Tactics of the US if it invades Canada 1890

[Belisarius II]

Splendid. So how do you stop the Royal Navy sweeping the mines with smaller vessels, which they've been doing since the Crimean War, without coastal artillery to shell those smaller vessels? Moreover, how long does it take to build the extensive infrastructure necessary to actually control the mines - and how long would said infrastructure last without coastal artillery to stop the larger British ships shelling it from a safe distance?

'Self-acting mines. — Used for closing channels not needed for our own use. Such mines are dangerous alike to friends and foes... Mines of this class find only a limited application in our system...​

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'Mines under control. — By the aid of electricity it is easy to bar a channel against any enemy by a system of automatic mines which can be made inoperative, and hence absolutely safe for our own vessels, at the will of the operator. This is accomplished by placing a mechanism in the mine which at the blow of a vessel shall, as desired, open or close an electrical circuit in the mine.... and is extended to the shore by an armored cable, like those used in deep-sea telegraphy. At low-water mark the cable enters a horizontal gallery, leading to a vertical shaft, which opens in a secure casemate, where is stationed the operator with his apparatus. This apparatus consists of a powerful firing battery, which will ignite the fuze if allowed to send a current through it; a signal battery too feeble to endanger the fuze, but strong enough to operate an electro magnet in the casemate when flowing through the fuze and mine; some form of relay capable of automatically regulating the flow of these batteries through the circuit ; and, lastly, of various galvanometers and other apparatus for testing the condition of the mines and cables, and a telegraph connecting with an exterior observation station. In such a system everything depends upon the will of the operator... It requires no argument to prove that 4 or 5 miles of channel thus obstructed will be no small obstacle to an advance, and if at the same time it be swept by a heavy fire of modern artillery, and be covered by movable fish torpedoes operated and controlled from the shore, the city in rear will be safe from insult, and the fleet in front will be free to operate in the most effective manner — secure in the possession of a haven of refuge should the fate of battle prove adverse.​

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'REQUIREMENTS.​

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'To make such a system of mines effective, four things must receive careful attention before the outbreak of war: (1) A supply of mines and their accessories must be in store; (2) the galleries, shafts, and operating casemates must lie constructed and ready for use ; (3) a sufficient number of instructed men must be available to plant and operate the mines; and (4) the flanking guns, machine guns, electric lights, and other appliances for defending the mines must be properly mounted in secure land defenses ready for action. Our actual condition in respect to these requirements will now be considered.​

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'(1.) As to the supply of mines in store, the small appropriations granted by Congress have been expended in purchasing such parts of the system as are most difficult to procure and slowest to manufacture. At the depot at Willets Point are stored enough electrical apparatus to supply about forty casemates (five are required in New York Harbor alone), and enough torpedo cable to meet immediate demands. At New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and San Francisco a few mines without anchors or wire cables or other appliances are. in store; but at no other points on our whole coast has any preparation been made... It is not enough to equip our chief harbors; because a proper number of mines, operated even from the old forts, would protect harbors of minor importance, together with the vessels which had sought a refuge in them... An annual appropriation not less than $100,000 for ten years, for submarine mines, may safely be recommended by the Hoard.​

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'(2.) Galleries, shafts, and casemates for operating mines involve little expense. Almost nothing has been done, although funds have been urgently requested for several years. An appropriation of $500,000 would go far to equip our whole Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and half that sum would meet the urgent needs of the Pacific coast.​

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'(3.) An instructed corps of submarine miners is absolutely essential... Until last autumn only about 130 men were under instructions at Willets Point; now the number is increased to about 375. At present this is probably sufficient ; but when moie material is in store the whole strength of the battalion authorized by law, 752 men, should be kept under training. The service is highly technical, and failure would be certain if officers and men without experience should suddenly be called upon to defend the coasts with mines.​

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'(4.) Flanking guns, machine guns, electric lights, etc., should not be neglected. These auxiliaries have in general received but little attention in this country. The old smooth-bore 10 inch and 8 inch guns in the existing casemated batteries (if themselves defended by modern ordnance properly mounted in modern defenses) would be of great service. No provision for machine guns or electric lights has been made except experimentally.'​

The 12pdr 6cwt of 1892 is a different gun, but used only by the Royal Horse Artillery. The 15pdr BL of 1895 is literally the 12pdr 7cwt of 1885, with a different shell in it.

THE EARL OF DENBIGH asked the Secretary of State for War what progress had been made in the re-arming of batteries of horse and field artillery... their Lordships would remember that the horse and field artillery batteries were not long ago armed with the 12-pounder breechloading gun. It was an excellent gun, found to be too heavy for horse artillery and not heavy enough for field artillery; and it was decided to convert the old 12-pounder into a 15-pounder for the field artillery, not by altering the size of the gun but by giving a longer and heavier shell, while the horse artillery were to be armed with the new 12-pounder gun... At the present time he understood that they were going to practise with the old 12-pounder ammunition for the purpose of using it up...​

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE). The rearmament to which the noble Earl's question refers is that which was mentioned in the explanatory Memorandum laid upon the Table with the Army Estimates for this year. It was explained in that Memorandum that two operations were in progress—first the rearmament of the Horse Artillery with the new 12-pounder gun; and secondly, the conversion of the whole of the guns of the Field Artillery from 12-pounders to 15-pounders... It was decided, as I have already said, to adopt a heavier shell for the 12-pounder gun. The shell first issued, and which weighed 14½ lb., was found to be slightly too heavy. This shell, which is known as "Mark I." shell, was given up after a very small number only had been manufactured, and a lighter shell, weighing very little over 14 lb., known as "Mark II." shell, was adopted in its place. The whole of the Field Artillery will have this shell, and we are now turning them out at the rate of between 3,000 and 4,000 a week. No Field Artillery guns have been sighted for "Mark I." shell, and no sights have been or will be issued for that shell. These guns all retain their old 12-pounder sights, and they will also be sighted for the 15-pounder "Mark II." shell. I can explain why, for the present at all events, it has been thought desirable to retain the old as well as the new sighting. It is intended that the whole of the Field Batteries should practise this year with the 12-pounder shell. This decision has been come to, first, because we have a considerable quantity of that shell in stock and do not desire to waste it, especially as it is held that instruction gained with it at gun practice is, for general purposes, equal to that gained from the new ammunition; and, secondly, because it is not thought desirable that we should begin using the new shell until we have accumulated an adequate supply of it to complete our ammunition columns.​

