war of the entire Holy Roman Empire, against France, and James II of England folded at the first sign of danger. By the beginning of 1689, the Germans were standing strong and England was fully in the grasp of William of Orange. To fight this powerful alliance of England, the Dutch Republic, and Germany, France did not even half of its armed forces mobilized. The warehouses and depots were not stockpiled. The regiments had not been called up. The ships were laid away. France was not ready for anything more than a few sharp actions. In contrast, the English seemed to embrace their new king, the Dutch were letting go of their inhibitions against war and were buying every mercenary they could, and German princes of every rank were raising soldiers for the Emperor. The only German who seemed to have a modicum of sympathy toward the French, Elector Max Emanuel of Bavaria, had been sent far away to the frontiers of Christendom where he could not be reached by the temptations of France. In every way, France seemed destined for setback.
1689 was not a difficult year for France.
1689 was a horrific year for the enemies of France. On almost every front, France was outnumbered and outgunned by its enemies because of Louis XIV and Louvois' self-deception. In Ireland, as soon as Marshal Schomberg arrived, the Franco-Jacobites were supposedly outmatched and immediately the security of Derry was restored. But after Derry, Schomberg accomplished nothing but his own humiliation. Not only was the rebellious city of Dublin not burned, it was not even reached. Instead, Schomberg stalled at Cú Chulainn's home, Dundalk, and just like men of Ulster, Schomberg's army seemed to be afflicted by the ces noínden. What other excuse can be offered for the fact that he did not advance and attack the lesser army of James II of Ireland? After losing thousands, Schomberg finally relented but then managed to bungle the siege of Charlemont so severely as to lose thousands more. Upon moment Schomberg arrived in Ireland it seemed almost impossible for him to lose and yet by the end of 1689, he had put into question whether his army would survive another year on the Emerald Isle. As egregious as they were Schomberg's mishaps paled in comparison to the German front where the coalition against France suffered nothing short of catastrophe. Three, three whole separate German armies had been assembled to match the singular and inferior French army of the ill-experienced Grand Dauphin of France. Led by Charles V of Lorraine, the supposed hero of the East, Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden, the grizzled veteran of the Turkish wars, and Friedrich III of Brandenburg, son of the Great Elector, the Germans should managed a great many feats against the Grand Dauphin. They did not. The three separate armies remained separate and separately they failed. Charles of Lorraine ran headfirst into the walls of Mainz and shattered his army in the process. Ludwig Wilhelm gave up his eastern aggression for western reticence and did not even dare to contest Philippsburg. Friedrich III took Cologne and held on Koblenz but failed to move past Bonn. Minor victories like Cologne and Derry could not make up for tragic mistakes like Charlemont and Mainz.
The only enemies of France to avoid embarrassment were Spain and the Dutch Republic, and the reason for that was a defeat in itself for France's opponents. After decades of having its honor and pride besieged, Spain stood by the mother of the future King of Spain, Luis Carlos. Spain refused to give up its allegiance to Queen Marie Louise's uncle and Prince Luis Carlo's great-uncle, King James II of England. Even as he was run out of his country (by himself in all honesty), Spain stayed loyal and true. For that reason alone, Spain spat in the face of the would-be king of England, William III, and refused his hand. But without the firm support of the Dutch, Spain could in no way risk war against France. Instead, for the time being, it put aside its differences and declared the Spanish Netherlands neutral grounds while giving Louis XIV thousands of men to use against William III. Afterward, Spain continued to abscond from another war against France and altogether neglected its obligations. Through these means, Spain saved the Dutch Republic from French armies but also locked the grand army that the Dutch were building behind a wall of neutrality. On the other side of that wall, the prospective opponent of the Dutch, Duc de Humieries liberally sent his men away to reinforce France’s other front, Germany. Humieries's southern counterpart, the Duc de Noailles similarly sent men away from the Catalonian frontier to fight against the Germans. These men played pivotal roles in saving Bonn and Mainz. Thus, Spain's neutrality enabled France to wreak havoc on its belligerent enemies. Altogether, France’s enemies had managed only a series of mild successes and messy failures. If this series of mild successes and messy failures was all that France’s enemies could manage while France was not even half-mobilized then what hope did they have once Louis XIV and Louvois fully activated their war machine? As it was, the Sun King shone brilliantly and the rest of Europe was at risk of being burnt.
