The Autumn War of 1939-1940: An Alternate History Timeline
- Thread starter euromellows
- Start date
Excerpt from a History of the Autumn War
The position of the Soviet Union during this period - Proposals for an alliance against Germany – The great reluctance of East Europe – The ascension of Molotov as Foreign Commissar – The final abandonment of any arrangement with the west
The energetic actions of the Reynaud government, both domestic and international, did not go unnoticed in the Soviet Union. Since the Munich Crisis in 1938, the Soviet leader Josef Stalin had sought to build a coalition with the western powers to thwart German ambitions in Eastern Europe, and to preserve the integrity of Czechoslovakia. These attempts had proven unsuccessful, and by the time Reynaud ascended to the leadership in April 1939, Stalin had become increasingly sceptical he would ever come to an arrangement with the west. [2]
A contemporary anecdote about Stalin's attitude during this period reports that when he was first told France had elected Paul Reynaud as leader, he deliberately remarked "Paul who?"[3] This anecdote, despite being popular at the time in many newspapers and also later in the post-war period, was entirely incorrect. Indeed, documentary records have since been discovered that reveal Stalin was intensely aware of Reynaud and his views on the Soviet Union.
Before Reynaud’s election, he had made a number of public comments highly critical of Stalin and his dictatorial rule. When news first emerged in the western media of the political purges taking place in the Soviet Union under Stalin, Reynaud commented that the purges were “…the inescapable conclusion of communism, which demands the liquidation of all opposing views. We should not be surprised by this; nor should we be surprised by the efficiency Stalin undertakes this evil task, for it is always the first instinct of a tyrant to prioritise the fate of his enemies.”[4] Although these comments, and others like it, were designed purely for domestic political consumption, it did not take long for Reynaud’s views to reach Stalin. Even up to a few days before his leadership he had publicly declared Stalin a tyrant. When he became Prime Minister, this position was damaging to potential relations with the Soviet Union.
However, while Stalin may have largely formed his views by that point, his foreign secretary Maxim Litvinov remained committed to the concept of collective security, and he desperately sought to resume the talks with the western powers. Extraordinarily, particularly given Stalin’s scepticism, these efforts lead to a remarkable offer being communicated to the British government on 16 April 1939. The Soviet offer proposed, in effect, a triple alliance between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union that would extend security to Russia’s immediate neighbours in east Europe. The proposal would have been a formidable check on Hitler's war ambitions, but before it could be enacted there remained a significant stumbling block to success. Winston Churchill described the situation thus:
The offer of 16 April is remarkable considering Stalin's pessimistic attitude regarding the western allies. Historians have largely concluded that the proposal was Litvinov’s last real gamble, since he had been so wedded to the concept for so long. Despite this last possible chance to avert a war, the western allies prevaricated. The British government, together with the French government, hesitated in responding to the Soviet offer. Churchill described this period as "...a long silence while half-measures and judicious compromises were being prepared."[6]
The dismissal of Maxim Litvinov as Foreign Commissar
Uncharacteristically, Paul Reynaud did not offer any firm views during this period. He had already conceded that Britain would take the lead in any negotiations with Moscow, firstly because of his critical views on communism, but also because he had already irritated the British Government by pursuing his own approach in east Europe. The delay in response to the Soviet offer was fatal. After two weeks of silence, foreign commissar Litvinov was dismissed from service on 3 May 1939 and replaced with the future Soviet leader Vyacheslav Molotov.[7] Litvinov’s last great gamble had failed, and if Stalin hadn't abandoned the idea of an alliance with the west before then, he most certainly had now.
The dismissal of Litvinov also sent a different, more sinister, signal internationally. Not only did it represent an abandonment of an alliance with the west, but it also allowed for a rapprochement with the ostensibly hated enemy: Nazi Germany. Crucially, Litvinov was of Jewish ancestry, and his removal from the foreign office preceded a distinct improvement in relations with Germany. German newspapers ceased their anti-Bolshevik propaganda, and German delegates flew to Moscow offering considerable trade concessions. At the infamous Bonn trials in 1940, former diplomat Heinrich Burkhardt testified:
With this change in personnel, a great reversal of policy in both Berlin and Moscow took place. At the same time that Reynaud was trying to build a coalition in east Europe, Germany and Russia were coming to an arrangement. Though the British government had carriage of the continuing negotiations with the Soviet Union, Reynaud was criticised for ignoring Russia and playing straight into German hands. Socialist journalist Andre Blanc in “LÍntransigeant” described Reynaud as “… the most successful agent of German diplomacy by his obstinate refusal to treat Stalin as an equal, thus depriving the workers of France with a genuine ally.”[9]
Although Andre Blanc cannot be described as a neutral source, the perception that Reynaud was a motivated primarily by ideology was popular at the time. However, his biographer Lucien Maes takes a slightly different view:
By the time Reynaud returned to France from his east European trip in June 1939, Stalin had finally abandoned any notion of an alliance with Britain and France. The last real opportunity to prevent the war had been lost, and it would soon become apparent that Germany had not been idle in the interim. Indeed, Germany had been pursuing with great activity a closer relationship with the other great fascist power on the continent.
