In other words, something like the Siege of Breslau, which in OTL was still going on when Berlin fell.
Cheers,
Nigel.
The Anglo/American - Nazi War
- Thread starter CalBear
- Start date
- Status
In other words, something like the Siege of Breslau, which in OTL was still going on when Berlin fell.
Cheers,
Nigel.
Das_Colonel
Banned
I've been lurking and reading for some months now, and just wanted to say how much I like this TL
Thanks for the kind words.
Some of the comments have been really interesting (the recent one about China being a good example).
As far as destruction, the Allies can, when the site is within range of the gun line, put down destruction at a mind numbing rate. Even beyond the big BB guns the Des Moines cruisers can each put 90 203mm shells onto a target every minute and do it with an accuracy that aircraft didn't equal until Smart weapons. The basic system is to have at least on of the CA-134's with the "gun line" at all times and have a second one assigned but in port rearming. The biggest advantage the gun ships have ITTL is that they are only a half day steaming, if that, from where they are supporting 3rd Army (and where the RN is supporting 8th Army) from resupply. This allows them to really lay down fire in massive amounts, get back to port, rearm and head back out. The biggest limitation is barrel life, since the 16" have to be relined every fourth time they come in for shells (they carry 130-150 round per gun and the liners need to be replaced every 400 rounds or so). There are couple yards in Northern Ireland and Eire that a getting REALLY good at replacing liners.
The USN is hoping that the ground troops get inland sooner than later since the supply of liners is finite and you can't exactly pick them up at Sears & Roebuck. If the Allies hadn't been getting ready for the invasion for 15 years the USN would already be out of business.
I do have a couple more tricks for the BBs to play before they fade from the pages so stay tuned.
They'll fade from the pages but I'll bet they won't fade from the minds of military planners TTL like they did OTL
...And any nation going up against these beauties is going to either have to face the fact that they'll be forced to cede the first 30-40 miles of their coast / inland or face disastrous losses... and that's probably conservative if the AA aren't doing any research on improving the range of their naval artillery.
While OTL is very much a 'smart' weapon / rocket / missile / aircraft based military I'm seeing TTL being an artillerywank... which is fine with me
...hmmmm.....bringing the ship guns to the Nazis, and on Hitler's own broad gauge railway. me like
One thing to keep in mind though, those railroad guns were HUGE. Plus, who wouldn't want to take advantage of all those Breitspurbahn (or something spelled like that) tracks with excess capacity?A comment on railroad artillery: remember that it lacks one of the great advantages of naval gunfire support, which is fast shell handling. The German Gustav and Dora took about half an hour to reload, though they were an extreme. Still, the Krupp K5 (~11") could only manage a round every four minutes. Compare that to two rounds per minute for a USN 16" Mk7, or ten rounds a minute for the USN 8" Mk16 (those Des Moines class cruisers were real gems - glad to see them getting some play ITTL).
Railroad artillery isn't any faster than a ship, takes longer to 'bring to battery' from movement, and isn't protected by armor from counter-battery fire.
The Allies are probably better off with heavy and super-heavy field artillery (8" and 240mm howitzers for the US army were deployed IOTL WWII) and air power.
Railroad artillery isn't any faster than a ship, takes longer to 'bring to battery' from movement, and isn't protected by armor from counter-battery fire.
The Allies are probably better off with heavy and super-heavy field artillery (8" and 240mm howitzers for the US army were deployed IOTL WWII) and air power.
Fenlander
Banned
Something that's just occured to me - the Soviet remnant will undoubtedly have a massive refugee problem, there's no way Nazi demands for reparations will match the millions of refugees streaming past the Urals. Meanwhile the Western allies need manpower badly (especially those with a smaller population like Canada and Australia). Might we see a deal cut where Russian refugees wind up leaving Vladivostok for Vancouver or Brisbane, creating Little Russias, and eventually signing up for military service?
Mite B Cool.
Mite B Cool.
Umm... Russia would have a refugee problem... The vast majority of the population of occupied Russia is hundreds to thousands of miles away from the Urals. The only ones who aren't slaves of the Nazis at this point are bandits who live hand to mouth. It's quite brutally simple. The Nazis deconstructed society until they had what they wanted and let the Russian climate take care of the rest...
You can bet Molotov didn't give 2 shits about the people he abandoned except in a purely academic sense and probably closed off the USSR rump to refugees to the extent he was able. Hell he didn't even have to do that since the people in that area would be closing their doors with 'Not open for business' signs the whole way...
The 'funny' thing will be that that whole area outside of the German enclaves is probably returning to nature. Sure the Ukraine would still be the bread basket of the Reich/Europe but the rest... I'd imagine it's pretty empty because the Germans don't want anything out there but their own stuff.
The irony....the worst thing to happen in the history of mankind is one of the best for nature. It is amazing what the most powerful nations in Europe will be post-war. Just think.....Sweden, Finland, Spain, heck even Ukraine will probably be better off than, say, France or Germany. Especially if the Germans adopt a scorched-earth policy in the last desperate days of the war
A couple of other superheavy pieces that are ideally suited to employment in urban combat would be the T94 250mm mortar and the 24" howitzer (some details and pics on Warships Projects a few years back). There could also the 32pdr Tortoise and the 7.2” armed Conway if something was required from British design and production.
There is also the possibility of new weapons being developed in response to the very different tactical and strategic problems faced here as compared to @ late 50s; this has not really occured, with technological developments (particularly aircraft) developing somewhat earlier with the same names and roles.
That, to me, is one of the few very minor issues with this well structured timeline, along with the issue of foregoing the use of atomic weapons and other errata.
Whilst the imagery of WW2 operations with mid 50s aircraft is one that appeals to many, it requires a lot of changes to their intended role and purpose to the point of being different aircraft. However, the issue of nuclear use has been well addressed and falls comfortably within the realm of authorial fiat without being too jarring.
