THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE
Intoduction
The two general elections in 1910 result in Liberal governments but with Irish nationalists holding the balance of power. In the rest of Britain the issue is whether the Lords can overrule the Commons; in Ireland it is whether the Lords can continue to block Home Rule. In November, a month before the second poll, the Ulster Unionist Council under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson forms a secret committee to buy weapons and form an army to resist Home Rule.
When the Third Home Rule Bill introduced in 1912 - Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law promises to oppose it and encourages resistance in Ulster.
On September 28, nearly 500,000 Protestants sign the 'Solemn League and Covenant' to defend Ulster against Home Rule.
The UVF is formed The Home Rule Bill is passed by the Commons in 1913 and accepted by the Lords. The next day, the Ulster Volunteer Force is formed and begins arming.
Catholics form the Irish Volunteers as a counter-balance and in opposition to proposals that Ulster should remain within the Union.
Preparations for revolt In March 1914, the British Army commander in Ireland, Sir Arthur Paget, asks his officers if they are prepared to force Ulster into joining an independent Ireland. Sixty at the Curragh camp including its commander say they would not - the 'Curragh Mutiny'.
The UVF smuggles in 24,000 rifles and 3m rounds of ammunition in April, bringing their total of rifles to 40,000. The Irish Volunteers smuggle in a small quantity of rifles at Howth three months later. A Infantry regiment tries to stop them, fails and later fires on a crowd of civilians, killing three.
June 1914, the home rule bill, becomes a reality, the UVF storm and hold key points in Ulster, mainly Belfast, Londonderry and Lisburn. They also start to force Northern Catholics to move out of the towns and cities. Using car and vans from the post office and docks they start to roam the countryside and start to burn catholic farms.
The Government orders the the 5th Infantry Brigade based at Curragh to move to Ulster to restore order. The GOC of Ireland Paget, refuses and resigns his commission, he is followed by other offices who supported him. Leaving the 5th Brigade with out any senior officers, forces the War Department to send the 1st and 2nd Division to Ulster to restore order.
Churchill sends in the Navy to seize the Docks in Belfast, but faces heavy but in-accurate fire from captured Costal guns being used by the UVF. The Dock and the surrounding area is shelled by Royal Navy Light Cruisers and Destroyers. Once seized by Royal Marines and Naval landing parties the two divisions are able to be shipped and disembarked and restore order in the city.
Though out the next three months, insurgent attacks by the UVF, makes the pacifying of Ulster a hard and slow action for the Army. With riots taking place in Liverpool and Glasgow in support of their fellow orange order members, forces the Government to commit troops to support police in some major industrial cities to prevent further riots. When war breaks out in August the government is to pre-occupied in the up-rising to take any notice in another European war, even is Belguim was invaded
PART 1
The Invasion of Beligium
FIGHTING ON 4 AUGUST
On the first day of World War I for the Kingdom of Belgium, around 0900, 12 regiments of the German 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions invaded the district of Herve, which would permit a rapid advance to the Meuse. The cavalry needed to seize Vise, which commanded the passage of the Meuse. Without Vise, it would be impossible to invest Liege or to deploy a cavalry screen on the left bank to mask the main army's movements.
Behind the cavalry, the mass of the Army of the Meuse, 130,000 strong, entered Belgium by the road from Aix-La-Chapelle, by the main road from Gemmenich to Vise, by the valley of the Vesdre, and by the Malmedy Road. The distance from the border to the Meuse River was 30 kilometres. By mid-afternoon, the Germans had reached the position Bombaye-Herve-Pepinster-Remouchamps.
At 1300, the 2nd and 4th found the bridges at Vise and Argenteau destroyed. The 2nd Battalion of the 12th Belgian Line Regiment under Major Collyns was deployed on the left bank to disrupt any attempted river crossings. The Germans attempted to build a pontoon bridge and came under heavy fire from across the river and from Fort Pontisse. The 2nd Battalion valiantly defended the river approaches, using their Parent Regiment's Machine Gun Company preventing the German force from crossing the river. German casualties were high. Further north, at Lixhe, on the Dutch frontier, two Hussar regiments forded the river. This Cavalry force was spotted in advance by the Belgian’s left flank companies, with enough time to create a temporary barricade up the Belgium’s force threw back a attempted charge by the Hussar regiment, causing them heavy causalities.
German bombardment of the Stubborn Belgians was answered by the guns of Fort Pontisse. The guns of the Fort Battice and the 2/12th Regiment held off Von der Marwitz's forces for the rest of the day and he was forced to bivouac for the night without reaching his objective. The German’s continued to suffer from random artillery fire and sniping shots from Belgium sharp shooters. The Germans had received their first taste of the Belgian spirit. In the desperate hours to come, the ferocious defence of Liege would exact a greater toll on the right bank.
THE TERRIBLE NIGHT OF 5-6 AUGUST
During the night, a bridge was built at Lixhe despite the Belgium forces inflicted heave causalities on the German Engineers, and the cavalry squadrons which were sent to penetrate as far as Tongres to screen movements of the main army north of Liege were also thrown back in complete disorder.
Early in the morning a flag of truce was sent to Major Collyns asking him to allow the Germans to pass. He refused.
Swarms of Germans advanced in the Meuse-Vesdre sector, covered by fire from their heavy guns (15 cm howitzers) German guns were directed by aircraft spotters. These Guns shelled the bank of Meuse river, trying to force the 2/12 Regiment to withdraw. This was only partially successful, as the Belgium’s had used the night to dig into the town, using cellars and the sewer system. Their morale was raised when the nearby fortress’ guns replied effectively to the enemy fire.
At 1740 hrs, with the Belgium’s being reduced to only 25% of their original strength, Maj Collyns decided to carry out a orderly retreat into the Countryside, making his men to don civilian clothing, and prepare to carry out Franc-Trilliers style attacks on the advancing German.
On the morning of the 6th, after completing new pontoon bridges the previous night , the Germans, after been held up for two days on the banks of the Meuse, attempted to launch an attack to enveloped Chaudfontaine. After a preliminary bombardment, the enemy infantry appeared and advanced in close formation. The guns of the forts, interval artillery, machine guns and rifles fired at the masses. Entire ranks were mowed down, but they kept coming. Defenders withheld fire until the enemy reached the barbed wire entanglements and the glacis of the forts. Masses of Germans kept coming again and again. They succeeded in reaching the wire, despite tremendous losses and thy failed to reach the trench parapets. General Leman ordered a counterattack by the 11th Brigade, consisting of 11th and 31st Regiments under General Bertrand. The Belgians advanced with fixed bayonets and the Germans retreated.
All day long, Belgian forces and fortress artillery successfully checked the German advance. In the vicinity of Evegnee, the Belgians took 800 prisoners.
In the north, fighting concentrated around Fort Barchon. At 1000, after a preliminary bombardment, elements of the German 53rd Regiment, 27th Brigade, approached the fort, threatening the gorge. They were thrown back by infantry fire and by the quick-firing 5.7cm guns and by counterattacks of the 11th Brigade. By 1700 the German attack had abated, but bombardment of Barchon and Evegnee by 21cm mortars of the 27th located at Mortous and Bolland, continued.
At 1430 main elements of the 34th Brigade arrived in the northern sector. By 2230 two regiments had forded the Meuse at Lixhe. Further south, the 14th advanced to the line Melen-Soumagne, the 11th to the east of Chaudfontaine. The Germans in this vicinity had met only small patrols. In the sector Vesdre-Ourthe, the 38th marched on Beaufays to menace Fort Embourg and to protect the flanks of the 11th. Behind the 38th was the 43rd, near the confluence of the Ourthe and Ambleve.
In the Meuse sector, two platoons of 2nd Lancers came upon the lead cavalry patrols of the 38th Brigade, some 500 strong. The lancers set up a defensive position in the cemetery of Plaineveaux, in the Forest of Beauregard, near Boncelles. By 2000, forward elements of the 38th reached Plaineveaux and engaged the Belgians in combat. 2nd Lancers had 75% casualties.
THE ATTACK ON THE FORTS
By the evening of 7 August, German forces were within 1 to 2 kilometres of the forts, which were pounded by German artillery throughout the night. During the night, the fighting continued in a surreal atmosphere. Soldiers clashed under the powerful beams of the fortress searchlights; grotesque images of death were illuminated by the constant flashes of exploding shells. Men fought in every sector, and in every sector the valiant Belgian defenders began to feel the weight of the German attack, and in some areas, began to break.