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[1] A genuine quote from OTL
[2] It is difficult to identify precisely when Stalin abandoned the thought of an alliance with the west. The offer in April 1939 was probably the last point a deal was possible.
[3] An original anecdote for TTL
[4] An original quote for TTL
[5] A genuine quote from OTL
[6] A genuine quote from OTL
[7] The dismissal of Litvinov is of course historic. Molotov being the future leader of the Soviet Union is not of course.
[8] An original quote for TTL. The Bonn trials will be covered in future updates, but in short it is the post-Nazi regime in Germany trying to lay the blame for military defeat.
[9] An original quote for TTL. Andre Blanc is fictional and is an old-fashioned socialist with rose tinted glasses for the Soviet regime. To be generous to him, Stalin’s actions in later years will alarm him and many other socialists across Europe. It will be explored in future updates, and it figures prominently in the novel.
[10] An original quote for TTL. Reynaud will be seen by many to be the French Churchill, there is dialogue in the novel which establishes his legendary status (along with other figures to be explored in later updates).
The position of the Soviet Union during this period - Proposals for an alliance against Germany – The great reluctance of East Europe – The ascension of Molotov as Foreign Commissar – The final abandonment of any arrangement with the west
The energetic actions of the Reynaud government, both domestic and international, did not go unnoticed in the Soviet Union. Since the Munich Crisis in 1938, the Soviet leader Josef Stalin had sought to build a coalition with the western powers to thwart German ambitions in Eastern Europe, and to preserve the integrity of Czechoslovakia. These attempts had proven unsuccessful, and by the time Reynaud ascended to the leadership in April 1939, Stalin had become increasingly sceptical he would ever come to an arrangement with the west. [2]
A contemporary anecdote about Stalin's attitude during this period reports that when he was first told France had elected Paul Reynaud as leader, he deliberately remarked "Paul who?"[3] This anecdote, despite being popular at the time in many newspapers and also later in the post-war period, was entirely incorrect. Indeed, documentary records have since been discovered that reveal Stalin was intensely aware of Reynaud and his views on the Soviet Union.
Before Reynaud’s election, he had made a number of public comments highly critical of Stalin and his dictatorial rule. When news first emerged in the western media of the political purges taking place in the Soviet Union under Stalin, Reynaud commented that the purges were “…the inescapable conclusion of communism, which demands the liquidation of all opposing views. We should not be surprised by this; nor should we be surprised by the efficiency Stalin undertakes this evil task, for it is always the first instinct of a tyrant to prioritise the fate of his enemies.”[4] Although these comments, and others like it, were designed purely for domestic political consumption, it did not take long for Reynaud’s views to reach Stalin. Even up to a few days before his leadership he had publicly declared Stalin a tyrant. When he became Prime Minister, this position was damaging to potential relations with the Soviet Union.
However, while Stalin may have largely formed his views by that point, his foreign secretary Maxim Litvinov remained committed to the concept of collective security, and he desperately sought to resume the talks with the western powers. Extraordinarily, particularly given Stalin’s scepticism, these efforts lead to a remarkable offer being communicated to the British government on 16 April 1939. The Soviet offer proposed, in effect, a triple alliance between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union that would extend security to Russia’s immediate neighbours in east Europe. The proposal would have been a formidable check on Hitler's war ambitions, but before it could be enacted there remained a significant stumbling block to success. Winston Churchill described the situation thus:
The offer of 16 April is remarkable considering Stalin's pessimistic attitude regarding the western allies. Historians have largely concluded that the proposal was Litvinov’s last real gamble, since he had been so wedded to the concept for so long. Despite this last possible chance to avert a war, the western allies prevaricated. The British government, together with the French government, hesitated in responding to the Soviet offer. Churchill described this period as "...a long silence while half-measures and judicious compromises were being prepared."[6]
The dismissal of Maxim Litvinov as Foreign Commissar
Uncharacteristically, Paul Reynaud did not offer any firm views during this period. He had already conceded that Britain would take the lead in any negotiations with Moscow, firstly because of his critical views on communism, but also because he had already irritated the British Government by pursuing his own approach in east Europe. The delay in response to the Soviet offer was fatal. After two weeks of silence, foreign commissar Litvinov was dismissed from service on 3 May 1939 and replaced with the future Soviet leader Vyacheslav Molotov.[7] Litvinov’s last great gamble had failed, and if Stalin hadn't abandoned the idea of an alliance with the west before then, he most certainly had now.
