Yes, finally. I've been trying to work on a communist Indonesia TL, and i wonder what are you doing with it.
Stars and Sickles - An Alternative Cold War
- Thread starter Hrvatskiwi
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Yes, finally. I've been trying to work on a communist Indonesia TL, and i wonder what are you doing with it.
Nice! Would love to see what you do, given that you're Indonesian, right? Would be super-interesting to see what perspectives you come up with. Are you basing it on the 'old guard' of communists that were suppressed in the Madiun Affair, or the later Aidit and co. generation? Or a post-New Order communist Indonesia?
The Aidit period, due to the abundance of literature about it.
Chapter 102: Jadi Pandu Ibuku - Nusantara (Until 1980)
New
For information about the history of Indonesia, 1950-1970, see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-21#post-11164323
Despite Western media representations of the rise of communism in Indonesia/Nusantara as a sudden takeover, it in fact was the result of the gradual breakdown of the tripartite Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion, Communism) balance that President Sukarno had tried to establish. A major contributing factor to the collapse of Nasakom was that the three pillars of the state were themselves unstable; the generals that comprised the "nationalist" base were often self-serving, scheming and focused on their own enrichment through management of state enterprises than on the wellbeing of their country, their junior officers split by different loyalties and visions of Indonesia's future; the Islamists concerned communists as well as non-Muslim regions like Bali; and the communists, whilst able to find large bases of support, were riven by factionalism. The 30 September Movement finally pushed Nasakom over the edge; The 30 September Movement was spearheaded by military officers sympathetic to the PKI, and as the fruit of the labours of Kamaruzaman Sjam. Hailing from the northeastern Javan town of Tuban and descended from Arab traders, Sjam had been a member of the pathuk group of youths which opposed Japanese occupation in Yogyakarta during the Second World War. After the war, he had joined the PKI and maintained a number of contacts from former pathuk members who were now officers in the Indonesian army. In 1964, Sjam had been appointed head of the top-secret PKI Special Bureau. The Special Bureau's existence was hidden even from PKI Central Committee members and took orders from Aidit himself. Sjam and his small group of subordinates in the Special Bureau infiltrated several military bases (to which they were provided access by old friends of Sjam) and established a degree of trust with certain notable officers by passing on intelligence regarding Islamist rebellions throughout the country. This arrangement of course benefitted the PKI by pitting their two greatest threats, the military and the Islamists, against each other, whilst slowly but surely turning elements of the military onside. In the meanwhile, the PKI also grew increasingly close with Sukarno and the leftist wing of the PNI, with the right wing PNI regional party bosses actually often defying the will of Sukarno whilst local PKI elements supported the unitary policies of the president. By 1968, Sukarno's reliance on the PKI and affiliated groups such as the SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Selurah Indonesia - Central All-Indonesian Workers Organisation) trade union confederation and the merah milisi was practically complete. Opposition army officers had been crushed by the red militias, loyalist army elements and the air force, whilst the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) supported the PKI-PNI government due to their increasing ties with Eastern bloc suppliers and their interests regarding Maluku and West Papua. Isolated on the various islands, the rebellious army officers were forced to surrender piecemeal.
Ceremony held by the Sidang Presidium of SOBRI. Note the portrait of Friedrich Engels
In 1968 Aidit was appointed Vice President, a post that had been vacant since the resignation of Mohammad Hatta in December 1956. Despite this, he was by now the most powerful man in Indonesia. It is a matter of historical controversy to which degree Sukarno fully supported the policies that would be implemented under Aidit's direction; even if he did not, he surely felt he had no other allies left; the Islamists and conservatives opposed him, the United States had sought to overthrow him. The communists were at least willing to keep him alive and nominally in charge of the country. 1969 saw the establishment of a new cabinet, stacked almost entirely with communist leaders. Aside from Aidit, of course, it also included figures such as Siauw Giok Tjhan/Shao Yu'tsan [245], who was made a minister without portfolio but would spend a great deal of time maintaining good relations with Peking; Muhammad Hatta Lukman; Oloan Hutapea as Minister of Culture; Subandrio as Foreign Minister (one of the few non-communists, he had nevertheless been the architect of the konfrontasi with Malaya and the West); and Sjam as Interior Minister. Sudisman maintained his position as General Secretary of the PKI. Shortly thereafter, Sukarno announced the renaming of Indonesia, which would from then on be known as Revolutionary Nusantara. In virtually all organisations (except those openly opposed to the new government), the name Nusantara replaced Indonesia. The newly-rebranded Partai Komunis Nusantara (PKN) and their merah milisi turned their eyes onto their opposition within the left. The smaller internal purge of the PKN included amongst its notable victims Njoto. Njoto had once been a notable figure in the PKI, regularly travelling to the Soviet Union to promote ties between the CPSU and the PKI. Njoto had caused controversy by travelling in the Soviet Union with Rita, an Indonesian student living in Moscow and studying Russian literature. Rita was supposed to translate between Russian and Indonesian for Njoto, but the two ended up having an affair whilst Njoto's wife Soetarni was back in Indonesia, pregnant with their sixth child. A rift had already been growing between Njoto and Aidit, particularly regarding different views on the Sino-Soviet split. The affair was a scandal that the PKI could ill-afford, and it gave Aidit an excuse to oust Njoto from the leadership of the PKI. Sukarno would maintain a good relationship with Njoto however, even unsuccessfully trying to convince him to establish a "People's Party" based on "Sukarnoism". With Sukarno no longer positioned to protect Njoto, he was arrested on espionage charges and was executed on September 16th, 1969.