Fresh attacks were delivered in the Meuse-Vesdre and Ourthe-Meuse sectors. Fort Barchon was attacked from the northeast by Germans on the road from Dalhem to Jupille, passing by Rabozee. Guns of Barchon and Pontisse bombarded the attackers. As the Germans reached Rabozee, they were fired on from a trench at right angles to the road which flanked the position. Heavy losses were inflicted from a second, concealed trench. Bayonet fighting ensured. By dawn over 400 Germans lay dead in the fields.
There were also attacks during the night at Fort Boncelles. Defence of this position was very difficult because the Germans advanced under cover of the Forests of Plaineveaux, Neuville, and Vequee, and the Forest of Begnac, a continuation of the St. Lambert woods, which reached all the way to Trooz on the Meuse. Here, the Hanoverians advanced by way of Francorchamps, Spa, Stoumont, Aywaille, and Esneux.
At 1130 on the 8th, the Germans began shelling Forts Embourg and Boncelles. Shellfire was very well directed, exploding on the parapets. An infantry attack followed. Infantry attacked the trenches in the gaps and were mown down by machine guns and from the guns of the forts. The first attack was repulsed. At 0300, a fresh assault was launched. The Germans crept to the trenches and attacked. The searchlights of the forts were turned on them and they were annihilated. The attackers fell by the hundreds. Succeeding waves crawled over dead comrades to the trench parapets. Hand-to-hand fighting continued for 5 hours. The defense started to give. General Leman dispatched men of the 12th, 9th, and 15th Regiments to assist. Counterattacks stopped the advance. Of the defenders of Fort Boncelles, 9 were killed and 40 wounded. 1,400 interval troops were killed (men of the 1st Chasseurs, 9th Regiment). The statement by those who cleaned up the battlefield the following morning that 10,000 German bodies were removed was never officially admitted or confirmed.
Similar fighting took place at Fleron and Chaudfontaine and in the gaps between Fleron and Evegnee. At 1900 on 8 August, Germans dug in 800 meters from Retinne attacked the outposts of Evegnee. The gap between Fleron and Evegnee was defended by a trench 150 meters long at Surfosse. At 2330, the Germans advanced on the trench and were set back with murderous fire from the thinly manned trench. Fighting for the trench continued until 0230. The Germans finally silenced the position by 0400.
By now it was evident that the Belgians were fighting at a fever pitch. Not only that, but many believed that they could defeat the mighty German army. An example of this confidence is depicted in the narrative of the men fighting in the Evegnee-Fleron gap, under command of Commandant Munaut. He noticed that his men were firing blindly at the advancing Germans, failing to look through the loopholes in the parapets while they fired, and missing their targets which were only 100 meters away. Munaut noticed that the German aim was no better and decided to show his men how bad it was. He jumped on to the parapet and took a step towards the enemy – not one German bullet struck him. The act gave his troops new-found confidence.
At 0230 the 34th marched south out of Hermee and quickly came under fire of Fort Pontisse. 3 companies were ordered to take out the Belgian artillery positions but discovered the fire was coming from inside the fort. The companies found themselves at the foot of the glacis, unable to advance. Between Pontisse and Liers, the 90th Fusilier Regiment attacked the interval trenches, but were caught by a heavy crossfire from the Milmort and Rhee forts. Suffering heavy loses and becoming pinned and disorganised after their Commanding officer was killed leading a charge, they were forced to withdraw.
Heavy, bloody fighting continued throughout the morning, resulting with failure of 90th Fusilier Regiment to take the Milmort and Rhee forts. The failure of the taking of Herstal postponed the planned taking of Liege. Thus, the failure to penetrate the fortress interval positions was starting to create dangerous consequences for whole timing of the plan to march into France and circling Paris.
While resistance in the vicinity of Pontisse, Barchon, and Boncelles was stiff, the Germans still unable to penetrate via the intervals. Many of the routes between the forts were heavily wooded, in deep cuts, out of the line of sight of the fortress guns. (Where attacking forces were spotted, the guns were very effective). Thus, throughout the night of 8-9 August, the Germans attempted to penetrate the gap between Barchon and Meuse, and the Evegnee-Fleron gap to fight their way into the city. At 1000, the 165th Regiment fought its way to the heights at Jupille, to the east of Chartreuse, by way of Queue-du-Bois and Bellaire. At each step, the Belgian resistance was fierce and fighting was murderous, and eventually being forced to retire.
With the failure to capture the hills overlooking the city of Liege, German forces unable to carry out the planned bombardment the Citadel and the city. The bombardment would continue throughout the night. Meanwhile, General Lundendorff’s launched a attack to seize key locations in the city, including the bridges. However, by this time, General Leman 3rd Division from Liege, was heavily dug in, and with Artillery support from the Citadel and close forts, General Lundendorff’s force was stalled, after several further attacks, the German High Command conceded that the continued attack should be halted, after General Lundendorff was killed leading a third attack.
The communiqué of 9th August to the German High Command announced that the Fortress of Liege had failed to fall.. Von Emmich's troops marched out of range of the forts guns to regroup and to wait for the arrival of the heavy Austrian Mortars and the Grupps 420mm Guns. The forts, especially those of the left bank, remained in Belgium hands. Until they fell and the roads and railroads west of Liege were opened, the huge German Army was going nowhere.
.Part 2
When, on August 8 King Albert read his speech to the joint meeting of the Belgian Chamber and Senate, it might well have been thought that the darkest hour had come in Belgium's long and troubled history. But the King spoke with unfaltering resolve. Come what might, the Belgian people would maintain the freedom which was their birthright. In the moment for action they would not shrink from sacrifices. "I have faith in our destinies," King Albert concluded. "A country which defends itself wins respect, and cannot perish." The speech echoed the feelings of a united nation. In the face of peril, party was no longer known. M. Emile Vandervelde, leader of the Socialists, accepted a post in the Ministry. Without hesitation, the two Houses voted the measures of emergency proposed by the Government. The announcement by M. de Broqueville, the Prime Minister, that German troops were already on Belgian soil caused deep emotion, but the emotion was not born of fear. It was the realisation of how priceless is the heritage of liberty.
On that stirring day in Brussels, which witnessed the departure of the King to join his troops at the front, the sentiment upper-most was in truth "faith in the nation's destinies." Great Britain was busy in Ireland to come to the defence of Belgian rights. Not merely reservists called to the colours, but volunteers in multitudes were anxious to take up arms. Crowds besieged the recruiting offices. The public feeling in the Belgian capital reflected the public feeling everywhere.
The mobilisation of the defensive forces of the country had proceeded smoothly and swiftly. Though it was common knowledge that in no part of Europe had the espionage system worked from Berlin become more elaborate, the national spirit was but intensified. Then came news of the fighting, and of the dauntless resistance offered by the garrison at Liége. Later came the first of many German prisoners of war.
Mistakes and miscalculations undoubtedly entered into the German disaster at Liége, and above all the mistake of grossly underestimating the quality and efficiency of the Belgian forces. That mistake was persisted in during all the attempts to storm the fortress. It cost thousands of German lives. Not certainly until this war is over will the extent of the disaster be really known. But that it was a disaster of the greatest magnitude is beyond any question.
From the merely military standpoint, the shattering of three army corps is a huge price to pay even for victory. But the shattering of General von Emmich's army accomplished nothing. It had merely proved that to hurl men in massed formation against positions defended by modern guns and rifles is folly. Elementary common sense, however, would enforce the same conclusion. As the assaults upon Liége showed, elementary common sense is not a strong point of Prussian militarism. Because massed formations were used with effect by Frederick the Great, massed formations were the one idea of some of his would-be venerators.
The moral effect was greater than the military. It brought down in three days all that edifice of prestige which Prussian diplomacy, Prussian espionage, and Prussianised philosophy had been labouring for a generation to build up. To say that Europe gasped with surprise is to state the effect mildly.
The peoples opposed to German ambitions woke as from a spell. The aspect of the war had changed. Here was an army, part of the great Fighting Machine in which war was presumed to be practically embodied as an exact science, beginning a campaign with the blunder of assuming that men fighting for their country were no better than half-trained mercenaries. The resistance to the passage of the Meuse; the resistance offered to the troops sent to seize the country south of Liége was treated as negligible. A general of resource and experience would have reckoned on that resistance as a certainty.
