Over the years there have been various threads about this, how this or that is impossible etc. So, I wondered what would be possible, Did do the best that they could or could they have done more? With 'one' or 'four' unless victory is complete with a Russian surrender or 'peace', the Germans will still be vulnerable to the Anglo/US forces landing in western France.
The German v Russia war how can Germany be victorious, or is it impossible?
- Thread starter merlin
- Start date
TheSpectacledCloth
Gone Fishin'
Actually, it was the decision of Halder and von Brauchitsch that really screwed Operation Barbarossa, as Hitler wanted to aim for Ukraine and the Caucasus but they insisted they aim the offensive towards Moscow. In this respect, Hitler proved to be more competent in his strategy than his spineless advisors in the Wehrmacht.
Garrison
Donor
Well neither of them was right because the underlying strategic concept of Barbarossa was to destroy the Red Army and cause the collapse of the USSR. Since they had underestimated the scale of the Red Army and the cohesion of the USSR the plan was lucky to achieve what it did and if the Soviets had adopted a more elastic defence in depth strategy it would probably have failed by the end of the summer of 1941. The German Generals were spineless, but mostly because they were all willing to ignore the many flaws of Barbarossa rather than defy Hitler.
Garrison
Donor
I'm not saying there should be others, I'm saying that you options are so wide that its hard to be specific beyond saying yes to the question in the title.
Karl der Große
Banned
A big one is no Lend-Lease, and even better if US keeps trading with Germany and its puppets.
I believe Stalin offered a peace treaty in 1941. If Germany could annex Ukraine, Eastern Poland and some or all of the Baltics, then that would be a victory of sorts. If we are talking about a long term victory, Germany could take that peace then use period before the Russians are ready for round two to sort out their economy and build good defensive positions in both the east and the west, including defense against bombers. Who knows how this would play out, but the allies and Russia would have no easy path to defeating Germany, and perhaps a lasting treaty would eventually be signed in the late 1940s (though atomics might scupper this plan, and I am aware of the ideological stance on lebansraum).
A German victory versus the Soviet Union is possible, but the bulk of feasible scenarios require them to not be led by Nazis. It also essentially requires that Germany not be at war with the Western Allies, and that it successfully puts together an Eastern European anticommunist coalition, on which it is dependent.
I voted for #5 and #3.
Russia makes worse decisions (attacking Poland), and then Germany France, and Great Britain dogpile the soviets.
Russia makes worse decisions (attacking Poland), and then Germany France, and Great Britain dogpile the soviets.
The problem with Barbarossa was that the further they got the more difficult fighting got, and thus the opposition has to lessen.
IOTL they had 4 aims. Destroy the red army, capture Leningrad (and unhinge the Soviet northern front), capture Moscow (and let the Soviet taste logistics problems) and take Ukraine (and improve long term strategic supply, and the oil is next).
IOTL they didn’t succeed anywhere, although partially in the south. Could they have avoided shuffling around panzer groups and achieved more? Most definitely. Certainly Leningrad was within reach freeing up more troops, with soviet surrenders, and a northern approach to Moscow with excellent supply lines.
For Moscow to fall here they have to avoid the Kiev encirclements which has negative butterflies, but the very positive one of wintering in Moscow with all weather airfields and soviet troop deployments in tatters.
Even if they are less advanced in the South this translates into a much better 1942.
The easiest is to somehow move forward or prevent the battle of Greece. Leaving aside the possible earlier start date, the armor deployed there was not available from the start of Barbarossa iotl, but should have been deployed in Romania. Had it been, encirclements would have taken place on this front as well taking away the need to be helped by AGC as well as possible butterflies in how fast the axis advance along the coast and take Odessa and this Sevastopol.
None of the above helps directly on the distance an AGS attack has to the oilfields, but it is a much stronger wehrmacht and likely weaker red Army facing off in 1942. Also, the bulk of the Army is here and on a single supply line outside Moscow meaning the Germans could deal a blow to the Soviets outside Moscow and move South-East to attack the caucasus now with waterways for transport all the way from Leningrad. Taking the East coast of the volga from that direction would leave the red Army poirly supplied and trapped in the Caucasus.
So imho there is a way. Basically stick to the plan in 1941 and the Germans might well in 2 years.
IOTL they had 4 aims. Destroy the red army, capture Leningrad (and unhinge the Soviet northern front), capture Moscow (and let the Soviet taste logistics problems) and take Ukraine (and improve long term strategic supply, and the oil is next).
IOTL they didn’t succeed anywhere, although partially in the south. Could they have avoided shuffling around panzer groups and achieved more? Most definitely. Certainly Leningrad was within reach freeing up more troops, with soviet surrenders, and a northern approach to Moscow with excellent supply lines.
For Moscow to fall here they have to avoid the Kiev encirclements which has negative butterflies, but the very positive one of wintering in Moscow with all weather airfields and soviet troop deployments in tatters.
Even if they are less advanced in the South this translates into a much better 1942.
