The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

[Athelstane]

In terms of the political situation, I agree the analogy mostly fits. The only difference I see is that there might be room for the USSR to get a favorable political settlement then there was for Japan, although this is heavily dependent on how the war starts. In particular, who resorts to violent force first will greatly shape subsequent public perception of the war and hence the willingness for the public to subsequently deal.

If it is an "accidental" war, Who Fired First might be murky.

But the likelihood is that some harrassing incident by Soviet fighters - there were HUNDREDS of those incidents, after all - gets out of hand. In such a case, it would not be hard for Western governments to *paint* it as a case of Soviet aggression, and then you're off to the races. Also, the context is already that of the Soviets basically trying to starve a major city into submission.

OTOH, the Soviets would have the advantage of millions of Western communists or communist sympathizers, both in Europe and the developing (soon-to-be-decolonizing) world - an ideological advantage considerably greater than any appeal of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. That might complicate perceptions in certain parts of the West, at least in the initial phases of the war.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Here.



Note the description of the mission profile presumed in 1948?

I like how you comprehensively ignore the rest of the article where it makes clear that LeMay noted that SAC could not fulfill it's mission profile in 1948. That rather says it all.

If it is an "accidental" war, Who Fired First might be murky.

But the likelihood is that some harrassing incident by Soviet fighters - there were HUNDREDS of those incidents, after all - gets out of hand. In such a case, it would not be hard for Western governments to *paint* it as a case of Soviet aggression, and then you're off to the races. Also, the context is already that of the Soviets basically trying to starve a major city into submission.

OTOH, the Soviets would have the advantage of millions of Western communists or communist sympathizers, both in Europe and the developing (soon-to-be-decolonizing) world - an ideological advantage considerably greater than any appeal of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. That might complicate perceptions in certain parts of the West, at least in the initial phases of the war.

Yeah, a unclear "Who Shot First?" would have it's own political dynamic that renders it different then either "Americans shoot first" or "Soviet unprovoked attack" scenarios, as both sides would have room to declare the other side is lying. It's speculative how public opinion might develop in the course of the war in that case. The only remaining twist to the analogy is also the fact that the Soviets were close to the bomb by 1948: the atomic production infrastructure was already all in place, they just had to gear it up to get out the first plutonium cores, and aren't liable to be bomber before the USSR gets some bombs as the WAllies didn't know about them. Of course, the Soviets inability to deliver the bomb to the CONUS crimps them, but taking a shot at the key American forward bases with them as a last-ditch effort to derail the American build-up for their atomic offensive is a possibility, although I doubt it would succeed: Anglo-American air defenses would become formidable after a year of wartime mobilization and the Soviets own delivery mechanisms in 1949-50 were crude.

 

[McPherson]

(^^^) Who invades who is clear enough. Kind of obvious.

 

[Athelstane]

(^^^) Who invades who is clear enough. Kind of obvious.

Well, yeah.

By the time that Soviet tanks are rolling through Cologne and Brussels and Paris, it won't be hard to paint them as the aggressors in much of the West, and even float the notion that the whole Blockade was just part of a grand scheme by the International Communist Conspiracy to blitzkrieg through Western Europe all along (even if it's not true).

Western and colonial communists will see it differently, but by 1948 they were already in danger of being politically isolated. That will only intensify in a war like this.

 

[marathag]

The only remaining twist to the analogy is also the fact that the Soviets were close to the bomb by 1948: the atomic production infrastructure was already all in place, they just had to gear it up to get out the first plutonium cores

Other than the really long delay between Joe-1 in August 29, 1949 and Joe-2 in September, 1951: both tower shots, and no drop test of a weaponized example of Joe-3 till October 1951.

Per wiki, test production of bomb cores in the USSR did not begin until March 1950, and combat ready bombs until December 1951 OTL.

Unlike the USA, production totals of HEU and Pu can only be guessed at for the 1950s for the USSR

 

[Athelstane]

Per wiki, test production of bomb cores in the USSR did not begin until March 1950, and combat ready bombs until December 1951 OTL.

In a shooting war, this schedule would likely be accelerated. But then from what I understand, the Soviets were already conducting the program at high tempo to begin with.

Hard to see a deployable weapon before the end of 1950, though I suppose they could bury a test article under a landing beach....