Murba Party member being harassed by local PKI activists and police
The most viciously-suppressed target of the security forces of Revolutionary Nusantara was the Murba Party. The Murba Party had emerged out of the political vacuum of the late 1940s as the PKI reeled from the aftermath of the Madiun Affair. It was an amalgamation of four main groups: the Revolutionary People's Movement, People's Party, Poor People's Party and the Independent Labour Party of Indonesia and led by their leaders, Tan Malaka, Chairul Saleh, Sukarni and Adam Malik. Guerrilla units loyal to Murba were active against the Dutch in West and Central Java in the 1950s. The Murba Party has been characterised as extremely nationalistic, secular and "messianic" in its social radicalism. The group was particularly popular with workers and ex-guerrillas. The leadership of the party were sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Adam Malik himself had been ambassador to the USSR and Poland until his return to Indonesia in 1963 and was appointed trade minister. As the PKI sided with China in their disputes with the Soviets, Murba intensified their courting of Moscow, hoping to replace the PKI in international socialist organisations, which didn't come to pass. In 1965, at the suggestion of the PKI, Sukarno ordered a number of arrests on Murba activists, despite appointing Malik as Foreign Minister and even briefly as Deputy Prime Minister. The PKI denounced Murba as a "Trotskyite" organisation, and as "puppets of imperialists". In 1969-1970, Offices of the Murba Party were raided by merah milisi and burnt to the ground. In the progress of arrests, many of these supporters were beaten to death. Others were thrown into prisons throughout Nusantara. Murba was outlawed, along with the Acoma Party, which had emerged out of the Young Communist Force, led by Ibnu Parna and affiliated with Murba.
A later image taken in one of the Unity Villages established during the Social Revolutionary period
The Central Committee of the PKN engaged in a rapid programme of social and economic transformation. The immediate effects of these policies was dislocation; a number of localised famines forced the central government to engage in forced requisitioning of rice from farmers. The owners of farming estates were often subjected to violence and collectivisation of their farms, whilst small peasant smallholders also had their rice taken, but were usually left unmolested except in the case of withholding of produce or destruction of surplus; in these instances summary execution was not uncommon. Inherited high levels of inflation were gradually controlled by a major devaluation of the rupiah, although this also wiped out the savings of many Nusantarans. PKI leadership's savings were largely converted and stored in Switzerland, of course. Oil and natural gas production and mining were fully nationalised and quickly became the primary source of income for the state. Despite still suffering from similar issues of corruption and embezzlement as pre-revolutionary Indonesia, high oil prices in the 1970s would allow Nusantara to eventually achieve economic stability and allow investment in large infrastructure projects. In order to deal with the issues of regional smallholder opposition to Nusantaran land reform policies and overpopulation of Java in one policy: transmigration. So-called Persatuan Desa (Unity Villages) were established throughout Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi. These villages were defined by collective ownership and the integration of the PKN into daily life, although they lacked the "struggle sessions" of their Chinese equivalents. Another difference to the Chinese collective villages was the establishment of red militias in every village, comprised of young men and women, and designed to defend the settlements against interference from neighbours, such as indigenous Dayaks on Borneo or followers of imams in Sumatra. The biggest flare-up in opposition to the transmigration policy was the 1973 Aceh Uprising. The uprising began as a regionwide protest against the Unity Villages, demanding the dissolution of those villages and the departure of their inhabitants from the province. During these protests, effigies of local PKN boss Muhamad Samikidin were burnt and in response, the military was sent in to restore order. An insurgency of Islamist rebels supported by local imams and supplied clandestinely by Malaya would be crushed by November 1974. Nusantara would retaliate against Malaya for support of Acehnese rebels by increasing clandestine support for communist insurgents on the Malaya peninsula. In order to link the Unity Villages to major townships, rail links throughout the country were expanded significantly. A few years before Aidit's dominance was established in Indonesia, the SOBSI trade union confederation had started to drift away from the party line, much to the PKI leadership's chagrin. This was largely caused by SOBSI encouraging industrial action at nationalised industrial sites, putting the interests of their membership above the national interest as a whole, or at least that was how it was seen by Aidit. A short burst of purges ousted SOBSI leaders who maintained an independent streak or who had been affiliated with the PNI.
Revolutionary Nusantara President Sukarno dining with Mao Tse-Tung
Internationally, Aidit and Sukarno threw their lot in with the the Chinese in their dispute with the Soviet Union. Whilst not openly hostile to Moscow, the PKN leadership saw the Chinese path to socialism as more relevant to the Nusantaran situation; like China, the number of industrial workers in Nusantara were far exceeded by the rural peasantry. Elements of feudalism still lingered in the form of the Islamic clergy and the Yogyakarta Sultanate, the latter of which was quickly toppled and Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX placed in house arrest, albeit in a relatively luxurious gilded cage in his palace. The particular situation of Nusantara led to an interesting duality in national economic development. The Unity Villages aped the rural communes of China, but the nationalised resource extraction industries allowed Nusantara to engage more heavily in a degree of state involvement in international markets and localised industrial development in processes such as oil refining. Nusantara also remained an OPEC member. The Nusantaran government sought especially close ties not only with China, but also with Vietnam and Korea. Like China and Korea, throughout the 1970s, Jakarta engaged in a significant expansion of naval capacity, although unlike the PLAN, the Tentara Nasional Nusantara Angkatan Laut (Nusantara National Military-Naval Force; TNNAL) would remain a largely brown-water force, albeit with a couple of missile cruisers attached. The naval buildup was intended to aid in force projection and protect from intrusions from Malaya, the Philippines and the Oceanian Treaty Organisation. Multiple skirmishes between Nusantara and South Maluku and West Papuan ships occurred throughout this period, and as such Royal Australian Naval units were based at Ambon. The presence of the Australians in South Maluku was rabidly denounced by the government of Revolutionary Nusantara, which claimed both South Maluku and West Papua as territories of Nusantara occupied by "imperialists and their running dogs". These confrontations intensified the rift between Moscow and Jakarta, as in various international socialist forums the CPSU leadership denounced "adventurism in Asia" that "exacerbate existing tensions" and "threaten the existing successes of socialism in the Pacific region". Between 1974 and 1976, Jakarta cut off diplomatic relations with Moscow, forcing Indochina to act as a go-between. During the Tibetan campaign, Jakarta made accusations in the United Nations of "wannabe Great Power chauvinism" by Delhi. In response, the Bharati diplomats denounced "the robbery and abuse of Hindus and Buddhists in the Indonesian archipelago", being sure to not acknowledge the new name of Nusantara. In the late 1970s, with the healing of the Sino-Soviet split, Jakarta reestablished relations with Moscow and began to solicit technology transfer from the Soviets, especially interested in the development of nuclear power grids.