Here's the manual for the 15pdr 7cwt Mark 1. Page 7 describes the sights: 'The bars are triangular in section, and are graduated on the left face in the case of converted sights with a yard scale graduated for 5,100 yards, reading to 25 yards (for use with the charge and projectiles of the 15-pr BL gun)… the rear face with a yard scale for use with the charge and projectiles of the 12-pr BL 7cwt gun. New sights, Mark III, for guns on Mark I carriages, and Mark IV, for guns on Mark II carriages, differ from the converted sights described above in not being graduated for the 12-pr charge and projectile'. The reason that some 15pdrs are fitted with converted sights featuring a scale graduated for the charge and projectiles of the 12pdr 7cwt is because, as we keep telling you, it's the same gun.


Perhaps because the problems weren't actually that bad. We are, after all, talking about a gun whose two flaws were:

• it was slightly too heavy for horse artillery, with a total behind-the-team weight of 37cwt. However, as its replacement weighed 33cwt, the 13pdr RML which had preceded it weighed 43cwt, and the 9pdr RML which preceded the 13pdr had weighed 35cwt, we aren't exactly dealing with large numbers here.
• the axle traverse mechanism, which allowed the crew to aim the gun a little way to the left or right without having to move the whole carriage, could seize up in the phenomenally dusty conditions of India. Notice that this was observed in the cavalry manoeuvres of 1891, which one would expect to create far more dust than comparable infantry manoeuvres in India or cavalry manoeuvres almost anywhere else in the world.

The latter was fixed with a new carriage, although for most of the world it wasn't a problem. The former was fixed by giving the horse artillery a slightly lighter gun. However, as we do keep telling you, the gun itself was not taken out of service.


Interesting that the maximum range for the 12pdr BL is given as 5,000 yards, because the range table for the 12pdr BL shows a range of 6,000 yards at 15 degrees 30 minutes on the Mark I carriage (p.27), and 15 degrees 24 minutes on the Mark II carriage (p.28). Even if you take Wikipedia as accurate, the Ordnance rifle weighs 5% more to fire a 25% smaller shell 20% less distance - at maximum range, not at the actual achievable distance by a professional artillery crew versus a part-time state militia one. And then you compare bursting charges for the US 3.2in M1885 with the 12pdr 7cwt BL to realise that the British shell contains more than three times as much explosive as the most modern US field gun, and things start to get really interesting...

Thanks for the information on mine warfare. Has I said given some time defensive mines would be laid. Civil War experience showed them how to do it quickly, and more sophisticated systems would follow. Sweeping mines within rifle range of a hostile shore is a hazardous operation. Your can't sweep mines north of the Verrazano Narrows, and Battleships aren't going to anchor in the Lower New York Bay. See what happened at Gallipoli. Shore based torpedoes would also be used. No British Army is going to land on Staten Island, like in 1776.

Thanks for the article about the BL 12 pounder cwt 7. So if you send a gun back to the factory, to be rebuilt to a new design, with new carriages, sights, ammo, and limbers it's not the same gun, it just has the same barrel. That's why it had a new model designation, when it was used in the 2nd Boer War. At any rate it's not the same gun being used in 1890. India isn't the only place on earth were a marching army kicks up a lot of dust. In the age of dirt roads you could see armies moving by the dust clouds hovering over them. Wagons, guns, limbers, caissons, horses, and thousands of marching men kick up choking dust, unless it's raining, which creates other problems.

It would be rare for these guns to be firing at their max ranges, except in bombarding fixed locations. Guns of the era were mostly used in direct fire roles. There not used like howitzers in the 20th Century. The earth isn't a table top, direct fire at thousands of yards isn't possible in most places. North American isn't the Russian Steppe, or the North African Desert. British doctrine was to push their guns up into rifle range, to support the infantry in the attack. They thought they were following Prussian doctrine, but they misunderstood what they were doing. When they did that in South Africa it didn't work out well, and it wouldn't in the first few battles with the Americans ether.

 

[Belisarius II]

It's practically ASB to my way of thinking. I was indulging an ASB scenario in which all American citizens wake up one morning in 1890 with a fixed resolve to destroy the British Empire completely, for no stated reason whatsoever. Annexing all of Canada to the USA (everything from the US border north, everything between Greenland and Alaska--the fact that Newfoundland is not in the Canadian federation makes no difference, it is "part of Canada" in this insane sense, to be annexed as a US state forever) is part of this plan. Destroying the UK--Ireland and Scotland to become independent, Wales separated from England, England broken up into many, at least three pieces--is the endgame which if accomplished would break the ASB spell and leave Americans free to wonder why they hell they did this. All British settler colonies have a choice of independence (but forbidden to federate with other distant former colonies), petitioning to be annexed to the US (whether as states or Territories would depend on population) or the US might or might not approve them joining some other colonial power's system, depending on circumstances. Ireland or Scotland could also vote to become US states, no questions asked. All persons in annexed territories that were citizen/subjects of Britain automatically become US citizens immediately per the US Constitution (the Reconstruction Amendment defining US citizens as persons born here--the annexed territories are deemed retroactively American so everyone born there or committed to residency there is deemed US born) but since they are not smitten with the ASB compulsion, they might not be trusted to be loyal. (Maybe the ASB compulsion should descend on such surrendered territories, everyone who qualifies as a citizen is suddenly in the same insane boat as the original Yankees; that solves the loyalty problem anyway). Colonies that are essentially protectorates are to be turned loose to make their way as independent nations again, but with the option of their regimes petitioning to be taken on as US Territories with autonomy--that will be accepted no questions asked and the spell works on these subjects too, making them all loyal US citizens in a territory who are equally committed to wiping out Britain and all her works. Thus in theory India could wind up being a mass of many US Territories--the catch is that the Constitution applies, meaning the autonomous regimes must be republican in form (since US law pretty much assumes Territories are destined to become states someday) so various protectorate sultans and maharajas and so forth probably want to give it a pass. Their subjects get a vote if they have previously been set up for democracy in any form, which I doubt any were. The US in lieu of taking them on as Territories can offer instead independence with a protectorate alliance--in exchange for USN basing rights and stuff of that nature, the USA pledges to uphold their security. Or they can ask to join some other colonial system, which American conquerors would again consider case by case with an eye to US strategic interests. Until and unless the endgame of conquering the British Isles and dismantling the UK into little bit is achieved, probably US interest is to agglomerate as much power as possible so the pressure is on to get the conquered colonies to choose either Territory status or allied nation status.