The development of aircraft would be affected by butterflies in the 1947-1954 period, and perhaps turn out rather differently. Not all of the historical aircraft and weapons would see service, and some new planes could well be developed in response to the different lessons of the hot war and the needs of the cold war.
A few examples:
1.) With Britain intact and relatively secure, there is an excellent airbase available well within range of Nazi Europe. This could well result in a focus on performance and bomb carrying capacity to the exclusion of range for some heavy and strategic bombers.
The B-47 will develop as in @, but the B-52 did grow out of the twin requirements of strategic atomic strike and not having to operate from foreign territory. Whilst the latter capability is useful, with an active Nazi enemy, it would perhaps not be the foremost characteristic desired, and the design process would be rather different.
2.) The B-47 would be converted to being capable of delivering conventional weapons a lot sooner than the 1960s.
3.) The F-105 would develop rather differently without an initial focus on delivery of nuclear weapons to the exclusion of a conventional role, and could therefore be a rather different aircraft.
4.) The lack of a Korean War would influence a lot of US and Allied fighter design, resulting in different requirements, different armament and different roles as compared to @ aircraft introduced slightly earlier.
One example of where this works well is the logical development of the EB-36 for the purposes of Continental Air Defence.
The RN seems rather small and tied to the circumstances of the Second World War prior to the growth of a very strong Nazi fleet, and there is nothing new beyond early 40s designs. This can also be applied to Britain in general, which has many drivers towards different levels and types of military development, but to a large extent simply pursue @ weapon systems and technological developments a little earlier.
Some examples and issues
- Using US aircraft (Wildcats and Avengers) on escort carriers in 1954 when there are Fireflies and Sea Furies available with substantially better performance
- Mosquitoes, Catalinas and Liberators in service with the RCAF in 1954 is not optimal.
- RAF developing the @ trio of V-Bombers in radically different circumstances rather than one or two types of aircraft.
- British would have some rather capable 3.7” and 5.25” rapid fire or automatic AA guns in heavy service by 1954 with the continuation of an air threat directly across the Channel, along with some sort of intermediate SAGW that would be augmented by a different Thunderbird and Bloodhound.
The threat is different, so the weapons would reflect it, catering to fighters and short range rockets as well as medium altitude bombers. Perhaps the first generation SAGW would be closer to the anti-kamikaze weapons that were mooted historically in order to overcome mass attacks.
There would not be a need of a 17pdr Skysweeper when a 3.7” Longhand is present, nor for the 4.5” to not be replaced by the 5.25”, possibly incorporating Green Mace.
For intermediate use, the 42mm Red Queen would be quite useful and probably see service by 1954.
- The 3”70 could be fast tracked by both the USN and RN, which would add substantially to the AA firepower of the Allied fleets.
- It is possible that intermediate swept wing jet fighters will be introduced by the RAF in the late 40s and early 50s in the face of a direct threat. This would have a flow on effect on the likes of the Hunter, Swift, Javelin (and Lightning), which could be developed in their more capable variant, particularly the P.1083.
Indeed, it is quite likely that the Swift wouldn’t see service in such a circumstance.
- The RAF using Lincolns and, to a lesser extent, B-36s in 1954 is not necessarily logical given the very different circumstances. There were other potential aircraft that could see development given the very early point of departure, such as the Avro 684, the Vickers C or the 100 ton bomber.
All of these have much high performance and operating altitudes, which allows the RAF to save money and lives, both of which would be at a premium for a war damaged Britain and also perform the mission of air launching missiles much more effectively.
The Lincoln could see service in the Pacific and into the late 1940s, but would not remain in service with a wartime RAF into the mid 1950s as it did with a cash strapped peacetime RAF.
- Vulcans had the capacity to haul more than 21000lb over reasonable distances if modified, and there are a lot of drivers to suggest that they would have been designed differently in this scenario.
- There would not be enough production capacity or funds to support using V-Bombers in a conventional strategic bombing campaigns where they suffered considerable attrition. Losing 17 Valiants over Hamburg to no real effect costs as much as a new battleship.
Only 329 V-Bombers were built historically, and even with the requirements of wartime, a damaged Britain is not going to be able to support more than 500 of them.
They are weapons designed for high altitude atomic strike, not for conventional bombing, and it is essentially wasting them (and the pilots, training and money) to use them like simply bigger and faster Lancasters. They will not survive a 2 year intensive bombing campaign and the British war economy simply couldn’t afford such a loss, given that annual production would extend to several dozen aircraft.
If more were lost than the OTL production level of 329 aircraft, then the cost would be pushing 500 million pounds, or a huge proportion of available British military expenditure.
Considering that total British expenditure on the Second World was around 25000 million pounds, with 4500 million in 43 and 44, and Britain in 1954 not being able to support the same level of expenditure with a lack of any postwar economic rebuilding and the loss of foreign markets, this is more than simply being an enormous cost resulting in the US being worse off. This is a situation whereby Britain cannot afford to fight anymore, and particularly not in the deliberately handicapped manner being pursued.
This could play out in the story in the form of extreme inter-Allied friction, or with the Americans completely taking over the role of strategic bombing, or with the RAF operating American bombers. That essentially makes it into an American-Nazi War.
The fleet couldn’t be maintained at the WW2 or interbellum level with two years of that type of hot war.
Even without the costs of supporting the Soviet Union and fighting in North Africa, the British economic cupboard will be bare, and indeed will be in the process of being repossessed. The major damage done by the loss of foreign assets and markets in South America in 1940 and 1941 will still occur, and the US will move into the remaining Imperial markets over the course of the late 40s and early 50s.
There will be an ongoing labour shortage with mobilized forces, several years further war damage and losses to cater for, and a lack of many of the historical circumstances which allowed for postwar economic recovery.
This means that in addition to Lend Lease, there will need to be a huge amount of direct aid and funding to Britain by the US, and nothing really to gain by doing so; this would be on top of the 4.5 billion USD given as substitute Marshall Aid.
Essentially, Britain cannot really afford to fight a conventional war in this scenario – this is the most striking issue that comes up out of the timeline so far.
