Successfully Defend Hong Kong, 1941

[Cryhavoc101]

Not sure it would be a small difference, it may not include a massive number of CVs but the RN is likely to get at least 4 fast battleships (G3s) if not 8 or 10 to match IJN (N3s or repeat G3s), with maybe IJN having added upto 10 weaker ships (T&K, then some of the 8 Kii/Amagi class?) and the USN upto 13 more (1C,6SD,6Lex, maybe a few later if others build 10 ship).

That's not a huge number of new ships 4-8-10 ? (21-31 ship total) maybe compared to the 15 ships allowed by LNT (21 of WNT) but if you consider that only 3 (H, R&R v at least 4 new) of them are fast and only 2 (different ships N&R v all new) would be of comparable fighting power its a significant advantage.

This is to the benefit of the RN as its ships are bigger and newer design than the IJN/USN even if the USN compensates by its larger number of ship.

It also benefits the RN as the other potential opponents (Germany/Italy) are not really included in the arms race (as with France) so its margin of superiority is greater and it can still use the old ships in reserve to cover some areas.

It will be in a better position to build more in late 30s and is unlikely to build 14" ships so can just build a class of 'Lions' fast pre war.

I think this requires its own thread

While the UK would certainly struggle to maintian an Arms race in the early 20s - Japan would fail a long time before the UK (regardless of earth quakes)

I could imagine that the UK would be left with some N3s / G3s and possible all 4 Admirals but no Nelrods

Once the steam goes out of the Race I can see as others have mentioned Britaina nd USA having a private agreement and Britain getting rid of or mothballing some of the older ships

 

[viperjock]

Not sure I accept that analogy

Malta was able (just) to be resupplied and held (mainly because the enemy had no real means of capturing it)

Also there was a clearly defined war aim in holding Malta - the interdiction of supplies from Italy to North Africa.

None of this was true of Hong Kong - it was impossible to resupply and outside of some vague political sop to the Chinese served no useful war aim

The not without a fight bit could have been acheived with locally raised units.

The Hong Kong Chinese Regiment (spend a year or so building this up to Brigade Strength)
The Hong Kong Artillery (again build this up to take over the coastal batteries and forts from local volunteers)
The Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps

Their orders would be to defend the colony for a long as possible ie up to the point where Kowloon and Hong Kong are directly threatened with a land assault and then ensure that anything that 'could give aid to the enemy' is destroyed before surrendering the colony - Artillery Guns, Supplies of Ammunition and Fuel stocks - and if possible destroy cranes and rolling stock.

The Regular units should have been withdrawn to Malaya by Sept 41 (along with C Force) - not suggesting that they could have changed the events there any more than the various US "China" Marine detachments withdrawn from China could make a difference in the Phillipines - but they (like the 4th marines were) would have been of more use than being picked off in China/Hong Kong.

And who knows maybe 2 more Brigades of Trained Regulars might have made a difference - we know now that it was a closer run thing for the Japanese forces than the Imperial Forces in Malaya realised and that they (the IJA) had effectively run out of supplies at the time of the Surrender.

Sorry I was just trying to show the political thinking behind not evacuating Hong Kong.
Admitting that Hong Kong was going to be a total loss in the coming war would have been smart. Get the bulk of the regulars and civilians out and blow the rest up. Imagine what effect it would have on the Japanese timetable if British Engineer totally wrecked the port of Hong Kong.

 

[Geordie]

Sound logically perhaps but would it ever have been acceptable politically? I'm not sure it would.

Probably not. Certainly not to Churchill.

One of these moments where Brooke has to sit on him rather forcefully, reminding him that sometimes military matters need to take precedent over politics. If that doesn't work, distract him by saying that the Naval chaps have been looking at Norway. By the time Winnie realises he's been duped, C Force can be in Johore, Singapore or Rangoon.

