I wrote a long, considered thing some days ago, only to lose it when my browser jammed forcing me to restart.

The general theme was, I hardly want to dictate to the author how things ought to go but did want to point out critical choices that had to be made. As I was writing, the author made some of these.

In retrospect I wish the thing hadn't been lost because I had some remarks about the options of the various parties, and I think Carthage might have acted other than to ally with Rome--which I did consider a high probability to be sure. But a better move for them might have been to appeal to Ptolemy to reconsider his alliance with Massalia and then seek alliance with Rome to focus on crushing the League. A policy of friendship with Egypt by Carthage would amount to splitting the Med trade between them, Egypt holding the more lucrative Eastern trade. The advantage to Ptolemy would have been that Carthage already is established while the Massaliote Greeks are just getting into the northern territory. With Rome pinning down Massaliotes on their eastern end, Carthage could attack from Sardina and Corsica by sea, from Iberia by land, and harry the Greek trade missions in the north. Even only partial success would clip the League's wings and re-establish Carthage as monopolist of Atlantic coastal shipped goods, especially if in return for trading these to Egypt in high volume at moderate prices, the Punics got a monopoly on eastern goods going to western destinations.

This grand plan would of course require the effective nullification of the triple Greek alliance, with Pyrrhus standing idly by while Ptolemy profits. It would also leave the Italians under Rome as the presumptive new rivals for hegemony in the west.

I suppose then that the way things do go makes more sense, especially if we factor in Greek solidarity--which one should note, is something of a new thing; hitherto (and onward to Roman conquest OTL) Greeks have been terrible at getting their acts together. According to something I read in Arnold Toynbee's many volumes of "A Study of History," and this some decades ago, I gather there was once, in western coastal Thrace, a confederation formed between many small, obscure little polieses that vaguely resembled the USA of the 1786 Constitution--the many towns guaranteed some proportionality of representation in a central council that the cities undertook to support binding decisions from, with a more or less central executive appended to this legislature--I suppose perhaps this is where it differed, execution of central decisions being dispersed back to the league members. No one ever mentions this body, if Toynbee was even correct in believing it existed at all. Obviously it was atypical, organizations such as the Delian League showing what was far more likely to happen--that is, a bunch of small, weak polieses dominated by a big leading city (Athens, in this case) whose individual democracy (and more often, not even a democracy) undertook decisions mainly in its own interest, valuing the League as a mere appendage of its own hegemony. In resisting the onslaught of the Persians, the Greeks famously did achieve a sort of collective unity of acton on an ad hoc basis, but only temporarily until the object in view, defeat of a universally existential threat (and not decisive defeat but a mere check of its immediate ambitions) was accomplished, at which point the unity dissolved almost at once into rival factions that had temporarily set aside deep conflicts, and with the blocs opposed to each other themselves fragmented by the egotism of big and small cities alike. Had the Greeks been able to develop some sort of balanced federalism I suppose there would have been no question of coming under the domination of Macedon, but rather this hypothetical league might have eaten away at the kingdom piecemeal, carving off territories here and there and setting them up as new polieses presumably adhering to the League in the self-interest of avoiding re-subordination to Macedon. Perhaps a balance would have formed with monarchial Macedon forming a sharp limit in its direction, with Eprios similarly either getting absorbed or forming another boundary. If anyone were to replicate Alexander's feat in such a TL it might be the League perhaps allied with Macedon, but it seems more likely internal squabbling not unlike the mutual suspicion between northern free and southern slave states in the USA would limit unified expansionism into Anatolia, with the League perhaps picking off certain small city-states here and there opportunistically--but every major crisis of Persia that might be an opportunity for expansion that way would instead turn into a political crisis in the League, and Persian power, with the Greek threat effectively self-checked, might last longer on an increasingly rickety basis until it collapsed internally and fell to successors other than Greeks. Perhaps a great Hellenic League would instead incorporate and organize the scattered colonies in Italy, Africa, the Gaulish coast and Iberia--but it seems more likely to me either these would remain bastions of traditional poleis independence or perhaps form local leagues of their own.

What you have going here with the "Massaliote League" seems to be a late invention of this type. If Toynbee's obscure and apparently short-lived example stands, for what it is worth there seems to perhaps be a slim chance of general Hellenic identity trumping the stubborn ideal of city independence. The question still remains, just how is this ATL League organized? It would seem from the posts that Massalia has a strong leading role comparable to Rome in the Latin League or Carthage in her system, but I have to question how stable that would be. Of the other Gaulish Hellenic colonies, some I suppose were indeed offshoots of Massalia themselves, but even these seem likely to asset their independence. Others are quite recent creations of a process of defeat and decimation of particular Gaulic tribes, dispossessing them and bringing in new Greeks from overseas--some of these have kinship with Massalia, but many of the Greek settlers the League needs to dominate the territory on a chauvinistically Hellenic basis will not be from sister Phocean colonies. It all points to a new type of organization, in which those who settle far from the queen city have nevertheless some assurance of their dignity and rights as fellow Hellenes, and yet the whole can act with unity and not fall apart due to parochial interests. Yet these parochial interests cannot simply be suppressed and overridden either! According to Wikipedia, about a century before the events on hand here in this thread start, Massalia had a population of only 6000 people--perhaps that merely counts elite full-rights citizens and counting subordinated classes and hinterland dependencies it might have been much more. But I think that figure is meant to count women and children too. That city getting credit for being the most ancient in modern French territory, presumably the other city states of the League are in some combination much smaller than that or much newer.

