The Milwaukee Road Strikes Back

MILW1970

A New Hope.... How about this for a rough alternate history to the MILW 68-79 for lines primarily west of the Twin Cities? The proposed CNW/MILW merger that gained momentum in mid 60's is beginning to cause major concerns and complications for shareholders, shippers, local governments, competing midwestern railroads and their connections to the west. The proposed BN merger is doing the same in the Pacific NW caused pimarily by a group of secretly organized opposition lead by some mid/upper level MILW managers in the western division called the Puget Sound task force. Simultaneously, a new proposal is being crafted by a group of skilled mid/upper level MILW/CNW managers in the east called the Grainger task force which were all taking direction from a Chicago fiinance group where the shareholder interests in the newly formed CMNW were being proteced. The final plans will split the CNW and MILW in half combining lines south and west of Chicago, Madison, LaCrosse, Twin Cities, and Aberdeen into the New CNW system with lines north of those points combined into the new MILW system. A realization of similar savings from the older 1965 plan is reached for the new CNW and MILW systems leaving the RI to deal with a more powerful CNW and potential merger/split with UP/SP. The SOO would receive selected northern Wisconsin trackage and agreements from the New MILW. The IC stuck in the middle of the two begins to loose interest in the overbuilt midwest territory and focuses on its own agenda in the center of the country. History rights itself somewhat for those RR's in later years to what we have today. The MILW western task force then adds its stipulations to the GNP&BL (BN) merger that would bring about a more competitive balance to the Pacific NW. The new MILW gets Twin Ports/Cities terminal changes to facilitate its CNW/MILW merger, joint mainline rights Miles City (Ft Keogh) to Billings, outright purchase of NP lines Billings to Sand Point-ish, basically your MRL today), purchase of the SP&S from former Waukee Jct on the SP&S near Malden to Pasco, trackage rights only Pasco to Portland. 25% Ownership in the Portland Terminal with BN/UP/SP. The PC in Seattle from GN. A joint 33% agreement between BN/MILW/UP to create an all access Port of Seattle and Port of Tacoma terminal. The MILW giving to BN in return the soon to be non-competitve lines in southern North Dakota, north/central Montana, northern Idaho and northern Washington north of Seattle where competition would be costly to maintain as well as an agreement to a quick and unapposed merger. Similair alliances and changes in Butte, Spokane, Seattle-Tacoma, Chehalis and Longview would go to the UP. The new transcon where all efforts would be focused durng the 70-79 era would be: CNW Chicago(Cragin) to Mayfair, Mayfair to St Paul (Westminster) Former GN (2 of 4 northen most mains only) Westminster to East Minneapols Jct. Trackage rights fromer GN East Minneapolis to Lyndale Jct, former MSTL Lyndale Jct to Bass Lake (Minneapolis), MILW Bass Lake to Ft Keogh (Miles City) joint with BN former NP Ft Keogh to Laurel, former NP Laurel-Garrison via Heleana then to St Regis, MILW St Regis-Plummer Jct-Waukee Jct to Maple Valley, former PC Maple Valley-Black River Jct- Argo(Seattle) With major western arteries from west to east: MILW Black River Jct to Tacoma, Waukee Jct to Pasco on former SP&S, trackage rights on former SP&S Pasco to Portland, Plummer Jct to Spokane on joint MILW\UP. Garrison to Butte via former NP. New coal line to Decker proposed via Tongue River to Miles City cuting off 100's of BN coal train miles to midwestern points...later though in the 80's...the BN/UP strikes back era 80-95. The MILW builds independent terminals in Pasco and Billings (Yeger). With UP it jointly builds/operates Fife, jointly operates Argo, Kent, Spokane and Butte with upgraded auto/intermodal terminals. Upgrades East Minneapolis yard due to the loss of St Paul hump. Builds the new 4.5 mile St Paul Pass Tunnel. Rock ballast and superelevation for all former MILW routes used in the transon in the PNW that keeps speeds at 25-50 mph. CTC St Regis to Waukee Jct. Sorry - Electrification reduced to 3 mountain grades west of Missoula in 1970-71 and terminated completly in 1976. (Hate the idea.) Abandonment of MILW main Lombard to St.Regis 1972, then Miles City to Lombard 1980. NP tunnels would be given clearance raises. This new Milwaukee system (traded under CMNW) would satisfy most of the concerns voiced by the opposition to the original BN and MILW/CNW mergers proposed prior. The BN would still view the new MILW eroniously as inferior due to its expensive combination of its lines in the east and the costly betterments required in the west to remain competitive over its mountainous territory with even fewer feeder lines then before and a historically weak gateway agreement for western traffic. This strong Milwaukee Road would still endure great financial hardships in the era until deregulation in the next chapter. The dynamic new leaders of the railroad would be a combination of the old task force visionaries and a new set of Sr leadership installed by the CMNW board. End a new hope.....
 