By that point, however, Curtis Lemay would be leveraging the same shooting war to have at least a few hundred nuclear capable bombers (including even some B-47s on a crash program) and warheads on hand. Lemay was a right bastard, but an almost inhuman force in assembling effective bomber forces.

 

[marathag]

In a shooting war, this schedule would likely be accelerated. But then from what I understand, the Soviets were already conducting the program at high tempo to begin with.

Hard to see a deployable weapon before the end of 1950, though I suppose they could bury a test article under a landing beach....

My guess is that the Soviets ran into the same problems with their reactors as Hanford did, and had problems maintaining production, let alone increasing it at the beginning.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Well, yeah.

By the time that Soviet tanks are rolling through Cologne and Brussels and Paris, it won't be hard to paint them as the aggressors in much of the West, and even float the notion that the whole Blockade was just part of a grand scheme by the International Communist Conspiracy to blitzkrieg through Western Europe all along (even if it's not true).

Western and colonial communists will see it differently, but by 1948 they were already in danger of being politically isolated. That will only intensify in a war like this.

For a "unprovoked Soviet invasion" or "unclear aggressor" scenario, that's certainly true. For a "US shoots first" scenario, however, things start to get more complicated. Many of the US’s most vigorous anti-communists were also pretty vigorously anti-European in outlook, viewing it as decadent and not worth defending. There was also some equivocation among the public at the start of the airlift, although this disappeared rapidly when it became obvious the airlift was succeeding. The idea that "politics ends at the waters edge" had disintegrated and Truman's 1948 election opponent, Dewey was mounting a full-scale assault on the policy of containment. If a shooting war kicks off where it's clear it's the US's fault and Truman is the one who catches the blame, that could be a real problem for US political willingness to see the war through and opens the door to a negotiated settlement that is advantageous to the USSR. I am not, mind you, saying it is guaranteed that it would be the case... merely that the odds go up.

Other than the really long delay between Joe-1 in August 29, 1949 and Joe-2 in September, 1951: both tower shots, and no drop test of a weaponized example of Joe-3 till October 1951.

Which is nonindicative about whether the Soviets had capability of air-delivery of atomic bombs in late-1949/early-1950. For all we know, the first Tu-4A rolled off the assembly line before RDS-1. If that is the case, then the fact RDS-1 is a fat man clone and the Tu-4A is a B-29 Silverplate clone tells us they did have a capability, if a limited one, to air-deliver atomic bombs the moment RDS-1 detonated. But when, precisely, the first Tu-4A actually became available... well, I can't find anything on that. That said, I doubt the Soviets ability to successfully deliver a bomb in the face of Anglo-American air defenses.

Per wiki, test production of bomb cores in the USSR did not begin until March 1950, and combat ready bombs until December 1951 OTL.

What wiki actually says is that 5 bombs were completed by March 1950, which means the cores would have been manufactured during the winter of 1949/1950. Assuming production began immediately after RDS-1, that's a bomb about every 1.2 months. Though being a Mk-III clone, they would have all the downsides of the Mk-III and it's doubtful that the five or fewer Soviet atomic bombers which would be available could make it through the sort of air defense forces the Anglo-Americans would have mobilized up around the British Isles after a year-and-a-half of war.

 

[Athelstane]

For a "unprovoked Soviet invasion" or "unclear aggressor" scenario, that's certainly true. For a "US shoots first" scenario, however, things start to get more complicated.

I think the difficulty is that it is hard to come up with a clear "US shoots first" scenario. And when I say that I mean a scenario where it's clearly perceived by the Western public(s) that way.

The optics began as very unfavorable for the Soviets almost from Day 1: Stalin was pretty clearly trying to starve out western Berlin - the western garrisons, technically, but it was all one in western perceptions - and an airlift to haul in food and coal gave the USAFE and RAF a whole lot of political latitude in any likely incidents which occurred in connection with it. Say a US fighter is escorting in some C-54's, a Yak gets a little too cozy, and the US fighter jock just splashes the Yak. Or say a US patrol driving through the Soviet sector gets trigger happy near a checkpoint and wastes a squad of Soviet soldiers. These are still incidents which will get spun as Soviet aggression, in the context of a horrible communist effort to starve a free people into servile Bolshie submission.

