The Battles at Dawn: The Japanese and American Battles that shaped the World War in the Pacific An Alternate History

Chapter 8 Aftermath of Pearl Harbor (part 2) The Japanese Fleet
Counting the cost – the Japanese Naval Air groups
As night falls, Yamamoto is aboard the cruiser Tone digesting the fact that the First Air Fleet has lost its commander, chief of staff and primary planner as Admirals Nagumo and Kusaka are dead and Captain Genda is badly wounded and out of action. thus Rear Admiral Yamaguchi now is the senior remaining carrier leader. Yamaguchi is ordered to prepare a report of available aircraft and losses suffered for the day, which he is rapidly able to do, having spent the day watching the survivors return from the raid throughout the morning and early afternoon. His report is sobering, although the amount of damage inflicted offsets that to a great degree.

The first wave, with 40 torpedo bombers and 3 dive bombers suffered horrific losses. In all 33 aircraft (and their pilots) were killed, and another 6 wrecked. However this wave sank a battleship, a submarine (which raises an eyebrow), a target ship (another rueful shake of the head), the destruction of a destroyer, heavy damage (and probable sinking) of a tanker, damage to 3 battleships, and damage to a repair ship. At nearly 80% casualties the First Wave achieved the mission minimum goal of the mission of knocking 4 American battleships out of action.

The report of the Second wave is just as painful however. This wave was supposed to suppress 2 American airfields and the 42 level bombers assigned the job lost 22 bombers shot down and 8 more write offs, and one target completely escaped attack while the American fighter strength available to meet the Third Wave did not seem terribly affected by the attack on Wheeler. Another 12 fighters shot down and 6 write offs just to get the force through is a lot more acceptable, particularly in light of kills being claimed but in effect both strikes were a waste of resources and lives. The level bombers however did definitely destroy a battleship and crippled at least two more, so that element of the strike at least was a success and worth the cost of the 6 level bombers shot down and 6 write offs. It is too early to tell if the attack on the Fleet headquarters was a success, although the surviving 4 pilots (of the 6 who carried out the strike) indicated good hits on the building. Yamaguchi is skeptical if it was worth the cost of 2 shot down and 2 write offs. In all out of 98 bombers and 60 fighters, he lost 42 aircrews (28%) and 66 aircraft lost or wrecked (44%). Unsustainable losses by any measure but this wave enabled the mission in two waves to achieve the neutralization of 5 of the 9 American battleships that were present at the beginning of the strike.

For Yamaguchi the most sobering part of the losses of the first two waves is that airborne strike commander (Fuchida), an old friend and classmate, as well as 4 of the 6 Lieutenant Commanders leading it are dead, including another of the planners, Lieutenant Commander Murata. His torpedo bombers are now being led by Lieutenants instead of Lieutenant Commanders and other officer casualties were equally severe. His fighters too lost some valuable leaders, although thankfully not as many and at a lower percentage (only 2 lost).

The Third Wave was supported to neutralize the American bomber base, which the damage to the Shokaku and Akagi makes clear was a failure. However, reports indicate 2 more battleships were damaged, as were 4 cruisers, and perhaps those cruisers even lost one or more sunk. Another 39 bombers lost, 41 more written off, which is a painful loss indeed especially as again losses of squadron leaders has been severe. The 17 fighters lost and 6 more written off were equally serious losses and only the damage inflicted (six heavy ships knocked out or possibly sunk) makes the loss acceptable at all. In all 103 aircraft lost or wrecked out of 180 aircraft committed and 31% aircrew lost and almost 60% of the aircraft expended. A terribly stiff price for neutralizing 2 more battleships and 4 cruisers. Yamaguchi is convinced this wave was a terrible mistake.

In all, the attack has cost the First Air Fleet lost 131 aircraft and their aircrew lost en route to, over or returning from their targets. Another 71 aircraft are so badly damaged as to be write offs. Then a carrier was sunk and two more suffered damage, one of which is effectively out of the battle. Along with the valuable aircraft aboard the Soryu, the loss of the ship and many of its very experienced crew is a hard blow. Another 10 valuable pilots died with the ship, along with the other 400 men who died with her and none of the aircrew that were rescued are really fit for duty after their dunking in the cold North Pacific. The hit on the Shokaku gutted part of the hanger deck and and also accounted for a few aircraft on deck. Luckily that hit did not kill or injure any of the valuable pilots. The good news was that the damage to the Akagi did not include any aircraft or aircrew, although Genda being out of the fight is a serious problem. Overall the first day has cost the fleet 2 carriers sunk or knocked out of action (33%), 262 aircraft shot down or wrecked (63%) and 141 valuable pilots (34%) including most of the his best leaders. To knock 7 battleships out of action along with some cruisers and destroyers. A victory, but one that cannot be repeated with that loss rate. Luckily there are spares aboard the surviving undamaged carriers, enough so that the damaged aircraft that are not write offs can be repaired and another 30 aircraft (10 of each type) are added to his strength. In his report he suggests that in the future the dive bombers lead off any attack to weaken enemy defenses before the more vulnerable torpedo aircraft go in.

In the morning it will be time to shuffle aircraft around and send a courier to the Tone with the report.

Preparing for the next battle
December 7 Night – December 8 Evening
Japanese Forces

Japanese striking Force
1030 hours 180 miles NNW Oahu (150 NM due north Kaui) (final recovery position)
speed 24 knots for 12 hours (2230 hours) 120 NM west

course change N 27 knots (2230 hours – 0830 hours) puts them 500 miles north of Nihoa Island, meets with supply group 2. Destroyers refuel 0900 – 1700 hours
Position is 700 miles from Oahu and 800 miles from Midway Island, just out of air search range for both. After refueling, the Zuikaku, 3 destroyers, 5 fleet oilers (from supply group 1) all head for Japan at 12 knots (reaching Japan on December 21). Remainder of the Striking Force steams toward Midway beginning 1700 hours December 8 at 21 knots, which will put them strike range of Midway Island on the afternoon of December 9, and the bombardment force can reach the island after dark.