- Early model Meteors and Vampires in Fighter Command service in 1954, as important parts no less, doesn’t really make sense with a hostile enemy a few minutes flying time away. The highest priority would be placed on the air defence of Great Britain and that would require transonic aircraft with equivalent performance to the F-86D and great firepower at a minimum, such as an evolved Hawker P.1081.
Now, Meteor night fighters are certainly something that would be around, and Vampires would be a good aircraft for service with the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, but not as frontline fighters.
- The Commonwealth countries would struggle to afford to operate Essex class carriers, let alone Midways given not only the costs but the very large manning requirements; Australia in particular was demobbing troops to help industrial production well before the end of the war. Given an extended war, things can change, though, such as population growth
A better situation would be the RCN with the Midway and Australia with the Essex
- The RN is extremely deficient in carriers compared to the USN, something that isn’t particularly reflective of their role or focus.
Given the ongoing war and the extended fighting in the Pacific, the carriers built could be 6 Illustrious/Implacable, 4 Audacious, 4 Malta; 8 Centaur CVLs and 4 of 16 Colossus/Majestics in RN service, with the balance serving with CW and Allied navies
That gives 26 RN ships (10 CV, 4 CVB, 12 CVL) to the 39 (24 CV, 7 CVB and 8 CVL) of the USN, with a lot more USN escort carriers and the CVAs entering service.
The Maltas would be done by 1954, so the situation where it seems that two are working up makes sense.
- This is a different fleet to @, but the RN has a very different tactical and strategic situation confronting it, and different lessons from the war, as compared to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. It doesn’t make sense to have the same aircraft as historical if there are viable reasons for different development and indeed viable reasons for different carriers.
Rather than Sea Hawks, some sort of navalised P.1081 could operated with swept wing DH.116 Sea Venoms and some variant of the Supermarine Scimitar.
Whether the Buccaneer would be developed would depend on whether NA.39 is issued. Given that tactical nuclear warfare is not the first resort, and that there is a considerable RN cruiser and carrier fleet available and most significantly there is no Sverdlov problem, the drivers to develop the Buccaneer in the form it took historically don’t really exist.
With an ongoing war and German battleship construction, the RN may operate more than 4 KGVs and 3 Vanguards. Certainly, nothing on the level of the Tentative Fleet Replacement Program, but perhaps 4 KGV, 4 Vanguards and 2-4 Lions based on the late war designs that incorporated modern AA schemes; they could possibly have 12 x 16” if so required.
The Lions do not need to be saved, but rather, started in 1945/46 to replace the likes of the QEs, Renown and Nelsol/Rodnol, given a growing German surface threat. The Vanguards (if more than one are built, then they can follow the lines of the prewar plans) are suited to replacing the Rs, using their guns, and for service in the Pacific and Med.
The Neptune class cruisers would most probably get a guernsey with additional RN cruiser losses, along with a full run of Minotaurs. These would replace the likes of the Arethusas and Leanders, with the Towns, Crown Colonies and Didos sticking around. The Counties could get a limited refit, but their long term replacement would possibly be based on the guided missile cruiser studies of the time.
Whether they will be affordable in the wider context of this war is a different matter.
Armament options would be the automatic 6” mount, a US supplied 8” turret, or something completely different.
- The British Army will lack the capacity to absorb very large losses in manpower and will follow the general Allied proclivity towards the use of technology and equipment in the place of losing men; of course, this is strongly related to the overall issue of the cost of a conventional war.
There is also the possibility of new weapons being developed in response to the very different tactical and strategic problems faced here as compared to @ late 50s; this has not really occured, with technological developments (particularly aircraft) developing somewhat earlier with the same names and roles.
That, to me, is one of the few very minor issues with this well structured timeline, along with the issue of foregoing the use of atomic weapons and other errata.
Whilst the imagery of WW2 operations with mid 50s aircraft is one that appeals to many, it requires a lot of changes to their intended role and purpose to the point of being different aircraft. However, the issue of nuclear use has been well addressed and falls comfortably within the realm of authorial fiat without being too jarring.
The development of aircraft would be affected by butterflies in the 1947-1954 period, and perhaps turn out rather differently. Not all of the historical aircraft and weapons would see service, and some new planes could well be developed in response to the different lessons of the hot war and the needs of the cold war.
A few examples:
1.) With Britain intact and relatively secure, there is an excellent airbase available well within range of Nazi Europe. This could well result in a focus on performance and bomb carrying capacity to the exclusion of range for some heavy and strategic bombers.
The B-47 will develop as in @, but the B-52 did grow out of the twin requirements of strategic atomic strike and not having to operate from foreign territory. Whilst the latter capability is useful, with an active Nazi enemy, it would perhaps not be the foremost characteristic desired, and the design process would be rather different.
2.) The B-47 would be converted to being capable of delivering conventional weapons a lot sooner than the 1960s.
3.) The F-105 would develop rather differently without an initial focus on delivery of nuclear weapons to the exclusion of a conventional role, and could therefore be a rather different aircraft.
4.) The lack of a Korean War would influence a lot of US and Allied fighter design, resulting in different requirements, different armament and different roles as compared to @ aircraft introduced slightly earlier.
One example of where this works well is the logical development of the EB-36 for the purposes of Continental Air Defence.
The RN seems rather small and tied to the circumstances of the Second World War prior to the growth of a very strong Nazi fleet, and there is nothing new beyond early 40s designs. This can also be applied to Britain in general, which has many drivers towards different levels and types of military development, but to a large extent simply pursue @ weapon systems and technological developments a little earlier.
Some examples and issues
- Using US aircraft (Wildcats and Avengers) on escort carriers in 1954 when there are Fireflies and Sea Furies available with substantially better performance
- Mosquitoes, Catalinas and Liberators in service with the RCAF in 1954 is not optimal.
- RAF developing the @ trio of V-Bombers in radically different circumstances rather than one or two types of aircraft.