Think also here of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. That turned out to be (if anything) a U.S. provocation, with the Maddox steaming right up to the North Vietnamese territorial line, at the same time that a U.S. supported South Vietnamese commando raid was underway just down the coast. And it was the Maddox that fired the first warshots. Not only was this represented by the DoD as an unprovoked NVA attack, but they even cooked up a second incident that never happened! Before you know it, you've got LBJ sending a half million American boys 9 or 10 thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.

But with or without deliberate administration distortion, almost any incident is going to get painted as a Soviet aggression, even if the reality is much more murky, or worse. At least for anything short of Curtis Lemay personally dropping a nuke on Moscow.

Many of the US’s most vigorous anti-communists were also pretty vigorously anti-European in outlook, viewing it as decadent and not worth defending.

If you mean the Taft faction, they were fairly clearly in retreat at this point, and the Berlin crisis only intensified that.

And even Taft wasn't about to forget his anti-communism. His defense of his Senate vote against the North Atlantic Treaty at the time is striking: "…Why did I vote against the Atlantic Pact? I wanted to vote for it - at least I wanted to vote to let Russia know that if she attacked western Europe, the United States would be in the war. I believe that would be a deterrent to war…"

If an incident rapidly escalates to something like regimental-level clashes, it will hardly matter even to a guy like Taft. Communists are killing American troops and worse. Taft may have been wary of programmatic commitments, but situationally, he was certainly more than willing to fight the Reds, if the Reds were starting to fight.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I think the difficulty is that it is hard to come up with a clear "US shoots first" scenario. And when I say that I mean a scenario where it's clearly perceived by the Western public(s) that way.

The "send a convoy to Berlin" option might do it without being too far-fetched. I agree that otherwise it's pretty hard to conceive.

If you mean the Taft faction, they were fairly clearly in retreat at this point, and the Berlin crisis only intensified that.

I wasn't quite referring to them, more the guys in the China Lobby who believe the US's future lay in Asia, not Europe (and would a year later bawl about "Losing China") and the proto-McCarthyists who would, obviously with the advent of Joe McCarthy, turn into full blown McCarthyist's. I know the "Old Guard" of ideological isolationists that Taft represented (although my understanding is that by the late-40s, Taft was more of a figurehead and the real leader was Kenneth Wherry) were still around and my understanding is that they actually enjoyed something of an upswing in this period thanks to an alliance with the previous two factions before they were inevitably overshadowed both the those other two factions and events overseas.

 

[Blue cat]

Lots of assertions, zero supporting evidence, plenty of evidence already provided contradicting them. On Soviet Air Defense:



Also worth noting that David Holloway states that by 1948 Soviet early-warning nets covered the approaches from the west, with them expanding to cover the southern and eastern approaches during the course of 1948-1949:

"In July 1948 the National Air Defense Forces were converted into a separate service, on an equal footing with the Air Forces, the ground forces, and the Navy. The country was divided for the purposes of air defense into a frontier zone and a zone of the interior. Responsibility for air defense in the frontier zone was given to the commanders of the military districts and to the Navy. Defense of the interior was the responsibility of the National Air Defense Forces. Early warning radars were first deployed to cover the approaches from the Baltic and Eastern Europe; by 1950 the radar net had been extended to the Pacific Ocean, and to the Caspian and Black Seas." David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, Pg 236

The claim that 6-8 bombers would be able to deliver it's bombs is similarly contradicted by a wartime exercise in early-1949, where not a single plane managed to successfully complete the mission:



What made the Soviets pause wasn't the atom bomb. Both Soviet political and military leaders repeatedly dismissed the atomic bomb at this point as a important factor in a war, a analysis largely shared by their American counterparts:

"Stalin did not abandon these principles after the war. He told Alexander Werth in September 1946 that atomic bombs "cannot decide the outcome of a war, since atomic bombs are quite insufficient for that." 7 Since Stalin wished to minimize the significance of the bomb, this statement cannot be taken as proof of his real views. But he had received several reports in 1945 and 1946 about the effects of atomic explosions, and although these drew attention to the destructive effects of the atomic bomb none of them portrayed it as a decisive weapon." Stalin and the Bomb, Pg 225-226

-Holloway, 238

As Holloway ultimately concludes: "Soviet and American military planners agreed in 1949–51 that the atomic air offensive would not win the war." (Pg 240) and the bomb brought about "no radical shift in the Soviet conception of war." (Pg 250)

What deterred Stalin was not the atomic bomb, or at least not the atom bomb specifically, but rather concern about American economic strength in a long war. In conclusion...