In general in this TL I get a sense of massive, sweeping changes going on in south Gaul that amount to major political and social revolution. I keep wanting to make analogies to the United States in its early days. But the USA drew on emigration from a Europe itself undergoing massive upheaval due to the sweeping and accelerating changes of the Industrial Revolution. While the Hellenistic Era has some trace of such upheaval, very little of it was due to massive transformation in the fundamental modes of production. Something amazing that needs a lot of justification is happening in South Gaul; suggesting that Pyrrhus living somewhat longer can explain it seems pretty absurd to me. The divergence is something else entirely, with Pyrrhus's different fate presumably being a butterfly coming off of this. The radical new way of thinking and operating in South Gaul may have many of its elements foreshadowed and exemplified in OTL Hellenistic history--notably transformation of military tactics, and the rise of new larger states. But the latter political revolutions were always elsewhere a matter of tyrannies mostly spinning off the great tyranny of Alexander's empire.

I also suspect that even if we grant a lot of revolutionary vision to the enterprising leaders of Massalia, and a bold pioneering ambition as well, OTL the demographic base was weak for such sweeping effects. Bringing in immigrants from other city-states would I would think tend to homogenize their general mentality to that prevailing in the east, which is to say they'd settle on a tyrant and be done with it. Here we have no great tyrant comparable to Ptolemy or Pyrrhus to explain the foundation; instead it all seems collective somehow, and yet we do not, as was the case in the federal Union of the USA, see the great names and decisions spread around. To make an American analogy, it is like the 13 colonies all decide to simply follow the lead of whoever leads in Boston, New York or Virginia--just one of these, mind, not the three together! In US history certain big states did seem to dominate in certain ways--for quite a long time far more Presidents than not were natives of Virginia for instance, yet a cursory glance at the complex Federal system not to mention the development of private interests shows that power was very widely distributed and individuals from every state, pretty soon including new frontier ones, were very important in Washington and in the developing national economy, and we also see power swinging back and forth between different regions, with one set of interests getting their way on issues that deeply bothered others, and yet those others later asserting themselves and discomfiting the recently high-riding blocs in turn.

Perhaps this overview account of necessity omits all this sort of turbulent and yet ultimately unifying action for the sake of a quick description. Perhaps named individuals of importance are not all Massallian by birth at all? Certainly the League is shown to recruit and promote people born completely outside of it?

Another elephant in the room--the relations between Gaulish tribespeople and the Hellenes. I figured reading early entries that one trait of the League would have to be a certain degree of merger of identity and interest between some Gauls and the Hellenic immigrants. Clearly the League has advanced at the expense of other Gaulish tribes, who happened to be opposed to the plans of expansion of trade and power; these have been defeated in detail and their lands distributed to immigrants. But other Gaulish tribes are shown to be allies and indeed vital sources of League strength; large sections of victorious League armies are said to be tribesmen. This would make sense to me if we were also witnessing a two-sided cultural and social fusion going on; if allied Gauls were recognized as members of the League in similar standing to Hellenic city-states, if intermarriage were producing mixed-heritage individuals who bridge the gaps and highlight commonalities. It was along these lines that I figured the League might seek to woo the Biturges sitting on the good port of Bordeaux, which the transport artery of the Garrone flows directly to, and seek to recruit them as new League allies to be partially Hellenized over time--but also, to be lured in by the observation that other Gaulish towns enjoy equal status as League members and therefore they too could proudly remain Gaulish (with increasing tinges of advanced Greek culture to be sure!) while profiting from the League's benefits.

But instead, it is League policy to establish a new town, one with significant disadvantages that have to be overcome with presumably expensive efforts, to bypass and cut off these established Gauls. Presumably there will be resentment; such disgruntled Celtic towns are just the kind of allies the Carthaginians, or farther east Romans, might take advantage of to check, push back, and even dissect the League. Such an ultimately confrontational policy strikes me as contemptuous of the potentials of these Gaulish neighbors, and in the absence of any commentary on the rise of specific old Gaulish allies in the League interior nor seeing any Gaulish names, even Greekified, among the leaders of the League, I am developing a darker picture of even the most friendly and assimilated Celts as a bypassed, hemmed-in, disrespected people who either are in a cycle of dissolution and slow assimilation to Hellenic norms (after which they might indeed be among the leaders and profiting members of League society) or worse, a rising tension in which they see their second-class status and would reasonably come to increasingly resent it. Given that recruits from among these people are important as foot soldiers and sword fodder, but not apparently recognized as generals nor credited with new twists on tactics that might plausibly give League armies unique advantages, this seems dangerous to me, laying the groundwork for Social Wars that might be as disruptive as those that overtook Rome OTL. Of course the outcome might be similar--after taking damage the dominant culture asserts itself, takes the last-gasp desperation of the aliens among them as opportunity to reduce them to total submission and assimilation on dominant terms. But it would be pretty unfortunate for these matters to come to a head in the foreseeable near future, whereas if the League had stumbled on a more creative path many of the mysteries and conundrums hanging over this ATL entity rising so fast and so far in power would be creatively addressed. A Helleno-Celtic hybrid society, with the League a patchwork of Greek and Gaulish communities cooperating in common and Gaulish influence laying the groundwork for unique abilities, would explain what we see better I think than Hellenistic chauvinism.

And yet, if the League can accomplish the amazing feat of fusing together Greeks of many backgrounds, dispersed across wide territories, into acting as one self-interested nation, perhaps it is far too much to expect it to also make this other leap. In fact we have seen much emphasis placed on Greek chauvinism; it helps explain why the triple alliance holds for instance. Greek chauvinism does seem to be a major factor that cannot just be wished away and is to a degree as creative as it is destructive.