Midway Invasion Force and Supply Group 3 is 600 miles west of Midway Island heading due east heading directly for Midway as of dusk on December 8. This fleet accelerates to its best speed of 15 knots just after dark, which will place them off Midway the morning of December 10.

The Japanese also have extensive air search out, with 24 Kate's flying in pairs out in a search pattern extending 180 degrees from the fleets course and extending out 200 miles, but sea conditions initially preclude using the float planes after they are recovered on December 7. It is not until the fleet refuels in the middle part of the day on December 8 that the float planes are again launched, and it is also the first chance that Yamaguchi has to send his report to Yamamoto. Aircraft, pilots and flight leaders are regrouped so that the Hiryu, Kaga, Shokaku, Akagi each have relatively balanced air groups, while the Zuikaku is sent toward home with minimal aircraft and aircrew as well as most of the survivors of the Soryu.

By December 9 the Japanese are deployed as follows:

Kido Butai (First Air Fleet) (Striking Force)
Carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku, battleships Hiei Haruna, Kongo, Kirishima, CA Tone (fleet flag: Yamamoto), , Chikuma, CL Abukuma, 14 destroyers, 12 fleet oilers,

detached
Refueling Group 1 – 3 oilers, 1 destroyer (en route to Japan after refueling fleet on December 6)
Refueling Group 2 – 5 oilers, 3 destroyers, CV Zuikaku (en route to Japan after refueling December 8)
Refueling Group 3 – 2 oilers, 1 destroyer (with Midway Invasion Force)
Refueling Group 4 – 2 oilers, 2 destroyers (off Marcus Island)

Midway Island Assault Force
CA Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, Kinugasa, 4 destroyers, 2 gunboats, 6 submarine chasers, 1 seaplane tender, 2 tenders, 9 transports, South Sea Force (4,886 troops)

losses:
CVL Soryu sunk, knocked out of action CV Zuikaku, damaged: CV Akagi
aircraft losses: 262 aircraft, 141 pilots all causes

The Japanese strike force left Japan with 459 aircraft (including spares). With only four available flight decks and serious losses among all squadrons, Admiral Yamaguchi orders a reorganization while the fleet is refueling on December 8. The Fleet has 187 fighter and strike aircraft remaining as of December 8 consisting of 91 fighters, 40 dive bombers, and 56 torpedo bombers after spare aircraft are assembled and including those lost aboard the Soryu and Zuikaku. . The Zuikaku is sent home with 11 fighters and 8 torpedo bombers to provide basic defense of its task group, while the remaining aircraft are divided among the 4 remaining carriers, giving each 20 fighters, 12 torpedo bombers and 10 dive bombers. Also available are 12 Jake float planes aboard the Tone and Chikuma, while the battleships each carry 2 Pete float planes. However heavy seas and the high speed of the Japanese movements prevent the use of any of the float planes after noon on the 7th, as the Fleet cannot afford the time needed to recover them if launched. Luckily the weather improved some on December 8, and it is hoped the weather will cooperate the next two days.

In the view of the fleet staff this is an alarmingly low number of strike and fighter aircraft to face potentially 2 American carriers and possibly two others if all of the American carriers are in the area, which between them would have according to estimates 92 fighters and 172 strike aircraft. But the entire expedition is a gamble, and Yamamoto believes firmly that now is the time to hit the Americans again while they are still trying to shake off peacetime lethargy and inexperience. At worst the Americans have a slight edge in aircraft and potentially the Japanese can catch and sink the more likely grouping of 2 American carriers as Yamamoto believes that at least one is on the West Coast and probably two.
 
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after counting determined that losses aboard the Soryu and Zuikaku were too low in the first draft. This entire attack is a gamble, indeed the wargame called for the loss off 2 carriers, perhaps 3. A more prudent man would fold and go home. Yamamoto believes that a successful battle is still possible
 

Driftless

Donor
How much did/did not Yamamoto ascribe 1940 German success to their go-for-broke approach in Norway and France? Or, wasn't that any part of Japanese calculations?
 
How much did/did not Yamamoto ascribe 1940 German success to their go-for-broke approach in Norway and France? Or, wasn't that any part of Japanese calculations?
Not to the best of my knowledge. The important thing to remember about Yamamoto is that he was an excellent gambler. At one time in his life his dream was to be a professional gambler in Monaco.

 
Midway will be a shock to both sides. Losses will be heavy and surprises will abound.

The more planes and especially pilots and crew Japan loses, the less they will have for future operations. The US can play the long term battle. The short term may hurt, but they'll be able to bounce back as new ships, planes, and pilots are rolled out to the fighting line.
 
Midway will be a shock to both sides. Losses will be heavy and surprises will abound.

The more planes and especially pilots and crew Japan loses, the less they will have for future operations. The US can play the long term battle. The short term may hurt, but they'll be able to bounce back as new ships, planes, and pilots are rolled out to the fighting line.
This is true, but iof the US looses too many pilots too soon, its training programs could suffer. too
 

marathag

Banned
This is true, but iof the US looses too many pilots too soon, its training programs could suffer. too
Japanese Pilots flew till they were too wounded to fly, or died

even with a loss of more Pilots at the Start, the US training program will flood the Pacific with better trained pilots.

Because with the US if you were a really good fighter pilot, you ended up back in CONUS, passing things on to the next batch
That old Saw about no Old, Bold Pilots really wasn't true
Jimmy Thatch lived to 75. He got pulled after Midway to train others.
Dave McCampbell lived to 86. He wasn't flying combat missions anymore in 1945

So say Thatch meets his end. Thing is, whoever in the ATL who does well, will go back in his place.
 
Japanese Pilots flew till they were too wounded to fly, or died

even with a loss of more Pilots at the Start, the US training program will flood the Pacific with better trained pilots.

