Survival of Yugoslavia into 21st Century

[Ricard (i.e. Rdffigueira)]

With any PoD you find the most convenient after Josip Broz Tito's formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, how can it survive as an intact country up into the 2010s?

Everyplace I read about it, the conclusion is that the entire country was built around the unifying figure, almost monarchical, of Marshal Tito's persona. His death in 1980 was a mere prelude of the self-destructive politico-nationalist ressurgence inside the country. Its quick fragmentation ultimately resulted in the most violent conflict in Europe since the end of WW2.

Now I antecipate people saying the collapse was inevitable, I won't dispute this, because I have little knowledge about this specific region and historical moment, but I'm interested in what could be done to preserve the integrity of the country. Perhaps even more repressive measures by the central "Serbian" government to contain the minorities pretentions on independence? Perhaps more concessions to grant autonomy to ethnic and religious denominations, in an extreme version of Spain and China's respective administrative divisions?

After this, what are the repercutions of its survival? Yugoslavia's cemented status as a non-alligned country kept it out of the Cold War, despite its seemingly Socialist political structure. I guess some pro-free-market economic stances would be adopted, just like every Soviet country did after the URSS's collapse.

And if the Yugoslav government does not perpetrates serious humanitarian violations against its minorities (specially Muslims), and sees some democratic developments, I imagine it surely will be in their best interest to join the European Union.

What you guys think?

 

[PsihoKekec]

Preparing a viable successor while he was still alive would help a lot, but I simply can't imagine anyone in the Yugoslav political scene who could pick up the mantle. If he didn't crush the liberalisation movements of the 70's but tried to harness them instead, then I guess he could reconcile with Đilas and name him successor instead of Kardelj, but this would lead to the conflict with the old guard.
But I really don't see this happening without some heavy duty ASB intervention.

 

[Simon]

Stalin apparently kept sending agents to try and kill Tito under the theory that with him out of the way any successor would be more pliable to Soviet pressure. Have one of them succeed but be captured and a trail of evidence leading back to the Kremlin tracked down. This would give them Tito's martyrdom as an issue for Yugoslav's to rally around and reinforce the government's position whilst at the same time forcing them to implement a system that doesn't just revolve around Tito and would collapse when he died. Rather than one central figure it becomes more collegial and, hopefully, more able to reform and change.

 

[PsihoKekec]

Tito's successor in 1948-53 timeframe would probably be Rankovič, I can see him sppeding up the dissolution of Yugoslavia, not the other way arround.

 

[GeographyDude]

I generally take the view, it's all economics. Or okay, let's say not all economics, but 70%.

With a growth in middle-class and above jobs and with good prospects on the horizon, people are far less likely to engage of scapegoating of any sort.

 

[Simon]

Tito's successor in 1948-53 timeframe would probably be Rankovič, I can see him speeding up the dissolution of Yugoslavia, not the other way around.

Crap, you're right. Well one of the plots apparently involved a bomb, simply have Rankovic and anyone else that's inconvenient standing next to Tito when it detonates.

With a growth in middle-class and above jobs and with good prospects on the horizon, people are far less likely to engage of scapegoating of any sort.

Maybe not scapegoating with regards to ethnicity, but if one of the constituent republics is doing better than the others and feels that they're having to pay for the others then that could breed resentment and a feeling of being better off going their own way.

 

[Shaby]

With a growth in middle-class and above jobs and with good prospects on the horizon, people are far less likely to engage of scapegoating of any sort.

Torpedoing Markovic's reforms also did not help. Milosevic did his best to do it.

Besides, such strong centrifugal forces that existed in Yugoslavia cannot be easily overcome. Fact is that perhaps the Yalta solution would have worked for the best in the long run. Although, it might have lead to a WW III.

 

[Tom Colton]

In before some smartasses point out that a state calling itself Yugoslavia existed until 2003.

 

[Charles RB]

Maybe not scapegoating with regards to ethnicity, but if one of the constituent republics is doing better than the others and feels that they're having to pay for the others then that could breed resentment and a feeling of being better off going their own way.