I merely share my observations. It looks to me like the evidence offered by the author suggests the League is a profoundly Hellenistic thing that definitely assumes anyone who deviates from Grecian norms must be a barbarian and inferior, even if useful and having shown valuable loyalty and service in the past. This latter is taken for granted as recognition of Greek superiority--and while this can plausibly work for a while and completely in some cases, in other cases it is a dangerous formula that seems liable to blow up with drastic consequences, and I would guess it ought to pretty soon if things are as bad as they look to me.

I'd like it otherwise because the idea of a very strong unified Greco-Gaulish state dominating the north Med west of Italy (and to my surprise, apparently Cis-Alpine Gaul is not already Romanized and is up for grabs too) and possibly taking on the role of Rome in the West, and possibly even the entire Roman Empire, is pretty exciting and romantic. And perhaps it can be done on the basis of uncompromising Hellenizing, but if so there must be some hard and dark years ahead.
 
Valid points. He is wining the Romans so far, but victory its not sure at all.

Accepting that maybe Pyrrhus is some kind of new model army strategic genius where his success, like that of Napoleon or the Union generals of the ACW is dependent on having lots of sword fodder and expending it massive numbers, where does he get the willing soldiery, who know they will die in large lots? Granted that if rewards for them are attractive enough, men will indeed rally to such causes, what are the rewards that lure them in to such dangerous enterprises? Granted that after all the bloodshed he emerges the winner, much if not all of the time, where are the replacements coming from allowing him to fight another round rather than suffering the sort of defeat Napoleon did in Russia?

OTL both Napoleon and the Union generals enjoyed the support of a very large nation that, mobilized in unique new ways, could draw deep upon demographic deep pockets and keep throwing numbers at their foes--in large part because of a profound patriotism that helped sustain their confidence. Napoleon could and did also draw on auxiliaries with less firm motives, but his control of the loyalty of a vast and enriched France was what gave him decisive control over these potentially wavering and disloyal units.

It seems Pyrrhus's only core is Epiros, which I gather was small and marginal. Was the region in fact much richer and more populous than my general knowledge would suggest--and if so, why did the region which is now Albania slip to such a low place during the Empire and stay there from that day to this? He can draw on Macedon and Greece generally now, but it would seem that no fanatical tie of shared nation and glory would bind these people--only the lure of relatively easy success.

Having won in the south of Italy, he now has new territories to draw from--but these have only yesterday been burned over by vengeful and ruthless Romans; if he had taken and held them before Roman conquest we'd see these territories as valuable assets, but now that seems dubious, unless like Napoleon, or for that matter the Romans, his system can make use of manpower older Hellenized states could not use. The Romans being good at this, and not being able to trust these recent conquests against a new Hellenic hero--and in fact having taken it from this same Hellenic genius quite recently, presumably have scorched the earth. So having bled himself so badly, can Pyrrhus be counting on adequate reinforcements all the way from Greece, without losing his grip on Greece itself?

Mind, even if his apparently successful campaign once again collapses and the Romans again drive him back, he has surely inflicted terrible blows on Rome already.

This is another aspect of the TL that needs some explanation. It often seems that when the Massaliote League needs a looming foe cut down to size, they can count on some third party gratuitously throwing themselves on their enemies' swords so they don't have to. Massalia is pulling their own weight overall in this war to be sure, having done the lion's share of work in cutting down the Carthaginian fleets. They acquire both Corsica and Sardinia as their rewards, which is fair enough, and also for the moment have pushed the Carthaginians back in Sicily in favor of their ally Syracuse. (Having turned decisively against Carthage and being locked in competition with them in the north, I don't think it is in their interest to have a stalemate in Sicily; they've cast their die against Carthage and would be better off if Syracuse took control of the whole island--better still if Hieron's power is insufficient to hold it but they can spare force to take control of colonies of their own there, and thus tie Syracuse all the more firmly to their alliance).

Before this phase, as OTL, it was the Romans who acted as Big Brother for them. The consequence, OTL, was Massalia being gradually absorbed wholesale into the Roman system, at first as honored client-allies and eventually to be totally subjugated.

Given their conflicts with both Carthage and the looming, obvious clash of interest with Rome on the horizon, and especially if a general cult of Hellenizing makes an ideological alliance with the tyrants of Greece and Egypt seem natural and inevitable, the Massaliotes are acting rationally enough in their interest.

But it is unclear to me what the basis of Pyrrhus's position is. He's got the Hellenic tie (though he is more an outsider himself than either the League's proud Hellenes or the ruling party in Egypt) but how exactly does he expect to make the kinds of profits that can offset his huge losses? Bearing in mind he has been lucky this time around; had things gone as badly for him as they had before in Italy he'd be eating even larger losses without the gains, a risk he should have factored in before joining this venture on this scale. Magna Graecia and a larger piece of the rest of south Italy is something, but against a weakened Rome it is Massalia that seems more likely to eventually get control of the Po Valley (especially if they can leverage a positive image among Gauls in general, a point in some doubt at this time given what we've been shown--but anyway they have experience in subjugating Gauls). As far as trade goes it is six of one and half a dozen of the other if Carthage, Massalia, or even Rome control the not-so-vital Atlantic trade while it is Ptolemy who sits comfortably on top of the much more valuable eastern trade; no matter what, he is in no position to secure any of it and is dependent on the good will of his allies for a decent share at a fair price.

Massalia owes Pyrrhus big time it seems to me (and even Ptolemy his enjoying seeing the badly burned war-cat pulling chestnuts out of the fire for him, at low cost to himself). What is such a debt worth? I don't see either accepting him as high kind and overlord just because he got his own grunts to bleed so copiously on their behalf. Yet he hardly has assets either to turn on them and extort a fair deal out of his allies.