Neither Prussian strategy then, nor Prussian tactics, were the perfection they had been taken to be. Both had broken at the first test. Nowhere was the gravity of the moral effect better appreciated than at Berlin. Henceforward the effort of Berlin was to efface it. In that fact will be found the key to all the succeeding "seventies" in Belgium.
That in Berlin, at all events in official and informed quarters, the surprise was as profound as elsewhere is proved by the fact that on August 9, through the neutral channel of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, the German Government made a second offer. The offer was in these terms.
The fortress of Liege had held after a courageous defence. The German Government regrets that as a consequence of the attitude of the Belgian Government against Germany such bloody encounters should have occurred. Germany does not want an enemy in Belgium. It is only by the force of events that she has been forced, by reason of the military measures of France, to take the grave determination of entering Belgium and attacking Liége as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has, in a heroic resistance against a great superiority, maintained the honour of its arms in the most brilliant fashion, the German Government prays his Majesty the King and the Belgian Government to avert from Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government is ready for any agreement with Belgium which could be reconciled in any conceivable way with its conflict with France. Once more Germany offers her solemn assurance that she has not been actuated by any intention to appropriate Belgian territory, and that that intention is far from her. Germany is always ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will permit her.
Part 3: The Battle of the Frontiers, 1914
The Battle of the Frontiers comprises five offensives launched under French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre and German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke's initiative during the first month of the war, August 1914.
The battles - at Mulhouse, Lorraine, the Ardennes, Charleroi and Mons - were launched more or less simultaneously, and marked the collision of both French and German invasion plans (Plan XVII and the Schlieffen Plan, respectively), each battle impacting the course of others.
Battles: The Battle of Mulhouse, 1914
The Battle of Mulhouse, one of the August Battles of the Frontiers, comprised the opening French attack of the war, and began at 05:00 on 7 August 1914.
Forming a fundamental component of France war strategy, Plan XVII, the Battle of Mulhouse was intended to secure the recapture of Alsace (with Lorraine to follow separately), territories lost to Germany as a consequence of losing the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.
Aside from the matter of national pride inherent in the capture of Alsace, French troops there would be well placed to guard the flank of subsequent French invasions further north.
In command of the operation to take Mulhouse was General Bonneau, and he was assigned a detachment of the First Army, plus one cavalry and two infantry divisions. Ranged against him was the German Seventh Army under General von Heeringen.
Having crossed the frontier on the morning of 7 August, the French quickly seized the border town of Altkirch with a bayonet charge. However Bonneau, suspicious of the light state of the German defences, was wary of advancing much further for fear of stepping into a carefully lain German trap. However, under orders to move to the Rhine next day, Bonneau continued his advance, taking Mulhouse shortly after its German occupants had left the town.
The taking of Mulhouse, albeit without opposition, sparked wild celebrations in France. The French were regarded as liberators by the inhabitants of Mulhouse itself.
However, with the arrival of German reserves from Strasbourg, the Germans mounted a counter-attack on the morning of 9 August at nearby Cernay.
Joseph Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, hastily despatched a reserve division to assist in the defence, but they arrived in time to save the town from recapture, This caused the Germans to withdraw on 10 August and preventing them to encircle the French. Alsace was firmly in French hands
The Invasion of Lorraine, 1914
The French invasion of Lorraine formed one of the major objectives of the French pre-war offensive strategy against Germany, Plan XVII. A consequence of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia festered in the minds of both French public and military alike, a national humiliation that needed to be addressed during the next war with the Prussians.
Plan XVII therefore made the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine a central plank of French strategy. This much was known to Germany before the First World War began, and was consequently factored into the German Schlieffen Plan.
One of the Battles of the Frontiers, the Invasion of Lorraine (also known as the Battle of Morhange-Sarrebourg) began with the French First and Second Armies entering the city on 14 August 1914, following on from General Paul Pau’s 8 August offensive at the Battle of Mulhouse, another key target near the Swiss border, with his ‘Army of Alsace’.
The French First Army, under General Auguste Dubail, intended to take Sarrebourg, east of Nancy, a strongly defended town, with General Noel de Castelnau’s Second Army taking Morhange, similarly fortified. The task of defending these towns fell to German Crown Prince Rupprecht, who had overall command of the German Sixth and General Josias von Herringen’s Seventh Army.
Rupprecht tried tpimplement a strategy of apparently retreating under the force of the French attack, only to bounce back in a fierce, cleverly manoeuvred counter-attack, having lured the French armies into a strong attack upon a heavily defended position. As the French armies advanced they encountered increasingly stern German opposition, including treacherous machine gun fire and heavy artillery.
Rupprecht, however, pressed German Army Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke to authorise a more aggressive strategy, under which the Germans would mount a counter-attack, the aim being to drive the French back to Nancy.
With Moltke’s agreement the offensive was launched on 20 August, whilst de Castelnau’s Second Army entered Morhange and heavily defended it. Caught by surprise by the French capture of Morhange and without the assistance of an entrenched position, and facing treacherous machine gun fire and heavy artillery the Germany force was forced to fall back,.
Gaps began to appear between the German armies, prompting Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre to push the Army of Alsace forward Diverting from the Schlieffen Plan, Rupprecht’s forces were reinforced withdraw to reform and to prepare for an attack against the two French armies. However the French, through the successful use of reconnaissance aircraft, were alerted to the German's build-up and so prepared an adequate defence. Attacked therefore on 24 August, German gains were minimal, limited to the acquisition of a small salient into French lines, itself reduced by heavy French counter-attacks on the morning of 25 August.
The Battle of the Ardennes, 1914
On the 21-23 August 1914, the Battle of the Ardennes was sparked somewhat unusually by the mutual confused collision of French and German invasion forces in the lower Ardennes forests.
According to the pre-war French war strategy document, Plan XVII, German forces in the area were only expected to be light, with French light, rapid-firing. artillery proving advantageous in a wooded terrain such as that found in the Ardennes.
By 20 August however it was becoming apparent - first to General Lanrezac's French Fifth Army, and then to Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre - that a massive German presence was gathering in the area. That same day the Germans launched a counter-offensive against the French advance into Lorraine. Even so, Joffre authorised an invasion of the Ardennes on 20 August for the following day.
Two sets of armies joined battle on both French and German sides. General Pierre Ruffey's Third Army and, further north, General Fernand de Langle de Cary's Fourth Army, fought the German Fourth and Fifth Armies: the former led by Duke Albrecht, the latter by Crown Prince Wilhelm. The two German armies together formed the centre of the German Schlieffen Plan's advance into France.
The French Fifth Army, meanwhile, had been despatched northwards to Charleroi on the back of news of a German build-up of strength in Belgium.
German troops had begun to advance through the woods on 19 August, constructing defensive positions as they went. Crown Prince Wilhelm was situated at Briey with Duke Albrecht en route to Neufchateau.
The aim of the advancing French forces was straightforward: to attack the German centre in the flank as it passed through the woods of the Ardennes.
With the descent of thick fog the opposing forces literally stumbled into each other in the woods on 21 August; in such fog, advance reconnaissance was of little worth. At this early stage the French mistook the German presence for small screening forces; in reality the French were heavily outnumbered. The first day of the battle, 21 August, was marked by scattered fighting, mostly skirmishes. Widespread battle only began the following day.
Superior tactical positioning by the Germans more than offset the occasional French success, , although casualties were heavy on both sides. French troops, dressed brightly, were notably conspicuous in the woods, no concession to camouflage having been considered.
The French, acting with 'offensive spirit', charged at German positions in the wood, pushing the germans back towards Germany.
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As a consequence of the poorly managed German retreat the French were able to take hold important iron resources, and were able to continue their advance into Germany. The scale of the German defeat was notable, only becoming clear to Moltke after a period of time had elapsed. Even then he was inclined to blame the poor performance of his forces rather than attribute it to strategy and circumstances. It did not dissuade him from planning further offensive attacks in the near future
Part 4 – The Russian Steam Roller
The first action on the Eastern Front, the Battle of Stalluponen (in present day Lithuania) was fought by a corps of the German Eighth Army against Russian General Rennenkampf's First Army.