Australia and New Zealand might either ask to join the USA or be set loose, an Australian union encompassing NZ and small former British Pacific islands is acceptable but not federation or Commonwealth with other former British colonies. Similarly a united South Africa might form, or parts of it might become US states (or Terrritories) while others are independent nations and perhaps annexed to some other European empire.

This is the world the Americans wake up one morning in 1890 determined to achieve, for no reason they can generally agree on or explain and no need to explain themselves. All agree, for maximum OP compliance, that step one must be to neutralize Canada by conquering it. There is no preparation whatsoever, the President (Cleveland as it happens) goes to Congress to simply say he wants a declaration of war against Britain, and Congress unanimously gives it to him. And immediately on getting it (Cleveland was a stickler for proprieties I gather, despite his infamous implicit admission of an extramarital affair as a young man) he gives the War and Navy secretaries their orders to strike at British assets and hit Canada with the best invasion that can be ordered immediately. So the USA is totally unprepared, but then again Britain and Canada have zero warning either. The afternoon of that same morning, suddenly Yankee state militias are pouring across the border doing their piecemeal best.

I won't go into the sort of strategy that would emerge, but point out if there is such a universal ASB compulsion, a shared conviction that the war is necessary and just, all sorts of cooperation that we would normally expect roadblocks to would solidify. For instance--SCOTUS ruled the Federal income tax Lincoln instituted in the Civil War unconstitutional; Grover Cleveland would hardly countenance simply defying the Court in this...but Constitutionally, the original document does permit Congress to levy a head tax. Citizens would not object to the clear injustice of a Rockefeller having to pay the same cash payment as a sharecropper in the deep South. They might however agree, rich and poor alike, that an income tax is needed and more fair, and an Amendment to enable one whips its way through House and Senate overnight, and upon unanimous approval there is rushed to the capitals of all states by telegraph, and the race is on among the legislatures of the states to approve it, as a matter of pride to try to be among the 3/4 necessary to pass it first. (The remaining quarter of states will pass it too). Bing bang boom, Congress can institute another income tax modeled on the Civil War era one, or perhaps with improvements. The Federal government now has credit to issue war bonds. Citizens buy them. Congress has the funds to do anything war related. The magnates of the US steel industry form a consortium voluntarily to coordinate the most rapid expansion of US munitions. DuPont and other munitions firms get working on how to secure adequate supplies of niter or something acceptable, busting their asses to find the most cost-effective way of producing suitable explosives ideally with domestic resources; if it is necessary to obtain them from overseas teams get cracking on how to evade British blockade attempts, say smuggling in via Mexico. Mexican American relations a problem? Consideration immediately about what combination of carrots and sticks would best and most securely win Mexican cooperation. Men volunteer for military service, but informal but quite scientific labor allocation boards form among captains of industry to discern a suitable balance of military manpower versus industrial and agricultural labor requirements for best effect in the drawn out struggle. Rationing goes into effect with no one trying to evade it--along with price controls (decreeing that prevailing market prices the day the war started are "fair" is the rule of thumb) and both military recruits and industrial hires being paid fair wages but having less to spend them on than usual, war bond purchases are very high, as everyone has full confidence they will be honored so it is a great way to save excess income. No one cheats on their taxes. Industrial and financial magnates are expected to make fair profits but not to gouge and set their contract price bids accordingly. Radicals like the Wobblies postpone their schemes of revolution to serve the wonderful cause of eliminating the profiteering British system and hope to turn to revolutionizing the postwar expanded US system when that great work is accomplished; bosses shrug at union organization, knowing the workers won't strike and will only demand a fair living wage and give their full effort to productive work, and that any workforce that proves redundant will cheerfully take being fired and either head for work where it is needed or else go to the military recruitment centers to be dispatched to whatever front they are needed on.

Going ASB like this thus is a departure from realism in more senses then just an inane answer to the question "Why in God's name does the USA invade Canada in 1890?" It Mary Sues the hell out of the USA by providing this inhuman unity in an arbitrary cause that solves all sorts of normal administrative headaches.

But I can't see any other approach that would explain it. With this assumption the USA is firing on all cylinders and if they are to be defeated it must be because of absolute inability to win this war. And they can suffer massive reversals, even British invasion, and not give up.

Every Anglo/American war thread seems to get irrationally hot. What is the status of Newfoundland?

 

[Shevek23]

What is the status of Newfoundland?

You must be referring to its status in 1890? Today it is Canadian of course.

But that wasn't true until well into the 20th century; I forget if it was indeed the Depression crisis, or an earlier one in the 1920s peculiar to Newfoundland itself, that changed things. The island rejected Confederation in 1867 and remained a separately governed British colony, not sure what not-colony name it got, a little Dominion of its own or something else. The government went bankrupt, I am almost sure it had to be the Depression that pushed it over though they had some problems electing a leader who played pretty fast and loose that led them to the brink the global crash pushed them over. Newfoundland was just not able, in the situation, to sustain self-governing on her own any longer and petitioned to join the Canadian federation belatedly.

So in 1890 its government had no direct ties to Canada's at all; it was within the larger British system of course but not part of Canada, just Canada-adjacent.

I believe when they were admitted to Canada as a province as a kind of compensation they had the shores of Labrador transferred to them, from Quebec. Perhaps in prior times Labrador had been administered as part of Newfoundland and had to give it up to Quebec, so this might have been a return.