Granted Pyrrhus as an individual might have some weird psychology to explain his glorious but not too profitable actions, what explains the willingness of his minions to line up and be slaughtered in service of his personal glory?
 
Hi Shevek 23! Nice analysis!

I wrote a long, considered thing some days ago, only to lose it when my browser jammed forcing me to restart.

:(
The general theme was, I hardly want to dictate to the author how things ought to go but did want to point out critical choices that had to be made. As I was writing, the author made some of these.

In retrospect I wish the thing hadn't been lost because I had some remarks about the options of the various parties, and I think Carthage might have acted other than to ally with Rome--which I did consider a high probability to be sure. But a better move for them might have been to appeal to Ptolemy to reconsider his alliance with Massalia and then seek alliance with Rome to focus on crushing the League. A policy of friendship with Egypt by Carthage would amount to splitting the Med trade between them, Egypt holding the more lucrative Eastern trade. The advantage to Ptolemy would have been that Carthage already is established while the Massaliote Greeks are just getting into the northern territory. With Rome pinning down Massaliotes on their eastern end, Carthage could attack from Sardina and Corsica by sea, from Iberia by land, and harry the Greek trade missions in the north. Even only partial success would clip the League's wings and re-establish Carthage as monopolist of Atlantic coastal shipped goods, especially if in return for trading these to Egypt in high volume at moderate prices, the Punics got a monopoly on eastern goods going to western destinations.

Well thats really interesting but i decided to go to an other direction.

This grand plan would of course require the effective nullification of the triple Greek alliance, with Pyrrhus standing idly by while Ptolemy profits. It would also leave the Italians under Rome as the presumptive new rivals for hegemony in the west.

For Pyrrhus plans against Rome, Massaliot League was a far better ally. Remember Carthage helped Rome in the last round. Ptolemy and Pyrrhus were close friends and Pyrrhus and Massaliot League help Ptolemy take back Cyrenaica.

I suppose then that the way things do go makes more sense, especially if we factor in Greek solidarity--which one should note, is something of a new thing; hitherto (and onward to Roman conquest OTL) Greeks have been terrible at getting their acts together. According to something I read in Arnold Toynbee's many volumes of "A Study of History," and this some decades ago, I gather there was once, in western coastal Thrace, a confederation formed between many small, obscure little polieses that vaguely resembled the USA of the 1786 Constitution--the many towns guaranteed some proportionality of representation in a central council that the cities undertook to support binding decisions from, with a more or less central executive appended to this legislature--I suppose perhaps this is where it differed, execution of central decisions being dispersed back to the league members. No one ever mentions this body, if Toynbee was even correct in believing it existed at all. Obviously it was atypical, organizations such as the Delian League showing what was far more likely to happen--that is, a bunch of small, weak polieses dominated by a big leading city (Athens, in this case) whose individual democracy (and more often, not even a democracy) undertook decisions mainly in its own interest, valuing the League as a mere appendage of its own hegemony. In resisting the onslaught of the Persians, the Greeks famously did achieve a sort of collective unity of acton on an ad hoc basis, but only temporarily until the object in view, defeat of a universally existential threat (and not decisive defeat but a mere check of its immediate ambitions) was accomplished, at which point the unity dissolved almost at once into rival factions that had temporarily set aside deep conflicts, and with the blocs opposed to each other themselves fragmented by the egotism of big and small cities alike. Had the Greeks been able to develop some sort of balanced federalism I suppose there would have been no question of coming under the domination of Macedon, but rather this hypothetical league might have eaten away at the kingdom piecemeal, carving off territories here and there and setting them up as new polieses presumably adhering to the League in the self-interest of avoiding re-subordination to Macedon. Perhaps a balance would have formed with monarchial Macedon forming a sharp limit in its direction, with Eprios similarly either getting absorbed or forming another boundary. If anyone were to replicate Alexander's feat in such a TL it might be the League perhaps allied with Macedon, but it seems more likely internal squabbling not unlike the mutual suspicion between northern free and southern slave states in the USA would limit unified expansionism into Anatolia, with the League perhaps picking off certain small city-states here and there opportunistically--but every major crisis of Persia that might be an opportunity for expansion that way would instead turn into a political crisis in the League, and Persian power, with the Greek threat effectively self-checked, might last longer on an increasingly rickety basis until it collapsed internally and fell to successors other than Greeks. Perhaps a great Hellenic League would instead incorporate and organize the scattered colonies in Italy, Africa, the Gaulish coast and Iberia--but it seems more likely to me either these would remain bastions of traditional poleis independence or perhaps form local leagues of their own.

Greek solidarity wasn’t uncommon ( Athens support for Ionian Polis, Pyrrhus support of Tarantum, etc). Ofc the help most of the times was not without something in return. But most of the times Greeks fight each other. About Massaliot League its dominated by Massalia. As i already said, Massaliot League was a blend of Rome, Aeolian League and later on of Ptolemaic Egypt, Political structure

Perhaps a great Hellenic League would instead incorporate and organize the scattered colonies in Italy, Africa, the Gaulish coast and Iberia--but it seems more likely to me either these would remain bastions of traditional poleis independence or perhaps form local leagues of their own

Thats the case in this ATL.