MILW1970

The BN/UP strikes back. Brief synopsis of the opposing forces against the Milwauke Road 1980-1995 and its struggle to survive. The staggers act reduces vast portions of the branch and secondary lines that were not successfully removed by the Grainger task force in the late 70's due to opposition by shippers and regulatory agencies. The railroad begins to look profitble on its own. CTC instalation and upgrades to the MILW's poor man CTC across the Dakotas give the road Dbl track or single track CTC from Chicago to Waukee Jct in Washington. The Tongue River expansion is also financed primarily by the former assets of the Milwaukee Land Corp and the former CNW holding company assets. A clever move by the CMNW finance group in Chicago combined all the assets into the New MILW system then spun off the new CNW system mentioned in episode 1 (A new Hope) with lifeboat assets ony to make a potential takeover target for the Union Pacific with potentially fewer stipulations then the RI planned split by SP/UP. This plan only few were privy to beyond the elite in Chicago, Omaha and Sacramento and was unknown to the early MILW Grainger task force. An excellent managememt team (a farm team for up and coming New Milwaukee talent) was running the shaky new CNW and proposed a merger with the Rock and fought the UP eventually keeping the real timeline for the Rock and CNW from 1970's onward to 1995 with the Union Pacific investing heavily enough into CNW to push its coal interests in the Powder River with CNW and eventually purchased by the UP. The CMNW held a 49% stake in the CNW and the eventual pofits from its sale was another windfal for the New MILW and CMNW shareholders allowing more MILW debt to be paid down and the CNW debt to be absorbed by the UP. Meanwhile during this time the New MILW also began expanding its intermodal/auto/perishable traffic to the Pacific Northwest and developed the Doublelstack with the Southern Pacific. It avoided heavy Manifest/Agriculture traffic to the west especially in lanes where BN's dominance would begin to reign and where the MILW's grades were no match to handle. A new vision for a premium lane transcon to the PNW was drafted for operations west of Miles City with a heavy coal corridor for lines east of Miles City. The same speed, high priority and lighter trains would utilize the longer but further apart sidings with fewer locals and manifest trains much better west of Miles City. The BN and UP would fight bitterly in the coal corridor by cutting rates and always keeping the Tongue River expansion only slightly above ROI with no offline powerplants served by MILW via runthrough agreements and constant contract changes for powerplants near the Twin Cities and Chicago. An ever increasing stake in the BRC in Chicago facilitated by merger agreements of owner roads and the MILW and sale of the IHB 49% stake in exchange for BRC shares gave the MILW a majority position and a new center of operations in Chicago at Clearing yard. The Belt Railway's direct connect options would cut days off the old interchange operations in Chicago giving it a new advantage for overhead traffIc. Facilities used in Portage/Madison/Milwaukee/Janesville and 40th St used to classify traffic to and from Chicago after the split of the CNW/MILW and the loss of Bensenville Hump in 1970 could be eliminated or reduced. Chicago-Milwaukee-Portage and Chicago-Madison-Portage operations would be heavily rationalized with existing commuter assets and property sold to Metra and CUS interests sold to Amtrak. A diverse mix of traffic consisting of IL/WI paper/manufacturing, MN/WI auto facilities, WI/MN/SD/ND agriculture, MT/ID forest products, MT coal to SD/MN/WI/IL, produce from WA and Intermodal from WA/OR ports gave it a cushion to adversities felt by carriers dependent on a small handful of commodities. BN litigation would continue over gateway agreements through this period with MILW loosing every battle. In Wisconsin the GBW assets would be split by the SOO/MILW in 1982 that narrowly avoided a BN incursion. The CP would merge the SOO in 1985 and divest itself of the SOO south/east of the Twin cities in 1987 creating the WC which would be much better at competing with the MILW in the Wisonsin territory. CP overhead traffic would continue on the WC between the Twin Cities and Chicago while the MILW would gain the CN overhead traffic Twin Ports to Chicago from the BN. The actual timeline for the WC, IC and eventual CN takeover of all the lines in the midwest would continue from here. The looming purchase of the SP by the UP would create major issues for the MILW line from Waukee Jct to Portland in the next chapter...return of the Hiawatha.
 