Russia's planned invasion of East Prussia - which comprised a major component of their pre-war strategy, Plan 19 - was two-pronged. Rennenkampf's First Army, of 200,000 men, entered East Prussia from the north while General Samsonov's Second Army invaded from the south.
Rennenkampf's forces marched into East Prussia on 17 August 1914, following cavalry probes conducted five days earlier, the same day that General Hermann von Francois, commander of I Corps - attached to General von Prittwitz's Eighth Army - brought them to action.
Launching a frontal attack, the aggressive Francois failed to drive the Russians back to the frontier, losing upto 3,000 prisoners in the process.
As Francois's corps withdrew to Gumbinnen, Rennenkampf's army resumed its slow march westward into East Prussia. Francois urged Prittwitz to launch an offensive against Rennenkampf sooner rather than later. Prittwitz, worried about by Francois's initial failure, concurred, authorising a much larger attack upon the Russian First Army three days later, on 20 August, at the Battle of Gumbinnen
The Battle of Gumbinnen, 1914
Signalling the first major offensive on the Eastern Front, and following an initial action and defeat of the German Eighth Army at Stalluponen on 17 August 1914, the Battle of Gumbinnen was initiated by Eighth Army's commander General von Prittwitz, during the early hours of 20 August.
Somewhat worried by the failure of I Corps under the impatient, aggressive General Hermann von Francois in losing up 3,000 prisoners at Stalluponen, before pulling his corps back to Gumbinnen, 15 km to the west of Stalluponen (an attack launched by Francois without prior consultation with the Eighth Army commander
Aware that General Samsonov's Russian Second Army was slowly winding its way northwards from the south, Prittwitz decided to engage Rennenkampf's Russian forces, advancing across a 55 km front, at the first available opportunity. Eighth Army's strength was estimated at approximately 150,000, set against Rennenkampf's 200,000.
After assigning a corps to guard Eighth Army's rear, he dispatched three corps plus a further division to the line south of Gumbinnen, around 40 km inside the East Prussian border.
The German offensive was launched somewhat in haste, certainly before two of his corps were in readiness. General Mackensen - whose XVII Corps was sited in the centre - and General von Below - to the south - did not achieve a full state of readiness until some four to eight hours after Francois had commenced the attack in the north with I Corps at 4 am on the morning of 20 August. As for the additional division dispatched by Prittwitz, it arrived too late to see any action whatsoever.
Rennenkampf's forces defended with vigour, his right held during mid-afternoon even after almost running short of shells, Francois was forced to retreat 8km. This caused Mackensen to call of an advance when his own forces were ready to attack at until he realized the situation.
Alerted however by Francois's earlier attack, effective Russian deployment of heavy artillery wreaked havoc among Mackensen's troops, forcing him to withdraw some 24km, with Below, in disorder. Francois, aware that the German centre and right were in disarray, was similarly obliged to authorise a retreat; in the process the Russians managed to capture 6,000 prisoners during the German retreat.
Prittwitz, panicked by the effectiveness of the Russian counter-attack, and concerned that Samsonov's advancing southern Second Army would combine to envelop Eighth Army - despite Rennenkampf's apparent unwillingness to pursue his foe - ordered a general withdrawal to the River Vistula - effectively conceding the entire Russian invasion of East Prussia.
Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief of Staff in Berlin, was furious at Prittwitz's capitulation. Promptly recalling Prittwitz and his deputy von Waldersee to Berlin - an effective dismissal - he brought the imperturbable Paul von Hindenburg out of retirement and gave him command of Eighth Army, though he wanted to assigning as his Chief of Staff the bold, aggressive Erich Ludendorff, but who was latterly impresse killed during the German attack on Liege.
Unfortunately for Hindenburg, the retreat to the Vistula had been fully executed when he arrived in the east on 23 August. Consulting with Colonel Hoffmann, Prittwitz's deputy chief of operations, he resolved to reverse Prittwitz's strategy of withdrawal, choosing instead to launch an hasty and unprepared offensive against Samsonov's approaching Second Army. This action resulted in possibly the greatest defeat of the war, at Tannenberg.
Part 5: The Battle of Tannenberg, 1914
Perhaps the most spectacular and complete German defeat of the First World War, the encirclement and destruction of the German Army in late August 1914 virtually ended Germany’s presence of East Prussia.
Russia's incursion into German territory was two-pronged. General Samsonov had begun to take his Second Army into the south-western corner of East Prussia whilst General Rennenkampf advanced into its north-east with the First Army. The two armies planned to combine in assaulting General Prittwitz's German Eighth Army, Rennenkampf in a frontal attack while Samsonov engulfed Prittwitz from the rear.
Upon his arrival in East Prussia on 23 August Hindenburg immediately reversed Prittwitz's decision to withdraw, choosing instead to authorise a plan of action prepared by Colonel Maximilian Hoffmann, Prittwitz's deputy chief of operations. While Hindenburg received much of the blame for the subsequent action at Tannenberg, the actual plan of attack was devised in detail by Hoffmann.
Hoffmann proposed a ploy whereby cavalry troops would be employed as a screen at Vistula, the intention being to confuse Rennenkampf who, he knew, held a deep personal vendetta with Samsonov (who had complained of Rennenkampf's conduct at the Battle of Mukden in 1905) and so would be disinclined to come to his aid if he had justifiable cause not to.
Meanwhile, General Hermann von Francois's I Corps were transported by rail to the far southwest to meet the left wing of Samsonov's Second Army. Hindenburg's remaining two corps, under Mackensen and Below, were to await orders to move south by foot so as to confront Samsonov's opposite right wing. Finally, a fourth corps was ordered to remain at Vistula to meet Samsonov as his army moved north. The trap was being set.
Samsonov was similarly unaware of Hoffmann's plan or of its execution. Assured that his Second Army was en route to pursue and destroy the supposedly retreating Eighth Army (and supported in doing so by overall commander Yakov Zhilinski, who was subsequently dismissed for his part in the following debacle), he continued to direct his army of twelve divisions - three corps - in a north-westerly direction towards the Vistula. The remaining VI Corps he directed north towards his original objective, Seeburg-Rastenburg.
On 22 August the bulk of Samsonov's forces reached the extremities of the German line, fighting (and winning) small actions as it continued to advance into the German trap of encirclement.
Hoffman issued an order to General Francois to initiate the attack on Samsonov's left wing at Usdau on 25 August. Remarkably, Francois rejected what was clearly a direct order, choosing instead to wait until his artillery support was in readiness on 27 August. Hoffmann - travelled to see Francois and to repeat the order. Reluctantly, Francois agreed to commence the attack, but complained of a lack of shells.
Francois however had no intention of attacking without artillery support. Buying time he fell to bickering with Hoffman and, as he intended, began his attack, by I Corps, on 27 August - and rapidly failed in its attack, and encirlcled and captured and so cutting communication with the rest of the German centre,
At this stage Hoffman, fearful that Rennenkampf's forces might yet suddenly join the fray, ordered the Army to fall back west, Helmuth von Moltke, the German Army Chief of Staff in Berlin, was similarly nervous of the German Army's prospects in the east. He astonished Hoffman by telephoning him with notification that he was dispatching a cavalry division and three corps from the west to bolster the Eastern Front. Aware that the troops could be ill-afforded by the weakened German defence of the Rhine - Hoffman protested that the reinforcements were to late. The German Army had lost at Tannenburg, it forces were dispersed, leaving its supplies and heavy weapons behind and VI corps had already been defeated. .
It was too late for a majority of the Germany forces, as they scattered - many throwing down their weapons and running - directly into the encircling Russian forces. Relief from the new divisions that Moltke had sent in the form of counter-attacks were weak and insufficient.
95,000 German troops were captured in the action; an estimated 30,000 were killed or wounded, and of his original 150,000 total, only around 10,000 of Hindenburg’s men escaped. The Russians suffered fewer than 20,000 casualties and, in addition to prisoners captured over 500 guns. Sixty trains were required to transport captured equipment to Russia.
Hindenburg, lost in the surrounding forests with his aides, shot himself, unable to face reporting the scale of the disaster to the Kaiser. His body was subsequently found by Russian search parties and accorded a military burial.
A great propaganda victory, the scale of the German defeat shocked Germany's allies, who wondered whether it signalled the defeat of the German army.