- British would have some rather capable 3.7” and 5.25” rapid fire or automatic AA guns in heavy service by 1954 with the continuation of an air threat directly across the Channel, along with some sort of intermediate SAGW that would be augmented by a different Thunderbird and Bloodhound.
The threat is different, so the weapons would reflect it, catering to fighters and short range rockets as well as medium altitude bombers. Perhaps the first generation SAGW would be closer to the anti-kamikaze weapons that were mooted historically in order to overcome mass attacks.
There would not be a need of a 17pdr Skysweeper when a 3.7” Longhand is present, nor for the 4.5” to not be replaced by the 5.25”, possibly incorporating Green Mace.
For intermediate use, the 42mm Red Queen would be quite useful and probably see service by 1954.
- The 3”70 could be fast tracked by both the USN and RN, which would add substantially to the AA firepower of the Allied fleets.
- It is possible that intermediate swept wing jet fighters will be introduced by the RAF in the late 40s and early 50s in the face of a direct threat. This would have a flow on effect on the likes of the Hunter, Swift, Javelin (and Lightning), which could be developed in their more capable variant, particularly the P.1083.
Indeed, it is quite likely that the Swift wouldn’t see service in such a circumstance.
- The RAF using Lincolns and, to a lesser extent, B-36s in 1954 is not necessarily logical given the very different circumstances. There were other potential aircraft that could see development given the very early point of departure, such as the Avro 684, the Vickers C or the 100 ton bomber.
All of these have much high performance and operating altitudes, which allows the RAF to save money and lives, both of which would be at a premium for a war damaged Britain and also perform the mission of air launching missiles much more effectively.
The Lincoln could see service in the Pacific and into the late 1940s, but would not remain in service with a wartime RAF into the mid 1950s as it did with a cash strapped peacetime RAF.
- Vulcans had the capacity to haul more than 21000lb over reasonable distances if modified, and there are a lot of drivers to suggest that they would have been designed differently in this scenario.
- There would not be enough production capacity or funds to support using V-Bombers in a conventional strategic bombing campaigns where they suffered considerable attrition. Losing 17 Valiants over Hamburg to no real effect costs as much as a new battleship.
Only 329 V-Bombers were built historically, and even with the requirements of wartime, a damaged Britain is not going to be able to support more than 500 of them.
They are weapons designed for high altitude atomic strike, not for conventional bombing, and it is essentially wasting them (and the pilots, training and money) to use them like simply bigger and faster Lancasters. They will not survive a 2 year intensive bombing campaign and the British war economy simply couldn’t afford such a loss, given that annual production would extend to several dozen aircraft.
If more were lost than the OTL production level of 329 aircraft, then the cost would be pushing 500 million pounds, or a huge proportion of available British military expenditure.
Considering that total British expenditure on the Second World was around 25000 million pounds, with 4500 million in 43 and 44, and Britain in 1954 not being able to support the same level of expenditure with a lack of any postwar economic rebuilding and the loss of foreign markets, this is more than simply being an enormous cost resulting in the US being worse off. This is a situation whereby Britain cannot afford to fight anymore, and particularly not in the deliberately handicapped manner being pursued.
This could play out in the story in the form of extreme inter-Allied friction, or with the Americans completely taking over the role of strategic bombing, or with the RAF operating American bombers. That essentially makes it into an American-Nazi War.
The fleet couldn’t be maintained at the WW2 or interbellum level with two years of that type of hot war.
Even without the costs of supporting the Soviet Union and fighting in North Africa, the British economic cupboard will be bare, and indeed will be in the process of being repossessed. The major damage done by the loss of foreign assets and markets in South America in 1940 and 1941 will still occur, and the US will move into the remaining Imperial markets over the course of the late 40s and early 50s.
There will be an ongoing labour shortage with mobilized forces, several years further war damage and losses to cater for, and a lack of many of the historical circumstances which allowed for postwar economic recovery.
This means that in addition to Lend Lease, there will need to be a huge amount of direct aid and funding to Britain by the US, and nothing really to gain by doing so; this would be on top of the 4.5 billion USD given as substitute Marshall Aid.
Essentially, Britain cannot really afford to fight a conventional war in this scenario – this is the most striking issue that comes up out of the timeline so far.
- Early model Meteors and Vampires in Fighter Command service in 1954, as important parts no less, doesn’t really make sense with a hostile enemy a few minutes flying time away. The highest priority would be placed on the air defence of Great Britain and that would require transonic aircraft with equivalent performance to the F-86D and great firepower at a minimum, such as an evolved Hawker P.1081.
Now, Meteor night fighters are certainly something that would be around, and Vampires would be a good aircraft for service with the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, but not as frontline fighters.
- The Commonwealth countries would struggle to afford to operate Essex class carriers, let alone Midways given not only the costs but the very large manning requirements; Australia in particular was demobbing troops to help industrial production well before the end of the war. Given an extended war, things can change, though, such as population growth
A better situation would be the RCN with the Midway and Australia with the Essex
- The RN is extremely deficient in carriers compared to the USN, something that isn’t particularly reflective of their role or focus.
Given the ongoing war and the extended fighting in the Pacific, the carriers built could be 6 Illustrious/Implacable, 4 Audacious, 4 Malta; 8 Centaur CVLs and 4 of 16 Colossus/Majestics in RN service, with the balance serving with CW and Allied navies
That gives 26 RN ships (10 CV, 4 CVB, 12 CVL) to the 39 (24 CV, 7 CVB and 8 CVL) of the USN, with a lot more USN escort carriers and the CVAs entering service.
The Maltas would be done by 1954, so the situation where it seems that two are working up makes sense.
- This is a different fleet to @, but the RN has a very different tactical and strategic situation confronting it, and different lessons from the war, as compared to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. It doesn’t make sense to have the same aircraft as historical if there are viable reasons for different development and indeed viable reasons for different carriers.
Rather than Sea Hawks, some sort of navalised P.1081 could operated with swept wing DH.116 Sea Venoms and some variant of the Supermarine Scimitar.