What you have going here with the "Massaliote League" seems to be a late invention of this type. If Toynbee's obscure and apparently short-lived example stands, for what it is worth there seems to perhaps be a slim chance of general Hellenic identity trumping the stubborn ideal of city independence. The question still remains, just how is this ATL League organized? It would seem from the posts that Massalia has a strong leading role comparable to Rome in the Latin League or Carthage in her system


Yes this is kind of a late invention of this type. Rome was quite similar example

but I have to question how stable that would be. Of the other Gaulish Hellenic colonies, some I suppose were indeed offshoots of Massalia themselves, but even these seem likely to asset their independence. Others are quite recent creations of a process of defeat and decimation of particular Gaulic tribes, dispossessing them and bringing in new Greeks from overseas--some of these have kinship with Massalia, but many of the Greek settlers the League needs to dominate the territory on a chauvinistically Hellenic basis will not be from sister Phocean colonies. It all points to a new type of organization, in which those who settle far from the queen city have nevertheless some assurance of their dignity and rights as fellow Hellenes, and yet the whole can act with unity and not fall apart due to parochial interests. Yet these parochial interests cannot simply be suppressed and overridden either!

We can’t know how stable this is going to be. There quite a possibility for civil wars to rise at some point like happen in Rome in OTL. Don’t underestimate the power of Hellenisation. Even Rome was “conquered” cultural by the Greeks. Besides Transalpine Gaul is thought to have been largely influenced by Massalia.

According to Wikipedia, about a century before the events on hand here in this thread start, Massalia had a population of only 6000 people--perhaps that merely counts elite full-rights citizens and counting subordinated classes and hinterland dependencies it might have been much more. But I think that figure is meant to count women and children too. That city getting credit for being the most ancient in modern French territory, presumably the other city states of the League are in some combination much smaller than that or much newer.

About population i made a search before i started this Atl and we can’t know for sure but a population of 10 to 40 thousands during 300 BC is the most possible.

In general in this TL I get a sense of massive, sweeping changes going on in south Gaul that amount to major political and social revolution. I keep wanting to make analogies to the United States in its early days. But the USA drew on emigration from a Europe itself undergoing massive upheaval due to the sweeping and accelerating changes of the Industrial Revolution. While the Hellenistic Era has some trace of such upheaval, very little of it was due to massive transformation in the fundamental modes of production. Something amazing that needs a lot of justification is happening in South Gaul; suggesting that Pyrrhus living somewhat longer can explain it seems pretty absurd to me. The divergence is something else entirely, with Pyrrhus's different fate presumably being a butterfly coming off of this. The radical new way of thinking and operating in South Gaul may have many of its elements foreshadowed and exemplified in OTL Hellenistic history--notably transformation of military tactics, and the rise of new larger states. But the latter political revolutions were always elsewhere a matter of tyrannies mostly spinning off the great tyranny of Alexander's empire.


Well It depends. I think i explain to a certain point, how this radical new way of thinking happened in Massalia and Massaliot League

Perhaps this overview account of necessity omits all this sort of turbulent and yet ultimately unifying action for the sake of a quick description. Perhaps named individuals of importance are not all Massallian by birth at all? Certainly the League is shown to recruit and promote people born completely outside of it?

Yes exactly.

Another elephant in the room--the relations between Gaulish tribespeople and the Hellenes. I figured reading early entries that one trait of the League would have to be a certain degree of merger of identity and interest between some Gauls and the Hellenic immigrants. Clearly the League has advanced at the expense of other Gaulish tribes, who happened to be opposed to the plans of expansion of trade and power; these have been defeated in detail and their lands distributed to immigrants. But other Gaulish tribes are shown to be allies and indeed vital sources of League strength; large sections of victorious League armies are said to be tribesmen. This would make sense to me if we were also witnessing a two-sided cultural and social fusion going on; if allied Gauls were recognized as members of the League in similar standing to Hellenic city-states, if intermarriage were producing mixed-heritage individuals who bridge the gaps and highlight commonalities. It was along these lines that I figured the League might seek to woo the Biturges sitting on the good port of Bordeaux, which the transport artery of the Garrone flows directly to, and seek to recruit them as new League allies to be partially Hellenized over time--but also, to be lured in by the observation that other Gaulish towns enjoy equal status as League members and therefore they too could proudly remain Gaulish (with increasing tinges of advanced Greek culture to be sure!) while profiting from the League's benefits.

But instead, it is League policy to establish a new town, one with significant disadvantages that have to be overcome with presumably expensive efforts, to bypass and cut off these established Gauls. Presumably there will be resentment; such disgruntled Celtic towns are just the kind of allies the Carthaginians, or farther east Romans, might take advantage of to check, push back, and even dissect the League. Such an ultimately confrontational policy strikes me as contemptuous of the potentials of these Gaulish neighbors, and in the absence of any commentary on the rise of specific old Gaulish allies in the League interior nor seeing any Gaulish names, even Greekified, among the leaders of the League, I am developing a darker picture of even the most friendly and assimilated Celts as a bypassed, hemmed-in, disrespected people who either are in a cycle of dissolution and slow assimilation to Hellenic norms (after which they might indeed be among the leaders and profiting members of League society) or worse, a rising tension in which they see their second-class status and would reasonably come to increasingly resent it. Given that recruits from among these people are important as foot soldiers and sword fodder, but not apparently recognized as generals nor credited with new twists on tactics that might plausibly give League armies unique advantages, this seems dangerous to me, laying the groundwork for Social Wars that might be as disruptive as those that overtook Rome OTL. Of course the outcome might be similar--after taking damage the dominant culture asserts itself, takes the last-gasp desperation of the aliens among them as opportunity to reduce them to total submission and assimilation on dominant terms. But it would be pretty unfortunate for these matters to come to a head in the foreseeable near future, whereas if the League had stumbled on a more creative path many of the mysteries and conundrums hanging over this ATL entity rising so fast and so far in power would be creatively addressed. A Helleno-Celtic hybrid society, with the League a patchwork of Greek and Gaulish communities cooperating in common and Gaulish influence laying the groundwork for unique abilities, would explain what we see better I think than Hellenistic chauvinism.