Because with the US if you were a really good fighter pilot, you ended up back in CONUS, passing things on to the next batch
That old Saw about no Old, Bold Pilots really wasn't true
Jimmy Thatch lived to 75. He got pulled after Midway to train others.
Dave McCampbell lived to 86. He wasn't flying combat missions anymore in 1945

So say Thatch meets his end. Thing is, whoever in the ATL who does well, will go back in his place.
Very true--but if too many are lost too soon, the pace will be slower, and potential instructors might be pulled out of line earlier to teach . The USA is also unique in that it's not facing an existential threat, AND has plenty of time and fuel.
If it takes X weeks to train a competent fighter pilot, but in x/2 weeks, you won't have anything for him to fly, you might see yourself as forced to throw the pilot up in x/3 weeks. The US won't have that problem.
 
After the dogfights above Oahu, the US has a lot of experienced fighter pilots in the first few days of the war compared to OTL. While one battle may not be much of an experience, the Army and Marine pilots all got a good showing of Japanese tactics and aircraft that they can no doubt pass on to everyone much quicker.
 
Chapter 9 The Battle of Midway (part 1)
Chapter 9 The Battle of Midway
The engagements around Midway Island between December 9 and 10, 1942 are collectively considered one large battle for the island itself. This was the first carrier versus carrier duel in the Pacific War, and indeed in history, and many mistakes and lessons were learned. Both the Japanese and Americans learned a healthy respect for one another as a result of the Hawaiian Campaign, and the Battle of Midway reinforced it.

Even as the smoke was still bellowing from wrecked ships and shore installations on Oahu, the US Navy was actively seeking the Japanese. Vice Admiral Halsey was senior ranking naval officer in the Hawaiian area by the end of the Third Wave strike on Pearl Harbor, and was informed of noon. He was already assembling the Pacific Fleet to repel any further attacks and was already concerned that Midway might be next.

American Forces
The American Scouting Force completes refueling 200 miles south Laysan Island by 1350 hours December 7. Halsey takes the fleet and turns east and runs at 18 knots until 0700 hours December 8 to meet with TF 15 (2 CL) which is steaming from just off Pearl Harbor at 31 knots from 1100 hours December 7 until 0700 hours December 8 where it joins Yorktown task force. At that point the Scouting Force has no idea where the enemy is as it waits for contact reports. Halsey orders the fleet to steam north in 3 task forces, each 10 miles apart, to a Point Option, at 30 degrees N, 170 degrees W. Worried that the Japanese might have slipped by air search from Midway and Pearl Harbor, he has 36 SBDs operating in pairs searching out to 200 miles, and 30 TBDs looking for submarines, which are suspected to be nearby in strength. By nightfall the American carriers have reached Point Option and there is still no report regarding the Japanese. In addition to air search capability, the Pacific Fleet has several ships equipped with the CXAM radar, which included the battleship West Virginia, the carriers Lexington, Yorktown, Enterprise, Saratoga, the cruisers Pensacola, Northampton, Chester, and Chicago and the seaplane tender Curtis, as well as the battleships California and Pennsylvania which are currently out of action. Although bulky and large, the CXAM radar has an air search range of between 50 and 100 miles, although somewhat less capability for surface search but still outside of the range of enemy gunfire. All of the American destroyer type warships are equipped with sonar although lack radar. There are also two American submarines near Midway which have been directed to take station (the Argonaut and Trout) but the submarines that were at Pearl Harbor are hurrying for sea but will not be ready before December 9 so are ordered to take up patrol stations north of Pearl Harbor.

Meanwhile long and medium range air search from Midway looks Northeast, North and Northwest out 500 miles but does not spot enemy, nor does the air search from Oahu, which is also patrolling out 500 miles. At the same time, American destroyers and destroyer minesweepers along with float planes and B18s are searching off the coast of Oahu for enemy submarines. They find two of them, sinking the I-3 and the I-70 near Oahu. Halsey also orders the formation of Task Force 1 and directs it to load up reinforcements for Midway in Pearl Harbor with orders to head to Midway on the morning of December 9. The base at Midway has radar, and it and the support ships at French Frigate Shoals are able to support the 80 PBY that are searching for the enemy that might remain, and there are the newly arrived Marine Vindicator dive bombers at Midway that can provide local search capability. Midway is well defended by a reinforced Marine Defense Battalion equipped with 3 inch AA guns, 5 inch shore batteries, and plenty of machine guns, and the Marines are now digging in with a will. Another defense battalion is being hurriedly loaded to reinforce the island by Task Force 1.

Washington, determining that reinforcements are needed, orders to the Saratoga to hurry loading its airgroup off San Diego and form a task force with with 6 destroyers and 2 fleet oilers. In addition, it is loading a Marine Corps bombing squadron with orders to steam to Pearl Harbor on December 10. A Warning Order is issued for several patrol squadrons on the West Coast to prepare for deployment to Hawaii. Washington also orders the American convoys en route to the Philippines are diverted to Brisbane, Australia pending further decisions. The Navy Department and President Roosevelt are suddenly looking for a new commander of the Pacific Fleet and several names are discussed. Overnight reports reach Pearl Harbor of fierce air battles over Luzon and the loss of important commanders there, attacks on Guam, a disastrous air raid on Wake Island, Japanese attacks on Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Malaya. The US Navy issues instructions to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare on Japan.

Steaming to Battle
Night December 8/9

The Japanese forces steam at their best speed during the night. At 0700 hours 450 miles west steaming at 15 knots and is zig-zagging as the likelihood of American submarines has increased as they approach Midway. However the Striking Force runs into a severe storm during the night and is forced to slow to 12 knots and move off its track to the south to avoid the worst of it. While this prevents it from having to zig-zag to avoid any possible American submarines, it also delays the Japanese substantially. As dawn breaks on December 9 the Japanese Striking Force is still 500 miles from Midway, and still almost 1,000 miles away from the Invasion Force it is supposed to cover.