 

[Alstein]

An 1898 war is not off the table if the Venezuela and Alaska-Canada border situations go differently. Should the US side with Venezuela entirely and push harder against Canada while blundering attempts at diplomatic reproachment. UK enters the Spanish-American War on the Spanish side, with Fashoda we might get France joining the US and getting a bigger World War I ahead of schedule.

Would Germany join in this scenario? I can't see France joining in without Germany pledging neutrality at the very least. What about Russia and Japan?

I see French involvement outside of trying to do peace as very unlikely.

 

[Belisarius II]

Would Germany join in this scenario? I can't see France joining in without Germany pledging neutrality at the very least. What about Russia and Japan?

I see French involvement outside of trying to do peace as very unlikely.

That would be a global hot mess. U.S. Venezuela, France & Russia, vs. Britain, Germany, AH, and Spain, with Japan looking for any spoils it could get it's hands on. It would be several separate conflicts that could tie together. Would Germany attack France, if France went to war with Britain? Would Austria join Germany if Germany started the war, knowing they would be intern attacked by Russia?

 

[Alstein]

Balkan Conflicts could bring that corner of the world into conflict. Italy is a wildcard. Germany would view France as easy pickings, but what could they gain from it. War might not be worth some colonies, and UK will be wary of Germany.

I don't see Germany and France allying, though if they did- there might be an agreement where if they win, France gets some of AL back in exchange for a colony or two, and maybe parts of Italy if they join the losing side.

US, Japan, Germany, and France allying and the Royal Navy is in trouble.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

Sweeping mines within rifle range of a hostile shore is a hazardous operation.

Not nearly as hazardous as firing rifles at armoured warships, with mounted machine guns and quick-firing artillery. And when we say "rifle range" we of course only mean the very narrowest point of the Narrows, which is just under 2,000 yards wide for less than a mile.

See what happened at Gallipoli.

Where the Ottomans, you'll notice, had extensive fixed coastal artillery defences, for exactly the same reason the US wanted them: you need mines, the "heavy fire of modern artillery, and ... movable fish torpedoes operated and controlled from the shore" to actually make a harbour secure. The idea that you can just improvise an entire system of harbour defence the moment war breaks out is nonsense, which you knew when you falsely told us:

The major cities were defended by forts, and batteries.

Why tell us this if they weren't needed? More importantly, why did the US government follow the Endicott report and spend all that money actually building forts and batteries to defend their cities if they could just drop a few mines in wartime and call it a day?

Shore based torpedoes would also be used.

You see, it's always the same old story with American supporters. You give them a source that explictly says torpedoes have to be operated from the same vulnerable shore installations, that all the torpedoes the US has available have problems, and that the British Whitehead is categorically the best in the world, and you just get a handwave of "American ingenuity will fix all these problems".

if you send a gun back to the factory, to be rebuilt to a new design, with new carriages, sights, ammo, and limbers it's not the same gun, it just has the same barrel. That's why it had a new model designation, when it was used in the 2nd Boer War. At any rate it's not the same gun being used in 1890.

It had a different model designation because it fired a larger shell. The carriages and limbers were adjusted because the new larger shell needed to fit into the trail box on the carriage and into the ammunition boxes on the limber; the sights were different because the new 15pdr round had different ballistic properties; and the ammunition was different because it used a larger shell and a more powerful propellant. However, you've kept telling us that the gun was a failure and had to be withdrawn, which isn't the case:

If you read it carefully it's talking about 2 separate guns. It's easy to read it that the 6 cwt was just for the cavalry, but the whole article is about the 6 cwt, and how it replaced the 7 cwt. The article about the 7 cwt notes it was taken out of service in 1895, so it wasn't used in the 2nd Boer War.

Yes a modified version designed in 1892 means it's new gun. It's not the same gun being used in 1890. The cwt 7 was considered unsuccessful, so it had to be replaced. My question was how it could've been in service for 6 years without noticing it's problems?

The gun your referring to isn't the gun the British had in 1890. The 1890 gun is the BL 12 pounder cwt 7, which had serious problems. The gun your talking about is the BL 12 pounder cwt 6 of 1892, which replaced it. That's the gun used in the 2nd Boer War. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BL_12-pounder_6_cwt_gun

Sorry, foolish mistake, the 12 pounder BL was off course a Breech loader. It was however a poor gun that had to be replaced. That such a weapon could've been in service for 6 years before being discovered to have so many basic faults that it needed urgent replacement is testimony to lack of operational training of the British Army of the period

By 1890 the British Artillery had reverted to muzzle loading cannon. The Ordnance BL 12-pounder 7cwt was the standard field piece at the time, for both the cavalry, and field artillery. It proved too heavy for the cavalry, and had operational problems that forced it's replacement in 1892.

If you're looking for an actual fundamental problem with a gun, try the US M1885 3.2in gun: they had to switch from the Freyre obdurator used on the first 25 guns to a de Bange obdurator for the last 75 of the order, because they found out after they started issuing them that the breech seal could be damaged in the process of reloading.

India isn't the only place on earth were a marching army kicks up a lot of dust.

Showing a lack of acquaintance with nineteenth-century warfare: India is legendary for its dusty conditions (e.g. Fanny Eden in December 1837: 'nothing [to be seen] but loose brown dust, which rises in clouds at the slightest provocation'; alternatively, try the memoirs of a vicereine in the 1880s). Alternatively, see the US Army Air Force's assessment that dust is 'a serious restriction to visibility during the dry season' and 'dust haze occurs over all parts of India during the dry season'. It's particularly hard on the guns because Indian cavalry manoeuvres were demanding - in the 1891 event we're discussing 'the Eighteenth Hussars covered about one hundred miles of country - no mean performance with the choking dust which arises whenever cavalry moves - besides taking part in the scouting and fighting.'. These manoeuvres also involved 13 cavalry regiments, which is three more than the United States had in its entire army, so understandably generated a lot more dust than did any comparable American campaigns in a similar period.