Whether the Buccaneer would be developed would depend on whether NA.39 is issued. Given that tactical nuclear warfare is not the first resort, and that there is a considerable RN cruiser and carrier fleet available and most significantly there is no Sverdlov problem, the drivers to develop the Buccaneer in the form it took historically don’t really exist.
With an ongoing war and German battleship construction, the RN may operate more than 4 KGVs and 3 Vanguards. Certainly, nothing on the level of the Tentative Fleet Replacement Program, but perhaps 4 KGV, 4 Vanguards and 2-4 Lions based on the late war designs that incorporated modern AA schemes; they could possibly have 12 x 16” if so required.
The Lions do not need to be saved, but rather, started in 1945/46 to replace the likes of the QEs, Renown and Nelsol/Rodnol, given a growing German surface threat. The Vanguards (if more than one are built, then they can follow the lines of the prewar plans) are suited to replacing the Rs, using their guns, and for service in the Pacific and Med.
The Neptune class cruisers would most probably get a guernsey with additional RN cruiser losses, along with a full run of Minotaurs. These would replace the likes of the Arethusas and Leanders, with the Towns, Crown Colonies and Didos sticking around. The Counties could get a limited refit, but their long term replacement would possibly be based on the guided missile cruiser studies of the time.
Whether they will be affordable in the wider context of this war is a different matter.
Armament options would be the automatic 6” mount, a US supplied 8” turret, or something completely different.
- The British Army will lack the capacity to absorb very large losses in manpower and will follow the general Allied proclivity towards the use of technology and equipment in the place of losing men; of course, this is strongly related to the overall issue of the cost of a conventional war.
A number of very interesting comments. I won't even begin to address them all, but for a few:
The RN is a smaller force than the USN, and noticeably so, for the reason you bring up quite correctly, money. The RN has been pushed about as far as the pounds will go, even with the U.S. providing on-going loans and support. I debated with greatly reducing the RN beyond what is in the T/L, but it just "felt" wrong to do it.
Aircraft are another issue that I struggled with a bit. Most of the aircraft in service ITTL are direct evolutions of designs in the pipeline IOTL circa 1946-48. The B-52 was very much a given, since it was the logical follow-on for the rather disappointing B-36 as a heavy lift bomber and an easy leap from the B-47. The V bombers exist for the simple fact that the RAF wanted to stay in the bomber business and the V bombers were the logical next step after the Lincoln. It is also logical, and cost effective, for the British, as much as the USAF (with the B-29 as well as the B-25 & 26 "gunships") ITTL to keep older aircraft in service in roles that they can still perform. IOTL an example of this is the B-52. The BUFF is utterly obsolete in its original role of a deep strike bomber, but it still fills a very useful role as a bomb dump truck.
Regarding the Sea Fury; an absolutely magnificent aircraft, but a total beast. The problem with the aircraft on a CVE is getting it off the deck, with its weight and wing loading the only way it gets off deck is with a pretty good cat launch (the bird weighed in at better than 12,000 pounds and had a 38 foot wingspan with 280 square feet of wing area). The RN and RCN operated them off 25+ knot carriers with decks over 600 feet, even the biggest of the CVEs topped out at 19 knots (on a REALLY good day) and with a flight deck of under 550 feet. The F4F and the TBF (which the RN operated afloat until 1954 IOTL) were capable of operating off the CVEs (even as heavy as the Avenger was it had a stunningly short take off run, in no small part thanks to a 54 foot wingspan that gave it 490 square foot of wing area). The only reason the CVEs still have any fighters is to deal with the odd snooper and the F4F-4 is generally up to that.
I appreciate your comments very much, some interesting data and perspective.
The RN is a smaller force than the USN, and noticeably so, for the reason you bring up quite correctly, money. The RN has been pushed about as far as the pounds will go, even with the U.S. providing on-going loans and support. I debated with greatly reducing the RN beyond what is in the T/L, but it just "felt" wrong to do it.
Aircraft are another issue that I struggled with a bit. Most of the aircraft in service ITTL are direct evolutions of designs in the pipeline IOTL circa 1946-48. The B-52 was very much a given, since it was the logical follow-on for the rather disappointing B-36 as a heavy lift bomber and an easy leap from the B-47. The V bombers exist for the simple fact that the RAF wanted to stay in the bomber business and the V bombers were the logical next step after the Lincoln. It is also logical, and cost effective, for the British, as much as the USAF (with the B-29 as well as the B-25 & 26 "gunships") ITTL to keep older aircraft in service in roles that they can still perform. IOTL an example of this is the B-52. The BUFF is utterly obsolete in its original role of a deep strike bomber, but it still fills a very useful role as a bomb dump truck.
Regarding the Sea Fury; an absolutely magnificent aircraft, but a total beast. The problem with the aircraft on a CVE is getting it off the deck, with its weight and wing loading the only way it gets off deck is with a pretty good cat launch (the bird weighed in at better than 12,000 pounds and had a 38 foot wingspan with 280 square feet of wing area). The RN and RCN operated them off 25+ knot carriers with decks over 600 feet, even the biggest of the CVEs topped out at 19 knots (on a REALLY good day) and with a flight deck of under 550 feet. The F4F and the TBF (which the RN operated afloat until 1954 IOTL) were capable of operating off the CVEs (even as heavy as the Avenger was it had a stunningly short take off run, in no small part thanks to a 54 foot wingspan that gave it 490 square foot of wing area). The only reason the CVEs still have any fighters is to deal with the odd snooper and the F4F-4 is generally up to that.
I appreciate your comments very much, some interesting data and perspective.
The one thing about this war is it would have introduced a huge sense of unreality when it comes to economics simply because the Anglo Americans are living in a bipolar world where the other pole is so odious it is a simply unacceptable alternative (unlike communism)...
Britain / Anzac at this point have spent so much money it's probably where the Brits say "We should build this because it will help win the war..." and the US says "Go nuts, it's only money... and what is money compared to defeating the hideous abomination we face?"
