Suppose that the higher ups in the USSR decide against invading Czechoslovakia for whatever reason, and so Alexander Dubcek stays in power and continues to carry on with his reformist agenda. How would a more democratic Czechoslovakia affect political developments in the East Bloc, and how would the country in particular look like after a few years? How different could worldwide communism be without the anti-Soviet backlash that followed Moscow's act of blatant imperialism?
The Prague Spring endures?
- Thread starter Vinization
- Start date
Okay, so the more hardcore Brezhnev reverses courses from the less hardcore Khrushchev? I mean, when Khrushchev invaded Hungary in 1956.
And people are complex. Even the most old school American football coach is likely to be hardcore in some ways but not in others. So, Brezhnev basically decides Khrushchev made a mistake. And/or mid-level leaders present the issue differently to him.
Yes, I’d like to see how this plays out.
According to wikipedia Mikhail Suslov was against invading Czechoslovakia, so the POD could be that Brezhnev listens to him.Okay, so the more hardcore Brezhnev reverses courses from the less hardcore Khrushchev? I mean, when Khrushchev invaded Hungary in 1956.
And people are complex. Even the most old school American football coach is likely to be hardcore in some ways but not in others. So, Brezhnev basically decides Khrushchev made a mistake. And/or mid-level leaders present the issue differently to him.
Yes, I’d like to see how this plays out.
What were the plans Dubcek had in mind for his country, economically and politically speaking? Besides the thaw, that is.
@Petike @Resurgam
Honestly, I think the best case scenario is Czechoslovakia winding up like a richer commie era Poland (1970s/1980s), then having a Velvet Revolution in the late 1980s. Czechoslovakia is likely a little too dogmatic for the "goulash communism" model of Hungary. Something like Poland, i.e. less censorship of imported foreign culture, slightly greater leniency, that's about as plausible as it gets. They would not let Czechoslovakia off the leash. Even Hungary was under permanent and de facto illegal military occupation since 1956, for over thirty years. Czechoslovakia spent 23 years on house arrest in the compound of a nuclear-armed doomsday cult before it finally freed itself. Imagine the UK, France, or even post-war Germany being under foreign occupation that long and forced to pay for everything as "punishment", as "tribute" to the soviet empire.
They would still seek to undercut Dubcek and other semi-reformists, much like in OTL. The reason the USSR didn't back down from quashing liberalization is the simple and sobering reason that it wasn't in their power-hungry interests to allow East Block satellite states, all acquired via illegal coups in the 1940s, to liberalise or become more open societies. Dubcek's efforts were quelled just because he allowed and encouraged average citizens to complain about governmental, administrative and economic corruption, and not face grave repercussions for "daring to" speak up. 1960s people interviewed on camera on the streets were genuinely fearful to speak about this at first, but slowly, they started to, and even that was subdued, measured, self-censoring.
The USSR saw what was going on, that even more innocuous political taboos were being breached, and they flew off the handle near-immediately. This is why I also keep explaining to westerners for years, in vain, that the USSR had no genuine interest in genuine liberalization, and therefore timelines with an almost hippie-and-cumbaya liberal USSR are not rooted in actual historical trends. The USSR never gave up social, political and cultural repression, because it was their bread and butter of running an empire that refused to acknowledge it's still mentally an 18th/19th century empire, hiding behind wannabe-revolutionary and wannabe-messianic ideological rhetoric. The USSR existed to further the interests of its mostly ethnic Russian elites. Not to appease Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary or the equally illegally occupied Baltics.