The dismissal of Litvinov also sent a different, more sinister, signal internationally. Not only did it represent an abandonment of an alliance with the west, but it also allowed for a rapprochement with the ostensibly hated enemy: Nazi Germany. Crucially, Litvinov was of Jewish ancestry, and his removal from the foreign office preceded a distinct improvement in relations with Germany. German newspapers ceased their anti-Bolshevik propaganda, and German delegates flew to Moscow offering considerable trade concessions. At the infamous Bonn trials in 1940, former diplomat Heinrich Burkhardt testified:
With this change in personnel, a great reversal of policy in both Berlin and Moscow took place. At the same time that Reynaud was trying to build a coalition in east Europe, Germany and Russia were coming to an arrangement. Though the British government had carriage of the continuing negotiations with the Soviet Union, Reynaud was criticised for ignoring Russia and playing straight into German hands. Socialist journalist Andre Blanc in “LÍntransigeant” described Reynaud as “… the most successful agent of German diplomacy by his obstinate refusal to treat Stalin as an equal, thus depriving the workers of France with a genuine ally.”[9]
Although Andre Blanc cannot be described as a neutral source, the perception that Reynaud was a motivated primarily by ideology was popular at the time. However, his biographer Lucien Maes takes a slightly different view:
By the time Reynaud returned to France from his east European trip in June 1939, Stalin had finally abandoned any notion of an alliance with Britain and France. The last real opportunity to prevent the war had been lost, and it would soon become apparent that Germany had not been idle in the interim. Indeed, Germany had been pursuing with great activity a closer relationship with the other great fascist power on the continent.
----------------------------------------
[1] A genuine quote from OTL
[2] It is difficult to identify precisely when Stalin abandoned the thought of an alliance with the west. The offer in April 1939 was probably the last point a deal was possible.
[3] An original anecdote for TTL
[4] An original quote for TTL
[5] A genuine quote from OTL
[6] A genuine quote from OTL
[7] The dismissal of Litvinov is of course historic. Molotov being the future leader of the Soviet Union is not of course.
[8] An original quote for TTL. The Bonn trials will be covered in future updates, but in short it is the post-Nazi regime in Germany trying to lay the blame for military defeat.
[9] An original quote for TTL. Andre Blanc is fictional and is an old-fashioned socialist with rose tinted glasses for the Soviet regime. To be generous to him, Stalin’s actions in later years will alarm him and many other socialists across Europe. It will be explored in future updates, and it figures prominently in the novel.
[10] An original quote for TTL. Reynaud will be seen by many to be the French Churchill, there is dialogue in the novel which establishes his legendary status (along with other figures to be explored in later updates).
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I don't know how much you're ready to change or retcon items in your TL, as you've already published your novel, but I'm baffled by the choice of Bonn for the anti-Nazi trials. IOTL Nürnberg was chosen because of its importance for the Nazi movement (location of the Nazi congresses). Bonn has no such importance and it is also not a tradtional seat of justice - I would expect either a place chosen to make a Point against the Nazis, like Nürnberg or perhaps München, or a tradional seat of justice, like Leipzig (seat of the Reichsgerichtshof).
Thanks Wannis. Bonn was chosen primarily in homage to it being the de facto capital of OTL West Germany. It is not identified specifically as the location of the anti-Nazi trials in the novel, so I'm not beholden to it. However there are reasons why I don't think it would be Munich or Nuremberg which will be explored in future updates. I confess that Leipzig is an interesting option.
I assumed that was the reason. But Bonn became the capital only accidentally IOTL, there's nothing that would mark it out as a place to hold political trials.
Subscribed!
Say, will this TL go past 1940? I really like to see the global long term effects of a very short (maybe even exclusively European) war, especially in places like Asia.
Say, will this TL go past 1940? I really like to see the global long term effects of a very short (maybe even exclusively European) war, especially in places like Asia.
Really enjoying this time line. Please continue with it.
A few questions I'm genuinely interested in . As France is both more ready for war and more belligerent towards Germany (and allied to Britain). How does this effect German plans. My understanding was that Hitler thought that the Wallies wouldn't go to war over Poland and would appease him again. That seams less likely in TTL so wouldn't the greater likelihood of escalation of hostilities constrain Hitler in September?
Assuming that Hitler orders the attack on Poland anyway as OTL. Wouldn't the German high command be more concerned of French intervention that they would reinforce the West. Certainly they used a sledgehammer (60 divisions all with better training and equipment)to crack the Polish nut (39 divisions many without the time to form) OTL, so half a dozen divisions could (and I expect would) have been redeployed west TTL without dramatically effecting the Polish campaign or OTL timetable of conquest.