And I don't think the US is going to be 'abandoning' Britain TTL like it did in a way OTL... At the end of this war the US isn't going call in the loans the way they are structured at the present but probably do some kind of massively gargantuan restructuring which leaves Britain in a spot that doesn't plunge it into Great Depression Part 2 because didn't they just fight a 20 year war because of that? I'm not saying they would just forgive everything and force everyone else to forgive but rather at this point (and well beforehand, really) and to the end this is a 'need to win it' war no matter the costs...
I also disagree with this in the sense that they are at this point unwilling to accept large manpower losses given their technological and doctrinal advantages... But if they were forced into an Eastern Front meat grinder or a WW1 trench warfare hell I'd think Britain and the US would soldier on... but they don't have to do that, there is an unlimited ability to avoid that with the gun line and nukes to force the Nazis to play to their tune and get slaughtered...
Britain / Anzac at this point have spent so much money it's probably where the Brits say "We should build this because it will help win the war..." and the US says "Go nuts, it's only money... and what is money compared to defeating the hideous abomination we face?"
And I don't think the US is going to be 'abandoning' Britain TTL like it did in a way OTL... At the end of this war the US isn't going call in the loans the way they are structured at the present but probably do some kind of massively gargantuan restructuring which leaves Britain in a spot that doesn't plunge it into Great Depression Part 2 because didn't they just fight a 20 year war because of that? I'm not saying they would just forgive everything and force everyone else to forgive but rather at this point (and well beforehand, really) and to the end this is a 'need to win it' war no matter the costs...
I also disagree with this in the sense that they are at this point unwilling to accept large manpower losses given their technological and doctrinal advantages... But if they were forced into an Eastern Front meat grinder or a WW1 trench warfare hell I'd think Britain and the US would soldier on... but they don't have to do that, there is an unlimited ability to avoid that with the gun line and nukes to force the Nazis to play to their tune and get slaughtered...
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Calbear:
Thanks a great deal for replying and for your explanations.
I had thought as much regarding the Sea Fury, but even so, there are other options such as the Corsair and the Seafire.
The RN is going to be constrained by money, but it will have a very different role and make up to the historical mid 1950s, and if Britain can afford to fight on land, air and sea, then it will do so with the best weapons it can get, rather than wartime compromise solutions. The butterflies from what is essentially 18 years of war will be considerable.
Available funds for military equipment will be larger in the absence of budget contraction that occured 1946-1951, and there most probably won't be a recognizable welfare state.
Such miscellaneous expenditure as 49 million pounds on the Tanganyika groundnut scheme will not be occuring, and nor will there be a need to clear out slips for civilian liner and merchant ship construction.
This combination of factors creates an opportunity for limited construction of top end ships for the RN - a handful of capital ships, scheduled carriers, modern cruisers and a full run of Battles, Weapons and Darings. This will be required by 1954, as quite a lot of ships that served in the OTL Second World War were completely worn out by the end and in need of replacement.
Alas, I do not have my copy of Vanguard to Trident with me at the moment, so cannot give the exact composition of the desired postwar RN fleet that did not occur due to financial crisis and defence cutbacks in the late 40s.
Like the USN, the RN can hold a lot in reserve until the hot war kicks off again.
The niche of the B-52 is most certainly a given, but due to the differing strategic circumstances, less weight may be placed on intercontinental range as compared to a higher operating altitude to put it beyond all hope of Nazi interception or a heavier bombload. It also depends whether it is being designed as a pure nuclear strike bird, or a conventional bomber.
I can see the utility of using older aircraft such as the Lincoln, but Britain cannot afford to repeat the losses of Bomber Command in WW2. It needs to have an interim aircraft that can go higher or faster, otherwise, it simply goes out of the bomber game.
lloyd007:
Whilst the imperative of fighting and winning the war will be the most vital factor at play, sheer reality will cut into what can be done. Even with massive US funding, this Britain has limits on what it can spend, what it can build, how fast it can build and how many men it can deploy.
Britain was bled dry in @, and here is not going to have a lot of the breaks that allowed it to rebound and rebuild, such as German machine tools, European export markets, the ability to focus on civilian/consumer good exports and a steady international financial system.
What it is going to take is something above and beyond a dollar hose, but a whole raft of measures regarding tariffs, export markets, loans, expert industrial reconstruction assistance and far more lenient terms regarding convertability. As an immediate issue, a reworking of the Lend Lease agreement would be required.
It is a funny situation - the Britain of the A-ANWverse has the ability to afford a lot more and yet a lot less. It is better off and worse off. It is on the precipice of financial and economic collapse, yet can possibly be sustained.
What it can't do is fight a long war of attrition.
Britain does not have the manpower to soldier on. In @ in 1944, divisions were disbanded to free up manpower for 21st Army Group, as there was simply nothing left available, which was rather disadvantageous when combined with a distinct labour shortage.
Even without the necessity to garrison India and put an army in SE Asia, Britain is going to struggle to field 18 divisions all up, as it still has to man the RN and the Merchant Navy, field a bigger and more complicated RAF, and have enough left over to work the coalmines, steelworks, shipyards and associated essential war industry. It is a simple matter of a limited pool of manpower (and that includes women fully involved in industry, which will have a big impact on upcoming conscription classes/age groups - there will have been no late war and postwar baby boom, and those British young men turning 18, 19, 20 and 21 in and around 1954-1960 don't come from 'big years' in terms of birthrate).
21st Army Group is described in Stephen Ashley Hart's 'Colossal Cracks - Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe 1944-45' as Britain's last substantial field army and an irreplaceable asset. The British forces committed to the Continent in 1958 will essentially be the same - the one shot that can be fired.
As such, they will need to play things even safer than 1944-45 when it comes to engagements and the use of firepower, and they are facing an enemy with substantially more firepower and lethality.
This, in combination with accounts of a complete decimation of RAF Bomber Command, other RAF losses, RN losses at sea, civilian losses from air attack and the cumulative losses of the interbellum period, paint a picture for me of a Britain that cannot afford to fight a rich man's war and cannot afford to get involved in meatgrinders or any semblence of a campaign of attrition. Britain is getting very, very close to the situation of France in 1917-1918.