Despite the best efforts of Chinese doctors, Sukarno passed away from kidney failure in February 1972. Aidit became the new President, formalising his leadership of Nusantara. As President, Aidit took a personal interest in several areas, most notably the promotion of Nusantaran cinema. Entertainers such as Nun Zairina, Gordon Tobing and Bing Slamet were featured in films promoting values deemed desirable to the government. Zairina's portrayal as a beautiful and ambitious young woman limited by the feudal regime in Yogyakarta made her a star throughout the communist world. The film, Yogyakarta Merah, was set against the backdrop of the 1969 deposition of the local sultan. More popular with local audiences was Rakyat Tersenyum Menantang, a musical comedy starring Gordon Tobing about the inhabitants of a Unity Village and their humiliations of a dour old imam who tries to undermine them.
On 7th December, 1975, Nusantara became involved in East Timor. Preoccupied with war in Africa and revolution at home, the Portuguese had largely abandoned East Timor to its fate. In the small nation, a civil war was fought between the two predominant factions, the left-wing Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente also known as "Fretilin" and the conservative União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union, UDT). Fretilin had resisted a UDT coup attempt and unilaterally declared independence from Portugal on 28th November 1975. Australian denunciations of Fretilin's anti-Lisbon coup spooked Fretilin, who requested that Nusantara troops be stationed in the country to protect from a potential Australian-backed UDT counter-coup. Whilst Portugal seemed to legitimately not care about the status of East Timor (perhaps even relieved that an economic liability had been snapped up by someone else), Australia immediately began posturing. Not only were they trying to limit Nusantaran expansion, but they also sought exploitation of potential future natural gas and oil reserves located in the Timor Gap between the island of Timor and Darwin. Upon entry into East Timor, Nusantara troops immediately began to assist Fretilin forces with the capture and forceful disarmament of UDT members. Of the three Carrascalão brothers who led the UDT, João and Mário were able to escape to Australia, whilst Manuel was captured, tortured and murdered by Nusantara troops. One of the founding members of Fretilin, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, was named the first President of East Timor. However, he soon fell out with the Nusantara military leadership in his country. He sought a withdrawal of Nusantaran troops and the establishment of a collective security agreement with Jakarta to protect against a return of the UDT. The Nusantara military refused, saying that the risk of Australian adventurism was too great. Relations between locals and the Nusantara military were also getting increasingly tense. Even putting aside misunderstandings as a result of language barriers, some of the army men would pass the time getting drunk and harassing locals, with little to no discipline upheld by their commanders. Seeing themselves as liberators, the Nusantara troops developed a fairly entitled attitude, helping themselves to food, drinks and the occasional local woman, regardless of the consternation this caused with the locals. Amaral would be ousted by Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, who would accept to negotiate with Jakarta around the potential issue of incorporation into Nusantara. It was in the end decided, largely by Aidit, that the Democratic Republic of East Timor would be integrated into Nusantara as the autonomous province of Timor Timur. Fretilin would be allowed to continue existence as a political formation governing Timor Timur. Falintil, the armed wing of Fretilin, would be the only ground forces permanently stationed in the area, but would be subject to the authority of the Nusantara Interior Ministry. Portuguese would be allowed to be used in a co-official capacity. This annexation would cause a split in the party, with many of the non-Marxists in Fretilin fleeing to Australia and banding together with the UDT exiles.
Falintil militia harassing political opponents
===
[245] His Chinese name in pinyin was Xiāo Yùcàn. Long-time readers may recall that we're using Wade-Giles orthography here for reasons outlined in the China updates.