The easiest is to somehow move forward or prevent the battle of Greece. Leaving aside the possible earlier start date, the armor deployed there was not available from the start of Barbarossa iotl, but should have been deployed in Romania. Had it been, encirclements would have taken place on this front as well taking away the need to be helped by AGC as well as possible butterflies in how fast the axis advance along the coast and take Odessa and this Sevastopol.
None of the above helps directly on the distance an AGS attack has to the oilfields, but it is a much stronger wehrmacht and likely weaker red Army facing off in 1942. Also, the bulk of the Army is here and on a single supply line outside Moscow meaning the Germans could deal a blow to the Soviets outside Moscow and move South-East to attack the caucasus now with waterways for transport all the way from Leningrad. Taking the East coast of the volga from that direction would leave the red Army poirly supplied and trapped in the Caucasus.
So imho there is a way. Basically stick to the plan in 1941 and the Germans might well in 2 years.
Ignoring Greece ties up Italian troops and weakens Mussolini while also providing a potential allied path into mainland Europe. It also weakens Italian control over their islands, allows allied bombers to handily reach Ploesti [1], and improves allied chances of getting Turkey and Yugoslavia into the war, and may keep Bulgaria neutral.
None of this is good for the axis, and it creates potential for major issues in future. At thd very least, static fibisions will jave to be allocated to border defence.
[1] Who wants to write the 'Barbarossa without oil' timeline?
None of this is good for the axis, and it creates potential for major issues in future. At thd very least, static fibisions will jave to be allocated to border defence.
[1] Who wants to write the 'Barbarossa without oil' timeline?
I agree with prioritising capturing Moscow in 1941 over encircling mass forces in Ukraine. Given it's centrality as a rail hub, capturing it would cause major problems to the Russians. Severely doubt enough to get an eventual Russian collapse, but potentially enough to produce a stalemate and peace treaty two, three or four years later.
This is purely in hindsight, since if I was making decisions in 1941 I would not turn down the biggest encirclement in history. Also, there are immense problems with pushing on to Moscow without securing the flank against literal hundreds of thousands of Russians. Additionally, the Germans do not need simply get closer to Moscow, that could just result in a Stalingrad type situation, but they need actually encircle the entire city. Finally, I think the fall of Moscow would do little to shake Soviet moral (unless you also capture Stalin and comrades but they would surely flee). So aiming to capture Moscow is high risk and the rewards may not be war winning, but on the basis of what they tried failed this is the best alternative strategy providing we assume going for a 1941 ceasefire is incompatible with Nazi psychology.
This is purely in hindsight, since if I was making decisions in 1941 I would not turn down the biggest encirclement in history. Also, there are immense problems with pushing on to Moscow without securing the flank against literal hundreds of thousands of Russians. Additionally, the Germans do not need simply get closer to Moscow, that could just result in a Stalingrad type situation, but they need actually encircle the entire city. Finally, I think the fall of Moscow would do little to shake Soviet moral (unless you also capture Stalin and comrades but they would surely flee). So aiming to capture Moscow is high risk and the rewards may not be war winning, but on the basis of what they tried failed this is the best alternative strategy providing we assume going for a 1941 ceasefire is incompatible with Nazi psychology.
Garrison
Donor
And left to their own devices in the Balkans the Italians are probably going to lose once the British can fully gear up to send support, which will be a lot easier if the Germans also elect not to intervene in North Africa. Not carrying out the attack on Crete will spare the 7th Airtborne Division heavy casualties, but it probably means that their next mass drop turns into a rerun of the Hague, especially if someone gets the bright idea to try Operation Herkules.
The best thing the Italians could do for the Germans in WWII is promptly overthrow Mussolini when he tries to enter the war in 1940 and declare neutrality.
Promise Russia independence within 5 years of a stable German victory and treat Russians well and Stalin will be overthrown by his own people.
The problems with that are 1)this goes against Nazi ideology in a big way and 2) there is not enough food to feed the Russian people and the German Army at the same time.
The problems with that are 1)this goes against Nazi ideology in a big way and 2) there is not enough food to feed the Russian people and the German Army at the same time.
The matter of food can be more or less dealt with in one stroke by the Germans not being of the Nazi ideology, since without it they are more able to negotiate peace with France and Britain to import food. That said, I don't think Stalin would be overthrown by his own people. His grip on power was too secure.
UK comes to terms in 1940, thus allowing full concentration of german resources to the East.
Lucky Luftwaffe bomb in July 1941 kills Stalin, causing massive colapse of Russian morale and disruption of command.
Combine these two and it might work.
Lucky Luftwaffe bomb in July 1941 kills Stalin, causing massive colapse of Russian morale and disruption of command.
Combine these two and it might work.
That's a what-if I want to see. We've had a lot of "France does better in 1940" timelines, and I love them, but I'd also like to see a "Russia does better in 1941" timeline.
And heck, a "Poland does better in 1939" timeline.
This is AH so different premises can be made. If not preventing the Italian intervention, then an acceleration of the German intervention might also work.
Might actually butterfly the mauling of the Italians in North Africa and thus the German Africa Core. Massive positive butterfly. Later there will be no non-comitted armor to send.
Probably how the Anglo-American Nazi war should have started.