Been pondering how to make this work and I've got a few ideas.
One obvious POD would be if Germany never provokes the US into entering the war and I have an idea how to avoid this.
In 1915 Erich von Falkenhayn launched a series of deliberately non-decisive operations aimed only at improving the situation in various theaters of war, crushing Serbia and pushing back Russia and Italy but he didn't even have a plan which could actually win the war. When he did come up with one, the concept of a bloodletting to break the French at Verdun not only failed but somehow missed the point that when facing the combined manpower of the French and British empires, plus various allies, a slugging match aimed at only one of the Allies on the Western Front was unlikely to work.
Now, if he had countered traditional German thought that Russia was too big to be knocked out of the war first...given a change in the military situation it follows that a change in military planning would follow.
The biggest problem remains the diplomatic field. It is hard to find anything positive to say about German diplomacy during the war. The method of negotiating with individual members of the Entente, accepting that if the Entente held together Germany was likely doomed, then making demands which were increasingly undeserved instead of a generous peace which, if accepted by one key player, might permit Germany to actually win the war...less than sensible and this remained the standard throughout the war.
As for German diplomacy towards neutrals, Germany gained the support of Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire effectively forced to join the Central Powers by the Entente, but many neutrals would join with the Entente instead. The Zimmerman Telegram may summarize German diplomacy, whereby Germany diplomats deliberately embarked on a series of actions all but certain to bring the US into the war.
As a result, this scenario presents the problem of requiring a diplomatic sense of wisdom which, in all honesty, runs entirely contrary to the actual record. Still, I'll start trying to find a way for what would have to be a radical shift in German diplomatic thought...
One obvious POD would be if Germany never provokes the US into entering the war and I have an idea how to avoid this.
In 1915 Erich von Falkenhayn launched a series of deliberately non-decisive operations aimed only at improving the situation in various theaters of war, crushing Serbia and pushing back Russia and Italy but he didn't even have a plan which could actually win the war. When he did come up with one, the concept of a bloodletting to break the French at Verdun not only failed but somehow missed the point that when facing the combined manpower of the French and British empires, plus various allies, a slugging match aimed at only one of the Allies on the Western Front was unlikely to work.
Now, if he had countered traditional German thought that Russia was too big to be knocked out of the war first...given a change in the military situation it follows that a change in military planning would follow.
The biggest problem remains the diplomatic field. It is hard to find anything positive to say about German diplomacy during the war. The method of negotiating with individual members of the Entente, accepting that if the Entente held together Germany was likely doomed, then making demands which were increasingly undeserved instead of a generous peace which, if accepted by one key player, might permit Germany to actually win the war...less than sensible and this remained the standard throughout the war.
As for German diplomacy towards neutrals, Germany gained the support of Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire effectively forced to join the Central Powers by the Entente, but many neutrals would join with the Entente instead. The Zimmerman Telegram may summarize German diplomacy, whereby Germany diplomats deliberately embarked on a series of actions all but certain to bring the US into the war.
As a result, this scenario presents the problem of requiring a diplomatic sense of wisdom which, in all honesty, runs entirely contrary to the actual record. Still, I'll start trying to find a way for what would have to be a radical shift in German diplomatic thought...