Assuming that the french don't mobilize prier to the invasion of Poland (which would be interesting and in this TL possible?). How long do you think it will take for the French to mobilize their forces to launch a major offensive? The OTL Saar offensive was small involving only 12 divisions due to it commencing during the French mobilization. The Big Offensive of 40 divisions was planned to take place later. Wiki quote below
On the 15th day of the mobilization (that is on 16 September), the French Army was to start a full-scale assault on Germany. The preemptive mobilization was started in France on 26 August and on 1 September full mobilization was declared.
French mobilization suffered from an inherently out of date system. The French military′s ordnance lacked the tanks and airplanes of the German military[citation needed] which greatly affected their ability to swiftly deploy their forces on the field.[4] The French command still believed in the tactics of World War I, which relied heavily on stationary artillery, even though this took time to transport and deploy (many pieces also had to be retrieved from storage before any advance could be made).[5]
This was called off OTL due to Poland already being effectively finished (Stalin joined in on the 17th September) and no French intervention would have changed the outcome. Could the French have mobilized quicker than OTL with such a close POD to the kick off of hostilities? If they go for the Big Offensive anyway which I think is your plan for this TL what would be the German reaction? They would have (assuming they don't reinforce the west prier to 1st September) 22ish poor quality divisions facing the offensive with a further 18ish poor quality divisions deployed along Germany's western border and internally for security purposes and these would form the bulk of the initial opposition. How much of a fight, In your opinion would these forces put up from their prepared defensive positions? How long until reinforced by more able formations taken from Poland?
I think that in this scenario the French would do very well initially until they run out of steam (the French army just wasn't trained or organised for a sustained deep thrust operation in 1939). This forces the Germans to redeploy forces from Poland (prolonging the fighting there) until a defensive line stabilizes. Once the Polish campaign is finished the Germans use their superiority in manpower, doctrine and in some areas equipment to launch a counter attack to push the French out of Germany. This might not happen until the spring due to the terrible winter of 1939/40. Of course in that case its unlikely that the Germans would have developed the Manstien's sickle cut strategy so France wouldn't have been knocked out of the war and continues fighting the war both she and Britain had planned for. A long war where the German economy collapses without the huge loss of life of the Great War.
The only real hope the French have of an early victory is for the German Generals to panic at the french advance and launch a coup against the Nazi's.
A few questions I'm genuinely interested in . As France is both more ready for war and more belligerent towards Germany (and allied to Britain). How does this effect German plans. My understanding was that Hitler thought that the Wallies wouldn't go to war over Poland and would appease him again. That seams less likely in TTL so wouldn't the greater likelihood of escalation of hostilities constrain Hitler in September?
Assuming that Hitler orders the attack on Poland anyway as OTL. Wouldn't the German high command be more concerned of French intervention that they would reinforce the West. Certainly they used a sledgehammer (60 divisions all with better training and equipment)to crack the Polish nut (39 divisions many without the time to form) OTL, so half a dozen divisions could (and I expect would) have been redeployed west TTL without dramatically effecting the Polish campaign or OTL timetable of conquest.
Assuming that the french don't mobilize prier to the invasion of Poland (which would be interesting and in this TL possible?). How long do you think it will take for the French to mobilize their forces to launch a major offensive? The OTL Saar offensive was small involving only 12 divisions due to it commencing during the French mobilization. The Big Offensive of 40 divisions was planned to take place later. Wiki quote below
On the 15th day of the mobilization (that is on 16 September), the French Army was to start a full-scale assault on Germany. The preemptive mobilization was started in France on 26 August and on 1 September full mobilization was declared.
French mobilization suffered from an inherently out of date system. The French military′s ordnance lacked the tanks and airplanes of the German military[citation needed] which greatly affected their ability to swiftly deploy their forces on the field.[4] The French command still believed in the tactics of World War I, which relied heavily on stationary artillery, even though this took time to transport and deploy (many pieces also had to be retrieved from storage before any advance could be made).[5]
This was called off OTL due to Poland already being effectively finished (Stalin joined in on the 17th September) and no French intervention would have changed the outcome. Could the French have mobilized quicker than OTL with such a close POD to the kick off of hostilities? If they go for the Big Offensive anyway which I think is your plan for this TL what would be the German reaction? They would have (assuming they don't reinforce the west prier to 1st September) 22ish poor quality divisions facing the offensive with a further 18ish poor quality divisions deployed along Germany's western border and internally for security purposes and these would form the bulk of the initial opposition. How much of a fight, In your opinion would these forces put up from their prepared defensive positions? How long until reinforced by more able formations taken from Poland?