What I find a much more underrated ATL possibility is not the Obvious Great Dates of History focus on 1968, but perhaps ocusing on a slightly different evolution of Czechoslovakia after 1989. Not necessarily on whether it stays together longer or not, that's not as interesting, actually, but focusing on Czechoslovakia "going the Baltic way" in terms of dealing with its communist past, particularly the various communist officials who enjoyed complete impunity and unaccountability under the regime, even in the 1980s. After communism fell and the Baltics regained their independence, an important thing that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did was investigate their communist era officials, and made various legal precautions to prevent the old bashaws from running for political office or spreading demagoguery in local media. The judicial system was also reformed to move away from soviet era malarkey to western-style courts and their transparency, etc. Czechoslovakia did much more sloppier work in this area during the early 1990s, when it had a golden opportunity to at least attempt this. In the post-communist years and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the judiciary stuff was somewhat better handled in Czechia, but was largelly stunted and shoved aside in 1990s Slovakia, and the consequences of that - including half-hearted reform attempts since the 1990s - are still causing major sociopolitical problems in Slovakia to date, to the very present day. As much as things have advanced and improved in central Europe in the over thirty years since 1989, dealing with the ugly legacies of the communist era in an earlier and more effective way would offer a lot more possibilities in what modern history ATLs you could create.
Ironically, it's not 1968, but 1945 and 1948 that present more options for the sort of changes demanded in this scenario. A more intriguing POD dealing with Czechoslovakia and the communists would be any POD in the mid-1940s and any POD between 1945 and 1948 (yes, I'm hinting at diminishing the soviet post-war influence and especially the anti-democratic coup that installed the commies into power). By 1968, it's a little too late, short of the USSR deciding to collapse already in the 1960s, just for the lulz or something.
They would still seek to undercut Dubcek and other semi-reformists, much like in OTL. The reason the USSR didn't back down from quashing liberalization is the simple and sobering reason that it wasn't in their power-hungry interests to allow East Block satellite states, all acquired via illegal coups in the 1940s, to liberalise or become more open societies. Dubcek's efforts were quelled just because he allowed and encouraged average citizens to complain about governmental, administrative and economic corruption, and not face grave repercussions for "daring to" speak up. 1960s people interviewed on camera on the streets were genuinely fearful to speak about this at first, but slowly, they started to, and even that was subdued, measured, self-censoring.
The USSR saw what was going on, that even more innocuous political taboos were being breached, and they flew off the handle near-immediately. This is why I also keep explaining to westerners for years, in vain, that the USSR had no genuine interest in genuine liberalization, and therefore timelines with an almost hippie-and-cumbaya liberal USSR are not rooted in actual historical trends. The USSR never gave up social, political and cultural repression, because it was their bread and butter of running an empire that refused to acknowledge it's still mentally an 18th/19th century empire, hiding behind wannabe-revolutionary and wannabe-messianic ideological rhetoric. The USSR existed to further the interests of its mostly ethnic Russian elites. Not to appease Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary or the equally illegally occupied Baltics.
What I find a much more underrated ATL possibility is not the Obvious Great Dates of History focus on 1968, but perhaps ocusing on a slightly different evolution of Czechoslovakia after 1989. Not necessarily on whether it stays together longer or not, that's not as interesting, actually, but focusing on Czechoslovakia "going the Baltic way" in terms of dealing with its communist past, particularly the various communist officials who enjoyed complete impunity and unaccountability under the regime, even in the 1980s. After communism fell and the Baltics regained their independence, an important thing that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did was investigate their communist era officials, and made various legal precautions to prevent the old bashaws from running for political office or spreading demagoguery in local media. The judicial system was also reformed to move away from soviet era malarkey to western-style courts and their transparency, etc. Czechoslovakia did much more sloppier work in this area during the early 1990s, when it had a golden opportunity to at least attempt this. In the post-communist years and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the judiciary stuff was somewhat better handled in Czechia, but was largelly stunted and shoved aside in 1990s Slovakia, and the consequences of that - including half-hearted reform attempts since the 1990s - are still causing major sociopolitical problems in Slovakia to date, to the very present day. As much as things have advanced and improved in central Europe in the over thirty years since 1989, dealing with the ugly legacies of the communist era in an earlier and more effective way would offer a lot more possibilities in what modern history ATLs you could create.