There will be intense pressure to use weapons, notably atomic ones, that can win the war quickly in an overwhelmingly decisive blow. Whilst this is not where the story is going, and wouldn't provide such opportunities to present lovely military equipment in expertly described detail, it is perhaps the only sensible course of action a British government and high command could push for; the argument would be 'We all regret what happened to the Japanese, but we literally can't go on this way. Something has to change.'
Thanks a great deal for replying and for your explanations.
I had thought as much regarding the Sea Fury, but even so, there are other options such as the Corsair and the Seafire.
The RN is going to be constrained by money, but it will have a very different role and make up to the historical mid 1950s, and if Britain can afford to fight on land, air and sea, then it will do so with the best weapons it can get, rather than wartime compromise solutions. The butterflies from what is essentially 18 years of war will be considerable.
Available funds for military equipment will be larger in the absence of budget contraction that occured 1946-1951, and there most probably won't be a recognizable welfare state.
Such miscellaneous expenditure as 49 million pounds on the Tanganyika groundnut scheme will not be occuring, and nor will there be a need to clear out slips for civilian liner and merchant ship construction.
This combination of factors creates an opportunity for limited construction of top end ships for the RN - a handful of capital ships, scheduled carriers, modern cruisers and a full run of Battles, Weapons and Darings. This will be required by 1954, as quite a lot of ships that served in the OTL Second World War were completely worn out by the end and in need of replacement.
Alas, I do not have my copy of Vanguard to Trident with me at the moment, so cannot give the exact composition of the desired postwar RN fleet that did not occur due to financial crisis and defence cutbacks in the late 40s.
Like the USN, the RN can hold a lot in reserve until the hot war kicks off again.
The niche of the B-52 is most certainly a given, but due to the differing strategic circumstances, less weight may be placed on intercontinental range as compared to a higher operating altitude to put it beyond all hope of Nazi interception or a heavier bombload. It also depends whether it is being designed as a pure nuclear strike bird, or a conventional bomber.
I can see the utility of using older aircraft such as the Lincoln, but Britain cannot afford to repeat the losses of Bomber Command in WW2. It needs to have an interim aircraft that can go higher or faster, otherwise, it simply goes out of the bomber game.
lloyd007:
Whilst the imperative of fighting and winning the war will be the most vital factor at play, sheer reality will cut into what can be done. Even with massive US funding, this Britain has limits on what it can spend, what it can build, how fast it can build and how many men it can deploy.
Britain was bled dry in @, and here is not going to have a lot of the breaks that allowed it to rebound and rebuild, such as German machine tools, European export markets, the ability to focus on civilian/consumer good exports and a steady international financial system.
What it is going to take is something above and beyond a dollar hose, but a whole raft of measures regarding tariffs, export markets, loans, expert industrial reconstruction assistance and far more lenient terms regarding convertability. As an immediate issue, a reworking of the Lend Lease agreement would be required.
It is a funny situation - the Britain of the A-ANWverse has the ability to afford a lot more and yet a lot less. It is better off and worse off. It is on the precipice of financial and economic collapse, yet can possibly be sustained.
What it can't do is fight a long war of attrition.
Britain does not have the manpower to soldier on. In @ in 1944, divisions were disbanded to free up manpower for 21st Army Group, as there was simply nothing left available, which was rather disadvantageous when combined with a distinct labour shortage.
Even without the necessity to garrison India and put an army in SE Asia, Britain is going to struggle to field 18 divisions all up, as it still has to man the RN and the Merchant Navy, field a bigger and more complicated RAF, and have enough left over to work the coalmines, steelworks, shipyards and associated essential war industry. It is a simple matter of a limited pool of manpower (and that includes women fully involved in industry, which will have a big impact on upcoming conscription classes/age groups - there will have been no late war and postwar baby boom, and those British young men turning 18, 19, 20 and 21 in and around 1954-1960 don't come from 'big years' in terms of birthrate).
21st Army Group is described in Stephen Ashley Hart's 'Colossal Cracks - Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe 1944-45' as Britain's last substantial field army and an irreplaceable asset. The British forces committed to the Continent in 1958 will essentially be the same - the one shot that can be fired.
As such, they will need to play things even safer than 1944-45 when it comes to engagements and the use of firepower, and they are facing an enemy with substantially more firepower and lethality.
This, in combination with accounts of a complete decimation of RAF Bomber Command, other RAF losses, RN losses at sea, civilian losses from air attack and the cumulative losses of the interbellum period, paint a picture for me of a Britain that cannot afford to fight a rich man's war and cannot afford to get involved in meatgrinders or any semblence of a campaign of attrition. Britain is getting very, very close to the situation of France in 1917-1918.
There will be intense pressure to use weapons, notably atomic ones, that can win the war quickly in an overwhelmingly decisive blow. Whilst this is not where the story is going, and wouldn't provide such opportunities to present lovely military equipment in expertly described detail, it is perhaps the only sensible course of action a British government and high command could push for; the argument would be 'We all regret what happened to the Japanese, but we literally can't go on this way. Something has to change.'
Since aircraft are being discussed, has pilot recovery gotten any better? And, has the Fulton Surface To Air Recovery System (STARS) been invented and/or implemented yet?
This will apply to the US also. in 1935~1940 the US fertility rate fell to 1.7, and while it will grow a little during the war [ OTL 2.4] It will not reach OTL's post war 3.+ Baby Boom.
Nor will there be a Boom during the Warm Peace.
Given the changes ITTL due to the Militarization of Society, ?I wonder if there will be a post war boom?
A point on 'escort' carriers.
There was a big internal argument in the RN in 42-43 about what speed merchant ships should have to minimise the dangers of the Atlantic run. It was pointed out that while increasing the normal speed to 17 knots would cost more in fuel, it would halve the crossing time (ships in convoy dont make their nominal speed). So building faster merchant ships would be very cost effective. It seems in the end the dying of the U-boat threat in mid 43 and the need to change designs meant that this wasnt followed through.