Intoduction
The two general elections in 1910 result in Liberal governments but with Irish nationalists holding the balance of power. In the rest of Britain the issue is whether the Lords can overrule the Commons; in Ireland it is whether the Lords can continue to block Home Rule. In November, a month before the second poll, the Ulster Unionist Council under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson forms a secret committee to buy weapons and form an army to resist Home Rule.
When the Third Home Rule Bill introduced in 1912 - Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law promises to oppose it and encourages resistance in Ulster.
On September 28, nearly 500,000 Protestants sign the 'Solemn League and Covenant' to defend Ulster against Home Rule.
The UVF is formed The Home Rule Bill is passed by the Commons in 1913 and accepted by the Lords. The next day, the Ulster Volunteer Force is formed and begins arming.
Catholics form the Irish Volunteers as a counter-balance and in opposition to proposals that Ulster should remain within the Union.
Preparations for revolt In March 1914, the British Army commander in Ireland, Sir Arthur Paget, asks his officers if they are prepared to force Ulster into joining an independent Ireland. Sixty at the Curragh camp including its commander say they would not - the 'Curragh Mutiny'.
The UVF smuggles in 24,000 rifles and 3m rounds of ammunition in April, bringing their total of rifles to 40,000. The Irish Volunteers smuggle in a small quantity of rifles at Howth three months later. A Infantry regiment tries to stop them, fails and later fires on a crowd of civilians, killing three.
June 1914, the home rule bill, becomes a reality, the UVF storm and hold key points in Ulster, mainly Belfast, Londonderry and Lisburn. They also start to force Northern Catholics to move out of the towns and cities. Using car and vans from the post office and docks they start to roam the countryside and start to burn catholic farms.
The Government orders the the 5th Infantry Brigade based at Curragh to move to Ulster to restore order. The GOC of Ireland Paget, refuses and resigns his commission, he is followed by other offices who supported him. Leaving the 5th Brigade with out any senior officers, forces the War Department to send the 1st and 2nd Division to Ulster to restore order.
Churchill sends in the Navy to seize the Docks in Belfast, but faces heavy but in-accurate fire from captured Costal guns being used by the UVF. The Dock and the surrounding area is shelled by Royal Navy Light Cruisers and Destroyers. Once seized by Royal Marines and Naval landing parties the two divisions are able to be shipped and disembarked and restore order in the city.
Though out the next three months, insurgent attacks by the UVF, makes the pacifying of Ulster a hard and slow action for the Army. With riots taking place in Liverpool and Glasgow in support of their fellow orange order members, forces the Government to commit troops to support police in some major industrial cities to prevent further riots. When war breaks out in August the government is to pre-occupied in the up-rising to take any notice in another European war, even is Belguim was invaded
PART 1
The Invasion of Beligium
FIGHTING ON 4 AUGUST
On the first day of World War I for the Kingdom of Belgium, around 0900, 12 regiments of the German 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions invaded the district of Herve, which would permit a rapid advance to the Meuse. The cavalry needed to seize Vise, which commanded the passage of the Meuse. Without Vise, it would be impossible to invest Liege or to deploy a cavalry screen on the left bank to mask the main army's movements.
Behind the cavalry, the mass of the Army of the Meuse, 130,000 strong, entered Belgium by the road from Aix-La-Chapelle, by the main road from Gemmenich to Vise, by the valley of the Vesdre, and by the Malmedy Road. The distance from the border to the Meuse River was 30 kilometres. By mid-afternoon, the Germans had reached the position Bombaye-Herve-Pepinster-Remouchamps.
At 1300, the 2nd and 4th found the bridges at Vise and Argenteau destroyed. The 2nd Battalion of the 12th Belgian Line Regiment under Major Collyns was deployed on the left bank to disrupt any attempted river crossings. The Germans attempted to build a pontoon bridge and came under heavy fire from across the river and from Fort Pontisse. The 2nd Battalion valiantly defended the river approaches, using their Parent Regiment's Machine Gun Company preventing the German force from crossing the river. German casualties were high. Further north, at Lixhe, on the Dutch frontier, two Hussar regiments forded the river. This Cavalry force was spotted in advance by the Belgian’s left flank companies, with enough time to create a temporary barricade up the Belgium’s force threw back a attempted charge by the Hussar regiment, causing them heavy causalities.
German bombardment of the Stubborn Belgians was answered by the guns of Fort Pontisse. The guns of the Fort Battice and the 2/12th Regiment held off Von der Marwitz's forces for the rest of the day and he was forced to bivouac for the night without reaching his objective. The German’s continued to suffer from random artillery fire and sniping shots from Belgium sharp shooters. The Germans had received their first taste of the Belgian spirit. In the desperate hours to come, the ferocious defence of Liege would exact a greater toll on the right bank.
THE TERRIBLE NIGHT OF 5-6 AUGUST
During the night, a bridge was built at Lixhe despite the Belgium forces inflicted heave causalities on the German Engineers, and the cavalry squadrons which were sent to penetrate as far as Tongres to screen movements of the main army north of Liege were also thrown back in complete disorder.
Early in the morning a flag of truce was sent to Major Collyns asking him to allow the Germans to pass. He refused.
Swarms of Germans advanced in the Meuse-Vesdre sector, covered by fire from their heavy guns (15 cm howitzers) German guns were directed by aircraft spotters. These Guns shelled the bank of Meuse river, trying to force the 2/12 Regiment to withdraw. This was only partially successful, as the Belgium’s had used the night to dig into the town, using cellars and the sewer system. Their morale was raised when the nearby fortress’ guns replied effectively to the enemy fire.
At 1740 hrs, with the Belgium’s being reduced to only 25% of their original strength, Maj Collyns decided to carry out a orderly retreat into the Countryside, making his men to don civilian clothing, and prepare to carry out Franc-Trilliers style attacks on the advancing German.
On the morning of the 6th, after completing new pontoon bridges the previous night , the Germans, after been held up for two days on the banks of the Meuse, attempted to launch an attack to enveloped Chaudfontaine. After a preliminary bombardment, the enemy infantry appeared and advanced in close formation. The guns of the forts, interval artillery, machine guns and rifles fired at the masses. Entire ranks were mowed down, but they kept coming. Defenders withheld fire until the enemy reached the barbed wire entanglements and the glacis of the forts. Masses of Germans kept coming again and again. They succeeded in reaching the wire, despite tremendous losses and thy failed to reach the trench parapets. General Leman ordered a counterattack by the 11th Brigade, consisting of 11th and 31st Regiments under General Bertrand. The Belgians advanced with fixed bayonets and the Germans retreated.
All day long, Belgian forces and fortress artillery successfully checked the German advance. In the vicinity of Evegnee, the Belgians took 800 prisoners.
In the north, fighting concentrated around Fort Barchon. At 1000, after a preliminary bombardment, elements of the German 53rd Regiment, 27th Brigade, approached the fort, threatening the gorge. They were thrown back by infantry fire and by the quick-firing 5.7cm guns and by counterattacks of the 11th Brigade. By 1700 the German attack had abated, but bombardment of Barchon and Evegnee by 21cm mortars of the 27th located at Mortous and Bolland, continued.
At 1430 main elements of the 34th Brigade arrived in the northern sector. By 2230 two regiments had forded the Meuse at Lixhe. Further south, the 14th advanced to the line Melen-Soumagne, the 11th to the east of Chaudfontaine. The Germans in this vicinity had met only small patrols. In the sector Vesdre-Ourthe, the 38th marched on Beaufays to menace Fort Embourg and to protect the flanks of the 11th. Behind the 38th was the 43rd, near the confluence of the Ourthe and Ambleve.
In the Meuse sector, two platoons of 2nd Lancers came upon the lead cavalry patrols of the 38th Brigade, some 500 strong. The lancers set up a defensive position in the cemetery of Plaineveaux, in the Forest of Beauregard, near Boncelles. By 2000, forward elements of the 38th reached Plaineveaux and engaged the Belgians in combat. 2nd Lancers had 75% casualties.
THE ATTACK ON THE FORTS
By the evening of 7 August, German forces were within 1 to 2 kilometres of the forts, which were pounded by German artillery throughout the night. During the night, the fighting continued in a surreal atmosphere. Soldiers clashed under the powerful beams of the fortress searchlights; grotesque images of death were illuminated by the constant flashes of exploding shells. Men fought in every sector, and in every sector the valiant Belgian defenders began to feel the weight of the German attack, and in some areas, began to break.