New colonies doesn’t mean that the Hellenisation stops. It was a blend of both directions. Similar to Rome/Gaul in OTL and ofc social wars may happen in the future.

And yet, if the League can accomplish the amazing feat of fusing together Greeks of many backgrounds, dispersed across wide territories, into acting as one self-interested nation, perhaps it is far too much to expect it to also make this other leap. In fact we have seen much emphasis placed on Greek chauvinism; it helps explain why the triple alliance holds for instance. Greek chauvinism does seem to be a major factor that cannot just be wished away and is to a degree as creative as it is destructive.

Maybe over time the next leap happens but we can’t know for sure.

SPOILER:

269 BC/Hermarchus Epicurean version of philosophy grew in popularity the last years in Massaliot League. Ofc Greek chauvinism is a major factor.

I merely share my observations. It looks to me like the evidence offered by the author suggests the League is a profoundly Hellenistic thing that definitely assumes anyone who deviates from Grecian norms must be a barbarian and inferior, even if useful and having shown valuable loyalty and service in the past. This latter is taken for granted as recognition of Greek superiority--and while this can plausibly work for a while and completely in some cases, in other cases it is a dangerous formula that seems liable to blow up with drastic consequences, and I would guess it ought to pretty soon if things are as bad as they look to me.

I'd like it otherwise because the idea of a very strong unified Greco-Gaulish state dominating the north Med west of Italy (and to my surprise, apparently Cis-Alpine Gaul is not already Romanized and is up for grabs too) and possibly taking on the role of Rome in the West, and possibly even the entire Roman Empire, is pretty exciting and romantic. And perhaps it can be done on the basis of uncompromising Hellenizing, but if so there must be some hard and dark years ahead.


A unified Greco-Gaulish state can’t happen in a day. But ofc its a possibility for Massaliot League. Hard and dark years are also a major possibility.
 
Accepting that maybe Pyrrhus is some kind of new model army strategic genius where his success, like that of Napoleon or the Union generals of the ACW is dependent on having lots of sword fodder and expending it massive numbers, where does he get the willing soldiery, who know they will die in large lots? Granted that if rewards for them are attractive enough, men will indeed rally to such causes, what are the rewards that lure them in to such dangerous enterprises? Granted that after all the bloodshed he emerges the winner, much if not all of the time, where are the replacements coming from allowing him to fight another round rather than suffering the sort of defeat Napoleon did in Russia?

Well what can i say? Why did Pyrrhus went in Italy in OTL or Alexander in Persia or Caesar in Gauls etc.

It seems Pyrrhus's only core is Epiros, which I gather was small and marginal. Was the region in fact much richer and more populous than my general knowledge would suggest--and if so, why did the region which is now Albania slip to such a low place during the Empire and stay there from that day to this? He can draw on Macedon and Greece generally now, but it would seem that no fanatical tie of shared nation and glory would bind these people--only the lure of relatively easy success.

Epirus is in modern day Greece south of Albania. But Pyrrhus had strong claims to Macedonia also. So Pyrrhus kingdom in my ATL is quite strong.

Having won in the south of Italy, he now has new territories to draw from--but these have only yesterday been burned over by vengeful and ruthless Romans; if he had taken and held them before Roman conquest we'd see these territories as valuable assets, but now that seems dubious, unless like Napoleon, or for that matter the Romans, his system can make use of manpower older Hellenized states could not use. The Romans being good at this, and not being able to trust these recent conquests against a new Hellenic hero--and in fact having taken it from this same Hellenic genius quite recently, presumably have scorched the earth. So having bled himself so badly, can Pyrrhus be counting on adequate reinforcements all the way from Greece, without losing his grip on Greece itself?

True, reinforcements its a major issue for Pyrrhus.

This is another aspect of the TL that needs some explanation. It often seems that when the Massaliote League needs a looming foe cut down to size, they can count on some third party gratuitously throwing themselves on their enemies' swords so they don't have to. Massalia is pulling their own weight overall in this war to be sure, having done the lion's share of work in cutting down the Carthaginian fleets. They acquire both Corsica and Sardinia as their rewards, which is fair enough, and also for the moment have pushed the Carthaginians back in Sicily in favor of their ally Syracuse. (Having turned decisively against Carthage and being locked in competition with them in the north, I don't think it is in their interest to have a stalemate in Sicily; they've cast their die against Carthage and would be better off if Syracuse took control of the whole island--better still if Hieron's power is insufficient to hold it but they can spare force to take control of colonies of their own there, and thus tie Syracuse all the more firmly to their alliance).

As Rome in OTL, alliances helped Massaliot League a lot. Ofc they are also strong enough to manage beat Carthage so far.

Before this phase, as OTL, it was the Romans who acted as Big Brother for them. The consequence, OTL, was Massalia being gradually absorbed wholesale into the Roman system, at first as honored client-allies and eventually to be totally subjugated.

Given their conflicts with both Carthage and the looming, obvious clash of interest with Rome on the horizon, and especially if a general cult of Hellenizing makes an ideological alliance with the tyrants of Greece and Egypt seem natural and inevitable, the Massaliotes are acting rationally enough in their interest.


yeap.