Despite Western media representations of the rise of communism in Indonesia/Nusantara as a sudden takeover, it in fact was the result of the gradual breakdown of the tripartite Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion, Communism) balance that President Sukarno had tried to establish. A major contributing factor to the collapse of Nasakom was that the three pillars of the state were themselves unstable; the generals that comprised the "nationalist" base were often self-serving, scheming and focused on their own enrichment through management of state enterprises than on the wellbeing of their country, their junior officers split by different loyalties and visions of Indonesia's future; the Islamists concerned communists as well as non-Muslim regions like Bali; and the communists, whilst able to find large bases of support, were riven by factionalism. The 30 September Movement finally pushed Nasakom over the edge; The 30 September Movement was spearheaded by military officers sympathetic to the PKI, and as the fruit of the labours of Kamaruzaman Sjam. Hailing from the northeastern Javan town of Tuban and descended from Arab traders, Sjam had been a member of the pathuk group of youths which opposed Japanese occupation in Yogyakarta during the Second World War. After the war, he had joined the PKI and maintained a number of contacts from former pathuk members who were now officers in the Indonesian army. In 1964, Sjam had been appointed head of the top-secret PKI Special Bureau. The Special Bureau's existence was hidden even from PKI Central Committee members and took orders from Aidit himself. Sjam and his small group of subordinates in the Special Bureau infiltrated several military bases (to which they were provided access by old friends of Sjam) and established a degree of trust with certain notable officers by passing on intelligence regarding Islamist rebellions throughout the country. This arrangement of course benefitted the PKI by pitting their two greatest threats, the military and the Islamists, against each other, whilst slowly but surely turning elements of the military onside. In the meanwhile, the PKI also grew increasingly close with Sukarno and the leftist wing of the PNI, with the right wing PNI regional party bosses actually often defying the will of Sukarno whilst local PKI elements supported the unitary policies of the president. By 1968, Sukarno's reliance on the PKI and affiliated groups such as the SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Selurah Indonesia - Central All-Indonesian Workers Organisation) trade union confederation and the merah milisi was practically complete. Opposition army officers had been crushed by the red militias, loyalist army elements and the air force, whilst the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) supported the PKI-PNI government due to their increasing ties with Eastern bloc suppliers and their interests regarding Maluku and West Papua. Isolated on the various islands, the rebellious army officers were forced to surrender piecemeal.
Ceremony held by the Sidang Presidium of SOBRI. Note the portrait of Friedrich Engels
In 1968 Aidit was appointed Vice President, a post that had been vacant since the resignation of Mohammad Hatta in December 1956. Despite this, he was by now the most powerful man in Indonesia. It is a matter of historical controversy to which degree Sukarno fully supported the policies that would be implemented under Aidit's direction; even if he did not, he surely felt he had no other allies left; the Islamists and conservatives opposed him, the United States had sought to overthrow him. The communists were at least willing to keep him alive and nominally in charge of the country. 1969 saw the establishment of a new cabinet, stacked almost entirely with communist leaders. Aside from Aidit, of course, it also included figures such as Siauw Giok Tjhan/Shao Yu'tsan [245], who was made a minister without portfolio but would spend a great deal of time maintaining good relations with Peking; Muhammad Hatta Lukman; Oloan Hutapea as Minister of Culture; Subandrio as Foreign Minister (one of the few non-communists, he had nevertheless been the architect of the konfrontasi with Malaya and the West); and Sjam as Interior Minister. Sudisman maintained his position as General Secretary of the PKI. Shortly thereafter, Sukarno announced the renaming of Indonesia, which would from then on be known as Revolutionary Nusantara. In virtually all organisations (except those openly opposed to the new government), the name Nusantara replaced Indonesia. The newly-rebranded Partai Komunis Nusantara (PKN) and their merah milisi turned their eyes onto their opposition within the left. The smaller internal purge of the PKN included amongst its notable victims Njoto. Njoto had once been a notable figure in the PKI, regularly travelling to the Soviet Union to promote ties between the CPSU and the PKI. Njoto had caused controversy by travelling in the Soviet Union with Rita, an Indonesian student living in Moscow and studying Russian literature. Rita was supposed to translate between Russian and Indonesian for Njoto, but the two ended up having an affair whilst Njoto's wife Soetarni was back in Indonesia, pregnant with their sixth child. A rift had already been growing between Njoto and Aidit, particularly regarding different views on the Sino-Soviet split. The affair was a scandal that the PKI could ill-afford, and it gave Aidit an excuse to oust Njoto from the leadership of the PKI. Sukarno would maintain a good relationship with Njoto however, even unsuccessfully trying to convince him to establish a "People's Party" based on "Sukarnoism". With Sukarno no longer positioned to protect Njoto, he was arrested on espionage charges and was executed on September 16th, 1969.
Murba Party member being harassed by local PKI activists and police
The most viciously-suppressed target of the security forces of Revolutionary Nusantara was the Murba Party. The Murba Party had emerged out of the political vacuum of the late 1940s as the PKI reeled from the aftermath of the Madiun Affair. It was an amalgamation of four main groups: the Revolutionary People's Movement, People's Party, Poor People's Party and the Independent Labour Party of Indonesia and led by their leaders, Tan Malaka, Chairul Saleh, Sukarni and Adam Malik. Guerrilla units loyal to Murba were active against the Dutch in West and Central Java in the 1950s. The Murba Party has been characterised as extremely nationalistic, secular and "messianic" in its social radicalism. The group was particularly popular with workers and ex-guerrillas. The leadership of the party were sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Adam Malik himself had been ambassador to the USSR and Poland until his return to Indonesia in 1963 and was appointed trade minister. As the PKI sided with China in their disputes with the Soviets, Murba intensified their courting of Moscow, hoping to replace the PKI in international socialist organisations, which didn't come to pass. In 1965, at the suggestion of the PKI, Sukarno ordered a number of arrests on Murba activists, despite appointing Malik as Foreign Minister and even briefly as Deputy Prime Minister. The PKI denounced Murba as a "Trotskyite" organisation, and as "puppets of imperialists". In 1969-1970, Offices of the Murba Party were raided by merah milisi and burnt to the ground. In the progress of arrests, many of these supporters were beaten to death. Others were thrown into prisons throughout Nusantara. Murba was outlawed, along with the Acoma Party, which had emerged out of the Young Communist Force, led by Ibnu Parna and affiliated with Murba.