Ironically, it's not 1968, but 1945 and 1948 that present more options for the sort of changes demanded in this scenario. A more intriguing POD dealing with Czechoslovakia and the communists would be any POD in the mid-1940s and any POD between 1945 and 1948 (yes, I'm hinting at diminishing the soviet post-war influence and especially the anti-democratic coup that installed the commies into power). By 1968, it's a little too late, short of the USSR deciding to collapse already in the 1960s, just for the lulz or something.
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From what I've read, Brezhnev was against military intervention since he wanted to be seen as the defuser after Krushchev's Cuban Missile Crisis. It was the Head of the KGB and later General Secretary Yuri Andropov, prime minister Kosygin and leaders of other Warsaw pact countries, most GDR, that demanded action. If the situation was handled more delicately, like limiting censorship, not abolishing it; harsh punishments for anti establishment actions (means from government officials, like the head of Czech TV channel). Also they should have long got rid of hardliners like Vasil Bilak, that forwarded the so called Invitation Letter. If the situation was good enough, there is a chance, that the Congress of the Communist Party would take on, and they would vote to have the reform wing in power and to put in action the Action plan from spring of that year.
It would be very difficult for SU to counter the reforms from then on, since they would have no legitimacy. And if they got rid of the hardliners from at least "ÚV" (don't know the english translation), i.e. the highest positions in Communist Party, SU would with most difficulities be looking for allies that would be able to take the power.
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I’ve just located an English translation of the action plan on marxists internet archive. The fraction of the party supporting the action plan obviously wasn’t historically determinate in real life so a future post will analyse the action plan and it’s reception. However for now there’s some macro-economics:
Fordism and malaise: the action plan identifies Fordism as a barrier to socialist (capitalist under nomenklatura control) development. Failing to take up the action plan historically due to the fraternal political assistance supplied by the Soviet Union resulted in malaise. An internally failed action plan would do likewise. What is the white heat of technology but an action plan for the UK?
Post Fordism under more nomenklatura control: it’ll involve new enclosures of culture and worker productivity.
Post Fordism under less nomenklatura control and more negotiation with Czechoslovak social forces: it’ll involve the above but with better conditions.
Post Fordism under a new revolutionary nomenklatura control: it’ll involve ten years of social chaos then one of the three above outlines
Sam R.
Fordism and malaise: the action plan identifies Fordism as a barrier to socialist (capitalist under nomenklatura control) development. Failing to take up the action plan historically due to the fraternal political assistance supplied by the Soviet Union resulted in malaise. An internally failed action plan would do likewise. What is the white heat of technology but an action plan for the UK?
Post Fordism under more nomenklatura control: it’ll involve new enclosures of culture and worker productivity.
Post Fordism under less nomenklatura control and more negotiation with Czechoslovak social forces: it’ll involve the above but with better conditions.
Post Fordism under a new revolutionary nomenklatura control: it’ll involve ten years of social chaos then one of the three above outlines
Sam R.
What if Dubcek had help from Jonas Kadar? Having replaced Nagy after the 56 blood bath, Jonas understood the need for carrots as well as sticks.
Iotl he tried to persuade Brensnev to avoid an armed invasion?
Iotl he tried to persuade Brensnev to avoid an armed invasion?
While János Kádár seems to have personally believed Dubček was still a reliable communist, he denounced the Czechoslovak reforms when in the Soviet Union. Probably because he, rightly, believed that he might get removed if he stuck out his neck.
Kadar risked his balls for Hungary and lost them. He risked his neck for Hungary after '56 in an incredibly long planned gambit to deStalinise after the triumph of Stalinism. Kadar knows the risk, but he's already risked it for Hungary. And a Soviet PC that is sensible enough to listen to Kadar, will have already listened to its members that suggested the same things.
Paradoxically, it was precisely because of Brezhnev (including) that the “Prague Spring” became possible at all. Leonid Ilyich had a negative attitude towards Novotny and contributed to his confusion. Otherwise, Novotny could have ruled until his death in 1975.