Fresh attacks were delivered in the Meuse-Vesdre and Ourthe-Meuse sectors. Fort Barchon was attacked from the northeast by Germans on the road from Dalhem to Jupille, passing by Rabozee. Guns of Barchon and Pontisse bombarded the attackers. As the Germans reached Rabozee, they were fired on from a trench at right angles to the road which flanked the position. Heavy losses were inflicted from a second, concealed trench. Bayonet fighting ensured. By dawn over 400 Germans lay dead in the fields.
There were also attacks during the night at Fort Boncelles. Defence of this position was very difficult because the Germans advanced under cover of the Forests of Plaineveaux, Neuville, and Vequee, and the Forest of Begnac, a continuation of the St. Lambert woods, which reached all the way to Trooz on the Meuse. Here, the Hanoverians advanced by way of Francorchamps, Spa, Stoumont, Aywaille, and Esneux.
At 1130 on the 8th, the Germans began shelling Forts Embourg and Boncelles. Shellfire was very well directed, exploding on the parapets. An infantry attack followed. Infantry attacked the trenches in the gaps and were mown down by machine guns and from the guns of the forts. The first attack was repulsed. At 0300, a fresh assault was launched. The Germans crept to the trenches and attacked. The searchlights of the forts were turned on them and they were annihilated. The attackers fell by the hundreds. Succeeding waves crawled over dead comrades to the trench parapets. Hand-to-hand fighting continued for 5 hours. The defense started to give. General Leman dispatched men of the 12th, 9th, and 15th Regiments to assist. Counterattacks stopped the advance. Of the defenders of Fort Boncelles, 9 were killed and 40 wounded. 1,400 interval troops were killed (men of the 1st Chasseurs, 9th Regiment). The statement by those who cleaned up the battlefield the following morning that 10,000 German bodies were removed was never officially admitted or confirmed.
Similar fighting took place at Fleron and Chaudfontaine and in the gaps between Fleron and Evegnee. At 1900 on 8 August, Germans dug in 800 meters from Retinne attacked the outposts of Evegnee. The gap between Fleron and Evegnee was defended by a trench 150 meters long at Surfosse. At 2330, the Germans advanced on the trench and were set back with murderous fire from the thinly manned trench. Fighting for the trench continued until 0230. The Germans finally silenced the position by 0400.
By now it was evident that the Belgians were fighting at a fever pitch. Not only that, but many believed that they could defeat the mighty German army. An example of this confidence is depicted in the narrative of the men fighting in the Evegnee-Fleron gap, under command of Commandant Munaut. He noticed that his men were firing blindly at the advancing Germans, failing to look through the loopholes in the parapets while they fired, and missing their targets which were only 100 meters away. Munaut noticed that the German aim was no better and decided to show his men how bad it was. He jumped on to the parapet and took a step towards the enemy – not one German bullet struck him. The act gave his troops new-found confidence.
At 0230 the 34th marched south out of Hermee and quickly came under fire of Fort Pontisse. 3 companies were ordered to take out the Belgian artillery positions but discovered the fire was coming from inside the fort. The companies found themselves at the foot of the glacis, unable to advance. Between Pontisse and Liers, the 90th Fusilier Regiment attacked the interval trenches, but were caught by a heavy crossfire from the Milmort and Rhee forts. Suffering heavy loses and becoming pinned and disorganised after their Commanding officer was killed leading a charge, they were forced to withdraw.
Heavy, bloody fighting continued throughout the morning, resulting with failure of 90th Fusilier Regiment to take the Milmort and Rhee forts. The failure of the taking of Herstal postponed the planned taking of Liege. Thus, the failure to penetrate the fortress interval positions was starting to create dangerous consequences for whole timing of the plan to march into France and circling Paris.
While resistance in the vicinity of Pontisse, Barchon, and Boncelles was stiff, the Germans still unable to penetrate via the intervals. Many of the routes between the forts were heavily wooded, in deep cuts, out of the line of sight of the fortress guns. (Where attacking forces were spotted, the guns were very effective). Thus, throughout the night of 8-9 August, the Germans attempted to penetrate the gap between Barchon and Meuse, and the Evegnee-Fleron gap to fight their way into the city. At 1000, the 165th Regiment fought its way to the heights at Jupille, to the east of Chartreuse, by way of Queue-du-Bois and Bellaire. At each step, the Belgian resistance was fierce and fighting was murderous, and eventually being forced to retire.
With the failure to capture the hills overlooking the city of Liege, German forces unable to carry out the planned bombardment the Citadel and the city. The bombardment would continue throughout the night. Meanwhile, General Lundendorff’s launched a attack to seize key locations in the city, including the bridges. However, by this time, General Leman 3rd Division from Liege, was heavily dug in, and with Artillery support from the Citadel and close forts, General Lundendorff’s force was stalled, after several further attacks, the German High Command conceded that the continued attack should be halted, after General Lundendorff was killed leading a third attack.
The communiqué of 9th August to the German High Command announced that the Fortress of Liege had failed to fall.. Von Emmich's troops marched out of range of the forts guns to regroup and to wait for the arrival of the heavy Austrian Mortars and the Grupps 420mm Guns. The forts, especially those of the left bank, remained in Belgium hands. Until they fell and the roads and railroads west of Liege were opened, the huge German Army was going nowhere.
.Part 2
When, on August 8 King Albert read his speech to the joint meeting of the Belgian Chamber and Senate, it might well have been thought that the darkest hour had come in Belgium's long and troubled history. But the King spoke with unfaltering resolve. Come what might, the Belgian people would maintain the freedom which was their birthright. In the moment for action they would not shrink from sacrifices. "I have faith in our destinies," King Albert concluded. "A country which defends itself wins respect, and cannot perish." The speech echoed the feelings of a united nation. In the face of peril, party was no longer known. M. Emile Vandervelde, leader of the Socialists, accepted a post in the Ministry. Without hesitation, the two Houses voted the measures of emergency proposed by the Government. The announcement by M. de Broqueville, the Prime Minister, that German troops were already on Belgian soil caused deep emotion, but the emotion was not born of fear. It was the realisation of how priceless is the heritage of liberty.
On that stirring day in Brussels, which witnessed the departure of the King to join his troops at the front, the sentiment upper-most was in truth "faith in the nation's destinies." Great Britain was busy in Ireland to come to the defence of Belgian rights. Not merely reservists called to the colours, but volunteers in multitudes were anxious to take up arms. Crowds besieged the recruiting offices. The public feeling in the Belgian capital reflected the public feeling everywhere.
The mobilisation of the defensive forces of the country had proceeded smoothly and swiftly. Though it was common knowledge that in no part of Europe had the espionage system worked from Berlin become more elaborate, the national spirit was but intensified. Then came news of the fighting, and of the dauntless resistance offered by the garrison at Liége. Later came the first of many German prisoners of war.
Mistakes and miscalculations undoubtedly entered into the German disaster at Liége, and above all the mistake of grossly underestimating the quality and efficiency of the Belgian forces. That mistake was persisted in during all the attempts to storm the fortress. It cost thousands of German lives. Not certainly until this war is over will the extent of the disaster be really known. But that it was a disaster of the greatest magnitude is beyond any question.
From the merely military standpoint, the shattering of three army corps is a huge price to pay even for victory. But the shattering of General von Emmich's army accomplished nothing. It had merely proved that to hurl men in massed formation against positions defended by modern guns and rifles is folly. Elementary common sense, however, would enforce the same conclusion. As the assaults upon Liége showed, elementary common sense is not a strong point of Prussian militarism. Because massed formations were used with effect by Frederick the Great, massed formations were the one idea of some of his would-be venerators.
The moral effect was greater than the military. It brought down in three days all that edifice of prestige which Prussian diplomacy, Prussian espionage, and Prussianised philosophy had been labouring for a generation to build up. To say that Europe gasped with surprise is to state the effect mildly.
The peoples opposed to German ambitions woke as from a spell. The aspect of the war had changed. Here was an army, part of the great Fighting Machine in which war was presumed to be practically embodied as an exact science, beginning a campaign with the blunder of assuming that men fighting for their country were no better than half-trained mercenaries. The resistance to the passage of the Meuse; the resistance offered to the troops sent to seize the country south of Liége was treated as negligible. A general of resource and experience would have reckoned on that resistance as a certainty.