A later image taken in one of the Unity Villages established during the Social Revolutionary period
The Central Committee of the PKN engaged in a rapid programme of social and economic transformation. The immediate effects of these policies was dislocation; a number of localised famines forced the central government to engage in forced requisitioning of rice from farmers. The owners of farming estates were often subjected to violence and collectivisation of their farms, whilst small peasant smallholders also had their rice taken, but were usually left unmolested except in the case of withholding of produce or destruction of surplus; in these instances summary execution was not uncommon. Inherited high levels of inflation were gradually controlled by a major devaluation of the rupiah, although this also wiped out the savings of many Nusantarans. PKI leadership's savings were largely converted and stored in Switzerland, of course. Oil and natural gas production and mining were fully nationalised and quickly became the primary source of income for the state. Despite still suffering from similar issues of corruption and embezzlement as pre-revolutionary Indonesia, high oil prices in the 1970s would allow Nusantara to eventually achieve economic stability and allow investment in large infrastructure projects. In order to deal with the issues of regional smallholder opposition to Nusantaran land reform policies and overpopulation of Java in one policy: transmigration. So-called Persatuan Desa (Unity Villages) were established throughout Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi. These villages were defined by collective ownership and the integration of the PKN into daily life, although they lacked the "struggle sessions" of their Chinese equivalents. Another difference to the Chinese collective villages was the establishment of red militias in every village, comprised of young men and women, and designed to defend the settlements against interference from neighbours, such as indigenous Dayaks on Borneo or followers of imams in Sumatra. The biggest flare-up in opposition to the transmigration policy was the 1973 Aceh Uprising. The uprising began as a regionwide protest against the Unity Villages, demanding the dissolution of those villages and the departure of their inhabitants from the province. During these protests, effigies of local PKN boss Muhamad Samikidin were burnt and in response, the military was sent in to restore order. An insurgency of Islamist rebels supported by local imams and supplied clandestinely by Malaya would be crushed by November 1974. Nusantara would retaliate against Malaya for support of Acehnese rebels by increasing clandestine support for communist insurgents on the Malaya peninsula. In order to link the Unity Villages to major townships, rail links throughout the country were expanded significantly. A few years before Aidit's dominance was established in Indonesia, the SOBSI trade union confederation had started to drift away from the party line, much to the PKI leadership's chagrin. This was largely caused by SOBSI encouraging industrial action at nationalised industrial sites, putting the interests of their membership above the national interest as a whole, or at least that was how it was seen by Aidit. A short burst of purges ousted SOBSI leaders who maintained an independent streak or who had been affiliated with the PNI.
Revolutionary Nusantara President Sukarno dining with Mao Tse-Tung
Internationally, Aidit and Sukarno threw their lot in with the the Chinese in their dispute with the Soviet Union. Whilst not openly hostile to Moscow, the PKN leadership saw the Chinese path to socialism as more relevant to the Nusantaran situation; like China, the number of industrial workers in Nusantara were far exceeded by the rural peasantry. Elements of feudalism still lingered in the form of the Islamic clergy and the Yogyakarta Sultanate, the latter of which was quickly toppled and Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX placed in house arrest, albeit in a relatively luxurious gilded cage in his palace. The particular situation of Nusantara led to an interesting duality in national economic development. The Unity Villages aped the rural communes of China, but the nationalised resource extraction industries allowed Nusantara to engage more heavily in a degree of state involvement in international markets and localised industrial development in processes such as oil refining. Nusantara also remained an OPEC member. The Nusantaran government sought especially close ties not only with China, but also with Vietnam and Korea. Like China and Korea, throughout the 1970s, Jakarta engaged in a significant expansion of naval capacity, although unlike the PLAN, the Tentara Nasional Nusantara Angkatan Laut (Nusantara National Military-Naval Force; TNNAL) would remain a largely brown-water force, albeit with a couple of missile cruisers attached. The naval buildup was intended to aid in force projection and protect from intrusions from Malaya, the Philippines and the Oceanian Treaty Organisation. Multiple skirmishes between Nusantara and South Maluku and West Papuan ships occurred throughout this period, and as such Royal Australian Naval units were based at Ambon. The presence of the Australians in South Maluku was rabidly denounced by the government of Revolutionary Nusantara, which claimed both South Maluku and West Papua as territories of Nusantara occupied by "imperialists and their running dogs". These confrontations intensified the rift between Moscow and Jakarta, as in various international socialist forums the CPSU leadership denounced "adventurism in Asia" that "exacerbate existing tensions" and "threaten the existing successes of socialism in the Pacific region". Between 1974 and 1976, Jakarta cut off diplomatic relations with Moscow, forcing Indochina to act as a go-between. During the Tibetan campaign, Jakarta made accusations in the United Nations of "wannabe Great Power chauvinism" by Delhi. In response, the Bharati diplomats denounced "the robbery and abuse of Hindus and Buddhists in the Indonesian archipelago", being sure to not acknowledge the new name of Nusantara. In the late 1970s, with the healing of the Sino-Soviet split, Jakarta reestablished relations with Moscow and began to solicit technology transfer from the Soviets, especially interested in the development of nuclear power grids.
Despite the best efforts of Chinese doctors, Sukarno passed away from kidney failure in February 1972. Aidit became the new President, formalising his leadership of Nusantara. As President, Aidit took a personal interest in several areas, most notably the promotion of Nusantaran cinema. Entertainers such as Nun Zairina, Gordon Tobing and Bing Slamet were featured in films promoting values deemed desirable to the government. Zairina's portrayal as a beautiful and ambitious young woman limited by the feudal regime in Yogyakarta made her a star throughout the communist world. The film, Yogyakarta Merah, was set against the backdrop of the 1969 deposition of the local sultan. More popular with local audiences was Rakyat Tersenyum Menantang, a musical comedy starring Gordon Tobing about the inhabitants of a Unity Village and their humiliations of a dour old imam who tries to undermine them.