Although the seas are no longer running nearly as heavy by dawn, and the rain has ended, flight operations are still delayed for nearly 3 hours by still heavy seas and a low overcast. Yamamoto is able to order his fleet to return to 27 knots by 1000 hours, but including the need to zig-zag, the fleet is still 25 hours from where it is supposed to be and will be nearly 18 hours late. With little choice, Yamamoto orders a radio signal be sent to the Invasion Fleet to relay this vital information. The Invasion Force receives the message and adding a blunder to the unavoidable, signals receipt. With zig-zagging the Japanese Invasion Force is 40 hours from Midway as of 0700 hours.

Midway Island picks up the two signals and immediately alerts Halsey. Unwilling to expose his fleet to possible discovery by radio intercept but with a need to have access to communications, he passes command over to Admiral Brown and he and his chief of staff Miles Browning fly over to Midway aboard a SBD. There not only does he have access to radio without danger of exposing his position (as the Japanese obviously know where Midway is), he also has access to the cable connecting Midway to Oahu. As acting commander of the Pacific Fleet (as senior officer left) he know does not have any longer has the luxury of being out of communication from Washington and the rest of the Pacific Fleet. He also for the first time is able to get a comprehensive report of the situation at Pearl Harbor and he issues several orders:

Task Force 1 is loading what Marines can be spared from the defense battalions at Oahu (2 machine gun companies), and is to begin steaming toward Midway at 1200 hours making best speed (18 knots) to Midway as planned to land reinforcements, spares, and ammunition. But at that speed and with the need to take evasive action against the submarine threat it is nearly a week away. Halsey decides that the issue will be decided by then and orders Task Force 1 to remain at Pearl Harbor for now, thus canceling the loading and other preparations. The exception are the cruisers Helena and Phoenix, which are to leave port at 0900 hours and make a high speed run to link up with Brown by the morning of the 10th as at 30 knots they can cover 1200 miles in 24 hours if they do not take evasive action, they will be going somewhat faster than that and Halsey decides the risk of submarine attack is outweighed by the need for their firepower. Both cruisers with their duel purpose 5 inch /38s are considered vital for protecting the carriers with their anti aircraft guns.

Task Force 2 (the Scouting Force) will move to a position 100 miles southeast of Midway allowing it to remain close enough to support Midway. Once in position, 3 squadrons of Dauntless Scout Bombers plus the Marine Scout Bomber squadron of Vindicators will fly off to Midway and will be organized into a provisional air group commanded by Browning. A detachment from each carriers of fighters (4 Buffalos, 8 Wildcats) will move to Midway as well. In effect Midway is being used as a shield and a forward patrol base.

The float planes at French Frigate Shoals, as well as the destroyer seaplane tenders Swan and Avocet, as well as the destroyer minesweeper Breese will steam at their best speed to Midway to support the float planes (12 in all) which with the dive bombers will allow a very dense search pattern out to 250 miles, while the 12 PBYs will conduct long range searches out to 500 miles in the direction of the radio signals to the west and northeast.

Patrol Wing 1 will send 16 PBYs to French Frigate Shoals, where they will meet with the seaplane tender Wright. They will conduct long range patrols to the north and northwest to find the enemy.

Halsey also receives orders to not unduly risk the fleet straight from Admiral Stark, who is already digesting the losses suffered so far. Aircraft and aircrew can be risked, but avoiding unnecessary loses it important as well. However, Hawaii must be held, even if it costs what remains of the Pacific Fleet, and Midway is the outer redoubt of Hawaii. In an exchange of communiques Stark grants Halsey permission to defend Midway, but he is ordered to preserve the Fleet if it comes to a choice.

The Battle of Midway - 1st Day (December 9, 1941)
At 1000 hours, a PBY from Midway spots the Japanese Midway Assault Force 400 miles west of Midway. Working out the math, the Japanese will barely be within strike range by dusk, even if Brown moves his fleet and any strike will have to return in the dark. At their present speed the Japanese will reach Midway sometime on the 10th. Meanwhile the Japanese carriers finally launch their scouts at 1000 hours, using 40 Kates flying in pairs for that mission as slowing to recover float planes will slow the fleet.

Meanwhile in the morning hours PBYs arrive from Hawaii at French Frigate Shoals and are refueled. They have orders to begin a search as soon as visibility permits on the 10th.

A pair of Japanese scouts flies over Midway at 1300 hours and reports a large number of single-engined aircraft at the airfield, large numbers of seaplanes and flying boats, and several warships. However the one operational radar set on the island had picked up the Japanese Scouts, and flight of 4 Buffalo fighter bounces them, shooting one down almost immediately and heavily damaging the other which crashes on the way back to its carrier. This also makes it clear that the Japanese carriers are at least within search range, and a pair of PBYs are sent a signal to look for them.

At 1454 hours, the PBYs both spot the Japanese Carrier Force, 383 miles from Midway on a course that will take them 100 miles to the west of it. This is the first confirmation that the Japanese fleet has been reduced to four carriers, confirming that two have been sunk or forced to retire. This force too is beyond air strike range and likely to remain that way past darkness.

Meanwhile, at 1500 hours, aware that he has been spotted, Yamamoto orders the 4 cruisers of the 6th Cruiser Division (Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako, Furataka, Rear Admiral Goto commanding) with a pair of destroyers to proceed at full speed to Midway Island and under cover of darkness shell the airfield until it is neutralized and high explosive ammunition is exhausted. By morning the Carriers should be within range to provide air cover in case the American carriers are nearby and thus they should be able to withdrawal without undue risk. At 33 knots there is little fear of submarine attack, and what risk there is deemed acceptable. At this speed the Japanese cruisers will arrive offshore at 0200 hours December 10.

At 1800, a pair of Dauntless Dive Bombers from VB2 spots the Japanese cruisers 245 miles west of Midway steaming at high speed straight for the island. A warning is sent to Halsey. Both make attacks but miss while Japanese flak inflicts little damage to the American aircraft.

By the time the message reaches him, it is 0610 hours and it will be night within 20 minutes. A hurried scramble is out of the question as is a hurried attack. There is only one option available. A force of surface warships will have to meet and engage the Japanese and prevent them from shelling the airfield.