Given the long term 'warm' war period, it would seem the drivers for faster convoys do apply (when you are looking at a longer period, the maths of faster ships is obviously better). So I would expect a new generation of Liberty ships and their UK equivalents to be making around 18 knots, probably with a real convoy speed of around 15.
This means the WW2 escort carriers are too slow. An escort carrier needs excess speed to operate aircraft and then recover to the convoy. However the British light fleets would be perfect in this role, they could do about 25 knots, and carry any aircraft necessary for the role. They could take 24 aircraft in the hanger, meaning they have ample capacity for this role. And yes, they can operate the Sea Fury... (A deck park, btw, is NOT a good idea in the North Atlantic Winter)
As to the UK manpower issue...I feel 18 divisions is greatly underestimating the available manpower. While there probably wont be as many available as in WW2 (around 70), there certainly will be more than 18. There is also a LOT of manpower available in the Empire (quite a lot of troops were held locally in WW2, for example in Africa. With no credible threat outside Europe, some of these will be available). Indeed, its almost certain that for political reasons the invading army will comprise troops from as many countries as possible.
Remember also that the need to keep large standing armed forces during the intervening years will drive efficiency in industry even more strongly than in OTL, and once the German navy is admiring the bottom of the Atlantic the manpower in the RN and USN can be reduced somewhat.
There was a big internal argument in the RN in 42-43 about what speed merchant ships should have to minimise the dangers of the Atlantic run. It was pointed out that while increasing the normal speed to 17 knots would cost more in fuel, it would halve the crossing time (ships in convoy dont make their nominal speed). So building faster merchant ships would be very cost effective. It seems in the end the dying of the U-boat threat in mid 43 and the need to change designs meant that this wasnt followed through.
Given the long term 'warm' war period, it would seem the drivers for faster convoys do apply (when you are looking at a longer period, the maths of faster ships is obviously better). So I would expect a new generation of Liberty ships and their UK equivalents to be making around 18 knots, probably with a real convoy speed of around 15.
This means the WW2 escort carriers are too slow. An escort carrier needs excess speed to operate aircraft and then recover to the convoy. However the British light fleets would be perfect in this role, they could do about 25 knots, and carry any aircraft necessary for the role. They could take 24 aircraft in the hanger, meaning they have ample capacity for this role. And yes, they can operate the Sea Fury...
(A deck park, btw, is NOT a good idea in the North Atlantic Winter)As to the UK manpower issue...I feel 18 divisions is greatly underestimating the available manpower. While there probably wont be as many available as in WW2 (around 70), there certainly will be more than 18. There is also a LOT of manpower available in the Empire (quite a lot of troops were held locally in WW2, for example in Africa. With no credible threat outside Europe, some of these will be available). Indeed, its almost certain that for political reasons the invading army will comprise troops from as many countries as possible.
Remember also that the need to keep large standing armed forces during the intervening years will drive efficiency in industry even more strongly than in OTL, and once the German navy is admiring the bottom of the Atlantic the manpower in the RN and USN can be reduced somewhat.
Hendryk
Banned
It's a pity that Bruges was destroyed, but there was no other way for the Allies to deal with the situation. The city was doomed the moment the Germans concentrated their forces in it.
Now the Allies' learning curve is faster, but I wouldn't expect the German one to remain flat indefinitely. They'll eventually adapt to their enemies' tactics.
Now the Allies' learning curve is faster, but I wouldn't expect the German one to remain flat indefinitely. They'll eventually adapt to their enemies' tactics.
While I somewhat agree with this I somewhat disagree with this about the US especially... Soldiers are still going to be coming back from the Pacific Front and the US is going to gear down to an extent during the Warm War. So while the Baby Boom might not begin in earnest until after the war is definitely concluded (or at all) I think pop growth in general might be higher than it was overall OTL (and stay that way unlike OTL).
More progressive policies towards racial integration and a much stronger national identity would also serve to suppress and reshape the Feminist movement more to one of equal work rights / pay but also against the more radicalized sexual liberation. That's not to say women will be stuck or content with living in some "Donna Reed", "Pleasantville" lifestyle and such but rather it will be a much more evolutionary rather than revolutionary change because they've been receiving greater rights since 1941 due to the necessity of women in the workplace. Rosie the Riveter can't go home to cook in 1945
.Another huge change is the fall of the Radical Left. When it came to Nazism vs Communism, Communism fell... it is a failed system only kept in place in one large but pathetic 'nation' by New Europe because they don't want to be bothered ruling over the 'inferiors' there. There is also the fact that TTL's govn'ts in the US, Britain and ANZAC have by necessity become more socialist/interventionist/'Big Govn't' due to their military industrial complexes although ironically I also see them remaining much more socially conservative on many other issues like promoting big nuclear families.
Yet another of the HUGE things that will be absent from TTL is the rise of privacy rights... Griswold vs Conn would not go the way it did OTL even though Brown v Board and Loving v Virginia would go much easier with the nation than OTL.
The US is going to be indelibly and irreversibly altered by this war more than any war in its history, including the ARW and ACW. It has shaped 2 entire generations with its impact and the aftermath will certainly shape
Britain would be promoting population growth policies with this war in mind (Hitler certainly did for Germany) and it has a sizable US presence during the Warm War so maybe the Baby Boom is happening... only in Britain
... Hell Britain would be even more irrevocably altered TTL than the US what with being on the front lines and retaining its Empire which is 'fading away' rather than being killed by WW2 as OTL. I'd hazard a guess that Britain has a considerably greater number of people living in it at this time than OTL and like the US has a substantially greater sense of national identity and 'pride' although unlike many things that have been butterflied away like the Beatles I can still see Monty Python coming together... That is the most intriguing pat of this time line and also the hardest to write.
While the technologies and battles of this time line are fascinating, the world they'll create is more fascinating by far.
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