MILW1970

Return of the Hiawatha. Brief history 1995-2007. The last pieces of the merger puzzle begin their last moves across the western chess board. The MILW makes an effort to expand by submitting to the CN an offer for the DW&P to solidify its Chicago-Twin Ports traffic as well as an offer to the Steel companies interest in the DM&IR to combine the two north of the Twin Ports and enter the increasing market of all rail Iron Ore moves. The offer is accepted by the CN with a requirement that the GTW also be included in the sale. The DM&IR rejected the offer and the MILW did not want to go east of Chicago for such a small gain or be strapped with the DW&P soley with no local traffic and no CN contract to haul its trains. Meanwhile the CP arranged a deal with the UP while it purchased the CNW in 1995 for the former MILW routes from the Twin Cities-Savanna-Bensenville and Savanna-Kansas City giving it deeper access to US economies and correcting its earlier jettteson of the SOO in Wisconsin (kinda like the ICE deal). The UP was mainly interested in securing the CNW Coal line, Council Bluffs-Chicago line and former RI Spine line. Exiting the slowest route from Chicago to KC and Chicago-Twin Cities for a decent price to offset the CNW debt/purchase was a win for the UP. The loss of CP traffic on the WC gave way to its purchase by the CN in 2001 with the CN taking a page from the MILW and consolidating the DM&IR, EJ&E, IC as well. Expansion was thwarted for the MILW but opportuinites arrose in 1995-1997 for increasing its presence in key areas of the PNW. In 1995 the BNSF formation gave the Milwaukee an opportunity to gain a greater interest in the Port Terminal railroad in Portland and put an end to the gateway battles by agreeing to the merger for gateway contracts and damages caused by the prior actions of the BN in the Pacific NW. Trackage rights agreements between Pasco and Portland were also modified. The BNSF wanted to avoid any legal battles with the CMNW and its ability to create long costly diversions concerning mergers with its talented vetern task forces like the ones used in the 1970 BN merger or the failed UP/SP attempt to purchase the Rock. In 1996 UP gains control of the SP. In exchange it gave up its rights to the Portland Terminal as well and expanded Milwaukee access to Portland area trackage. The Milwaukee now owned 100% of the PT and finally had its own facilities. Joint UP ownership or operation ended in Butte yard, Butte-Garrison, Plummer Jct-Spokane, East Spokane yard, Fife yard, Kent Yard, Argo yard, Argo-Black River Jct and UP's 33% ownership of the Port of Seattle and Port of Tacoma was split between the MILW and BNSF. The UP continued to operate between Portland and Seattle with the MILW handling all switching north of reservation in Tacoma and the UP concentrating it efforts on north south traffic to California and discontinued its competition for a vast majority of its traffic to the east from SeaTac leaving the BNSF and MILW as its chief route east. UP also contracted the MILW to handle its operations in East Spokane and Butte. Increased velocity and more powerfull engines and lighter cars coupled with the short distance to the midwestern powerplants using the Tongue River cuttoff finally paid off for the Milwaukee. The BNSF and UP would reduce competitive tactics for coal and focus on their consolidation and expansion efforts within their own system with the UP failure in Houston causing most of the change of focus for the UP and the BNSF focus on the former ATSF routes and competitive markets against the UP. The CP would purchase the DM&E to gain access to the Powder River as well which would follow the real course of history. The resulting mergers and coal brought huge prosperity for the Milwaukee enabling it to become very profitable and cash laden. The CMNW would sell its majority interest in the MILW in 2000 and divest completly by 2007 creating a holding company for its non-rail assets accumulated during its time calling itself CMC with much of the same Chicago financial leaders or succesors in place from CMNW still at the helm. CTC, welded rail of 132 lbs, and deep ballast from Reedsburg, Big Stone, Whitehall and Frenchtown would cover all core routes with speeds increased greatly from 1970's by rebuilding slow order bridges, removing many curves greater than 10 degrees and rengineering the row in major cities where slower speeds were required for grade crossings. A modern fleet of Hiawatha painted AC4400'S for the main would haul the railroad into the next era. Never giving up, its official name: Chicago, Milwaukee, St Paul and Pacific was never changed. The leaders of the railroad in its CMNW days and it task force groups began to slowly fade from it ranks. A new breed who had entered the railroad and were hand picked to run a railroad free of deregulation now began to take posts in the Milwaukee. A time of great prosperity was on the horizon as the officers gathered in Milwaukee at its new HQ building for a new years celebration to usher in 2008.
 