Never say never. In 1980, Andropov said an invasion of Poland was fucking idiocy, and Politburo made a sensible choice.
What do you mean by them not being determinate?
What do you mean by Fordism?
What do you mean by white-heat od technology?
What do you mean by the last question of the paragraph Fordism And malaise?
I can't seem to grasp what are you trying to say. Not saying its wrong, just unconprehancible.
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Historically the action plan fraction of the Czechoslovakian party didn't determine the historical outcome: in a brutal way the leadership of the Soviet Union did with force.
In a more local sense the action plan fraction of the Czechoslovakian party theses in the action plan that the social forces of Czechoslovakian society would be determinate, would determine the outcome of attempting an action plan, was correct: both factory meetings and students activated in 1968 to develop the action plan.
Fordism is a common political economic and macro-economic term which describes both factory level changes in industrial capitalism (assembly lines, interchangeable parts, deskilling, mass factories, time and motion studies (Taylorism)), and society level changes such as a higher security from unemployment through greater deliberate employment of social resources (direct planning, highly concentrated firm planning, capital interventions by the state), along with a greater volume of more complex commodities consumed by the labouring classes.
Fordism started to experience limits to growth across the 1950 and 1960s along with declining rates of profit. This happened both in the first world and in the second world. Often the working class response to fordism was mass go-slows, and the "tripartite" or Employer Government Union system of control over workers broke down, especially in the second world.
Think about the difference between UK motorcycles in the 1960s being produced in pre-fordism, US motorcycles being produced in fordism, and Japanese motorcycles being produced in post fordism. Which were cheapest, most reliable, and eventually best performing?
The United Kingdom's labour party's equivalent of the action plan, 1963, famously failed ( https://www.theguardian.com/science...19/harold-wilson-white-heat-technology-speech )
The collapse of Fordism in the United States is commonly called "malaise" in reference to Carter's typification of the situation in 1979. Carter's attempts at reform failed. ( https://billofrightsinstitute.org/essays/jimmy-carter-and-the-malaise-speech )
All advanced industrial societies faced the economic crisis that Czechoslovakia did. Many societies emphasised new technology to over come their crisis. Fewer, like the Czechoslovakian party referenced new forms of social relations. The West had not implemented the kinds of mass social education and health that were present in the urban areas of the second world's industrial nations, they used this to produce a new kind of "skill" which dictated prices of labour, while smashing old out of date industries and off-shoring them to the third world. In comparison, much of the second world declared bankruptcy and sold the profitable elements of the firm system to themselves.
I need to read the action plan in more detail to figure out whether the stuff about skill structures is just white heat of technology blindness, or whether the party fraction in alliance with students and workers councils would shut down low profit sites and require more intensive hours of the mass of the Czechoslovakian population for "prospering." Which is the only way I can see a successful "post-fordist" economy of work coming into being. By a new enclosure of skill and exertion. Because to be honest the action plan sounds a lot like Nagy's points for discussion, or many of the things people were saying in other societies at similar times. None of which resulted in high quality technically advanced mass production.
yours,
Sam R.
My concern is that it is not clear that you could easily halt the forces of the Prague Spring, that there might not be a sweet spot where you could have a stable and relatively liberal Communism on the model of Yugoslavia, that once you start questioning the Communist orthodoxy you are bound to undo everything.
In '56 it was Mikoyan. Six years later he was shooting Soviet strikers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novocherkassk_massacre
There's always someone speaking against. Usually they're earnest and real about it, and believe it to be in the best interests of the power of the party.
yours,
Sam R.
I don't know much about western developments of that era, like the Fordism Sam is talking about. My only knowledge is about communism in Czechoslovakia. The real economical difference would be found between OTL normalization and TTL economical liberalization. As per the action plan, state-owned businesses would be able to make decision about trade deals and most prices themselves. Cooperatives would be rid of most of the state influences.
These alone I believe would be enough to get the economy by the 80's into much better shape than in OTL.
These alone I believe would be enough to get the economy by the 80's into much better shape than in OTL.