You'll likely want to take your own advice.



I've already cited scholarly sources which state otherwise. Until you provide something of similar quality, your just blowing smoke.



Sure. They can recall it. The problem is that they don't have the means to execute it for the first year or two. I've already discussed extensively at the West's state of their strategic air forces and their failure to wreck the communists supply lines in Korea despite facing a weaker opponent and more favorable air conditions. The claim that the Soviet logistic links are creaky and vulnerable have not been substantiated in any manner and certainly they are much more robust then the North Koreans and Chinese, not to mention better protected. Now over the long term, the West will rebuild their strategic air forces to their wartime strength and then their conventional and atomic attacks will wreak absolute havoc on the USSR but in 1948, there's little they can achieve.



Neat way to contradict yourself there. As you yourself obliquely ascknowledge, if the WAllies call it quits when the Russians hit the channel then they have "won a war of some duration", just not one of long duration. You are correct that the US would ultimately outproduce the USSR once it gears up and over the subsequent years, the US would rebuild it's forces and eventually grind down the Soviets and this was sufficient to deter Stalin. It's not strictly true that all attention can be diverted to Europe: the Middle East and East/Southeast Asia might become theaters depending on how the Arab States and China swing, but it's true enough since American efforts in these theaters would be secondary and largely defensive.



At most, it will take the USSR a few days to shift it's forces into a offensive posture and launch their to-the-channel offensive. History shows that it will take the west many months to dispatch reinforcements of any substance. The massive difference lends itself to the conclusion that the West simply cannot. So yes, a quick march to wash their feet in the channel is still very much a realistic outcome even in a "spirals out of control" scenario.

It does seem interesting to me that in 1948 when the USAF used their own B29s to test their own air defenses the conclusion was that the presumed target area would have been hard hit. This leads me to conclude that a night time attack B29 attack against the Soviet Union by a carefully chosen force of B29 crews would likely have gotten a reasonable number of weapons to their target areas assuming assembled nuclear weapons were available.

See p87
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a246702.pdf

 

[ObssesedNuker]

It does seem interesting to me that in 1948 when the USAF used their own B29s to test their own air defenses the conclusion was that the presumed target area would have been hard hit.

Of course, because they automatically assumed that once the B-29s penetrated the air defenses, they would then accurately find and strike the target area. But trying to extrapolate the performance of SAC against another agency that was also crippled by post-war demobilization against a foreign force which has been heavily built up with extensive funding and staffed with skilled personnel is a obvious fallacy. It's like trying to extrapolate the performance of Arab militaries in the latter part of the 20th Century against each other for their performance against a non-Arab force: all your really doing is proving which one is the better of a bad lot.

On the other hand, if a ASB suddenly gave the USSR a couple hundred atom bombs and a equivalent number of fully functioning Tu-85s in 1948, the USA would have been in some trouble.

 

[Blue cat]

Of course, because they automatically assumed that once the B-29s penetrated the air defenses, they would then accurately find and strike the target area. But trying to extrapolate the performance of SAC against another agency that was also crippled by post-war demobilization against a foreign force which has been heavily built up with extensive funding and staffed with skilled personnel is a obvious fallacy. It's like trying to extrapolate the performance of Arab militaries in the latter part of the 20th Century against each other for their performance against a non-Arab force: all your really doing is proving which one is the better of a bad lot.

On the other hand, if a ASB suddenly gave the USSR a couple hundred atom bombs and a equivalent number of fully functioning Tu-85s in 1948, the USA would have been in some trouble.

Actually I don't view this as a fallacy. This result does imply to me that SAC could infact navigate to the target area and the comments about the limitations of the P61 are of interest to me as well vis a vis the likely night fighters the Soviets had access to at the time.

I've also read similar comments from RCAF along the lines of they felt they needed jet powered all weather interceptors to handle an attack by B29 class aircraft.

 

[Emperor Casey]

I am curious what sort of territorial transitions would occur after this war. Assuming that the US eventually wins would they push for independent Ukraine and of the Caucasus regions? Expand Poland? Etc

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I am curious what sort of territorial transitions would occur after this war. Assuming that the US eventually wins would they push for independent Ukraine and of the Caucasus regions? Expand Poland? Etc

That come up before as the subject in another thread. Let's see...