MILW1970

Episode 4. Milwaukee Road 2008-2017. The Milwaukee Shaken. Years of large capital budgets have made the MILW one of the best railroads of the era. Although surounded by the BNSF and blocked by the powerfull UP to the south the MILW was well protected in its KCS like existance in its territory giving it immunity from takeover interests with its finances poised to defend takover. The MILW was gaining profitable traffic in all directions and Sep 29, 2008 was unlike any other profitable day on the railroad. The railroads after that day would see a 14% industry wide hit for traffic on US railroads due the drop in the stock market in 2008/9. The MILW would be hit harder than most. Steady losses in paper traffic and competition by CN in WI was offset by the new ethanol business in the Dakotas and NS's Roadrailer service to the Twin Ports/Cities over the MILW. Then the slowdown in building materials began with many lumber mills closing in the former NP territory and across the PNW. Auto plant closures in Janesville and the Twin Cities ended this traffic stream by 2011 and the roadrailers with it. Coal would begin its slide from dominance on the MILW ledger with the shift to other fuel sources in the midwest and a growing anti-coal movement throughout the US. Competiton began anew with Berkshire purchasing the BNSF giving it more freedom to run its railroad and invest its profits into strengthening itself against its rival UP and the troublesome but tolerable rate cutting MILW. The Dakota oil boom missed the Milwaukee with the exception of shorthaul Frac sands from WI. BNSF capacaity issues diverted traffic to the MILW until the slowdown in prodction. Intermodal and premium traffic began to take up the capacity opened up by other traffic losses as well but the expensive mainteneance required to run these fast trains and fuel costs over the mountain ranges would erode any positive gains. Budgets, cost controls, curtailed operations and strict adhearence to operating plans were something that the current breed of MILW managers had never truly faced prior. The days of old had returned to the railroad industry. Rapid up and down blips in traffic generated countless meetings, flavor of the day process teams from outside the industry and spreadsheets makers for the nearly weekly crisis-challenges created in the industry were the norm. Making difficult decisions to invest or cut were difficult for the new officers of their era. The officers of the Milwaukee or other railroads were not grown in the ranks like they had been before 1980. Deregulation forced changes on the railroad industry that created a new breed of railroaders skilled in free market theology that relied heavily on their higher education and business technology processes to run an efficient railroad from a central location that were needed for that time. Constant profitability never made them use the last chapters in their college text books. Indesicion when pressured created improper cuts or investments, key terminal closures or changes, deeper centralization or reorginizations and departmental independence and isolation to protect the status quo.The sale of the Spooner main line north of the Frac sand mines of the Rice Lake, WI area to the CN to exit the Chicago-Twin Ports market would bring fear to the investors of the CMStP&P when announced on Wall Street in is stock price. Overatures from other railroads interested in the still financially and physically sound asset rich property began to emerge. The BNSF spoke first offering to purchase Appleton, MN west to dismantle or assimilate. The UP wished to grab back its assets in the PNW lost in the SP deal in the previous chapter. A promenant business leader in Montana offering a Billings west purchase offer and friendly connections there to a smaller MILW was the first non class 1 offer. spuring a internal group of employess in the west to embark on a heartfelt but outclassed attempt for lines west of Minneapolis. Hunter H's reorginized CP was willing to take the "scraps" east of Minneapolis for a better route to Chicago from the Twin Cities and perhaps even creating a Transcon later for his CP and a eastern carrier he was eyeing at the time to seal his status as a modern railroad great. It was clear to investors that a plan was needed to run the railroad and navigate the blood filled waters that the current staff was not fully capable of achieving. A vote of no confidence rang out and a formation of a independent group of retired and veteran officers mainly from the CMNW days was organized and given their own exploritory teams to come up with plans for survival seperate from the current regime. Each group would present their plans with the veteran group also submitting a list of officers they would feel capabale of leading their plan from throughout the MILW and the industry. Each groups plans would be reviewed by the board and its shareholders for consideration and implementaion of the plan selected individually or perhaps intergrated into a workable plan. The old guard would once again be called upon to see if their efforts could produce the same outcome it had before. Many still had financial dependencies leaning toward its success and a deeper nostalgia and pride of days past. Armed with modern day resources and a staff to interpret the present and do the heavy lifting their last endevor began. It was unclear who had clearly crafted such a plan and some say it was delivered annonimously but deaperate times called and was watched with great curiosity by onlookers in the MILW and the industry. Meanwhile, CSX had lured Hunter H away from CP hoping for a threepeat instigating deeper cost cutting demands from investors in railroads as a whole. The biggest decisions lay ahead for the Milwaukee since the 60's and 70's. Employees, retirees, management, competing lines, investors and hobbiests alike awaited the reports.....
 
Simon

Simon

Some interesting ideas but without meaning to appear overly critical could I suggest the use of paragraphs? Reading the forums on a tablet those posts are displayed as massive walls of text that take up more than a screen, generally the easier things are to read the more likely you're to get people to respond.
 
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