Under this heat, some of the enemies contemplated peace after no more than a year of fighting with Louis XIV. Even the man who was supposed to be Louis XIV’s primary antagonist, William III, questioned the wisdom of further war against France. He could afford to have such thoughts. His lands on the Continent were untouched by war thanks to the Spanish buffer and he had already accomplished his goal of being crowned King of England. All that remained for him was the complete defeat of James II, which might only become possible after France dropped its support of the exiled Jacobite king. However, William III knew that Louis XIV would not abandon James II lightly, at least not until his Continental ambitions were sated. Those Continental ambitions at the very least included nothing less than a fulfillment of France’s September 1688 ultimatum. In other words, the full recognition of Furstenberg as the Archbishop of Cologne, a settlement of Elisabeth Charlotte’s claims to the Palatinate, and the permanent cession of numerous Imperial border towns and fortresses to France. Even if France’s army was close to accomplishing all three of these goals through a force of arms, France's Continental enemies in the Dutch Republic and Germany were not willing to succumb, They understood that giving in to these demands would only enable Louis XIV to continue with his rabid expansionism. Cologne, Bonn, and Heidelberg would be the bases for the next wave of French attacks and these ones would drive even deeper into the Dutch Republic and Germany. As terrible as things had gone in 1689, the enemies of France could not give up just yet. As frightening as the repercussions of further conflict and further defeat might be, the price of peace was too dear. They had to fight on, they had to find a way to win.
The inability to conceive an acceptable peace in 1689 forced France’s enemies to redouble their commitment to the war. Earlier in the summer of 1689, the Dutch Republic had formed two alliances with William III’s England and Emperor Leopold’s Austria, respectively. The new Anglo-Dutch alliance was built off the previous Treaty of Defensive Alliance signed in 1678. Under the new “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance”, William III and the Staten-Generaal forged “close Alliance and faithful League in order to maintain and continue mutually Order, Peace, Friendship, and Neutrality at sea and on land .... and to defend, assist and maintain, keeping in possession the Lands, Towns and Places that belong at present and that will belong later both to His Majesty and His Successors as Kings of Great Britain and to the said Lords States General, the said Treaties wherever those Lands, Towns and Places be located.” In simpler words, England and the Republic agreed to defend one another’s territories as they were currently understood. This document was augmented by Treaty on Combined Fleets, which clarified the means of joint-naval campaigns between England and the Dutch Republic. Between the two treaties, the English and Dutch had been meant to fight together in the British Isles, on the high seas, and the Continent. However, the precarious situation in Ireland and the neutral setting for the Spanish Netherlands prevented any deployment of English soldiers to the Continent and also forced William III to keep thousands of elite Dutch soldiers constrained to the British Isles. The Austro-Dutch alliance was considerably more aggressive in its goals. While the Anglo-Dutch treaty was supposed to defend what the English and Dutch held, the Austro-Dutch treaty was supposed to reclaim lands lost years before. This both defensive and offensive alliance was explicitly targeted against France and precluded either country from finding a separate peace. The objective of this alliance was nothing less than restoring the borders set by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Peace of Pyrenees of 1659. In other words, the Dutch and Austrians meant to undo all of Louis XIV’s conquests from the War of Devolution, the Franco-Dutch War, and the War of Reunions. Also, the Dutch promised to support the election of Holy Roman Emperor Leopold’s eldest son, Joseph, as King of the Romans. In December 1689, the Dutch organized for these two bilateral alliances to be joined in one, the Grand Alliance of Vienna. Together, they promised to eject France from Germany, including Alsace, the Spanish Netherlands, and Lorraine. Additionally, they would force France to accept William III’s accession to the English throne.