Mmm. It's a tricky one. In the long run, you need Yugoslavia to be a good enough deal and enough people getting along better than they did and all the various groups feeling like they've got a say in how Yugoslavia works. You could probably do it but it'd take a lot of work, starting early on.

(Or you cheat and have everyone stuck with an external threat everyone has to team up against. A giant squid monster teleports into Belgrade)

 

[Neoteros]

In before some smartasses point out that a state calling itself Yugoslavia existed until 2003.

I wonder, could a "Kleinjugoslawien" made up of the regions inhabited by the speakers of Serbo-Croatian, without Macedonia, Slovenia and maybe Kosovo and Vojvodina, ever come into being with a decent enough POD?

 

[Halagaz]

Vojvodina and Kosovo are inhabited by quite a lot of Serbo-Croatian speakers (at least before the late 19th century, in Kosovo's case).

Anyway, excluding Slovenia and Macedonia from the mix means that the PoD should be something which leads to Kleinjugoslawien existing alongside greater Bulgaria and some kind of a larger Austria (that lost its Habsburg empire but stayed strong enough to force the Slovenes to stay).

 

[Ricard (i.e. Rdffigueira)]

I wonder, could a "Kleinjugoslawien" made up of the regions inhabited by the speakers of Serbo-Croatian, without Macedonia, Slovenia and maybe Kosovo and Vojvodina, ever come into being with a decent enough POD?

Vojvodina and Kosovo are inhabited by quite a lot of Serbo-Croatian speakers (at least before the late 19th century, in Kosovo's case).

Anyway, excluding Slovenia and Macedonia from the mix means that the PoD should be something which leads to Kleinjugoslawien existing alongside greater Bulgaria and some kind of a larger Austria (that lost its Habsburg empire but stayed strong enough to force the Slovenes to stay).

OK, I have zero knowledge of German language, but "klein" is supposed to mean "little", and Kleinjugoslawien means something like "little Yugoslavia". I surely have no idea about Macedonia and Kosovo, but isn't Slovenia a Slavic-speaking country? I guess they had little identification with Serbians, so they are more likely to be a centrifugal movement.

I hadn't considered taking Tito out of picture early, that's an interesting proposal.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I half-remember news reports at the time of the break-up saying that: they all spoke the same language; although officially they were Catholics, Orthodox and Muslim, most of them weren't religious; there was a lot of intermarriage; and that 40% wrote Yugoslav for their nationality on the last census.

I have only met one "former Yugoslav", but when I told her that, she said they were perfectly happy being Yugoslavs, but it all changed overnight.

This particular person was a Kosovan and a Muslim married to a Catholic, but he was Portuguese.

 

[Halagaz]

OK, I have zero knowledge of German language, but "klein" is supposed to mean "little", and Kleinjugoslawien means something like "little Yugoslavia". I surely have no idea about Macedonia and Kosovo, but isn't Slovenia a Slavic-speaking country? I guess they had little identification with Serbians, so they are more likely to be a centrifugal movement.

That would be more of a thought about the above poster's idea. Slovenia is Slavic-speaking, but together with Macedonia it's outside the Serbo-Croatian language group.

As for the major question of how to keep Yugoslavia into the 21st century...not sure. It would help if all or most of the republics were created with autonomous provinces for minorities, so everyone has more of a stake in not leaving the federation.

 

[thebulbaderp]

Easy, create a Serb autonomous entity in Croatia and Bosnia, thereby preventing Milošević from puppeting Vojvodina and Kosovo, and make stronger efforts to economically equalize the republics (so that Slovenes don't feel that they're pulling the dirty southerners up and the dirty southerners don't feel like they're providing for the wealth of the pompous Slovenes.), which will also prevent radicalization in the southern republics.

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

The difficulty in a "Kleinejugoslawien" would be that by removing Slovenia, Macedonia and Kosovo (the last of which could not happen peacefully), you would be increasing the proportion of Serbs:Non-Serbs, which would actually make conflict between Croats & Bosniaks v Serbs much more likely.

