The High Ground: Space Race meets Arms Race

From my 'Nuclear WIs' thread, tentative map and TL seen on map thread.

This is just a plausibility test.

The POD: 1966

Overview: 1966-1970

Major technical problems delay the Defense Support Project, pushing the first satellite launches into the early 1970s. The US still makes it to the moon, but the failure of the DSP encourages the Soviets to continue their use of FOBS, or Fractional Orbital Bombardment systems. The Soviets also begin research on 'stealthing' said systems against US sensors, hoping to use them to render American defenses that cover the Arctic Circle useless.

Realizing the advantages held by the Soviets, who would soon be able to orbit hydrogen bombs, the United States never quite embraced the concept of MAD, because of the 'technology gap' now existing. Many worried that the Soviets could easily launch a first strike on American strategic forces, making MAD less than mutual.

As a result, US emphasis on missile defense increased, but Vietnam continued basically as in OTL, with Nixon promising Vietnamization and stronger missile defense. SALT is delayed, and in 1970 no breakthrough seems close. The Soviets are reluctant to give up the heavy investment in FOBS, while the US is too skeptical of Soviet belief in MAD to abandon their similar investment in missile defense.

A similar development is the earlier interest by the US in smaller, mobile missiles and SLBMs, as now the US lacks the proper defense (in many strategists' eyes, anyway) for their ICBM fields and bomber fields in the US. More plans and more money is put into forward bases in Europe or hte Mideast, and the 'Midgetman' is already proliferating throughout wargamer's debates on nuclear strategy.
 

Tielhard

Banned
I am not sure that I understand this post fully but ....

There is no credible ground based defence possible against orbital launched nuclear weapons. If the platform orbit is low or even atmosphere grazing and highly elliptical then the weapon may only have to travel some 120 km under boost this can be done in seconds, under free fall the weapon is effectively invisible. Tracking the platforms is difficult especially if they are kept in high orbit and only change to low orbit to attack. Aquiring the weapon is near impossible. I strongly suspect both the USA and Russia having such weapons in orbit now they would be fools not to.
 
I know that's true, that's exactly why the missile defense race has been accelerated. Because of OST, if either side deploys those satellites in orbit, it's effectively an act of war. So for that reasons, both sides are investigating orbital missile defense that could engage the missiles in boost phase...

And the launch of FOBS is detectable by DSP satellites, but in this TL their release is delayed as a POD.
 
The main advantage of FOBS is that you can attack from more than one direction and thus defeat ABM systems. As the Americans haven't built one, there is no point the Soviets continuing down the FOBS path.

On the space platform, it would have the same weakness as the first subs namely accuracy with an additional disadvantage, maintenance.

On the bomber fleet, the Americans are still going to get stealth plus cruise missiles. A supersonic AS lauched from a B2 is going to be easily as good as one fired off a space platform and it will be better maintained.
 

CalBear

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Tielhard said:
I am not sure that I understand this post fully but ....

There is no credible ground based defence possible against orbital launched nuclear weapons. If the platform orbit is low or even atmosphere grazing and highly elliptical then the weapon may only have to travel some 120 km under boost this can be done in seconds, under free fall the weapon is effectively invisible. Tracking the platforms is difficult especially if they are kept in high orbit and only change to low orbit to attack. Aquiring the weapon is near impossible. I strongly suspect both the USA and Russia having such weapons in orbit now they would be fools not to.

FOBS are not space based platforms, per say. They were designed to be launched, approach from a different direction and reenter before the completion of a full orbit. They did not have the capacity to retarget post launch.

They are a logical step toward true orbital basing, but they are the first baby step.
 
Michael B said:
The main advantage of FOBS is that you can attack from more than one direction and thus defeat ABM systems. As the Americans haven't built one, there is no point the Soviets continuing down the FOBS path.

Not true... The POD here is the failure of the DSP satellites, not the early US ABM programs and NORAD. The Arctic Circle is still heavily monitored, and the Sentinel Program (and Safeguard later) are still running fine. FOBS however, would avoid the Northern-concentrated systems like NORAD.

On the space platform, it would have the same weakness as the first subs namely accuracy with an additional disadvantage, maintenance.

Not really a space platform... As Calbear explained far more articulately than I, it's a really, really long range ICBM. The MIRV just happens to orbit around the Earth once. Not much of a maintenance problem there, and with the warheads the Soviets could have put on them (See: R-46).... Accuracy wouldn't have been too much of a problem.

On the bomber fleet, the Americans are still going to get stealth plus cruise missiles. A supersonic AS lauched from a B2 is going to be easily as good as one fired off a space platform and it will be better maintained.

True, and as the US starts its massive research of digital computers for its ABM program, you're gonna see those cruise missiles. Of course, the problem is that these bombers could be dead through blast or EMP if FOBS can launch a surprise attack, so its not like the US can assure a 'victory' on bombers anyway, or at least until the '80s.
 

CalBear

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The FOBS system was only really useful to defeat a ABM system. If you can't detect a launch, it really doesn't matter how the weapon arrives, you've dropped warning time to almost nothing.

The lack of detection capability will likely mean that the U.S. retains the old "Fail-Safe" patrols, where a significant segment of the bomber force is sent to patrol positions just outside Soviet airspace. The "launch on warning' policy will also remian in effect. The combination will result in a much greater chance of an accidental nuclear exchange.

The irony of this is that FOBS, or depressed trajectory launches (where a sub sneaks in close and fires a missile that impacts within five minutes of launch) make it more likey that civilians are removed from the decision loop, meaning that the people Ivan was really scared of, the "reactionary military" would have the power to start the war.

FOBS also wouldn't help with the "City Killer" part of the triad, the Boomers. Pre D-5, American missile boats lacked the accuracy to be used as counter-force platforms, this made them the designated hitters. The Soviet cities would have died from SLBM's (and whatever bombers managed to penetrate the Soviet ADF).

Weapon was an idea looking for a reason to exist, and the POD still wouldn't give it one.
 
All good points, but remember that in the Cold War, reality often wasn't as important as the impression given. In reality, the chance of the US launching a first strike was slim for both ideological and strategic reasons. Yet most of the nuclear close calls (that we know of, anyway), are the results of various groups just freaking out, in some cases. (The Soviet first-strike 'defense' group looked at things as obscure as vaccination drives when coming up with the probability of a US 'first strike)

FOBS did have a purpose, and it was to scare the US, or at least in this TL. With serious failures on the part of the US, people are going to be more paranoid of said system, and even if it is eclipsed, people are still going to be afraid of it, and since politicians write the budgets in the US, it's going to have some effect on the development of technology. Of course, the Soviets will also try and use it as leverage against the US in negotiations on a bigger extent than in OTL, but the point, the actual effectiveness of these weapons isn't as important as the impact they leave on the other side.
 
Of course, the Soviets will also try and use it as leverage against the US in negotiations on a bigger extent than in OTL, but the point, the actual effectiveness of these weapons isn't as important as the impact they leave on the other side.
Or alternatively the Americans build their own and put them on the their Titan ICBMs. Problem neutralised at least on the diplomatic front.
 
Whatis, yeah, I still have ideas floating around for a Cold War TL, but it will need to be seriously reworked so I doubt it will look too much like this.
 
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