Neither Prussian strategy then, nor Prussian tactics, were the perfection they had been taken to be. Both had broken at the first test. Nowhere was the gravity of the moral effect better appreciated than at Berlin. Henceforward the effort of Berlin was to efface it. In that fact will be found the key to all the succeeding "seventies" in Belgium.
That in Berlin, at all events in official and informed quarters, the surprise was as profound as elsewhere is proved by the fact that on August 9, through the neutral channel of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, the German Government made a second offer. The offer was in these terms.
The fortress of Liege had held after a courageous defence. The German Government regrets that as a consequence of the attitude of the Belgian Government against Germany such bloody encounters should have occurred. Germany does not want an enemy in Belgium. It is only by the force of events that she has been forced, by reason of the military measures of France, to take the grave determination of entering Belgium and attacking Liége as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has, in a heroic resistance against a great superiority, maintained the honour of its arms in the most brilliant fashion, the German Government prays his Majesty the King and the Belgian Government to avert from Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government is ready for any agreement with Belgium which could be reconciled in any conceivable way with its conflict with France. Once more Germany offers her solemn assurance that she has not been actuated by any intention to appropriate Belgian territory, and that that intention is far from her. Germany is always ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will permit her.
Part 3: The Battle of the Frontiers, 1914
The Battle of the Frontiers comprises five offensives launched under French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre and German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke's initiative during the first month of the war, August 1914.
The battles - at Mulhouse, Lorraine, the Ardennes, Charleroi and Mons - were launched more or less simultaneously, and marked the collision of both French and German invasion plans (Plan XVII and the Schlieffen Plan, respectively), each battle impacting the course of others.
Battles: The Battle of Mulhouse, 1914
The Battle of Mulhouse, one of the August Battles of the Frontiers, comprised the opening French attack of the war, and began at 05:00 on 7 August 1914.
Forming a fundamental component of France war strategy, Plan XVII, the Battle of Mulhouse was intended to secure the recapture of Alsace (with Lorraine to follow separately), territories lost to Germany as a consequence of losing the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.
Aside from the matter of national pride inherent in the capture of Alsace, French troops there would be well placed to guard the flank of subsequent French invasions further north.
In command of the operation to take Mulhouse was General Bonneau, and he was assigned a detachment of the First Army, plus one cavalry and two infantry divisions. Ranged against him was the German Seventh Army under General von Heeringen.
Having crossed the frontier on the morning of 7 August, the French quickly seized the border town of Altkirch with a bayonet charge. However Bonneau, suspicious of the light state of the German defences, was wary of advancing much further for fear of stepping into a carefully lain German trap. However, under orders to move to the Rhine next day, Bonneau continued his advance, taking Mulhouse shortly after its German occupants had left the town.
The taking of Mulhouse, albeit without opposition, sparked wild celebrations in France. The French were regarded as liberators by the inhabitants of Mulhouse itself.
However, with the arrival of German reserves from Strasbourg, the Germans mounted a counter-attack on the morning of 9 August at nearby Cernay.
Joseph Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, hastily despatched a reserve division to assist in the defence, but they arrived in time to save the town from recapture, This caused the Germans to withdraw on 10 August and preventing them to encircle the French. Alsace was firmly in French hands
The Invasion of Lorraine, 1914
The French invasion of Lorraine formed one of the major objectives of the French pre-war offensive strategy against Germany, Plan XVII. A consequence of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia festered in the minds of both French public and military alike, a national humiliation that needed to be addressed during the next war with the Prussians.
Plan XVII therefore made the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine a central plank of French strategy. This much was known to Germany before the First World War began, and was consequently factored into the German Schlieffen Plan.
One of the Battles of the Frontiers, the Invasion of Lorraine (also known as the Battle of Morhange-Sarrebourg) began with the French First and Second Armies entering the city on 14 August 1914, following on from General Paul Pau’s 8 August offensive at the Battle of Mulhouse, another key target near the Swiss border, with his ‘Army of Alsace’.
The French First Army, under General Auguste Dubail, intended to take Sarrebourg, east of Nancy, a strongly defended town, with General Noel de Castelnau’s Second Army taking Morhange, similarly fortified. The task of defending these towns fell to German Crown Prince Rupprecht, who had overall command of the German Sixth and General Josias von Herringen’s Seventh Army.
Rupprecht tried tpimplement a strategy of apparently retreating under the force of the French attack, only to bounce back in a fierce, cleverly manoeuvred counter-attack, having lured the French armies into a strong attack upon a heavily defended position. As the French armies advanced they encountered increasingly stern German opposition, including treacherous machine gun fire and heavy artillery.
Rupprecht, however, pressed German Army Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke to authorise a more aggressive strategy, under which the Germans would mount a counter-attack, the aim being to drive the French back to Nancy.
With Moltke’s agreement the offensive was launched on 20 August, whilst de Castelnau’s Second Army entered Morhange and heavily defended it. Caught by surprise by the French capture of Morhange and without the assistance of an entrenched position, and facing treacherous machine gun fire and heavy artillery the Germany force was forced to fall back,.
Gaps began to appear between the German armies, prompting Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre to push the Army of Alsace forward Diverting from the Schlieffen Plan, Rupprecht’s forces were reinforced withdraw to reform and to prepare for an attack against the two French armies. However the French, through the successful use of reconnaissance aircraft, were alerted to the German's build-up and so prepared an adequate defence. Attacked therefore on 24 August, German gains were minimal, limited to the acquisition of a small salient into French lines, itself reduced by heavy French counter-attacks on the morning of 25 August.
The Battle of the Ardennes, 1914
On the 21-23 August 1914, the Battle of the Ardennes was sparked somewhat unusually by the mutual confused collision of French and German invasion forces in the lower Ardennes forests.
According to the pre-war French war strategy document, Plan XVII, German forces in the area were only expected to be light, with French light, rapid-firing. artillery proving advantageous in a wooded terrain such as that found in the Ardennes.
By 20 August however it was becoming apparent - first to General Lanrezac's French Fifth Army, and then to Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre - that a massive German presence was gathering in the area. That same day the Germans launched a counter-offensive against the French advance into Lorraine. Even so, Joffre authorised an invasion of the Ardennes on 20 August for the following day.
Two sets of armies joined battle on both French and German sides. General Pierre Ruffey's Third Army and, further north, General Fernand de Langle de Cary's Fourth Army, fought the German Fourth and Fifth Armies: the former led by Duke Albrecht, the latter by Crown Prince Wilhelm. The two German armies together formed the centre of the German Schlieffen Plan's advance into France.
The French Fifth Army, meanwhile, had been despatched northwards to Charleroi on the back of news of a German build-up of strength in Belgium.
German troops had begun to advance through the woods on 19 August, constructing defensive positions as they went. Crown Prince Wilhelm was situated at Briey with Duke Albrecht en route to Neufchateau.
The aim of the advancing French forces was straightforward: to attack the German centre in the flank as it passed through the woods of the Ardennes.
With the descent of thick fog the opposing forces literally stumbled into each other in the woods on 21 August; in such fog, advance reconnaissance was of little worth. At this early stage the French mistook the German presence for small screening forces; in reality the French were heavily outnumbered. The first day of the battle, 21 August, was marked by scattered fighting, mostly skirmishes. Widespread battle only began the following day.
Superior tactical positioning by the Germans more than offset the occasional French success, , although casualties were heavy on both sides. French troops, dressed brightly, were notably conspicuous in the woods, no concession to camouflage having been considered.
The French, acting with 'offensive spirit', charged at German positions in the wood, pushing the germans back towards Germany.
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As a consequence of the poorly managed German retreat the French were able to take hold important iron resources, and were able to continue their advance into Germany. The scale of the German defeat was notable, only becoming clear to Moltke after a period of time had elapsed. Even then he was inclined to blame the poor performance of his forces rather than attribute it to strategy and circumstances. It did not dissuade him from planning further offensive attacks in the near future
Part 4 – The Russian Steam Roller
The first action on the Eastern Front, the Battle of Stalluponen (in present day Lithuania) was fought by a corps of the German Eighth Army against Russian General Rennenkampf's First Army.