I think that in this scenario the French would do very well initially until they run out of steam (the French army just wasn't trained or organised for a sustained deep thrust operation in 1939). This forces the Germans to redeploy forces from Poland (prolonging the fighting there) until a defensive line stabilizes. Once the Polish campaign is finished the Germans use their superiority in manpower, doctrine and in some areas equipment to launch a counter attack to push the French out of Germany. This might not happen until the spring due to the terrible winter of 1939/40. Of course in that case its unlikely that the Germans would have developed the Manstien's sickle cut strategy so France wouldn't have been knocked out of the war and continues fighting the war both she and Britain had planned for. A long war where the German economy collapses without the huge loss of life of the Great War.
The only real hope the French have of an early victory is for the German Generals to panic at the french advance and launch a coup against the Nazi's.
Depends what Hitler has in mind. In OTL he wanted to smash that "nut" as soon as possible to minimize political fallout by presenting the world with a fait accompli as soon as possible (this is the likely reason why German propaganda claimed Warsaw had fallen by September 8, signalling an effective end to the fighting). It failed of course, but if Hitler retains such a mindset in this timeline he'll probably grudge every division sent west.
Stalin had little to do with it, as it seems it had already been decided during the first meeting of the Anglo-French supreme war council on September 12th that there would be no offensive, even if Poland managed to hold out.
Thank you. To answer your question, yes. The novel is set in 1956, so the timeline will at least address up to then in detail. I will also provide some brief descriptions of the world up to the present day.
Thanks for the feedback. Your questions will be addressed in future updates. If there is one significant weakness with this timeline it is that it assumes no significant change in the German campaign, however I will try to demonstrate why I think that is at least plausible.
Thanks for your comments. I agree on both points, and they will be addressed in future updates.
Latest update. I retconned the last ending paragraph as I realised I'd failed to catalogue Italy's actions (which on the macro level remain unchanged. Next update will be the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the lead up to war)
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Excerpt from a History of the Autumn War
German search for an Alliance – German/Italian relations - the Anti-Comintern Pact – Invasion of Albania – Meeting between Reynaud and Ciano
Up until this point Hitler's foreign policy successes had been nothing short of remarkable - perhaps even genius. He had successfully remilitarised the Rhineland, reared the German military to a formidable state, effected the Anschluss of Austria, and dismembered the state of Czechoslovakia: all without having fired a shot. Furthermore, with the west’s mishandling of relations with the Soviet Union, he was even able to prevent that relationship becoming hostile. However, with the exception of the new Slovakian puppet state, Nazi Germany remained isolated and without alliance. With the possible exception of preventing Soviet hostility, the principal focus of Germany’s diplomatic efforts became its relations with the Italian empire, then under the effective control of Benito Mussolini.
Italian-German relations in the lead up to the Autumn War remains an area of controversy for historians. Italian historians claim there was no formal military alliance between the two nations, and that speculation Italy was preparing for war is mistaken. This is also claimed by the contemporary Italian Government, who maintain there was never any intention Italy would enter the war. Furthermore, they argue that the differences between fascism and national socialism are so significant that Mussolini’s positioning was only to guarantee the neutrality of Italy, not to embark on a joint war of aggression.
These claims are hard to reconcile with the evidence uncovered. It is true that in the early days of the Nazi regime the relationship between Italy and Germany had been strained. Though Hitler had publicly praised and admired Mussolini's fascist regime, the feeling was not reciprocated. Indeed, Mussolini viewed Hitler with considerable suspicion and, as a counter to Hitler’s ambitions, he strongly supported the independence of Austria. Tensions came to a head in July 1934, when Hitler attempted to engineer a Nazi coup in Austria which resulted in the death of the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, a personal friend of Mussolini. These events lead to a severe downgrading of relations with Italy. When a part of the Italian army was mobilised in response, Hitler withdrew from his destabilising actions and approached more cautiously.
It wasn't until Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935 that Hitler was able to improve relations. Italy’s invasion faced immediate international condemnation, most particularly from Britain and France. This condemnation ultimately resulted in a series of economic sanctions imposed on Italy through the League of Nations. Though the sanctions were not punitive and would not prevent the successful prosecution of the Italian invasion, Mussolini remained outraged at what he called the hypocrisy of Britain and France.
The crisis was the perfect opportunity for Hitler to repair relations with the Italian dictator. An attempt from the west for rapprochement by partitioning Ethiopia into Italian occupied zones was unsuccessful when its contents was leaked to the media in Britain and France, causing a scandal. In this context, the offer of German support was enticing for Italy and promised to break its isolation during the crisis. Consequently, the two nations entered into closer relations: first with Mussolini conceding German influence in Austria in 1936, and later with Italy’s joining of the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1937. Perhaps the most infamous example of the close Italian-German cooperation during this period is that of the Munich Agreement, where Mussolini portrayed himself as a moderate urging for a peaceful solution. That a peaceful solution at the expense of Czechoslovakia was successful has often been claimed by Italian historians as proof of Mussolini’s desire not to wage war.