On 7th December, 1975, Nusantara became involved in East Timor. Preoccupied with war in Africa and revolution at home, the Portuguese had largely abandoned East Timor to its fate. In the small nation, a civil war was fought between the two predominant factions, the left-wing Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente also known as "Fretilin" and the conservative União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union, UDT). Fretilin had resisted a UDT coup attempt and unilaterally declared independence from Portugal on 28th November 1975. Australian denunciations of Fretilin's anti-Lisbon coup spooked Fretilin, who requested that Nusantara troops be stationed in the country to protect from a potential Australian-backed UDT counter-coup. Whilst Portugal seemed to legitimately not care about the status of East Timor (perhaps even relieved that an economic liability had been snapped up by someone else), Australia immediately began posturing. Not only were they trying to limit Nusantaran expansion, but they also sought exploitation of potential future natural gas and oil reserves located in the Timor Gap between the island of Timor and Darwin. Upon entry into East Timor, Nusantara troops immediately began to assist Fretilin forces with the capture and forceful disarmament of UDT members. Of the three Carrascalão brothers who led the UDT, João and Mário were able to escape to Australia, whilst Manuel was captured, tortured and murdered by Nusantara troops. One of the founding members of Fretilin, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, was named the first President of East Timor. However, he soon fell out with the Nusantara military leadership in his country. He sought a withdrawal of Nusantaran troops and the establishment of a collective security agreement with Jakarta to protect against a return of the UDT. The Nusantara military refused, saying that the risk of Australian adventurism was too great. Relations between locals and the Nusantara military were also getting increasingly tense. Even putting aside misunderstandings as a result of language barriers, some of the army men would pass the time getting drunk and harassing locals, with little to no discipline upheld by their commanders. Seeing themselves as liberators, the Nusantara troops developed a fairly entitled attitude, helping themselves to food, drinks and the occasional local woman, regardless of the consternation this caused with the locals. Amaral would be ousted by Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, who would accept to negotiate with Jakarta around the potential issue of incorporation into Nusantara. It was in the end decided, largely by Aidit, that the Democratic Republic of East Timor would be integrated into Nusantara as the autonomous province of Timor Timur. Fretilin would be allowed to continue existence as a political formation governing Timor Timur. Falintil, the armed wing of Fretilin, would be the only ground forces permanently stationed in the area, but would be subject to the authority of the Nusantara Interior Ministry. Portuguese would be allowed to be used in a co-official capacity. This annexation would cause a split in the party, with many of the non-Marxists in Fretilin fleeing to Australia and banding together with the UDT exiles.
Falintil militia harassing political opponents
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[245] His Chinese name in pinyin was Xiāo Yùcàn. Long-time readers may recall that we're using Wade-Giles orthography here for reasons outlined in the China updates.
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Glad to see communist Nusantra doing well, hopefully they can "liberate" the rest of the islands around them
Chapter 103: Furtive Seas - South Maluku and West Papua (Until 1980)
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Flag of the Republic of South Maluku. Blue represents the bounty of the sea, white denotes peace and purity, green symbolises the fertility of the land, and invokes the ancestors and the blood spilled in defense of the islands.
In the aftermath of the South Moluccan expulsion of an Indonesian expeditionary force in 1951, the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) became a key link in the chain of Australian military bases that were developed to limit Indonesian expansionism in the region. A major point of contention between the RMS and the Indonesian government was the kidnap of Johanis Manuhutu, who had been appointed as President of the RMS, but had been kidnapped and imprisoned during an Indonesia raid, held in Java on charges of treason. Chris Somoukil would take over the mantle of President until resigning in 1972. From 1972 Johan Manusama would govern. As the government of Indonesia considered South Maluku merely a rogue province under occupation of imperialists and their collaborators, Jakarta claimed justification in holding Manuhutu on charges of treason. He would be held in captivity for decades and was used as a symbol within South Maluku of the cruelty of the Indonesian state. For the most part, over the next couple of decades things changed relatively little in the day-to-day life of South Moluccans. Seram island, the largest in the country, and known by locals as Nusa Ina (Mother Island) as a legendary homeland of the Moluccan people, continued to produce copra, sago, resin and fish. Some oil deposits were being explored in the northeast during the late 1960s, although these wouldn't attract significant investment in development for decades. The westernmost major island of Buru also produced agricultural goods, with the traditionalist locals refusing even to take up use of tractors or other modern equipment and techniques. Instead they were content with growing by hand maize, sweet potato, rice [246], beans, coconuts, coffee, cloves and nutmeg on the local plantations. Despite the wide variety of crops grown on Buru, the relatively low yields meant that little was left over for export. The locals supplemented their diet with proteins from fish and hunting of the local babirusa wild-pig, notable for its tusks which curve backwards and, if left long enough, penetrate their own skulls. It is on the main island of Ambon where modernity has made inroads into South Maluku. Plantation agriculture is also the primary economic activity here, producing breadfruit, sugarcane, coffee, cocoa, pepper and cotton, with the chief food crops being cassava and sago. Modest amounts of copra were also exported. It is on Ambon that mechanisation was gradually introduced into farming, largely due to the efforts of locals trained in basic mechanics by the Australian navy. Pearl diving and the harvesting of lobsters and shellfish are a significant industry in all of the islands, along with logging. Ambon Island is home to the nation's capital, Ambon Manise ("Beautiful Ambon", often referred to simply as Ambon City).