At 1830 hours, instructions are sent to Brown and Rear Admiral Raymond John H Newton to form a surface task force consisting of 5 cruisers and for Newton to take this force, along with 8 destroyers to meet the Japanese force. The remaining ships under Brown's command will form one task force and steam to a position 100 miles south of Midway which puts them within range to hit Invasion Fleet directly on the 10th, and by staging out of Midway hit the Japanese carriers or potentially strike them directly. Brown (aboard the Indianapolis) detaches the Minneapolis and Astoria (Cruiser Division 6, Rear Admiral Fletcher aboard the Minneapolis) to reinforce Newton's Cruiser Division 4 (Chicago, Portland) as well as the Chester from Cruiser Division 5. Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance is appointed commander of the screening force for the carriers.

Newton and his 13 ships form up by 1900 hours and steam at high speed (32 knots) to meet the enemy. His destroyers are deployed in an arc ahead of the Chicago (the flag ship) as only one of his ships (the Chicago) has radar and this will provide him a scouting force to spot the Japanese.

Task Force 6 (Rear Admiral Newton aboard Chicago)
Heavy Cruisers Chicago, Portland, Minneapolis,Astoria, Chester
Destroyers Farragut, Aylwin, Monaghan, Porter, Drayton, Flusser, Lamson, Mahan,

Midway 1st Bombardment Force (Rear Admiral Goto)
Heavy cruisers Aoba, Kinugasha, Kako, Furataka
destroyers Shigure, Yugure

Yamamoto decides that a follow up bombardment will be conducted in the afternoon on December 10. He orders Mikawa to prepare a battle plan using his 4 battleships, 1 light cruiser, and 3 destroyers to finish off the American base or to engage any American surface forces in the area , while Yamaguchi is ordered to hit the island as soon as he can launch at first light with half his dive bombers and a third of his fighters. His torpedo planes will be held in reserve to deal with any American carriers that may be nearby, although 24 plus all of the available float planes will conduct a search at first light. The remainder of the dive bombers will also be held in reserve for an anti-shipping strike and one third of the fighters will cover the carries, and the remaining third will be split between covering the cruisers and Mikawa and the Invasion Fleet which is coming into range of a possible strike from Midway. The fleet will change course so that it is within 50 miles of the island as soon as practical on the 10th and that zig-zagging can be dispensed with after dark to cut down the steaming time.
 
The Final Countdown to the Battle has started. The night will be lit up by guns, spotlights, and the churning of the seas. The only true winner will be Davy Jones locker.
 
The Battle of Kure Atoll (Battle of Midway part 2)
Night action December 9, 1941 The Battle of Kure Island
15 miles east Kure Atoll (43 miles west of Midway)

The Ships (US)
The Americans are steaming with a line of 5 heavy cruisers (1,000 yards apart)
In the lead is the Chicago, which has a CXAM radar, which can detect surface ships at a range of 14 miles.

The Chicago is a Northampton class heavy cruiser commissioned in 1931, and is flagship of Cruisers, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet, as well as Cruiser Division 4. Aboard is Rear Admiral Newton who has limited experience with radar but is one of the few admirals in the US Navy with any experience at all. The Chicago (as well as the Chester) have 3 main battery turrets with triple 8 inch guns, 8 single open deck mount 5 inch guns, 4 single open mount 3 inch guns, 4 quad mounted 1.1 inch anti-aircraft guns, and 8 heavy machine guns for close in defense. Capable of 32 knots, but relatively weakly protected as fuel tanks make up twice the tonnage of her armor. Next in line is the Portland which is a bit newer, and a bit better armored. Like all of the heavy cruisers in the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Richardson pushed for her to get her 1.1 inch anti-aircraft guns earlier than originally planned. Her armament is essentially the same as the Chicago, but is 1,000 tons greater displacement. Behind her is the Minneapolis, a New Orleans Class heavy cruiser (as is the Astoria) which are newer still. They are heavier armored than the other American cruisers present having sacrificed some range for greater tonnage and proportion of armor. Both the Minneapolis and Astoria have essentially the same armament as the other American cruisers present. The cruisers are 1,000 yards apart in a line ahead formation with the Chicago in the lead, followed by the Portland, Minneapolis, Astoria, and Chester. All of the American cruisers were built to fall within the London Naval Treaty requirements limiting them to 10,000 tons and 8 inch guns, and like all cruisers that were built that actually complied with the treaty, they tend to sacrifice protection for range and firepower as they were built to hunt raiders or act as such.

Trailing the cruisers and also in line ahead 2,000 yards behind the cruisers is Destroyer Division 9 (Commander George Kriner) with 4 Mahan class destroyers with 1,000 yards between each ship and consistof the Drayton, Flusser, Lamson and finally the Mahan). All four of these sister ships are around 1,500 tons, have 5 single turret mounted 5 inch 38 caliber guns that are superior to the 5 inch mounts on the cruisers, and a triple mount with 21 inch torpedoes as well as depth charges. With no armor aside from hull plating, like all destroyers, they depend on speed to survive a battle. A significant problem is that they are behind the cruisers and thus tactically are not in position to launch their torpedoes until after the cruisers open fire, which is adequate perhaps for daylight conditions but means that the enemy will be well aware of the American presence by the time they engage. They are also equipped with the seriously flawed American Mark 15 torpedo, which just as the submarine launched Mark 14 torpedo, has flaws with its magnetic and contact detonator and those flaws have not yet been discovered.

Ahead of the column, 2,000 yards ahead of the lead cruiser, and 2,000 yards to the starboard is the destroyer Alywin (Destroyer Division 2, Commander Flynn commanding), and 2,000 yards off to her starboard is the destroyer Farragut. Their mission, as well as the Monaghan, which is 2,000 yards ahead and 2,000 yards to the port of the lead cruiser as well as the destroyer Porter which is 2,000 yards to the port of the Monaghan, is to illuminate the enemy fleet with star shells once it is discovered, as Newton is not certain of how effective his radar will be in providing early warning. All four ships except the Porter are Farragut class destroyers, a bit older than the Mahan class, but are essentially the same, carrying only two torpedoes instead of three, and if anything, even more lightly built. The Porter is the lead ship of her class and the only one of her class present. She has only 4 of the five inch gun mounts, but does have a triple 1.1 antiaircraft gun mount, plus more anti-aircraft machine guns than the other destroyers and a twin torpedo mount.