Although this agreement in late 1689 cemented a triple alliance between three of Europe’s mightiest powers, it did not actually improve the strength and coordination of the enemies of France. The Dutch Republic, England, and the Emperor had all already been at war with France in 1689 and each was less successful than the last. Perhaps it was beneficial to paint a clear picture of what world the Grand Alliance wanted to live in if victorious. However, the Grand Alliance still needed to find a way to become victorious, and each member of the Grand Alliance knew that this victory started with Spain. Naturally, the Dutch placed the greatest importance on securing Spain’s admission to the Grand Alliance. Austria too felt compelled to bring Spain into the war after the trouble at Mainz. However, in England, William III remained firm in the idea that Spain’s admission must be accompanied by the recognition of his kingship. This desire had been the block to any sort of Anglo-Dutch-Spanish reconciliation in 1689 and at the beginning of 1690, that remained true. Rather boldly, William III attempted to appoint a new English ambassador to Madrid, Alexander Stanhope. Spain's response was rather cold. Spain deliberately ignored every letter that announced Stanhope's appointment but did not outright reject it. Thus, Stanhope sailed to Spain thinking that there was a chance at reconciliation. He was denied entry at the port and asked to leave immediately. As far as the Spanish government was concerned, John Stafford, James II’s last ambassador to Spain, remained the only valid representative of the English government in Spain.
The fact of the matter was that Spain did not feel any pressure to reach an understanding with William III and his England. 1689 had seen James II take over most of Ireland and put himself in a solid position to overcome Marshal Schomberg’s army in 1690. At the same time, the Great Dundee had decimated the Williamite forces in Scotland, including the supposedly top-notch Anglo-Scot Brigade. All the while, John Stafford was delivering report after report to Queens Mariana and Marie Louise of the widespread support in England that remained for James II. To Madrid, William of Orange’s rule seemed unsettled, unstable, and on the verge of collapse. For Spain, it simply did not sense to move toward friendliness with William’s England when their true friend, James II, was edging toward total restoration. At that point, Spain would desperately need to retain James II’s goodwill or they would risk being the victims of his retaliation. This idea that William of Orange's reign had already passed its apex gave Queen Marie Louise, the Jacobite of Spain, serious sway within the royal council. In another victory for Marie Louise, one of Scotland's emigres, Alexander Cannon, was brought before both King Carlos II of Spain and his heir, Infante Luis Carlos of Asturias, in a public audience [1]. In front of the most important officials of Spain and a number of foreign dignitaries, including the Dutch Republic’s ambassador, Coenraad van Heemskerck, Cannon was openly received as the envoy of Balcarres' Scottish government. So rather than step toward an understanding with England, Spain took a leap away from William’s extended hand.
William III was furious over both Stanhope's denial of admission and Cannon’s reception. In that moment, he absolutely wanted to end diplomatic overtures to Spain. He wanted to damn the Spaniards to Hell and wished for the French to drag them there. However, William III had bound himself to the interests of the Dutch Republic and Austria through the Grand Alliance, and both the Staten-Generaal and Emperor Leopold remained determined to win Spain’s help. In 1689, Michiel ten Hove, the Republic’s Grand Pensionary, had folded to William III’s demands and made Dutch-Spanish military cooperation contingent on Spain’s acceptance of William III as King of England. In 1690, Hove chose to be stubborn with William III instead of with Spain. Hove exchanged a flurry of letters with William III to convince him of the necessity of the Spanish alliance with or without a recognition of Williamite rule. With each reply, William III denied Hove’s pleas and told him to remain strong because Spain would bend. Spain was weak he promised and the Jacobite Queen could not beat out the Austrian Queen forever. However, the ambassador in Spain, Heemskerck, though differently. Marie Louise was the mother of the future of Spain. Luis Carlos was Spain's miracle and Marie Louise, was his mother. Certainly, Carlos II defied every scientific explanation by continuing to live another day, but still he was expected to die before Luis Carlos came of age. When he did, Marie Louise, not Mariana, would be the Queen Mother and with that she would become the most powerful person in Spain. The Spaniards understood that and feared it even. The Orleans Queen remained French at heart and the Spanish government did not know what to do with that. What if she made her son an agent of Louis XIV, just as she seemed to be? What could be done? He was going to be their king and they would have no other. Some ministers even conjured up ideas about sending Luis Carlos away from his mother so he might be raised away from her influence. Those plans were stillborn. The boy was just six years old and his life could not be risked at sea. So for the time being, every indication pointed to Marie Louise raising her own son and being every part of the future of Spain. So long as that remained true, Marie Louise would retain enough power within Spain's government to keep the Jacobite agenda afloat, even if a French agenda remained out of reach.