The real forces which broke apart Yugoslavia were predatory economic practices by the US Congress and the IMF which (in the former case anyway) had the explicit intent of regime change in Yugoslavia. There was no perceived need to tolerate the continued existence of the SFRY with the fall of the USSR.

This combined with scapegoating by desperate former-Communist apparatchiks who wanted to maintain control of their fiefdoms (they would rather be big fish in a small pond than vica-versa). This is strongly suggested by the frequent cooperation between Tudjman and Milosevic, particularly on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To save Yugoslavia, you would merely need to remove the economic pressure, perhaps change a few peoples' career trajectories around, and voila. The assumption that Yugoslavia was doomed is a myth propagated in Western historiography which absolves the United States of responsibility. Because of general ignorance about the Balkans, this is accepted as gospel due to lack of knowledge to the contrary.

 

[Falecius]

Mmm. It's a tricky one. In the long run, you need Yugoslavia to be a good enough deal and enough people getting along better than they did and all the various groups feeling like they've got a say in how Yugoslavia works. You could probably do it but it'd take a lot of work, starting early on.

(Or you cheat and have everyone stuck with an external threat everyone has to team up against. A giant squid monster teleports into Belgrade)

Yugoslavia was a better deal than its collapse IOTL for almost everyone involved, except probably the Slovenians (who escaped the mess largely unharmed). This is hindsight of course. However, again, to the average person, few deals are WORSE than being caught in crossfire during an "ethnic" war.

 

[Falecius]

The difficulty in a "Kleinejugoslawien" would be that by removing Slovenia, Macedonia and Kosovo (the last of which could not happen peacefully), you would be increasing the proportion of Serbs:Non-Serbs, which would actually make conflict between Croats & Bosniaks v Serbs much more likely.

The real forces which broke apart Yugoslavia were predatory economic practices by the US Congress and the IMF which (in the former case anyway) had the explicit intent of regime change in Yugoslavia. There was no perceived need to tolerate the continued existence of the SFRY with the fall of the USSR.

This combined with scapegoating by desperate former-Communist apparatchiks who wanted to maintain control of their fiefdoms (they would rather be big fish in a small pond than vica-versa). This is strongly suggested by the frequent cooperation between Tudjman and Milosevic, particularly on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To save Yugoslavia, you would merely need to remove the economic pressure, perhaps change a few peoples' career trajectories around, and voila. The assumption that Yugoslavia was doomed is a myth propagated in Western historiography which absolves the United States of responsibility. Because of general ignorance about the Balkans, this is accepted as gospel due to lack of knowledge to the contrary.

Ideological nationalist radicalization precedes the predatory politices you mention. However, I am under the impression that it could have been contained if the economy was in a better shape, or the IMF in particular acted differently (that is, sadly, unlikely, given what the IMF saw, and partly still sees, to be its core mission).

 

[Hrvatskiwi]

Ideological nationalist radicalization precedes the predatory politices you mention. However, I am under the impression that it could have been contained if the economy was in a better shape, or the IMF in particular acted differently (that is, sadly, unlikely, given what the IMF saw, and partly still sees, to be its core mission).

Of course there was ultranationalism in Yugoslavia, but it was always much greater amongst the emigre communities than within the state itself. Even then, it was rarely anything more than a fringe ideology. Sure you may have found support for independence amongst Croats in Australia or the United States, but not to the point of condoning ethnic cleansing.

People need to remember that movements like the Ustashe were tiny but loud. Its like assuming that ISIS was inevitable because salafism exists, even when most Muslims hate "da'esh".

 

[Charles RB]

When it comes to the economy, Yugoslavia not going for an IMF deal seems more plausible than the IMF not being the IMF sadly.

Yugoslavia was a better deal than its collapse IOTL for almost everyone involved, except probably the Slovenians (who escaped the mess largely unharmed). This is hindsight of course.

That's the thing though: people at the time didn't know that was going to happen. (In an alternate timeline where it was peaceful, someone's done a DWBI: Yugoslav Wars Never Happened and Bosnian, Serb etc posters are going "lol, silly westerners")