It would be rare for these guns to be firing at their max ranges, except in bombarding fixed locations.

It would indeed. However, even if they were firing at the same range, the 12pdr BL would have a 25% larger shell than the 3in Ordnance rifle. In practice, the Ordnance rifle was fired at less than a thousand yards, and the pre-cordite British artillery were instructed to open fire at two and a half thousand yards. That's why even the United States army eventually had to face up to reality and replace its antiquated muzzle-loading artillery.

British doctrine was to push their guns up into rifle range, to support the infantry in the attack. They thought they were following Prussian doctrine, but they misunderstood what they were doing.

Just British doctrine? How quickly you seem to forget:

The British tactic of pushing guns forward into rifle range in support of the infantry proved costly in the 2nd Boer War. In 1890 the U.S. ... used better tactics.

'Although the ranges of field artillery had increased significantly since the American Civil War, artillerymen had not appreciably adjusted their tactics to fit the new technology. Caught in the middle of a technological revolution, cannoneers of the 1890s still stressed closing with the enemy by firing at distances of eight hundred yards, which was well within the range of rifles of the time. Drill Regulations of 1896 taught that... "for the close support of its own infantry of decisive moments... it should not hesitate to enter this zone and meet the fire of the enemy's infantry at short ranges (eight hundred yards)"... Only able to deploy direct fire, American artillerymen preached moving their field pieces as close as possible to enemy infantry even if such action brought them within the range of small arms fire. Employing direct fire and moving their guns within one thousand yards of the enemy created problems for the field artillery in the Spanish-American War... the enemy covered American artillery with heavy fire, prevented the cannoneers from serving their guns properly, and forced Dinnenback to withdraw his field artillery from the infantry line for the rest of the battle... After fighting only Indians for the past thirty years, the Army had forgotten the lessons of the Civil War... and did not fully understand that improved technology, which had appeared since 1865, was even more lethal.'

You're obsessed with the idea that the British pushed guns into "rifle range", but at Magersfontein they used howitzers at 4,000 yards and field guns at between a mile and 1100 yards; at Ellandslaagte they opened at 3,000 yards and moved up to 1,500; at Talana Hill they opened at 3,000 yards and moved to 2,300 where they suppressed the artillery before moving up to 1,400 and firing shrapnel to suppress the infantry. There are only two battles where the British artillery moves as close to the Boers as the US artillery moved to the Spanish: Colenso, where it paid the price, but even then opened at 4,000 yards; and Modder River, where moving up to 400 yards saves the day. British tactics are far more nuanced than you suggest, moving into rifle range is not solely a British prerogative, and - perhaps most crucially - sometimes it works.

When they did that in South Africa it didn't work out well, and it wouldn't in the first few battles with the Americans ether.

I see we're back to the Americans being as effective as Boers again, despite being armed with single-shot black powder rifles and black-powder non-QF artillery - and having less training to boot.

 

[M79]

We might see some of these begin to appear in serious numbers fairly quickly, especially as mobile artillery.

 

[Belisarius II]

Not nearly as hazardous as firing rifles at armoured warships, with mounted machine guns and quick-firing artillery. And when we say "rifle range" we of course only mean the very narrowest point of the Narrows, which is just under 2,000 yards wide for less than a mile.


Where the Ottomans, you'll notice, had extensive fixed coastal artillery defences, for exactly the same reason the US wanted them: you need mines, the "heavy fire of modern artillery, and ... movable fish torpedoes operated and controlled from the shore" to actually make a harbour secure. The idea that you can just improvise an entire system of harbour defence the moment war breaks out is nonsense, which you knew when you falsely told us:



Why tell us this if they weren't needed? More importantly, why did the US government follow the Endicott report and spend all that money actually building forts and batteries to defend their cities if they could just drop a few mines in wartime and call it a day?


You see, it's always the same old story with American supporters. You give them a source that explictly says torpedoes have to be operated from the same vulnerable shore installations, that all the torpedoes the US has available have problems, and that the British Whitehead is categorically the best in the world, and you just get a handwave of "American ingenuity will fix all these problems".


It had a different model designation because it fired a larger shell. The carriages and limbers were adjusted because the new larger shell needed to fit into the trail box on the carriage and into the ammunition boxes on the limber; the sights were different because the new 15pdr round had different ballistic properties; and the ammunition was different because it used a larger shell and a more powerful propellant. However, you've kept telling us that the gun was a failure and had to be withdrawn, which isn't the case:











If you're looking for an actual fundamental problem with a gun, try the US M1885 3.2in gun: they had to switch from the Freyre obdurator used on the first 25 guns to a de Bange obdurator for the last 75 of the order, because they found out after they started issuing them that the breech seal could be damaged in the process of reloading.


Showing a lack of acquaintance with nineteenth-century warfare: India is legendary for its dusty conditions (e.g. Fanny Eden in December 1837: 'nothing [to be seen] but loose brown dust, which rises in clouds at the slightest provocation'; alternatively, try the memoirs of a vicereine in the 1880s). Alternatively, see the US Army Air Force's assessment that dust is 'a serious restriction to visibility during the dry season' and 'dust haze occurs over all parts of India during the dry season'. It's particularly hard on the guns because Indian cavalry manoeuvres were demanding - in the 1891 event we're discussing 'the Eighteenth Hussars covered about one hundred miles of country - no mean performance with the choking dust which arises whenever cavalry moves - besides taking part in the scouting and fighting.'. These manoeuvres also involved 13 cavalry regiments, which is three more than the United States had in its entire army, so understandably generated a lot more dust than did any comparable American campaigns in a similar period.


It would indeed. However, even if they were firing at the same range, the 12pdr BL would have a 25% larger shell than the 3in Ordnance rifle. In practice, the Ordnance rifle was fired at less than a thousand yards, and the pre-cordite British artillery were instructed to open fire at two and a half thousand yards. That's why even the United States army eventually had to face up to reality and replace its antiquated muzzle-loading artillery.