What is clear during this period is that, though the two nations embarked on closer relations, Mussolini did not intend for Italy to remain in the shadow of Nazi Germany. With the considerable diplomatic successes of Hitler, Mussolini did not wish to be overshadowed by his partner. When Germany annexed the Czech lands in March 1939, Mussolini spied an opportunity to take advantage of the crisis with his own act of aggression:
Italy’s invasion and occupation of Albania was an unnecessary endeavour, given that it had long operated under the effective domination of Italy in any event. The Italian invasion came two days after the ascension of Paul Reynaud as Prime Minister of France, who derisively commented “the invasion was more for the benefit of Mussolini’s vanity than the practicalities of state.” [3] These comments were well known in Italy, and Mussolini is reported to have dismissed Reynaud as “another petit-bourgeoisie lackey.” [4]
Relations were to be further weakened when, a month after the Italian invasion, Italy and Germany announced a formal defensive military alliance in the ‘Pact of Steel’. Though Italian historians eagerly point out its strictly defensive nature, it undoubtedly lead to an increase in tensions across Europe at the time. Though Italy ultimately did not enter the Autumn War, its intentions to at least destabilise the peace was widely observed, as described by Winston Churchill:
Despite Mussolini’s disdain for Reynaud, the eminently pragmatic Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano observed Reynaud’s leadership with great interest. Of particular note to him was Reynaud’s attempts to proceed independently of Britain. When Reynaud returned from his diplomatic tour of east Europe, Ciano proposed to meet with him to discuss the situation in Europe. Prior to Reynaud’s leadership, France had attempted to re-engage with Italy following the Ethiopian crisis by offering to negotiate concessions in the colonial empire. Though these were generous attempts at reconciliation, they were invariably dismissed by Mussolini who wanted to negotiate the status of Nice, Corsica and Savoy. Ciano was curious if France, under Reynaud, was still prepared to negotiate on such terms or whether Reynaud had hardened his attitude.
Ciano’s offer for a meeting went unanswered initially, and when Reynaud was asked by a journalist from Le Monde whether he thought an agreement could be reached with Italy he replied, “The die has been cast.” [6] These comments, and the reluctance for a meeting to proceed, caused substantial alarm in London who still held out hope Italy could be separated from Germany. Within hours of their having been made, British diplomats spoke to their French counterparts urgently seeking a reversal to the position. The extent of the panic in London included the intervention of the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax, who contacted the British ambassador in Paris to “impress the strong view of His Majesty’s Government that every opportunity of dialogue should be explored.” [7] This intervention was symptomatic of the perception that Reynaud was ideologically driven, though in this case it was also an unfair criticism:
Reynaud met with the Italian Foreign Minister in Paris on 24 July 1939. The general purpose of the meeting was to attempt to deescalate the growing tensions and, from the Italian point of view, present themselves as an honest broker. Though Reynaud had earlier expressed scepticism at attending the meeting, he appears ultimately to have seized on the opportunity and perhaps even gone further than might have been necessary. The minutes of the meeting suggest a cordial and pleasant atmosphere, where Reynaud and Ciano spoke at length on European politics though both were not unguarded in their views. Ciano sought to explore the extent of concessions he could obtain, but Reynaud remained firmly opposed to any discussion of Nice, Corsica and Savoy. However, Reynaud signalled he was prepared to discuss the status of Tunisia and Djibouti, greatly surprising Ciano who had not expected any further concessions to be made. Reynaud’s offer was largely cosmetic, and there was never any intention to transfer the territory to Italy. However, the offer was still a welcome development from the Italian point of view as Tunisia had always been firmly refused in earlier meetings. Ciano was initially exuberant over the discussions when he returned to Rome:
Ciano also met with the German ambassador, Ulrich von Hassel (a future conspiratorial leader) and reported the discussions of the meeting to him. Because of Reynaud’s earlier mishandling of the meeting request, along with the seemingly extraordinary offer to negotiate on Tunisia and Djibouti, Germany’s conclusions largely aligned with Mussolini’s. Furthermore, the German embassy in Paris was aware of the British Foreign Secretary’s intervention in convincing Reynaud to meet: further confirming in Hitler’s mind the weakness of France, and “its utter reliance on Britain.” [10]
These feelings were held strongly by the Fuhrer well into August, when Nazi Germany was in a position to announce the most cynical and dishonourable of alliances in the Twentieth Century: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
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[1] A genuine quote from OTL.
[2] A genuine quote from OTL.