Russia's planned invasion of East Prussia - which comprised a major component of their pre-war strategy, Plan 19 - was two-pronged. Rennenkampf's First Army, of 200,000 men, entered East Prussia from the north while General Samsonov's Second Army invaded from the south.
Rennenkampf's forces marched into East Prussia on 17 August 1914, following cavalry probes conducted five days earlier, the same day that General Hermann von Francois, commander of I Corps - attached to General von Prittwitz's Eighth Army - brought them to action.
Launching a frontal attack, the aggressive Francois failed to drive the Russians back to the frontier, losing upto 3,000 prisoners in the process.
As Francois's corps withdrew to Gumbinnen, Rennenkampf's army resumed its slow march westward into East Prussia. Francois urged Prittwitz to launch an offensive against Rennenkampf sooner rather than later. Prittwitz, worried about by Francois's initial failure, concurred, authorising a much larger attack upon the Russian First Army three days later, on 20 August, at the Battle of Gumbinnen
The Battle of Gumbinnen, 1914
Signalling the first major offensive on the Eastern Front, and following an initial action and defeat of the German Eighth Army at Stalluponen on 17 August 1914, the Battle of Gumbinnen was initiated by Eighth Army's commander General von Prittwitz, during the early hours of 20 August.
Somewhat worried by the failure of I Corps under the impatient, aggressive General Hermann von Francois in losing up 3,000 prisoners at Stalluponen, before pulling his corps back to Gumbinnen, 15 km to the west of Stalluponen (an attack launched by Francois without prior consultation with the Eighth Army commander
Aware that General Samsonov's Russian Second Army was slowly winding its way northwards from the south, Prittwitz decided to engage Rennenkampf's Russian forces, advancing across a 55 km front, at the first available opportunity. Eighth Army's strength was estimated at approximately 150,000, set against Rennenkampf's 200,000.
After assigning a corps to guard Eighth Army's rear, he dispatched three corps plus a further division to the line south of Gumbinnen, around 40 km inside the East Prussian border.
The German offensive was launched somewhat in haste, certainly before two of his corps were in readiness. General Mackensen - whose XVII Corps was sited in the centre - and General von Below - to the south - did not achieve a full state of readiness until some four to eight hours after Francois had commenced the attack in the north with I Corps at 4 am on the morning of 20 August. As for the additional division dispatched by Prittwitz, it arrived too late to see any action whatsoever.
Rennenkampf's forces defended with vigour, his right held during mid-afternoon even after almost running short of shells, Francois was forced to retreat 8km. This caused Mackensen to call of an advance when his own forces were ready to attack at until he realized the situation.
Alerted however by Francois's earlier attack, effective Russian deployment of heavy artillery wreaked havoc among Mackensen's troops, forcing him to withdraw some 24km, with Below, in disorder. Francois, aware that the German centre and right were in disarray, was similarly obliged to authorise a retreat; in the process the Russians managed to capture 6,000 prisoners during the German retreat.
Prittwitz, panicked by the effectiveness of the Russian counter-attack, and concerned that Samsonov's advancing southern Second Army would combine to envelop Eighth Army - despite Rennenkampf's apparent unwillingness to pursue his foe - ordered a general withdrawal to the River Vistula - effectively conceding the entire Russian invasion of East Prussia.
Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief of Staff in Berlin, was furious at Prittwitz's capitulation. Promptly recalling Prittwitz and his deputy von Waldersee to Berlin - an effective dismissal - he brought the imperturbable Paul von Hindenburg out of retirement and gave him command of Eighth Army, though he wanted to assigning as his Chief of Staff the bold, aggressive Erich Ludendorff, but who was latterly impresse killed during the German attack on Liege.
Unfortunately for Hindenburg, the retreat to the Vistula had been fully executed when he arrived in the east on 23 August. Consulting with Colonel Hoffmann, Prittwitz's deputy chief of operations, he resolved to reverse Prittwitz's strategy of withdrawal, choosing instead to launch an hasty and unprepared offensive against Samsonov's approaching Second Army. This action resulted in possibly the greatest defeat of the war, at Tannenberg.
Part 5: The Battle of Tannenberg, 1914
Perhaps the most spectacular and complete German defeat of the First World War, the encirclement and destruction of the German Army in late August 1914 virtually ended Germany’s presence of East Prussia.
Russia's incursion into German territory was two-pronged. General Samsonov had begun to take his Second Army into the south-western corner of East Prussia whilst General Rennenkampf advanced into its north-east with the First Army. The two armies planned to combine in assaulting General Prittwitz's German Eighth Army, Rennenkampf in a frontal attack while Samsonov engulfed Prittwitz from the rear.
Upon his arrival in East Prussia on 23 August Hindenburg immediately reversed Prittwitz's decision to withdraw, choosing instead to authorise a plan of action prepared by Colonel Maximilian Hoffmann, Prittwitz's deputy chief of operations. While Hindenburg received much of the blame for the subsequent action at Tannenberg, the actual plan of attack was devised in detail by Hoffmann.
Hoffmann proposed a ploy whereby cavalry troops would be employed as a screen at Vistula, the intention being to confuse Rennenkampf who, he knew, held a deep personal vendetta with Samsonov (who had complained of Rennenkampf's conduct at the Battle of Mukden in 1905) and so would be disinclined to come to his aid if he had justifiable cause not to.
Meanwhile, General Hermann von Francois's I Corps were transported by rail to the far southwest to meet the left wing of Samsonov's Second Army. Hindenburg's remaining two corps, under Mackensen and Below, were to await orders to move south by foot so as to confront Samsonov's opposite right wing. Finally, a fourth corps was ordered to remain at Vistula to meet Samsonov as his army moved north. The trap was being set.
Samsonov was similarly unaware of Hoffmann's plan or of its execution. Assured that his Second Army was en route to pursue and destroy the supposedly retreating Eighth Army (and supported in doing so by overall commander Yakov Zhilinski, who was subsequently dismissed for his part in the following debacle), he continued to direct his army of twelve divisions - three corps - in a north-westerly direction towards the Vistula. The remaining VI Corps he directed north towards his original objective, Seeburg-Rastenburg.
On 22 August the bulk of Samsonov's forces reached the extremities of the German line, fighting (and winning) small actions as it continued to advance into the German trap of encirclement.
Hoffman issued an order to General Francois to initiate the attack on Samsonov's left wing at Usdau on 25 August. Remarkably, Francois rejected what was clearly a direct order, choosing instead to wait until his artillery support was in readiness on 27 August. Hoffmann - travelled to see Francois and to repeat the order. Reluctantly, Francois agreed to commence the attack, but complained of a lack of shells.
Francois however had no intention of attacking without artillery support. Buying time he fell to bickering with Hoffman and, as he intended, began his attack, by I Corps, on 27 August - and rapidly failed in its attack, and encirlcled and captured and so cutting communication with the rest of the German centre,
At this stage Hoffman, fearful that Rennenkampf's forces might yet suddenly join the fray, ordered the Army to fall back west, Helmuth von Moltke, the German Army Chief of Staff in Berlin, was similarly nervous of the German Army's prospects in the east. He astonished Hoffman by telephoning him with notification that he was dispatching a cavalry division and three corps from the west to bolster the Eastern Front. Aware that the troops could be ill-afforded by the weakened German defence of the Rhine - Hoffman protested that the reinforcements were to late. The German Army had lost at Tannenburg, it forces were dispersed, leaving its supplies and heavy weapons behind and VI corps had already been defeated. .
It was too late for a majority of the Germany forces, as they scattered - many throwing down their weapons and running - directly into the encircling Russian forces. Relief from the new divisions that Moltke had sent in the form of counter-attacks were weak and insufficient.
95,000 German troops were captured in the action; an estimated 30,000 were killed or wounded, and of his original 150,000 total, only around 10,000 of Hindenburg’s men escaped. The Russians suffered fewer than 20,000 casualties and, in addition to prisoners captured over 500 guns. Sixty trains were required to transport captured equipment to Russia.
Hindenburg, lost in the surrounding forests with his aides, shot himself, unable to face reporting the scale of the disaster to the Kaiser. His body was subsequently found by Russian search parties and accorded a military burial.
A great propaganda victory, the scale of the German defeat shocked Germany's allies, who wondered whether it signalled the defeat of the German army.