All total the American force covers an area 12,000 yards across (including the picket destroyers), and in all stretches over 14,500 yards or 6 miles across by almost 8 miles in length from beginning to end. The American force is steaming at 30 knots, on a course to the northwest which will encounter the Japanese force at just after 2205 Hours local time. The American cruisers also have float planes, but all of the float planes were flown off with orders to fly to Midway Atoll (which with its bright white sand is easily visible in the dark) as Admiral Halsey has appropriated every available scout plane to look for the Japanese carrier fleet Halsey expects to see the following morning.

The American ships however do have some disadvantages they are not yet aware of or have not yet had time to correct. The hangers aboard the cruisers are extremely flammable, with aviation fuel and oil stored there for their aircraft. None of the American ships have had time to strip for action, thus there is a lot of paint, wood, and other peacetime highly flammable fittings aboard and those too are major fire hazards. The crewmen have not yet learned the importance of keeping skin from being exposed and thus are more vulnerable to flash burns. The Americans also have relatively minimal training for combat at night, as peacetime budgets and safety regulations kept training during the daytime in good weather to avoid accidents and needless damage.

Conditions are very dark, with a Waxing Quarter Moon with a sea state of 6 foot swells, with partly cloudy skies (40% cloud cover). A very dark night indeed

Japanese Forces: Midway Bombardment Force (Cruiser Division 6 plus escorts)
The Japanese force is steaming due west at 30 knots and is not expecting to run into any enemy forces as none of been spotted. The last report was of a pair of old 4 stack destroyers anchored off Midway (spotted by search aircraft in the late afternoon) and they are not expected to remain in the area.

However, after the submarine attack on the 1st Air Fleet, and just in case the Americans are willing to fight with those old ships, Rear Admiral Goto has his two destroyers 5,000 yards ahead of his cruisers, with the Yugure south of the cruisers track at 2,000 yards (thus on his starboard side ahead) and the Shigure off to the north (thus port side) of the column. The Yugure is a Hatsuharu-class destroyer, larger than any of the 8 American destroyers at 2,000 tons, a bit slower with a best speed of 30 knots, with 2 duel purpose 5 inch guns in fore and after turret mounts, plus 2 twin mounted 25 mm anti-aircraft guns but most importantly with 2 triple mounted torpedo launchers. The Shigure is a Shiratsuyu-class destroyer and only slightly larger than the American ships at 1600 tons but faster than the Yugure, and has 2 twin mounted 5 inch guns, a single mount 5 inch guns, 2 twin mounted 25 mm anti-aircraft guns and has 2 quadruple torpedo launchers. In gun power the Japanese destroyers are markedly inferior to the American destroyers, are a bit slower. But they individually carry more and much better torpedoes than the American destroyers.

The four Japanese cruisers are 1,500 yards apart in a line ahead formation. They are the Japanese 6th Cruiser Division, with years of working together and have been under Admiral Goto's command for 4 months. In the lead (in the order indicated) are the Aoba and the Kinugasha, and each are Aoba class heavy cruisers. This class is smaller than the American cruisers at around 9,000 tons, have only 3 twin 8 inch gun turrets, but unlike the American cruisers carries 12 torpedoes. Next in line are the Furataka and Kako (in that order) which are smaller still at just over 8,700 tons and these ships are the smallest of the Japanese Navy heavy cruisers, and the oldest but while having only 6 x 8 inch guns they carry 8 torpedoes. Cruiser Division 6 was originally assigned to the Mandates as a patrol force and thus was readily available for the escort mission originally envisioned but like their escorting destroyers were nearby and available for this new mission of bombarding Midway Island and catching the American aircraft stationed there on the ground. The Japanese force is steaming at 30 knots due west and expects to reach Midway around midnight. The Japanese cruisers have their aircraft aboard, and 1 Kawanishi E7K Alf float plane each on their catapults which they intend to launch once they are within 15 miles of Midway to drop flares and correct the ships bombardment of Midway. Goto has instructions to neutralize the American airfield and the aircraft located on it, and to avoid pointless engagements with shore batteries and thus is to remain out of range of the American 5'inch guns expected to be there. He is completely unaware of the oncoming American task force. However his ships are stripped for action, his crews have trained for night time engagements in rough weather, and while accidents and deaths were frequent during those peacetime exercises, they have also resulted in crews and particularly officers who are very well trained for the battle that is coming up.

As the fleets move toward each other, each ship is at least 5 ship lengths from the one in front of it, and in the case of the Japanese, even further. Time enough to take evasive action in case of the need to do so. At 30 knots it takes about 1 minute to cover 500 yards so space does equal reaction time. The Japanese have trained more at night and thus gave themselves more space (and thus reaction time) to avoid collision issues. As the cruisers average around 600 feet in length apiece, the columns are greater than the distances between ships as there are around 200 yards for each ship in it (for the cruisers) and about half that for the destroyers in it.

Overall the 13 American and 6 Japanese ships are relatively modern versions of their type, although a bit old and somewhat outclassed by newer ships. They were designed for just the engagement ahead of them and incorporate the lessons from the Great War, and have solid leaders well trained in the doctrine of their respective navies. Indeed in a microcosm they represent the relative size differences between the American and Japanese navies, and the battle in the open ocean that both navies have been preparing for a generation. The war they have trained for and the battle they were designed for comes this night. The lessons that are learned will carry forward.