Just British doctrine? How quickly you seem to forget:



You're obsessed with the idea that the British pushed guns into "rifle range", but at Magersfontein they used howitzers at 4,000 yards and field guns at between a mile and 1100 yards; at Ellandslaagte they opened at 3,000 yards and moved up to 1,500; at Talana Hill they opened at 3,000 yards and moved to 2,300 where they suppressed the artillery before moving up to 1,400 and firing shrapnel to suppress the infantry. There are only two battles where the British artillery moves as close to the Boers as the US artillery moved to the Spanish: Colenso, where it paid the price, but even then opened at 4,000 yards; and Modder River, where moving up to 400 yards saves the day. British tactics are far more nuanced than you suggest, moving into rifle range is not solely a British prerogative, and - perhaps most crucially - sometimes it works.


I see we're back to the Americans being as effective as Boers again, despite being armed with single-shot black powder rifles and black-powder non-QF artillery - and having less training to boot.

These debates about Anglo/American wars always come down to a few points. From the British side it's based on Victorian Omnipotence. They can just do anything, and any argument that the Americans could effectively resist, are answered with, "Your just invoking American Exceptionalism." The only people who invoke jingoism are the pro British side. The other argument is that any deficiency of the British Army won't matter, because they were mostly professionals, and most of the Americans weren't. Technical arguments are made that everything the British had is just superior to anything the Americans have. Because their defense spending was so low on day one they start out with a decisive disadvantage, and can't make it up, because any arrangements would be too makeshift to be effective.

On the American side the arguments include. First their fighting on their own borders, so their closer to their sources of supplies, and reinforcements. On the other side the Empire has very long LOC going all the way back to the UK. With Britain's vast merchant fleet they can manage it, like they did in SA, but at great cost, in money, and resources. The USA has a vastly greater population, and economic output then Canada, and given time, (In 1890 a few months) can mobilize several hundred thousand men. In 1890 the RN will shut down U.S. transatlantic shipping, but their overall economy won't be seriously weakened. And finally that it's no simple matter for the RN to sail into, and destroy a major port city.

Experience in the ACW showed taking a defended port needed army support. Ironclads were battered by heavy guns, and feared mines. Earthwork gun batteries were very difficult for naval guns to destroy. Stone, and masonry forts were actually more vulnerable. RN Ironclad Battleships were great advances over Union Monitors in open waters, but would have the same problems against coastal defenses. At Gallipoli the RN was never able to silence the Turkish batteries, or clear the mines. The U.S had thousand of guns from the CW period, that could be emplaced in coastal batteries to defend it's cities, and many of them could do damage to even Ironclad Battleships. They don't have to penetrate the armor belts, to force them to withdraw. No Monitors ever had their armored turrets, or side armor pierced, but were forced to retreat.

The Confederates had electrically fired mines, so it's not something they have to invent. The waters around NY, and other American cities are shallow, and were more so in the 19th Century, so bottom mines, and obstacles are easy to lay. In 1890 the British cleared mines with row boats dragging grapnels. They don't have armored rowboats. Sailing around the shallow waters of the NY Bays your restricted to narrow channels, or run the risk of running aground. The Howell Torpedo was simpler, and cheaper to produce then the Whitehead, ran straight for 900 yards, and was wakeless. They don't have to be better then the Whitehead, your not selling them, they just have to work. sailing into NY like Nelson at Copenhagen wouldn't be a good idea.

If you consider the M-1885 a failure, because it needed to be modified after the first 25 were made, but the BL 12 pounder cwt 7 wasn't, I don't understand your standard. It seems the need to modify it caused mass confusion, and great expense in the British Artillery Arm. So it worked fine world wide, but only the dust of India was a problem? It had no problem in the sand storms of Egypt, and Sudan? It took 6 years of service, presumable in India to discover it had a problem with grim? At least the Americans discovered the problem after 25 guns went into service.

Here are some British guns in use in the 1st Boer War.

Still using rockets I see. With a good saber charge thrown in. I guess this was just because every Boer was a marksmen? Tactics had nothing to do with it? For those interested here is a discussion about what the British learned in the 2nd Boer War. Keep in mind many of these problems would have been worse in 1890, when the British have single shot rifles.

 

[Stark]

These debates about Anglo/American wars always come down to a few points. From the British side it's based on Victorian Omnipotence. They can just do anything, and any argument that the Americans could effectively resist, are answered with, "Your just invoking American Exceptionalism." The only people who invoke jingoism are the pro British side. The other argument is that any deficiency of the British Army won't matter, because they were mostly professionals, and most of the Americans weren't. Technical arguments are made that everything the British had is just superior to anything the Americans have. Because their defense spending was so low on day one they start out with a decisive disadvantage, and can't make it up, because any arrangements would be too makeshift to be effective.

Dude, cerebropetrologist just answered your every argument one by one, with citations for everything he says. He never claimed anything about "Victorian Omnipotence", his every argument was very specific.

 

[HarryLeferts]

Interestingly enough, the most likely reason for the US and Britain/Canada to go to war here is also the one that would shoot the idea that the US tactics would win the day due to the British/Canadian forces not being used to them. Mainly, the most likely flashpoint to lead to a rise in tensions would be, rather than dying off, the Fenian raids increasing in both strength and number. These were Irish immigrants to the US who decided that, to free Ireland from British control, it would be best to invade Canada and basically ransom it for Ireland. And when you look at some of the raids had upwards of a thousand.

The reason this screws over the US is that the Fenians, those in the more militant wing anyways were generally veterans of the ACW using the same tactics and weapons as regular US forces. Heck, one thing to remember is that it was suspected that there was a lot of silent support for their actions because of the belief of the British supporting the Confederacy during the Civil War. Something which is not exactly impossible...

So, this being the most likely divergence, all you would need is for the President(s) at the time to not enforce neutrality and arrest the Fenians. Basically, just shrug their shoulders, maybe every so often arrest one of them... But otherwise allow them to continue their actions. As in reality, this would enflame anti-American sentiment in both Canada and Britain. Most likely, the real road to war would kick off by someone in Canada having enough and chasing the Fenians to the border... and then over it to put an end to it with the US throwing a fit.

 

[Alstein]

Would that lead to an earlier start of the Irish Rebellions? That could be a headache as well.