From 1955, having become a founding member of the Oceanian Treaty Organisation, the Republic of South Maluku hosted a permanent Australian naval presence at a base at Ambon Manise. The Australian military also operated several training grounds throughout the country to ensure that local recruits were trained to the standard necessary in any future conflict with Indonesia. Ambonese recruits became well-known as durable and reliable light infantry with great endurance in tropical conditions. They were equipped with Australian and British small arms which had become standardised throughout the OTO, including the Owen submachinegun and the "Jungle Carbine" (a derivative of the Lee-Enfield No.4 Mk I with improved mobility for tropical conditions), which would later be replaced by the F1 submachinegun and the L1A1 (locally-licensed semi-automatic variant of the FN FAL) and trained in their use at Australia's expense. Whilst the expansion of the naval base at Ambon and the establishment of a permanent RAN presence did a great deal to secure South Maluku's independence and discourage attacks from Indonesia (not to mention an influx of Australian dollars), there were some negative consequences to the Australian presence. The lack of a major city with Western-style amenities meant that onshore leave was taken in Ambon Manise itself, and there were several incidents over the first couple years provoked largely by binge-drinking Australian servicemen. This included a number of brawls between servicemen and locals, which resulted in a number of deaths on both sides, and the stimulus of a black market for navy rum, much of which entered the local economy as payment for prostitution. Furthermore, a number of social issues arose from the proximity of Moluccan servicemen to their Australians comrades. Drinking at bars built to service Australian sailors, it wasn't uncommon for Moluccan servicemen to find their way home drunk, and engage in violence both to passersby and to family members at home. In order to curb these problems, the RAN and RMS established a set of strict rules around the conduct of both Australian and Moluccan military personnel. An area around the Australian naval base was designated as a so-called "special military zone" (SMZ). Within this zone, order would be kept not by the South Moluccan government, but by Australian military police. Australian personnel below the rank of Warrant Officer would not be allowed outside of the SMZ past 5pm, and any alcohol consumption beyond was strictly prohibited, as was the sale of rum to locals outside the zone. Moluccan military personnel were allowed to enter and leave the zone mostly without limitation, although the Australian military police were given a mandate by the RMS government to prevent drunk Moluccans from leaving. They would instead sleep overnight in designated "sober-up shelters" before leaving in the morning. The military presence in Ambon Manise did have a number of positive impacts though, teaching locals a number of important skills which encouraged the uptake of modern technology in spheres such as farming and fisheries. The Australian dollar was the sole currency used in the RMS, and the rotation of Australian servicemen in and out of the country provided a good source of foreign money. Some of the older former Moluccan military personnel (mostly in their late 30s and 40s) would also provide for their families through mercenary and private security work throughout the South Pacific.
Moluccan soldier armed with WWII-vintage Thompson submachinegun
The Dutch presence in West Papua was faced with resistance from within the territory as well. The town of Enarotali and the nearby Wissel Lakes were the site of fierce fighting between Royal Netherlands Navy (Koninklijke Marine, KM) marines and the followers of a messianic movement called Wege. The Wege believed that they were to prepare for the arrival of their folk hero Situgumina, who they believed would travel from Java to West Papua to establish a "kingdom of happiness". The Wege movement syncretised local folklore with the Javanese legends of Ratu Adil ("Just Ruler"). The leader of the movement, a former priest by the name of Zacheus Pakage, was arrested in 1954 and would not be released until 1962. In 1956, a group of Papuan youths from Fakfak revolted and engaged in arson attacks on police stations, from which some firearms were also stolen. This was committed in reaction to the Dutch arrest of a number of pro-Indonesian figures in Soren [247]. This group's plan to blow up an oil tank in Soren was thwarted by Dutch police. Another messianic movement would engage in multiple revolts in the late 1950s, which were put down by the Dutch, who engaged in brutal reprisals. 1960 saw a number of successive rebellions throughout the territory, including in the capital, Hollandia. The brutality of KM personnel in the suppression of these uprisings drew increasing negative scrutiny from the Dutch public and media at home. After the defeat of multiple resolutions brought to the UN by Indonesia demanding the transfer of Netherlands New Guinea to their sovereignty, from November 1957 the Indonesian government initiated a wave of economic nationalisations with a total value of around $1.5 billion. By January 1958, ten thousand Dutch nationals had left Indonesia. Given the events in New Guinea, few of the Dutch and Eurasians of Indonesia resettled in New Guinea, instead opted to start new lives in Australia or in the Netherlands. With the expulsion of not only political control over Indonesia, but also the seizure of their economic interests, the Dutch finally accepted that their presence in the East Indies was limited. The Republic of South Maluku had already been recognised by the Netherlands, but they would not be able to hold New Guinea indefinitely. The Dutch colonial administration intensified efforts to prepare the Papuans for self-governance. The Dutch built a new hospital in Hollandia, a shipyard in Manokwari (and a naval academy), plantations, a gendarmerie known as the Papuan Volunteer Corps (Papoea Vrijwilligers Korps, PVK) and the New Guinea Council (Raad), a legislative body for the fledgling nation. 1961 even saw an election to determine the composition of the West Papuan Raad. In Hollandia and Manokwari the representatives would be directly elected, whilst in the other fourteen constituencies, a two-stage process was employed, where locals would vote for representatives that then elected the council members (this was to get around the issue of widespread illiteracy and low education levels in many less-developed regions of the country). Alongside the sixteen elected members, another twelve were appointed by governor PieterJohannes Platteel. The New Guinea Council would adopt an anthem and flag for the country, which was supposed to gain its total independence in 1970.
