The Hump - Wikipedia
The wonderful C-54.
Here is a link to the Wikipedia article describing the WW2 airlift carrying supplies and personnel from India to China. "The Hump." It's worth taking note of the astonishingly extremely high casualty rate for what was a (mostly)non-combat operation. The vast majority of aircrew and aircraft losses were not directly due to enemy action but were caused chiefly by the atrocious weather frequently encountered over the Himalayas and their foothills though poor training and maintenance also played a role.
There might have not been very much that could have been done about this in 1942 as the only airplanes available for the airlift in any numbers were the C-47. So consequently the shortest possible air route had to be used so the C-47 could carry a useful load. This was the route from the airfields in Assam, British India to Kunming, China. About 520 to 540 air miles depending on which airfield was the flight was departing from. A C-47 could carry about 2 tons for this distance.
The major problem was the route from immediately after take off until landing at Kunming was over the Himalayan foothills which produce the dangerous weather conditions as described in the Wikipedia article. The threat of interception by Japanese fighters would compel flight crews to detour further Northward which brought them into higher elevations and worse flying conditions. This situation produced the heavy losses that were suffered by the Hump operation through 1943 and most of 1944 until an adequate Allied fighter escort was established that permitted the use of a more Southerly route with less severe weather conditions.
In 1943 two longer range aircraft types were beginning to become available to the U.S. Air Transport Command that was operating the airlift. The 4 engined C-54 and C-87 transports. These planes had the capability of carrying heavier loads longer distances then the C-47s that had been used by the ATC up to that time. But these new planes were still just as vulnerable to the terrible weather and flying conditions encountered in Northern Burma over the foothills of the Himalayas. The C-87 even more so. Nevertheless the ATC persisted in operating the new longer ranged planes from the same airfields in Assam that hat been built for the shorter ranged ranged C-47.
I think a safer route should have been chosen that the longer ranged planes could have utilized. In 1942 the British and Commonwealth forces had constructed a large airfield at Chittagong. Chittagong being a port city on the Bay of Bengal. Further enlargement to produce a complex of airfields could have been carried out through early 1943 with American assistance. These airfields should have served as the new departure point for the airlift to Kunming.
From Chittagong to Kunming is about 720 airmiles. Which would add about 200 more miles then the Assam airfields to Kunming distance. This would likely eliminate the C-47 for the practical reason that while it could fly the longer route it's payload would be reduced. Anyhow there were plenty of other uses that could be found for the C47s in the CBI. The C-54s could fly this distance with an 8 to possibly as much as 10 ton load. The C-87 about 6 tons. Both planes having a flight time of about 4 hours depending on the winds aloft.
The main reason for selecting this route is I think it would've greatly reduced the loss rate due to the bad weather encountered over the Himalayas. The elevations for the entire route doesn't reach 7000 feet until approaching the mountain range about 60 miles Southwest of Kunming. Not the 12000 to 14000 foot peaks along the high hump route.
As this route takes the transport planes over central Burma for most of its length they would be exposed to a much greater risk of interception by the IJAAF. Unless they restrict operations to only flying at night or during heavy cloud cover (Monsoon) conditions. The Japanese would be very unlikely to achieve interceptions at night or in cloud with the day-fighter squadrons that operated in Burma in 1943 and 1944.
As long as the Allied flight crews are at least adequately trained in instrument flying then operating at night is no different then flying in cloud. Either way there are no visual references. This was often the case along the Assam to Kunming route anyway. One factor that must be considered is, especially for low time aircrews, it is much easier to take off at night then land at night. I would think the scheduling for flights from Chittagong to Kunming would need have the flights take off a few hours before dawn so as to arrive at Kunming to permit a day light landing.
This gives the aircrews the protection that night provides from the IJAAF fighters and allows the less hazardous daylight landing. How long flights could be scheduled to leave Chittagong as the morning approaches would depend on how far out from Kunming the Allied fighter umbrella could be extended. Eventually by late 1944 the entire length of the route could be patrolled extensively by the Allies. As mentioned daylight flights could still be flown if there is enough heavy cloud cloud cover along the route to prevent the transports from being spotted by the Japanese pilots.
One other advantage of operating the Hump Airlift from an airfield complex based at Chittagong is the Port Of Chittagong located a few miles from the location of the airfields. Cargo doesn't need to be shipped by train hundreds of miles from Calcutta to Assam as was done. From ship to plane is just a few miles at Chittagong.
I don't contend that this is a perfect solution to the difficulties faced by the ATC operating the Hump Airlift in OTL. But looking at the appalling casualty rate I believe with the benefit of hindsight that something different should have been done. I wonder if anybody involved with the Airlift back then had considered this or other options.
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