I do think the more time the US has to prepare for war, the more likely they'll be able to eventually take the upper hand. A flash war the UK wins, something where the US gets to mobilize they can win a long slog if they are angry enough to take losses for 2-3 years.

 

[HarryLeferts]

Would that lead to an earlier start of the Irish Rebellions? That could be a headache as well.

I do think the more time the US has to prepare for war, the more likely they'll be able to eventually take the upper hand. A flash war the UK wins, something where the US gets to mobilize they can win a long slog if they are angry enough to take losses for 2-3 years.

The Fenian Raids basically did nothing for the actual Irish in the end. On the other hand, they actually lead to improvement for the Canadian militias as well as giving Canada an example of how they were stronger together than apart, binding them closer and giving a shot in the arm to Canadian nationalism.

Looking further into it, another divergence that could add to this was if Louis Riel didn’t inform the Canadians after signing an agreement with them about the Fenians planning a raid/their location. So you could have the relationship between them continue and, when he lead the Northwest Rebellion in 1885, get support from the Fenians. Possibly enough to drag the rebellion out further and maybe give him the chance to flee to the US again (in which case, the Canadians would be downright livid if the US didn’t turn him over).

It would still be enough to have bad feelings on both sides of the border and strain things nearly to the breaking point.

 

[tallthinkev]

Thanks for all the ideas, yet as the title says, it's the US doing the invading.

 

[Belisarius II]

Dude, cerebropetrologist just answered your every argument one by one, with citations for everything he says. He never claimed anything about "Victorian Omnipotence", his every argument was very specific.

Dude, he answered very specific questions about the modification to the BL 12 pounder cwt 7, and how it's really still the same gun used in the 2nd Boer War. He also told us Indian dust is worse then any other dust in the world. He also told us the problem for the British in the Boer War wasn't doctrinal, just that the Boers were such good shots. He didn't say anything about tactical, and operational lessons of the ACW, or Colonial wars effecting an 1890 War.

I should add he gave a fine lesson in mine warfare, but didn't give any reason why given a few month the Americans couldn't set up mine fields.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

Because their defense spending was so low on day one they start out with a decisive disadvantage, and can't make it up, because any arrangements would be too makeshift to be effective.

Umm, yeah, that's kind of how wars work? There's a reason why countries at risk of invasion generally keep a large standing army even during peacetime.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

These debates about Anglo/American wars always come down to a few points. From the British side it's based on Victorian Omnipotence. They can just do anything, and any argument that the Americans could effectively resist, are answered with, "Your just invoking American Exceptionalism." The only people who invoke jingoism are the pro British side.

This is a remarkable reversal of the truth. The British side is generally focused around uncontroversial propositions such as "training makes you better at things," "infrastructure is quite complicated to build," and "no nation really solved the tactical problems of advancing under fire before WWI". From the pro-American side, we have arguments like "the single defining experience of late nineteenth century warfare is the American Civil War," "the US does not use volley fire," "the US does not advance its artillery into rifle range," "the US is an autarky," "the US can manufacture all the guns and torpedoes and mines that it needs within a few months of the outbreak of war," and so on.

Fortunately, there's an easy way to test this. Let's go back to here, when we discussed Lord Salisbury's view that "we have no army capable of meeting even a second-class Continental Power; that is, we could never spare force enough at any one point to do so." I agree wholeheartedly with Lord Salisbury: the British did not have an army capable of meeting second-class Continental Powers, because a ratio of 2-1 is too low to give them any chance of success in the field. So, two questions:

1) Do any pro-British posters deny that Lord Salisbury was right, and Britain's force ratio of 2-1 made it almost impossible for them to meet a second-class Continental Power and coming off victorious, on the grounds that Britain is somehow an exception to the normal rules of warfare?

2) Do any pro-US posters deny that the US force ratio of 4-1 makes it almost impossible for them to meet Britain and come off victorious?

2a) For pro-US posters willing to make such a denial, do you simultaneously agree with Lord Salisbury that Britain couldn't meet a second-class Continental Power and come off victorious?

That should sort out where the exceptionalists lie.

The other argument is that any deficiency of the British Army won't matter, because they were mostly professionals, and most of the Americans weren't.

No, the argument is that the British have ten times as many professional soldiers as the Americans do, which makes training your amateur ones easier, and that a solid chunk of the British amateur ones (militia, yeomanry and Rifle Volunteers) also have more training than their American counterparts. I don't know whether you're taking issue with the idea that practicing at something makes you better at it, or claiming that the US can train and equip new armies faster than the British can ship troops over from the UK. Either way, it's a pretty bad objection to make.

Because their defense spending was so low on day one they start out with a decisive disadvantage, and can't make it up, because any arrangements would be too makeshift to be effective.

Well, yes. That's exactly what the Americans of the time thought, which is why they spent all the money that they did historically on coastal defences and gun manufacturing facilities from 1890 onwards. You're free to argue that this was a mistake, and they could have continued spending nothing as they did between in the quarter of a century between 1875 and 1890 without having any impact on their ability to wage war or protect their coasts, or that raising their army to 98,000 men before WWI was just a waste of money. However, it strikes me that Americans of the time were both very shrewd in their assessment, and had considerable historical precedent for the actions they took.

Earthwork gun batteries were very difficult for naval guns to destroy. Stone, and masonry forts were actually more vulnerable.

Yes, the Civil War era stone and masonry forts that the US has are extremely vulnerable, but I'm not sure why you think this is a point in the American's favour. Granted, the US can throw up earthwork batteries, but as we've seen it doesn't have any heavy coastal guns to put in them. Nor does it have any heavy siege artillery: the experimental versions of the 5in and 7in BL siege rifles weren't manufactured until after 1890, and they weren't put into regular service until even later. You could, of course, put some of the 100 3.2in M1885 guns into earthwork batteries, but they won't do anything against armoured warships, they'll be out-shot by even the weakest ships - e.g. HMS Rattlesnake, a 560-ton torpedo gunboat, mounts a 4in gun - and they can't be used in your army against Canada.