The beginning and course of the war is gonna rather heavily impact this. A peace treaty in which American political will breaks after the Red Army drives them out of Eurasia as the result of a an ill-conceived attack on the USSR is going to be extremely different then one which the WAllies/NATO drive the Soviets back into Eastern Europe after a few years and several million WAllied dead but decide not to go the extra mile in heading on to Moscow during a war whose beginnings arose from a complicated crisis which in turn will be extremely different then one in which the WAllies drive the Communist Bloc to collapse during a protracted war after a unprovoked attack. And those are only a sample of the myriad forms with which WW3 could occur and unfold in the '45-'53 timeframe. With that said, since the OP specified a total WAllied victory scenario, presumably by driving the USSR to collapse after a protracted and bloody war, I'll focus on that for the rest of this post. The place to look to gain some indication of American peace intentions would be US planning for war in this period.

The first American war plans of this era, the 1946 Pincher-series, didn't contain anything in the way of political objectives in the event of victory as that plan was almost entirely focused on the first 18 months of hostilies, with only vague thoughts given to the later stages of such a war and none at all for the final outcome. The 1947-48 Broiler-series of plans was the first to address any sort of end-state settlement and envisioned that, in the event of total victory, the peace settlement would involve the retention of a unitary Russian state within the 1939 borders and the disarmament of said state, but was a bit vague on further details largely because the planners lacked any political guidance...

"In the absence of a definitive policy statement from the civilian leadership, the planners assumed that the US would seek to destroy the war-making capacity of the USSR to the extent that the Americans could compel the withdrawal of Soviet political and military forces at least to within Russian 1939 borders. It was not clear whether or not the Soviets would be required to relinquish territory taken from Poland in 1939, but the planners obviously expected the Baltic States to regain their independence and presumably Finland and Rumania would regain territory lost in 1940. The planners also assumed the United States would create conditions which would assure the abandonment of Soviet political and military aggression. Whether or not this meant the overthrow of the Communist regime or merely the installation of a peacefully inclined Politburo remained unclear."
-American War Plans 1945-1950, Steven T Ross, Pg 62.

The above political assumptions were largely retained in the subsequent 1948-49 Bushwhacker-Halfmoon series (although Bushwhacker at one point rather bizarrely denied the idea of forcing unconditional surrender, despite the fact that it is difficult to see how else such political objectives could be achieved). It wasn't until the 1949 Offtackle-series of warplans that the planners received any sort of political guidance to alter and refine their thinking for a political settlement in the event of total victory. This plan did call for the break-up of the USSR, but a core Russian state would be allowed to exist so presumably the division would be done along the lines of making the 16 Soviet republics independent. While a communist regime might be permitted to exist within the territory of the RSFSR, it would do so in a disarmed and peaceable state. Plans after the Offtackle-series (such as the famous Dropshot-series) largely stuck to these ideals.

"Offtackle was the first plan that contained authoritative political guidance. NSC 20/4 established American objectives toward the USSR. Political goals in both peace and war were identical--to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constituted a threat to peace and the independence of the stability of the world family of nations.

War aims supplemental to peacetime goals included the elimination of Russian domination in areas outside the borders of any Russian state allowed to exist after the war and the destruction of the network of relationships though which the Communist Party of the USSR exerted influence over groups and individuals in the non-communist world.

The United States also intended that any regime or regimes on traditional Russian territory would not have the requisite military power to wage aggressive war. Additionally, if any Bolshevik regime survived in any part of the USSR, it would be denied the military-industrial potential to be able to wage war against any other regime or regimes existant on traditional Russian territory. These goals were to be pursued without permanently impairing the American economy or way of life."

-American War Plans 1945-1950, Steven T Ross, Pg 111-112.

Of course whether that final requirement could be fulfilled during and in the aftermath of a WW3 scenario is... debatable.

Of course, the above carries the caveat that American political objectives toward the USSR could change radically during the course of the conflict.
​

 

[Athelstane]

Of course, the above carries the caveat that American political objectives toward the USSR could change radically during the course of the conflict.
​

One only has to look at Allied objectives at the outset of WW2 and contrast them with the actual postwar settlement to see that...this would almost certainly be the case. Revoking the Munich Pact (and thus German annexation of the Sudetenland) did not become British policy until after Nazi reprisals for Operation Anthropoid in 1942 - to take just one example. Likewise, Soviet and then American entry had impacts as well.