But it is unclear to me what the basis of Pyrrhus's position is. He's got the Hellenic tie (though he is more an outsider himself than either the League's proud Hellenes or the ruling party in Egypt) but how exactly does he expect to make the kinds of profits that can offset his huge losses? Bearing in mind he has been lucky this time around; had things gone as badly for him as they had before in Italy he'd be eating even larger losses without the gains, a risk he should have factored in before joining this venture on this scale. Magna Graecia and a larger piece of the rest of south Italy is something, but against a weakened Rome it is Massalia that seems more likely to eventually get control of the Po Valley (especially if they can leverage a positive image among Gauls in general, a point in some doubt at this time given what we've been shown--but anyway they have experience in subjugating Gauls). As far as trade goes it is six of one and half a dozen of the other if Carthage, Massalia, or even Rome control the not-so-vital Atlantic trade while it is Ptolemy who sits comfortably on top of the much more valuable eastern trade; no matter what, he is in no position to secure any of it and is dependent on the good will of his allies for a decent share at a fair price.

Massalia owes Pyrrhus big time it seems to me (and even Ptolemy his enjoying seeing the badly burned war-cat pulling chestnuts out of the fire for him, at low cost to himself). What is such a debt worth? I don't see either accepting him as high kind and overlord just because he got his own grunts to bleed so copiously on their behalf. Yet he hardly has assets either to turn on them and extort a fair deal out of his allies.

Granted Pyrrhus as an individual might have some weird psychology to explain his glorious but not too profitable actions, what explains the willingness of his minions to line up and be slaughtered in service of his personal glory?

For Pyrrhus, Italy/Sicily was the obvious place to expand his kingdom and as you said he had some weird psychology, to explain his glorious but not too profitable actions/ambitions.
 
I think Pyrrhus is trying to play up himself as the defender of Greeks.If he defeats the Romans,it will give him strong legitimacy throughout the Hellenistic world.
 
Sure, he looks good. But where is he getting his reinforcements from, and will the notion that serving Pyrrhus is serving the cause of Hellenes widen his recruiting pool--or will the other Hellenes just free-ride on his noble self-image until he has hollowed it out? Pyrrhus is now tyrant of most of Greece itself as well as Macedon, true, and that is about as large a pool of Hellenic fighters as one might hope to drain. But he's drained it a lot already, and I'd think his subjects are hurting. Will they go on hurting more, showing up to be trained and serve and not be around to run their own business interests nor get the harvest in, or might they at some point dig in their heels and figure, hero of Hellas or no, great commander one had better think twice before crossing or not--the men he needs to sacrifice for Hellas in foreign fields are the Hellenes he is supposed to be saving, and if they defy him and stay home to defend their own homes and toss out his tax gatherers and recruiters, they can fight for Hellas just as nobly defending these homes from Pyrrhus as they can bowing to him and getting killed off on behalf of Ptolemy and those rich clever Massaliotes?

What do the people who run Greece and Macedon and even Epiros on behalf of the absent crusading Pyrrhus gain to compensate for their sacrifices, from his grand policy? If the other allies want to secure the ongoing aid of Pyrrhus's great armies they had best see to it it is clear, if not to irrelevant men in the street, than anyway the ruling sub-elites of Pyrrhus recently cobbled together tyranny that this investment of the blood and treasure they route to his hungry and casualty-prone forces pays off in ways that lets them keep on doing it. Otherwise no matter how determined Pyrrhus himself is to fight on, he's going to run out of men, and before that happens his recruiting centers will have turned on him and turned him away. He can't punish them with a mighty army if getting and keeping a mighty army is exactly what he can't do!
 
Sure, he looks good. But where is he getting his reinforcements from, and will the notion that serving Pyrrhus is serving the cause of Hellenes widen his recruiting pool--or will the other Hellenes just free-ride on his noble self-image until he has hollowed it out? Pyrrhus is now tyrant of most of Greece itself as well as Macedon, true, and that is about as large a pool of Hellenic fighters as one might hope to drain. But he's drained it a lot already, and I'd think his subjects are hurting. Will they go on hurting more, showing up to be trained and serve and not be around to run their own business interests nor get the harvest in, or might they at some point dig in their heels and figure, hero of Hellas or no, great commander one had better think twice before crossing or not--the men he needs to sacrifice for Hellas in foreign fields are the Hellenes he is supposed to be saving, and if they defy him and stay home to defend their own homes and toss out his tax gatherers and recruiters, they can fight for Hellas just as nobly defending these homes from Pyrrhus as they can bowing to him and getting killed off on behalf of Ptolemy and those rich clever Massaliotes?

What do the people who run Greece and Macedon and even Epiros on behalf of the absent crusading Pyrrhus gain to compensate for their sacrifices, from his grand policy? If the other allies want to secure the ongoing aid of Pyrrhus's great armies they had best see to it it is clear, if not to irrelevant men in the street, than anyway the ruling sub-elites of Pyrrhus recently cobbled together tyranny that this investment of the blood and treasure they route to his hungry and casualty-prone forces pays off in ways that lets them keep on doing it. Otherwise no matter how determined Pyrrhus himself is to fight on, he's going to run out of men, and before that happens his recruiting centers will have turned on him and turned him away. He can't punish them with a mighty army if getting and keeping a mighty army is exactly what he can't do!
I don't think his manpower has tanked yet,nor is the logic of liberating Greeks that bad,but essentially,he screwed up the moment he decided to invade Rome right when Carthage and Rome were planning to fight it out.As for people who run Greece and Macedonia on his behalf,they don't need to gain anything,they are just cronies of Pyrrhus,they are lackeys who benefit from Pyrrhus being still in charge.It's the landlords and aristocrats that are the problem.Arguably though,getting so much manpower killed off could be beneficial to Pyrrhus if done right.If he purposely kills off the manpower of Macedonia and the Greek city states while conserving the manpower of Epirus itself,he could weaken his opposition's ability to revolt--since his control over Macedonia and the Greek city states is not as secure as his control over Epirus.Problem though is that I don't think he is intelligent enough to think about that.The main problem about his campaign so far is that why the fuck is he gutting his army in each battle.Are the Roman commanders really as good as he is or is he losing his military talents?As I've mentioned,thus far,his performance is even worst than during the Pyrrhic War.