Night Battle of Kure Atoll
Impending Battle

2200 Hours 9 December, 1941
The American warships are moving at high speed to engage the enemy with the expectation of attacking the Japanese squadron before it reaches Midway. The American crews are at their battle stations and have been for over an hour after having their supper and a brief rest before the night ahead. The Japanese are steaming at the same speed (30 Knots) with the expectation of beginning their bombardment around midnight. Crews are already preparing the cruiser float planes for launch, and the Japanese commanders are preparing to call their crews to general quarters within an hour. For now half of their crews are at their stations, the rest are resting as best they can as it is expected to be a long night.

The Enemy is in Sight!
2205 hours
Radar operators aboard the Chicago spot 6 surface contacts at 12 miles from the Chicago (which puts them 11 miles from the American destroyers in the van). Admiral Newton is quickly alerted.

2207 hours
Newton gets on TBS (Talk Between Ships voice radio) and orders Commander Flynn and his four ships to proceed directly toward the enemy and close as per the battle plan hurriedly put together three hours before. This plan calls for Flynn and his destroyer division to close with the enemy and after illuminating the enemy column launch their torpedoes and turn west to get out of the line of fire. Meanwhile Newton orders a course change from its current heading of 315 degrees (northwest) to 290 degrees (north northwest) as he is hoping to cross the T of the approaching enemy.

Aboard the Aoba a Japanese radio operator makes out what he thinks is a voice message but it is garbled. He attempts to locate the channel he heard it on better, intently listening for more.

2210 hours
On the Aoba, the Japanese communications officer is alerted that the radio is picking up what sounds like it could be voice chatter from somewhere close. Admiral Goto is alerted.

2215 hours
At this point the American destroyer Porter has accelerated to its full speed of 36 knots on a course heading 315 NW. The Japanese destroyer Yuguri is steaming at 30 knots on a heading of 90 W. The Porter is 10,000 yards from the Yuguri at a 1 o'clock position relative to the Japanese ship. The Monaghan is directly ahead of the Yuguri (12 o'clock position) at just over 12,000 yards.

Aboard the Aoba, Admiral Goto decides that perhaps the American destroyers spotted earlier at Midway have come out to fight. He orders a signal of battle stations be sent by voice radio to his force with signal lamp to also be used to ensure that all ships receive the warning. The Aoba goes to general quarters.

2216 hours
aboard the Porter, American lookouts spot the signal lamp message from the Aoba to the Yuguri. Captain Overesch, commander Destroyer Squadron 5, and senior destroyer command tells Lieutenant Commander Entwistle to illuminate the ship that used its signal light. Meanwhile, at the 1 o'clock position relative to the Aoba, the Chicago is just over 16,000 yards away and the American cruiser column is about to cross the Japanese “T”.

Commence Firing!
2217 The Porter opens fire at the Japanese column. A Turret fires just ahead of the Aoba, while B Turret fires just behind a total of 15 rounds a minute, illuminating the Aoba and Kinugasha in a flurry of star shells. The Porter executes a high speed turn to come to course 270 W, and her rear turrets open fire adding more star shells to the illumination already under way. The Monaghan also executes her turn, which puts her on a collision course with the Yugari. Aboard the Alywin, Commander Flynn orders his ship and the Farragut to maintain their heading and open fire at the enemy warships to their port side. The Farragut spots the shape in the darkness that can now be made out as it is back lit by star shells. Within seconds 5 inch star shells light up the Shigure.

Aboard the Japanese ships, sailors are frantically running to their battle stations and officers are hurriedly trying to figure out what is happening ahead.

2218 hours
The Porter launches 8 Mark 15 torpedoes aimed at the Japanese battle line as she turns. This takes a couple of minutes. The Japanese cruisers are 12,000 yards away, within range, but long range for the American torpedoes. She also continues to pour out star shells, illuminating the Furataka and Kako as the she passes them at 36 knots while they are still steaming at 30 knots.

The Yugure sees the approaching Monaghan and makes an emergency turn to starboard while the Monaghan also spots the enemy. Both ships open fire with their forward guns, getting off several rounds in the opening exchange. Most miss, but two each slam into the respective bridges of the two destroyers, killing or wounding many at those stations. The Japanese torpedo crews hurriedly prepare their torpedoes to launch.

2220 hours
The Chicago is now at the 11 o'clock position relative to the Aoba, with the Portland at the 12 o'clock position, the Minneapolis at the One o'clock position and all 5 cruisers have the lead Japanese ships in their sights. They open fire with a total of 45 8 inch guns and 20 5 inch guns which lights up the sky, themselves, and of course not long after that the Aoba. Each 8 inch gun is able get off up to 5 rounds a minute and they all do in the opening moments. A total of 225 8 inch rounds and dozens more of 5 inch splash all around the Aoba, which has yet to open fire. In all 8 of the heavy 8 inch shells hit her from her forward superstructure to her bow. Of these, three smash her forward turrets, knocking them out and starting serious fires which threaten her magazines but disaster is narrowly averted by flooding them. The other 5 hit her around the bridge or higher, killing Admiral Goto, most of his officers as well as the ships captain and starting serious fires that light up the sky. It also knocks the ship out of control, and the stricken cruiser takes a turn to the port that is unplanned while the executive officer hurries to take back control from the auxiliary control station further aft. Meanwhile his rear turret is still in commission and it, along with his secondary 4.7 inch guns crews struggle to get the Porter into their sights. They are soon joined by the other cruisers as weapons are finally manned and begin to return fire.

Aboard the Kinugasha, Captain Sawa quickly realizes that the Aoba is out of control and seeing the fierce blazes already marking the pyre that was her forward superstructure he is just starting to realize he is likely now in tactical command. With destroyers to his starboard, cruisers to his front, he makes a quick decision.

As the cruisers are in action or about to be, and the Porter and Monaghan are making their brave charge, the Shigure comes under fire from the Alywin and Farragut who pour 5 inch rounds into her. Several hit, starting fires in the forward superstructure and knocking out her forward gun mount. She makes an emergency turn to port and opens fire.