I do think your observation that "The beginning and course of the war is gonna rather heavily impact this" is important here. It's absolutely true. A World War III in which American armies have to go all the way to Moscow and beyond will have a different postwar settlement than one in which they don't. I don't think it is especially controversial to think that the more total (and bloody) the war is, the more likely that regime change will be demanded, and territorial changes will become more far-reaching.

But then I tend to think that a 1948 War is not likely to end with American tanks fighting their way into Moscow or Omsk.

 

[McPherson]

But then I tend to think that a 1948 War is not likely to end with American tanks fighting their way into Moscow or Omsk

If Moscow is killed in a decapitation strike and the Moscow madman somehow meets his deserved end, it is likely to be a confusing and chaotic time inside the soviet ramshackle empire and also along the fighting fronts. One could expect that an internal regime change inside Russia could see some attempt by rational actors there (actually on both sides) who might try to put a stop to this madness, but it all depends on the actors being "rational". WW I and WW II did not suggest that "rational" was in sufficient quantity among the lunatics running the assorted dictatorships. American tanks would likely not be plowing through the rubble of Rostov, but it is likely that the pounding on Russian infrastructure would continue from the air until the Russians quit. Then they might be left to stew in their ruins (A BAD decision in my opinion when a reformation and assistance plan should be the postwar model as it was for Germany and Japan.). I do not think the Americans or their allies, forced into a third world war inside a decade, would be very kind or generous to Russia at all.

Just my 2 sense.

 

[sloreck]

I'm probably wasting the time it takes to type this, but US/UN efforts against logistics during the Korean War were pretty effective. Trains behind North Korean lines ran only at night for the most part, and hid in tunnels during the day. The NK/Chinese effort against UN forces was basically infantry, armor/mechanized was really only prominent for the NK forces during the very early parts of the war. Furthermore all of the transportation infrastructure north of the Yalu was untouched, and the Yalu bridges were not attacked effectively. South of the Yalu the supplies were primarily moved by porters or animal drawn carts with minimal use of rail or trains.

It is one thing to use these methods to supply a basically light infantry force, with some artillery in what was for most of the war a relatively static situation. It does not indicate that the sorts of supplies needed to keep a very large heavy force with lots of tanks and other vehicles and a large artillery park moving forward. If the "best" the US and allied air forces can do is restrict supplies to the Soviet forces the same way they did to the DPRK forces and the Chinese, that will do quite nicely.

 

[Athelstane]

If Moscow is killed in a decapitation strike and the Moscow madman somehow meets his deserved end, it is likely to be a confusing and chaotic time inside the soviet ramshackle empire and also along the fighting fronts. One could expect that an internal regime change inside Russia could see some attempt by rational actors there (actually on both sides) who might try to put a stop to this madness, but it all depends on the actors being "rational". WW I and WW II did not suggest that "rational" was in sufficient quantity among the lunatics running the assorted dictatorships. American tanks would likely not be plowing through the rubble of Rostov, but it is likely that the pounding on Russian infrastructure would continue from the air until the Russians quit. Then they might be left to stew in their ruins (A BAD decision in my opinion when a reformation and assistance plan should be the postwar model as it was for Germany and Japan.). I do not think the Americans or their allies, forced into a third world war inside a decade, would be very kind or generous to Russia at all.

Just my 2 sense.

Neither the American nor Commonwealth publics are going to be terribly enthusiastic about spending hundreds of thousands lives to liberate Europe AGAIN for the second time in less than a decade - not when they have a plausible alternative thanks to nuclear physics.

Give Lemay, say, 12-18 months at wartime tempo to build up even a modest version of his "Sunday Punch" at SAC, and it's going to get used. The harder question is just who would be left to negotiate a surrender (or Tacitean peace) with. It might be multiple somebodies.

But all this underlines why Stalin was so careful not to let the Berlin Crisis escalate into something a lot hotter.

 

[sloreck]

"they make a desolation and call it peace". I wonder if the Halsey quote will be remade, "Russian will be a language only spoken in Hell".