 

[Blackfox5]

It would require either 1) China still controls the port of Canton and has control of the surrounding area so that the Chinese can support the British, or 2) there is already a large Chinese force ready to attack south and relieve Hong Kong so the defenders can escape.

There is very little the British can do by themselves. The Geography of Hong Kong itself, and the distance from available help means the colony will fall quite soon. The troops there are like the NATO troops in West Berlin; they exist as a tripwire to prevent a fait accompli, but cannot put up any meaningful defense on their own. Any defense will rely on the Chinese reaching the colony so the defenders withdraw before being overwhelmed.

 

[iddt3]

Going back a bit, what if the British somehow enlarged Hong Kong to give it some Strategic depth? You'd need a turn of the Century PoD, but a HK that goes 100 miles inland is much more defensible than the current one. Say the UK has another unequal treaty with China to expand it? That of course will have all sorts of other butterflies, but at least it makes the defense *possible*.

 

[deathscompanion1]

Going back a bit, what if the British somehow enlarged Hong Kong to give it some Strategic depth? You'd need a turn of the Century PoD, but a HK that goes 100 miles inland is much more defensible than the current one. Say the UK has another unequal treaty with China to expand it? That of course will have all sorts of other butterflies, but at least it makes the defense *possible*.

No Chinese government worth the name would accept that and you'd see the last hundred years be continuous warfare against Britain which wanted a tradeport not a colony.

 

[Kevin C. Smith]

The Battle of Hong Kong would be a victory the moment IJA troops slated for other concurrent offensives were diverted to it (for example, 38th IJA Division was slated for operations in the DEI after Hong Kong was taken; now, imagine it couldn't get the job done - the knock-on effects could be significant)

I've often wondered about that of thing...if the British had held out as long as physically possible (i.e., fighting as long as possible before being overwhelmed) in Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong how would this have upset Japan's air/land/sea strength and what are the butterflies? No move toward India? No attacks toward Australia? A smaller defensive perimeter in general? Maybe not so much victory disease?

 

[CCA]

An aggressive forward defence including more aid to the Nationalist government earlier might mean Japan not in a place to invade Hong Kong due to threats earlier.

But that requires an earlier POD.

 

[M. A. Dickens]

An aggressive forward defence including more aid to the Nationalist government earlier might mean Japan not in a place to invade Hong Kong due to threats earlier.

But that requires an earlier POD.

Hmmmm, holding Guangdong in 1938 would be very hard for the Nationalist Government, even with foreign aid.

And have you checked out my previous post? I covered a few possible PODs.

I've often wondered about that of thing...if the British had held out as long as physically possible (i.e., fighting as long as possible before being overwhelmed) in Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong how would this have upset Japan's air/land/sea strength and what are the butterflies? No move toward India? No attacks toward Australia? A smaller defensive perimeter in general? Maybe not so much victory disease?

It would have delayed later operations in DEI and Burma for sure, since the early stages of the Pacific War was basically Japan operating with a very small margin of error.

Marc A

 

[maxs]

The only thing I'm recalling is the Chinese potential

to assist Britain against the Japanese in the area. There were a couple of "ifs" beforehand. Certain things would have happened in the war between China and Japan, in I guess the least changed scenario. There was some mention of the Kowloon army coming to the assistance from the landward.

This required some measure of success by the Chinese against the Japanese at some point(s) earlier. This about the potential assistance of the Kowloon Army was, I believe, actually discussed by British military planners going into the War.

 

[M. A. Dickens]

to assist Britain against the Japanese in the area. There were a couple of "ifs" beforehand. Certain things would have happened in the war between China and Japan, in I guess the least changed scenario. There was some mention of the Kowloon army coming to the assistance from the landward.

This required some measure of success by the Chinese against the Japanese at some point(s) earlier. This about the potential assistance of the Kowloon Army was, I believe, actually discussed by British military planners going into the War.

By "Kowloon Army" do you mean Hong Kong Independent Battalion of the Dongjiang Column?