At Gallipoli the RN was never able to silence the Turkish batteries, or clear the mines.

It was the batteries that made minesweeping difficult, and it was the mines that made silencing the batteries difficult. Without the mines, the battleships could have silenced the batteries; without the batteries, the minesweepers could have cleared the mines. This is why the US government insisted on having the "heavy fire of modern artillery" to back their mines up. It's a synergy that completely bypasses most pro-American posters, who invariably seize on one piece of technology (normally the one they judge simplest to manufacture) and think that spamming it leads to victory.

The U.S had thousand of guns from the CW period, that could be emplaced in coastal batteries to defend it's cities, and many of them could do damage to even Ironclad Battleships.

Sorry, but no. This is pure wishful thinking: even as of 1865 the US had very few guns that could do damage to HMS Warrior, with 4.5in of wrought iron armour. HMS Colossus (1882) has at least 14in of compound armour, which is 25% more effective than wrought iron. Furthermore, (a fact that you're seemingly struggling with) modern breech-loading artillery has far longer ranges than Civil War artillery and delivers more explosive more accurately. The argument that a nation can defend against 13.5in BL guns with 15in smoothbore Rodmans is so foolish that I find it hard to believe you're arguing in good faith.

The Confederates had electrically fired mines, so it's not something they have to invent.

Nobody said they have to be invented. But they have to be manufactured in large quantities and laid before the British arrive, and there has to be the series of protected casemates from which the operators can control the mines, and coastal batteries to stop ships simply demolishing the casemates before sailing into the unprotected harbours. And, as the Endicott report makes completely clear, the US does not have this infrastructure and cannot simply create it on the outbreak of war.

The Howell Torpedo was simpler, and cheaper to produce then the Whitehead, ran straight for 900 yards, and was wakeless.

The US ordered 30 of them in January 1889, and it took three years for the first ten to be delivered. Indeed, the government got so fed up of waiting for them that they bought 100 Whitehead torpedoes in 1892; the Whitehead entered service in the same year that the Howell did, and was so far superior that the Howell was phased out despite costing less. The idea that the Howell is somehow going to be delivered in vast quantities and win the war for the United States is fantasy.

sailing into NY like Nelson at Copenhagen wouldn't be a good idea.

Why not? For a start, Copenhagen had coastal defences.

If you consider the M-1885 a failure, because it needed to be modified after the first 25 were made, but the BL 12 pounder cwt 7 wasn't, I don't understand your standard.

I didn't call it a failure, but the breech seal leaking gas is a far more substantial problem than the axle traverse mechanism seizing. Have you actually stopped for a second to consider what happens to a gun on which the axle traverse stops working? The answer is that it continues to function exactly the same as a gun which lacks an axle traverse in the first place, i.e. the US M1885 3.2in field gun, which had to be manhandled every single time it needed to be re-laid.

It seems the need to modify it caused mass confusion, and great expense in the British Artillery Arm.

It seems to you that the need to modify it caused mass confusion, because you're seizing onto everything you can find in Wikipedia that might present a problem for the British, and throwing in its conversion to a 15pdr to boot. In reality, it was a minor blip, and the gun as a whole was so successful that it could be upgraded to a 15pdr and then to quick-firing.

So it worked fine world wide, but only the dust of India was a problem? It had no problem in the sand storms of Egypt, and Sudan?

You've not realised the implications of your own statement, which is that - if it was a real problem - you'd be able to find plenty of quotes about it being a problem from campaigns other than a single set of cavalry manoeuvres elsewhere in the world. And yet, we have troops from Australia to Great Britain using the gun without issue. Unless you admit to being unable to find these kind of quotes, in which case we can fairly question the research behind many of your other conclusions, the logical deduction is that the incident show the British to be incredibly responsive to potential problems, and willing to put money into fixing them.

The temperate climate of Great Britain, and the gun's performance with the field artillery, is a much better indication of how the gun would serve in a war in Canada than the experience of India: I think I've demonstrated perfectly clearly that the circumstances there are different. You might, of course, choose to say that cold conditions would hamper the gun's performance; however, unless you can show that the US 3.2in M1885 served adequately in Canadian conditions, there's no reason to believe that this would be specific to the British 12pdr.

He didn't say anything about tactical, and operational lessons of the ACW, or Colonial wars effecting an 1890 War.

I'm sorry - did you miss the post here where I proved the US army was guilty of all the bad tactical behaviours you said illustrated a lack of awareness of the lessons of the American Civil War on the part of the British - i.e. using volley fire and advancing their artillery into rifle range? My point is that British and American tactics of the time were much of a muchness - far closer than American and Boer tactics were - something which you have been unable to argue against except by repeated assertion. Couple that with the additional material advantages the Boers had over the Americans (i.e. charger-loading magazine-fed smokeless rifles and smokeless quick-firing artillery, against single-shot black powder rifles and black-powder recoiling artillery), and it shows your attempt to conflate historical Boer success with putative American success to be fundamentally flawed.

 

[Belisarius II]

Umm, yeah, that's kind of how wars work? There's a reason why countries at risk of invasion generally keep a large standing army even during peacetime.

So explain how out of a clear blue sky the Canadian Army could invade the United States? Sure without warning the RN could attack NYC, or Boston. The U.S. had low defense spending, because the chances of an invasion without warning was virtually impossible. The British starting a war without provocation, with a Pearl Harbor style attack on America's biggest city was about unthinkable. The American reaction would be even worse then in 1941. At least there was a leadup to Pearl Harbor. Burning New York without provocation would be a hell of a way to start a war, and sure wouldn't end it with that blow. Just how would anyone end a war like that?

 

[Fabius Maximus]

So explain how out of a clear blue sky the Canadian Army could invade the United States?

I don't think I've ever claimed that they could, either in this thread or anywhere else.

 

[Belisarius II]

I don't think I've ever claimed that they could, either in this thread or anywhere else.

So you said countries that are at risk of invasion keep a large standing army even in peace time. The United States wasn't at any realistic danger of being invaded, and that's why they historically had low defense spending. So that was my point, what point were you making?