Heemskerck's confirmation that the Jacobite sentiment in Spain showed no signs of weakening resolve forced Michiel ten Hove into a dramatic standoff with William III. Since William refused to listen to Hove's reason, the Grand Pensionary resorted to rather aggressive defiance. In a letter that left William III stunned, Hove reprimanded William III for abandoning the Dutch Republic for England. With a boldness that bordered on temerity, Hove accused William of subjecting Dutch interests to his personal English ambitions. Hove brought back up Manuel de Coloma and Escolano and James II's assurances of England's friendliness and suggested that William's invasion had no military merit. The adventure was nothing more than William abusing his powers as a Stadtholder to claim a personal kingship for himself. Hove reminded William III that the authorization for his invasion had been withdrawn at the last moment and that the legality of the continued use of Dutch soldiers in the British Isles was in question. Hove even hinted at the fact that William's usurping of James II had not been part of the plan he had revealed to the Staten-Generaal, and thus was never approved. On a more open note, Hove remonstrated William for stealing the best soldiers of the Dutch Republic and for losing some of them (the Anglo-Scots Brigade) to Scottish clansmen. Pointedly Hove pointed out, as William III’s own letters to James II illustrated, the Anglo-Scots Brigade belonged to the Dutch Republic, especially when the Dutch Republic was under the threat of invasion. To add one final flourish to his letter, Hove inquired when the thousands of English soldiers that the Dutch Republic had been promised would arrive. The total insubordination of Hove shocked and appalled William III [2].
Upset at Hove’s Loevestein-esque threats [3], William III considered having Hove removed and replaced by a more helpful Grand Pensionary. William III thought that Anthonie Heinsuis would be this figure, but Heinsuis shied away from participation in William III’s scheme to replace Hove. Surprisingly, the man who volunteered to help William III was Govert van Slingelandt, cousin of the de Witts’ whom William III had had murdered. However, Govert’s price was that his 26-year-old son be made Grand Pensionary in Hove’s stead. William III’s personal friend and adviser, Hans Willem Bentinck was in favor of the Slingelandt plot, but William III hesitated. Although stubborn and unbearably proud, William III at his core understood pragmatism. The thought of putting the inexperienced Simon at the head of the Dutch Republic worried William and so too did Simon’s de Witt heritage. Bentinck did not seem concerned about Simon's family, but even Hove, the cousin and personal choice of Gaspar Fagel, was leaning into Loevestein politics. While William hesitated, his plots against Hove were uncovered and Hove defeated them in a surprisingly efficient manner. First, Hove appointed Simon as secretary of the Council of State to buy Govert’s compliance. As it turned out, Govert was on his deathbed, and with his waning energy, he was content with securing his family’s legacy. Second, Hove began discussions about the military situation and a Spanish alliance before an assembly of the Staten-Generaal. Of course, the fear-prone Dutch statesmen fell in line with Hove’s thinking that the Spanish alliance was completely necessary. Naturally, the Dutch were also too afraid to directly challenge William III over the issues of the Dutch soldiers in the British Isles and the lack of English soldiers on the Continent. However, Hove did elicit a weak resolution that effectively begged William III to seriously consider how he used Dutch military resources in 1690. Even if this resolution lacked teeth, it showed which way the Staten-Generaal leaned. Soon afterward, William received a carefully worded letter from Emperor Leopold that asked for him to put aside his demands for recognition from Spain and to put defeating France first. Emperor Leopold reminded William of his frustration at the removal of James II’s Catholic daughter, Mary Louisa, from the line of succession. Undoubtedly, William’s attacks on the prestige of the future Queen of Spain did immense harm to his relations with Madrid. Between the Staten-General’s display of approval for Hove, Slingelandt’s defection, and Leopold’s lecture, William was clearly defeated. Finally, William III consented to negotiations with Spain being re-opened to the exclusion of the English topic.