[3] An original quote for TTL.
[4] An original quote for TTL.
[5] An amended quote from OTL. Churchill’s quote now directly references the ‘efforts of M. Reynaud and Chamberlain.’
[6] An original quote for TTL.
[7] An original anecdote for TTL, though I do not think it unrealistic.
[8] An original quote for TTL.
[9] An original quote for TTL. By this stage there was no hope of enticing Italy away from Germany, though Mussolini still knows his country is not ready for a war for many years yet. Italian neutrality will be explored in future updates, including its significant impact on the post-war settlement. Italy figures prominently in the novel.
[10] An original quote for TTL, though it represents Hitler’s general views.
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Excerpt from a History of the Autumn War
German search for an Alliance – German/Italian relations - the Anti-Comintern Pact – Invasion of Albania – Meeting between Reynaud and Ciano
Up until this point Hitler's foreign policy successes had been nothing short of remarkable - perhaps even genius. He had successfully remilitarised the Rhineland, reared the German military to a formidable state, effected the Anschluss of Austria, and dismembered the state of Czechoslovakia: all without having fired a shot. Furthermore, with the west’s mishandling of relations with the Soviet Union, he was even able to prevent that relationship becoming hostile. However, with the exception of the new Slovakian puppet state, Nazi Germany remained isolated and without alliance. With the possible exception of preventing Soviet hostility, the principal focus of Germany’s diplomatic efforts became its relations with the Italian empire, then under the effective control of Benito Mussolini.
Italian-German relations in the lead up to the Autumn War remains an area of controversy for historians. Italian historians claim there was no formal military alliance between the two nations, and that speculation Italy was preparing for war is mistaken. This is also claimed by the contemporary Italian Government, who maintain there was never any intention Italy would enter the war. Furthermore, they argue that the differences between fascism and national socialism are so significant that Mussolini’s positioning was only to guarantee the neutrality of Italy, not to embark on a joint war of aggression.
These claims are hard to reconcile with the evidence uncovered. It is true that in the early days of the Nazi regime the relationship between Italy and Germany had been strained. Though Hitler had publicly praised and admired Mussolini's fascist regime, the feeling was not reciprocated. Indeed, Mussolini viewed Hitler with considerable suspicion and, as a counter to Hitler’s ambitions, he strongly supported the independence of Austria. Tensions came to a head in July 1934, when Hitler attempted to engineer a Nazi coup in Austria which resulted in the death of the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, a personal friend of Mussolini. These events lead to a severe downgrading of relations with Italy. When a part of the Italian army was mobilised in response, Hitler withdrew from his destabilising actions and approached more cautiously.
It wasn't until Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935 that Hitler was able to improve relations. Italy’s invasion faced immediate international condemnation, most particularly from Britain and France. This condemnation ultimately resulted in a series of economic sanctions imposed on Italy through the League of Nations. Though the sanctions were not punitive and would not prevent the successful prosecution of the Italian invasion, Mussolini remained outraged at what he called the hypocrisy of Britain and France.
The crisis was the perfect opportunity for Hitler to repair relations with the Italian dictator. An attempt from the west for rapprochement by partitioning Ethiopia into Italian occupied zones was unsuccessful when its contents was leaked to the media in Britain and France, causing a scandal. In this context, the offer of German support was enticing for Italy and promised to break its isolation during the crisis. Consequently, the two nations entered into closer relations: first with Mussolini conceding German influence in Austria in 1936, and later with Italy’s joining of the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1937. Perhaps the most infamous example of the close Italian-German cooperation during this period is that of the Munich Agreement, where Mussolini portrayed himself as a moderate urging for a peaceful solution. That a peaceful solution at the expense of Czechoslovakia was successful has often been claimed by Italian historians as proof of Mussolini’s desire not to wage war.