As for Magna Graecia,I don't think the Romans are able to scorch it.The natives threw them out to their surprise when Pyrrhus came.
 
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To the point of the early chatting about 'soft drink' companies, wouldn't referring to them as Symposium work pretty well? It is, after all, the (latinized) Greek word for a drinking meeting.
 
The Roman army and generals are really good.



Yes
But are the generals supposed to be on the same level of Pyrrhus?If Pyrrhus is indeed a genius,then the Romans have a lot of geniuses.The two new consuls are almost doing as well as the past two in gutting Pyrrhus army.As for the quality of the armies,Pyrrhus' army shouldn't be inferior to the Romans' either,given he is following Philip and Alexander's military formula correctly through the use of combined arms.His army also has superior experience than the Roman one given how frequent he has been fighting compared to the Romans.
 
But are the generals supposed to be on the same level of Pyrrhus?If Pyrrhus is indeed a genius,then the Romans have a lot of geniuses.The two new consuls are almost doing as well as the past two in gutting Pyrrhus army.As for the quality of the armies,Pyrrhus' army shouldn't be inferior to the Romans' either,given he is following Philip and Alexander's military formula correctly through the use of combined arms.His army also has superior experience than the Roman one given how frequent he has been fighting compared to the Romans.
Pyrrhus maybe is a genius but that doesn't mean that he will win all battles. Romans were also super experienced( The last 30 years the fight constant). Nevertheless in the last two battles he still won but with heavy losses. Invading Italy/Rome at 264 BC and won battles against 50000 man Roman armies its not a simple task even if they are Pyrrhic victories(sic)
 
Pyrrhus maybe is a genius but that doesn't mean that he will win all battles. Romans were also super experienced( The last 30 years the fight constant). Nevertheless in the last two battles he still won but with heavy losses. Invading Italy/Rome at 264 BC and won battles against 50000 man Roman armies its not a simple task even if they are Pyrrhic victories(sic)
I think he clearly lost the last battle.The Roman army counterattacked and his army was mauled so hard that it had to be withdrawn.The Romans also broke the Siege of Capua.
 
I think he clearly lost the last battle.The Roman army counterattacked and his army was mauled so hard that it had to be withdrawn.The Romans also broke the Siege of Capua.
Indeed the Romans broke the siege of Capua,but he managed to defend against a 10k bigger roman army and stabilise his control of south Italy.
 
Indeed the Romans broke the siege of Capua,but he managed to defend against a 10k bigger roman army and stabilise his control of south Italy.
Keeping the field at the end of the battle in premodern battles is a key indication in those days of having won the battle.The fact that his army didn't get wiped out by an army 10k larger is pretty irrelevant.Tactically,he was chased off the field,strategically,his attempts of capturing Capua has been foiled.
 
Keeping the field at the end of the battle in premodern battles is a key indication in those days of having won the battle.The fact that his army didn't get wiped out by an army 10k larger is pretty irrelevant.
Ofc keeping the field at the end of the battle is a key indication in those days but Pyrrhus didn't retreat from the area he is still close by. The fact that he managed to defend against a 10k larger army and stabilise his control of south Italy is a "victory"
Could Pyrrhus done better? Yes, but controlling Magna Graecia is all ready important.
 
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Ofc keeping the field at the end of the battle is a key indication in those days but Pyrrhus didn't retreat from the area he is still close by. The fact that he managed to defend against a 10k larger army and stabilise his control of south Italy is a "victory"
Could Pyrrhus done better? Yes, but controlling Magna Graecia is all ready a victory.
The fact that he left the field in the hands of the Romans is an indication of him losing.The fact that he still controls Manga Graecia isn't an indication he didn't lose.By all means,the English didn't immediately conquer any land after the Battle of Argincourt for example either.
He had to go back a little to secure his supply lines.
So why didn't he need to secure his supply lines prior to the battle?All indication shows that he's forced as a result of the battle to withdraw.
 
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The fact that he left the field in the hands of the Romans is an indication of him losing.The fact that he still controls Manga Graecia isn't an indication he didn't lose.By all means,the English didn't immediately conquer any land after the Battle of Argincourt for example either.

ok you got a point, but lets see the situation from the Roman side: They have lost the control of Magna Graecia. They managed to save Capua and repel Pyrrhus from marching against Rome but with staggering losses. With Carthage losing, i think the best for them to do is to accept Pyrrhus as King of Magna Graecia.

So why didn't he need to secure his supply lines prior to the battle?

He was. But after the battle he went to a more secure place close by.
 
Romans May have experience sure, but not against the phalanx of the Hellenistic world, but against the likes of Samnites and Etruscans, which use a completely different tactic. And in OTL Punic wars the consuls that fought against Hannibal were quite incompetent, if Phyrrus is even half the general Hannibal thought him to be (and he very likely is at least that) he should be beating off the Romans with ease.....

The only time the phalanx was beaten by the Romans was when it was lead horribly, had nothing anchoring their flanks, or got it self taken over rough ground. At other times the Romans were steadily getting wrecked. In the flat plains of Italy and with great cavalry like Thessalians Phyrrus should be able to do well....

Also the Roman cavalry was quite weak at the time, the hammer and anvil tactic should work wonders here.....
 
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