In this new light, Coenraad van Heemskerck met with Carlos II’s favorite, Manuel Joaquin Alvarez de Toledo, to discuss the nature of Dutch-Spanish military cooperation. Marie Louise briefly considered intervening to stop the standing Dutch-Spanish alliance and German-Spanish alliances from coming into effect against her native France. However, the Orleans queen was still young and learning. Before she moved, Mariana and the war party had already taken control of negotiations. As soon as Heemskerck made it clear that Spain would not need to recognize William III’s kingship nor even sign any agreement with his English government, the Spanish dropped all objections to working with the Dutch and Germans. Rather quickly, Heemskerck and the Spanish agreed that the Dutch field army should enter the Spanish Netherlands immediately and join Marques de Gastanaga’s defense. Furthermore, Spain affirmed that it would keep its ports open to both Dutch ships of commerce and ships of war for the duration of the conflict. In general, Spain advocated for quick and complete cooperation in the Spanish Netherlands and the Mediterranean. The Dutch, for their part, were fully willing to send soldiers to the Spanish Netherlands, ships to the Mediterranean, and money to Spain. Against this furious rush, Marie Louise and her Orleanistas were helpless. Spain’s innate desire for war with France could not be stopped. Mariana even agreed to permit English soldiers to serve in the Spanish Netherlands so long as they did so as soldiers of the Dutch Republic rather than as soldiers of William III’s England. The only concession that the Orleanistas won was thanks to Don Pedro Ronquillo, still technically the official Spanish ambassador to James II even though Don Pedro was residing in Madrid at the moment [4]. Ronquillo took note of how the Treaty on Combined Fleets gave precedence to England rather than the Dutch Republic. Therefore, English ships could not serve under the Dutch and fly Dutch colors as English soldiers on a Continental battlefield might. Although to most landlubbers this was a technicality, at sea precedence was considered hugely important. Ronquillo took full advantage of this fact to prevent Spain’s open-port policy from extending to English ships. At the time, this seemed to be an innocuous concession for both Mariana’s war party and Heemskerck to make.
Within a few weeks, Spain not only agreed to join the war against France but had already outlined some of the ways in which it would help fight France. Officially, Spain was doing no more than fulfilling its pre-existing obligations to both the Dutch Republic and the League of Augsburg. This fulfillment amounted to coordinating with the Dutch and Germans in the Low Countries for the defense of the Spanish Netherlands and Rhineland against France. Spain abstained from official admission to the Grand Alliance due to Williamite England’s participation. Spain also avoided any new treaty of alliance with the Dutch Republic that clearly outlined a joint Dutch-Spanish approach to the war. William III wanted to wait until he could turn the tides against James II and then from a position of power, he would negotiate with Spain. Austria felt no need for a new treaty with Spain and Spain was not looking for one either as it remained sore from the Bavarian Netherlands scheme. In this manner, Spain did not bind itself to the same commitments as the three members of the Grand Alliance. Specifically, Spain was not restricted from negotiating a separate peace with France. Although Mariana made loose statements to that effect, nothing on paper bound Spain to fight at the leisure of the Grand Alliance. Still, Spain would benefit if the Grand Alliance won as its war goals specifically included the recovery of Luxembourg, Franche-Comte, and the southern environs of the Spanish Netherlands. Altogether, Spain could not have been happier with the outcome. Or at least, the war party could not be happier. The peace party was less enthusiastic about the prospect of war, especially with Catalonia unsettled. At the end of April 1690, after the lapsing of the Brussels Convention, Spain officially declared war on France and with that, the next phase of the Louis' war began.
[1] Carlos II and both Luis Carlos being both put on public display is a significant symbolic action. Carlos II did not attend every possible function due to his ill-health and was often represented by proxies. So to have both of them (as well as the two Queens) receive someone is a major sign of respect. The fact that they showed this level of respect toward the unofficial envoy of the Scots while not even letting William III's ambassador into the country is a demonstration of the lasting ill-will toward William III's government in England and how Spain's clings to James II.
[2] Not a lot is known about Michiel ten Hove because he died so quickly after succeeding Gaspar Fagel and effectively was sandwiched between two titans in Fagel and Anthonie Heinsius. I'm leaning into the fact that he's a middle-aged man with fully formed opinions and perspectives, so he isn't going to just bend like a reed in the wind. I'm also leaning into his background with the Dutch East India Trading Company as him having a more international background and with him being more understanding of commerce issues. Altogether, I've decided to have him be a bit more independent-minded and willing to stand up to William to defend the Republic's own interests.
[3] For clarity, Loevestein is the liberty, statist alignment in the Dutch Republic. Hove is officially an Orangist, but in this case is showing Loevestein tendencies.
[4] As a reminder, Don Ronquillo left England during William's invasion and facilitated the Scottish escape at the time. Since then, Ronquillo has returned to Spain. He officially remains ambassador to the Court of St. James as another example of Spain's reluctance to let go of James II.
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