About that... I couldn't find any sources that indicated the British ever thought about asking for ChiComm assistance. I'm not saying they couldn't do it in an ATL, merely wondering if us, a bunch of know-it-alls in front of a computer, can come up with something like this, why didn't they, the ones facing an invasion, thought of it too.

Marc A

 

[jsb]

Why ask for assistance if asking for it makes you lose HK anyway ?

If you ask the KMT in to save HK then you may as well say goodbye to the lease ....

Admittedly with hindsight its better to lose HK permanently and hold Malaya from the IJA (but that might not work anyway and GB got HK back after the war for a few decades in OTL)

Probably the best is just to raise local 'British' forces (just armed police) and accept that you are losing it, after pulling out anything worth moving. (including as many people as you can to help in Malaya)

 

[maxs]

Pulling from memory, but the source's brief mention

was in the context of an all-British discussion on the dynamics and merits of reinforcing HK in the immediate aftermath of Dec. 7.

At that point tactical military alliance with KMT was a done deal, but probably the goal was to have something to say to allay concerns of the local British commanders as to their hopes of success. It occurred to me that it reflects some interest in grasping at some straw in their behalf by parties far away.

That would be some parallel to the argument being made here by various posters that HK was hopeless unless you were going to go back a ways in time to start changes.

 

[hipper]

The UK couldn't have a fleet that size, there was a reason the British were so heavily in favor of the WNT. The UK was flat broke and in hock to the U.S. up to its earlobes.

A fleet with 9 BB and 15 CV available to send to the Far East, when involved in a major war with the Reich would have to be larger than the 1945 USN. Considering OTL's requirements that would mean an RN of, at minimum, 26 BB, 24 CV, 90 CA/CL, 185 modern destroyers, and at least 200 fleet auxiliaries, assuming the British were willing to go as shorthanded in both the Atlantic and Med as IOTL. That is very unlikely. Realistically the actual number would need to be bumped by at least 20% across the board, so 32+ BB 30+ CV, 220+DD and 240 support. This would also require that they have sufficient frigates and corvettes for the Battle of the Atlantic since IOTL the much smaller RN fleet train required 14 FF, 18 DDE (aka sloops), and 19 corvettes (RAN ships IOTL). The British would need to have enough escorts to allow 50+ convoy escort to head off to the Pacific at the height of the Battle of the Atlantic.

With the UK revenue stream that size fleet is a literal impossibility. As was, the British were reliant on the U.S. for a number of CVE, DDE, cargo vessels, etc. under the Lend Lease program simply to hold the Atlantic open (not that this was anything other than an advantage to the U.S., but it sort of illustrates the economic realities).

BTW: No WNT means a larger IJN as well, so the figures above may require considerable enlargement.

well Historically the sent 6 Battleships and one Battlecruiser East in 41 & 42
so 9 should not be a stretch requiring 26 battleships compared to the historical 15

As to the size of the fleet, one carrier one cruiser and a destroyer flotilla per year added to the the building program from 1924 to 1936 is hardly a challenge for the UK shipbuilding Industry, after that the historical building program would replicate the UK's carrier position in home waters during 1942 (1 modern and two older carriers)

light carriers would be an pinch point but the conversion of some of the 50 odd passenger liners to light carriers instead of auxiliary cruisers would tide over the issue untill the new light carriers arrive.

You are correct to say that the demands of the historical U boat war would make the provision of sufficent merchant hulls an issue. realistically you would have to assume the relegation of bomber command to a minor role and the elevation of Costal Command and the fleet air arm as priorities in the Air ministry.

Effective convoys established at the start of the war in US costal waters, would probably preserve the UK merchant marine enough to provide a effective supply system for the fleet.

as for paying for all this less debt repayment in the 1930's would have to happen.

you would have to increase the Naval vote by @£10,000,000 per year an increase of 20%

Manning would probably be a more serious issue you'd have to make a deliberate manpower choice to prioritise the navy over the army during the war, the hungry 30's would ensure adequate manning levels

the only thing that is not in the control of the UK goverment is the merchant convoys in US waters.

the difficult task is providing a political reason for these changes to the UKs policy but the thing itself is not impossible

cheers Hipper.