The Japanese Return Fire
As of 2222 Hours the situation is as follows:
The Aoba has taken an emergency turn to port while it was out of control and during the two minutes since the American cruisers opened fire on her numerous 8 inch shells have wrecked her from end to end, knocking out her fire control, her bridge, both forward turrets, and finally her rear turret. The float plane has been blasted off the catapult and over the side, and a fierce fire rages in her forward superstructure. A shell has also knocked out her steering compartment, two have penetrated and wiped out her boiler rooms and she is coasting to a stop. Her torpedo crews have been swept away by shrapnel as has most of her crew on exposed decks. She is out of the fight.

The Yugure has turned to starboard and is accelerating to her best speed of 30.5 knots on a course heading of 180 degrees S. This places her within firing range of the American Destroyer Division 9. She opens fire with star shells from her rear gun mount, trains what searchlights she has available, and illuminates the American destroyers which are 2,000 yards behind the Chester, as well as the Chester and Astoria. She launches her full spread of six Long Lance torpedoes aiming just ahead of the Astoria but as all ships are moving at over 60 miles an hour relative to each other, her torpedoes are actually going to have the Chester as a target. As she launches she is taken under fire by the Drayton and secondary 5 inch guns of the Chester. She is also under fire from the Monaghan which continues to pour rounds into her while the torpedo crews of that ship fire their spread of 8 torpedoes at the Aoba.

The Shigure has executed an emergency turn to port and is steaming due north at 34 knots and finds herself paralleling the Americans with the Alywin at 8,000 yards immediately to her port side Her crew launches a spread of 8 torpedoes hoping to hit anything and her remaining gun mount opens up on the Alywin, scoring a pair of 5 inch hits on her aft superstructure and starting a serious fire. She however comes under fire from the 5 inch guns from the Chicago, Alywin, and Farragut and suffers numerous more hits which quickly silences her guns and starts more fires as well as killing her exposed torpedo crews. However she remains under power and in control for the moment.

The three Japanese cruisers all open fire on the Porter and she is illuminated by searchlights and in moments is hit many times by 8 inch and secondary weapons. Captain Overesch (and future CIA Director, Far East and Vice Admiral USN) survives the firestorm as does the ships captain, but the ship and many of her crew do not. The Porter comes to a halt on fire from end to end, her engine room flooding, her steering destroyed, and the ship is ordered abandoned. In all 38 of her crew die with the Porter.

Captain Sawa, who now finds himself in command of Cruiser Squadron 6, orders a 180 degree column turn, all ships to fire torpedoes as they bear. American Destroyer Division 9 will find itself squarely in this spread. Meanwhile an signal is sent to Yamamoto reporting that the bombardment mission force is under fire by an overwhelming superior force, with the flagship already knocked out of action and Admiral Goto out of command.

The Empire Strikes Back
2224 Hours
Torpedoes are in the water from the remaining Japanese cruisers, both Japanese destroyers as well as the Monaghan. The Porter launched its torpedoes as well but none hit although two exploded in the wake of the Aoba. The first Japanese torpedoes hit the Alywin with two hitting her aft of her rear superstructure and detonating her aft 5 inch magazine, blowing the rear 100 feet of the ship to pieces and killing nearly half her crew in seconds. She immediately begins sinking, and the surviving 85 crewmen including her captain make it over the side before she goes down. Her attacker, the Shigure, meanwhile blows up under a barrage of 8 and 5 inch shells from the Portland and Chicago. Only a handful of her crew make it over the side and only a pair of young Japanese sailors are eventually rescued and captured by the US Navy.

The next ship hit is the Chester, which takes 2 torpedoes amidships, flooding her boiler rooms and starting a ferocious fire amidships as several 8 inch rounds from the Kinagusha hit her at the same time. Power is immediately knocked out, and she begins to coast to a stop, forcing the American destroyers behind to shift their course to avoid her. As the crew of the Chester begin an ultimately futile effort to save their ship, the Aoba is hit by 3 torpedoes from the Monaghan, one of which explodes, blowing off much of her stern and speeding her flooding substantially.

The Japanese cruisers meanwhile make their column turn, putting 24 torpedoes into the water. Hurriedly launched nearly all of them miss, but one hits the Lamson in the engineering spaces, causing her to slow enough that two more hit her in rapid succession. She detonates in a spectacular explosion, and with her die 106 of her 158 men. The Yugari in the meantime is smothered by more shells and comes to a halt completely ablaze. She sinks soon after taking all most of her crew with her and all but 6 of the survivors refuse rescue by the Americans.

However her death buys time for the Japanese cruisers, who complete their turn successfully masked in part by the American ships blowing the Yugari to pieces and the death of Lamson and disaster suffered by the Chester. The remaining destroyers of Division 9 are forced to take action to avoid collision and enemy torpedoes and manage to avoid further damage but also lose contact with the enemy.

2230 hours
In less than 25 minutes the battle is over. The 3 remaining Japanese cruisers are retiring at high speed west while the concussion of repeated salvos fired has temporarily knocked out the radar aboard the Chicago, while the Chester has lost all power and is rapidly flooding.

Admiral Newton sends a signal to Halsey who orders him to leave a pair of destroyers to rescue survivors and for the rest of the task force to hurry as quickly as possible to rejoin Brown.

Task Force 3
Meanwhile during the night Task Force 3 is steaming at high speed to put it 150 miles southwest of Midway and within range of the Japanese Invasion Fleet at dawn and Brown has orders to attack it as soon as it is light enough to launch and the PBYs from Midway find it again.

Striking Force
Over the tense night that follows Yamamoto receives another signal from Sawa reporting the destruction of two destroyers and the flagship and that he is retiring to rejoin the Invasion Fleet. As of midnight Yamamoto is still pondering his next move.

Epilogue
The Chester goes down at 0120 hours December 10, taking with her over 150 of her crew. The Aoba sinks shortly after dawn, burning all night and abandoned. She ends up taking over 650 men with her either directly or who refuse rescue later. Only 25 Japanese sailors accept rescue.
 
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