What is clear during this period is that, though the two nations embarked on closer relations, Mussolini did not intend for Italy to remain in the shadow of Nazi Germany. With the considerable diplomatic successes of Hitler, Mussolini did not wish to be overshadowed by his partner. When Germany annexed the Czech lands in March 1939, Mussolini spied an opportunity to take advantage of the crisis with his own act of aggression:
Italy’s invasion and occupation of Albania was an unnecessary endeavour, given that it had long operated under the effective domination of Italy in any event. The Italian invasion came two days after the ascension of Paul Reynaud as Prime Minister of France, who derisively commented “the invasion was more for the benefit of Mussolini’s vanity than the practicalities of state.” [3] These comments were well known in Italy, and Mussolini is reported to have dismissed Reynaud as “another petit-bourgeoisie lackey.” [4]
Relations were to be further weakened when, a month after the Italian invasion, Italy and Germany announced a formal defensive military alliance in the ‘Pact of Steel’. Though Italian historians eagerly point out its strictly defensive nature, it undoubtedly lead to an increase in tensions across Europe at the time. Though Italy ultimately did not enter the Autumn War, its intentions to at least destabilise the peace was widely observed, as described by Winston Churchill:
Despite Mussolini’s disdain for Reynaud, the eminently pragmatic Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano observed Reynaud’s leadership with great interest. Of particular note to him was Reynaud’s attempts to proceed independently of Britain. When Reynaud returned from his diplomatic tour of east Europe, Ciano proposed to meet with him to discuss the situation in Europe. Prior to Reynaud’s leadership, France had attempted to re-engage with Italy following the Ethiopian crisis by offering to negotiate concessions in the colonial empire. Though these were generous attempts at reconciliation, they were invariably dismissed by Mussolini who wanted to negotiate the status of Nice, Corsica and Savoy. Ciano was curious if France, under Reynaud, was still prepared to negotiate on such terms or whether Reynaud had hardened his attitude.
Ciano’s offer for a meeting went unanswered initially, and when Reynaud was asked by a journalist from Le Monde whether he thought an agreement could be reached with Italy he replied, “The die has been cast.” [6] These comments, and the reluctance for a meeting to proceed, caused substantial alarm in London who still held out hope Italy could be separated from Germany. Within hours of their having been made, British diplomats spoke to their French counterparts urgently seeking a reversal to the position. The extent of the panic in London included the intervention of the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax, who contacted the British ambassador in Paris to “impress the strong view of His Majesty’s Government that every opportunity of dialogue should be explored.” [7] This intervention was symptomatic of the perception that Reynaud was ideologically driven, though in this case it was also an unfair criticism:
Reynaud met with the Italian Foreign Minister in Paris on 24 July 1939. The general purpose of the meeting was to attempt to deescalate the growing tensions and, from the Italian point of view, present themselves as an honest broker. Though Reynaud had earlier expressed scepticism at attending the meeting, he appears ultimately to have seized on the opportunity and perhaps even gone further than might have been necessary. The minutes of the meeting suggest a cordial and pleasant atmosphere, where Reynaud and Ciano spoke at length on European politics though both were not unguarded in their views. Ciano sought to explore the extent of concessions he could obtain, but Reynaud remained firmly opposed to any discussion of Nice, Corsica and Savoy. However, Reynaud signalled he was prepared to discuss the status of Tunisia and Djibouti, greatly surprising Ciano who had not expected any further concessions to be made. Reynaud’s offer was largely cosmetic, and there was never any intention to transfer the territory to Italy. However, the offer was still a welcome development from the Italian point of view as Tunisia had always been firmly refused in earlier meetings. Ciano was initially exuberant over the discussions when he returned to Rome:
Ciano also met with the German ambassador, Ulrich von Hassel (a future conspiratorial leader) and reported the discussions of the meeting to him. Because of Reynaud’s earlier mishandling of the meeting request, along with the seemingly extraordinary offer to negotiate on Tunisia and Djibouti, Germany’s conclusions largely aligned with Mussolini’s. Furthermore, the German embassy in Paris was aware of the British Foreign Secretary’s intervention in convincing Reynaud to meet: further confirming in Hitler’s mind the weakness of France, and “its utter reliance on Britain.” [10]
These feelings were held strongly by the Fuhrer well into August, when Nazi Germany was in a position to announce the most cynical and dishonourable of alliances in the Twentieth Century: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
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[1] A genuine quote from OTL.
[2] A genuine quote from OTL.
[3] An original quote for TTL.
[4] An original quote for TTL.
[5] An amended quote from OTL. Churchill’s quote now directly references the ‘efforts of M. Reynaud and Chamberlain.’
[6] An original quote for TTL.
[7] An original anecdote for TTL, though I do not think it unrealistic.
[8] An original quote for TTL.
[9] An original quote for TTL. By this stage there was no hope of enticing Italy away from Germany, though Mussolini still knows his country is not ready for a war for many years yet. Italian neutrality will be explored in future updates, including its significant impact on the post-war settlement. Italy figures prominently in the novel.
[10] An original quote for TTL, though it represents Hitler’s general views.
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I suspect spellcheck's sinister interference here....
So, Italy will sit out the war ITTL, if I take the hints?
Thanks Wannis: corrected. As to your query, yes Italy remains neutral in the war.
I wonder what would the overall technology level will be like after this TL's World War II?
Egnimajone's excellent Dead by Dawn TL has a delayed "World War II" that took place in the late seventies and the tech at that time was implied to be similar to OTL 1950's.
Egnimajone's excellent Dead by Dawn TL has a delayed "World War II" that took place in the late seventies and the tech at that time was implied to be similar to OTL 1950's.