 

[deathscompanion1]

well Historically the sent 6 Battleships and one Battlecruiser East in 41 & 42
so 9 should not be a stretch requiring 26 battleships compared to the historical 15

As to the size of the fleet, one carrier one cruiser and a destroyer flotilla per year added to the the building program from 1924 to 1936 is hardly a challenge for the UK shipbuilding Industry, after that the historical building program would replicate the UK's carrier position in home waters during 1942 (1 modern and two older carriers)

light carriers would be an pinch point but the conversion of some of the 50 odd passenger liners to light carriers instead of auxiliary cruisers would tide over the issue untill the new light carriers arrive.

You are correct to say that the demands of the historical U boat war would make the provision of sufficent merchant hulls an issue. realistically you would have to assume the relegation of bomber command to a minor role and the elevation of Costal Command and the fleet air arm as priorities in the Air ministry.

Effective convoys established at the start of the war in US costal waters, would probably preserve the UK merchant marine enough to provide a effective supply system for the fleet.

as for paying for all this less debt repayment in the 1930's would have to happen.

you would have to increase the Naval vote by @£10,000,000 per year an increase of 20%

Manning would probably be a more serious issue you'd have to make a deliberate manpower choice to prioritise the navy over the army during the war, the hungry 30's would ensure adequate manning levels

the only thing that is not in the control of the UK goverment is the merchant convoys in US waters.

the difficult task is providing a political reason for these changes to the UKs policy but the thing itself is not impossible

cheers Hipper.

The RAF would defect to the Luftwaffe and offer to bomb London for them before letting Coastal Command or the FAA have single paper airplane more than OTL.

The decisive issue of the day was paying down the debt and returning to the Gold Standard and a return to normality after the chaos and devestation of WWI.

So spending more on defence when the nation had much higher priorities economically and morally was turning towards pacifism seems a hard sell and any extra money is going to be wasted given the RAF won the budget wars hands down pretty consistently and had the government and public imagination onside in doing so.

 

[TinyTartar]

Hong Kong was very hard to defend at that point. I suppose if anything could have been done, it would have been to transfer a large portion of Britain's fleet to the defense of India and Malaya.

A RN Carrier Group operating in the South China Sea possibly could have kept Hong Kong supplied, and with a large enough garrison, they could have held out for a while.

But this is a huge stretch.

Maybe, the US flies the B-17s to Hong Kong (assuming there is an airbase there to accommodate them) immediately after Pearl Harbor before the Japanese destroy them all and the massed bomber power can make a difference.

Logistically speaking however, the lack of any air superiority, as everywhere else in late 1941, makes operations damn hard to pull off.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Isn't the best defence of Hong Kong an active alliance with Chinese forces between it and the IJA?

 

[HongCanucker]

Hong Kong was very hard to defend at that point. I suppose if anything could have been done, it would have been to transfer a large portion of Britain's fleet to the defense of India and Malaya.

A RN Carrier Group operating in the South China Sea possibly could have kept Hong Kong supplied, and with a large enough garrison, they could have held out for a while.

But this is a huge stretch.

Maybe, the US flies the B-17s to Hong Kong (assuming there is an airbase there to accommodate them) immediately after Pearl Harbor before the Japanese destroy them all and the massed bomber power can make a difference.

Logistically speaking however, the lack of any air superiority, as everywhere else in late 1941, makes operations damn hard to pull off.

Well, Kai Tak was basically disabled in the onset of the battle, so the airfield wasn't really usable. And the runway at the time wasn't long enough for the B-17 at the time - there were just 457 m or so, and a loaded B-17 would have needed more than double that to get into the air. Even one with a greatly reduced fuel load would probably have just ended up in Victoria Harbour and unusable as a result.