The "Morning Star" Flag of West Papua, determined as the national flag by the New Guinea Council
In 1970 the Republic of West Papua was granted its independence[249] with Nicolaas Jouwe as President. It immediately became a member of the OTO, a process that had been initiated even prior to independence. Hollandia would remain the capital, albeit renamed its local name, Numbay [250]. Numbay is also the site of a major naval base, one of the key links in the Oceanian Treaty Organisation's "first phase defense region". Other major towns include Manokwari and Soren, the latter of which is home to a container port and has become the site of oil exploration. A key foreign interest in West Papua is the Grasberg mine, which holds one of the largest reserves of gold and copper in the world. The site was surveyed in 1960 by the Dutch and opened in 1973 by American mining corporation Freeport-McMoRan. The site is nestled in the Orange range in the central highlands of New Guinea, 4,100 metres above sea level. The major capital and technological input was well-beyond the capabilities of the West Papuan government, with the total project cost mounting to $175 million. This project included not only the mine itself, but the construction of a 116km road and slurry pipeline, a port, an airstrip, a power plant and a new town called Koperstad [251]. The mine is highly lucrative, but little benefit stays in the country, whilst it does major ecological harm and has interfered with the traditional lives of the local Amung people. Ethnic tensions flare up from time to time due to interactions between the Amung and other groups migrating into the area for work (mostly the Dani people). The Amung consider the mine to be a desecration of a sacred site. The West Papuan government nevertheless allows this to happen, both due to corruption and as a means to keep a vested American interest in the continued independence of West Papua [252].
Grasberg mine
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[246] Whilst Buru both IOTL and ITTL produces rice, ITTL the quantity is far less, as Buru isn't subject to the transmigration policies OTL, and as such there isn't an influx of settlers from the western islands for whom rice is the key staple.
[247] ITTL Sorong is renamed Soren after independence, as a result of indigenisation of town names.
[248] IOTL, President Kennedy encouraged the Dutch to accept an Indonesian occupation, with a promise for a future plebiscite on the issue of self-determination. This plebiscite is widely believed to have been rigged. Kennedy did this in order to prevent Indonesia from being pushed into the Soviet orbit, believing he could get Sukarno onside. Of course historically this wasn't successful, but the CIA ended up encouraging a military takeover that established a quasi-fascist "New Order" regime under Suharto, which did align with the United States.
[249] Things I'm retconning in this chapter (changed from Chapter 66a): West Papua is not a constitutional monarchy under the Dutch Queen; mass resettlement of Eurasians to West Papua does not occur; de facto racial segregation between Papuans and other East Indies groups is not a major factor in West Papua.
[250] Of course, IOTL this city was renamed Jayapura by the Indonesians.
[251] IOTL, this town is called Tembagapura (also meaning copper town). The name is Dutch because ITTL West Papua uses Dutch as a neutral lingua franca between the diverse groups of West Papua.
[252] IOTL, with Indonesia being pro-Western after Suharto's seizure of power, American mining companies were allowed to operate in West Papua/Irian Jaya without inference from the government.
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Not at this stage. They have engaged in land reform which in many cases has been received poorly, but the Islamists dont have any way to really oppose it. Dealing with local religious figures is largely left to local governors. Cooperative clergy are left well alone, whether they are Muslim, Christian, Hindu or Buddhist, but the state doesn't pull punches dealing with defiant ones. In my research I dont get the impression that the PKI were any more extreme in their anticlericalism than any other communist party.
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Hopefully Nusantra can bring those breakaway states back into the fold and properly modernize them, albeit with support of the locals there in order to assure an ease of integration.
In fact, there is reason to believe that this was a provocation by right-wing radicals. Here you also need to keep in mind that Mao was categorically against regime change in Indonesia, and you mentioned that the local Communist Party is strictly pro-Beijing.
Hi @WotanArgead ,
As always, loving your feedback and interest! Just figured I'd explain why I went with the 30 September movement as a leftist coup:
There is some evidence (mostly from anecdotes from people politically-active at the period) that it was a rightist false-flag/provocation, but I couldn't find much evidence about that beyond testimonials (as always, if you have access to some smoking-gun evidence, let me know, I am trying to keep this TL as plausible as possible) from people who, frankly, have an interest in pushing that narrative. That doesnt mean I dont believe it; in fact I lean towards believing that the CIA was involved in the planning and execution of the army's takeover in Indonesia (as much if not more involved than they undeniably were in the persecution of PKI members, trade unionists, and practically anyone that had known them), however, in the absence of solid evidence I don't feel like I can put that in the timeline.
Either way it wouldn't ITTL make a major change to the basic arc of the story. ITTL the establishment of the Red Militias means that the PKI can succeed in a counter-coup. Whether its the PKI performing a coup and the army failing in the counter coup OR the army performing a coup and then getting counter-couped by the PKI, the outcome is the same: total dependence by Sukarno on the PKI to maintain the presidency (and likely, his life).
I totally understand the desire to shed light on the controversies of the Cold War (and I really like that posters like you point them out for readers that aren't that familiar with Cold War politics) but for the narrative to really work (and be accessible to readers that aren't necessarily leftists) I cant assume that the right-wing forces in the Cold War really are engaging in every conspiracy. That doesnt mean they aren't featured in some ways: the Italy update essentially has Italy taken over (with French junta help) by GLADIO members.
Also the PKI is very pro-China, but it's still independent. It isnt as tightly-controlled as, say the European communist parties were during the Stalin period. Its more sympathetic to the CCP (both Asian communists, both resisted Western powers, both largely rural etc.) than a puppet of it.
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Chapter 104: Kings and Kingmakers - Post-Independence North Kalimantan (Until 1980)
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For a recount of the independence struggle of the North Borneo Federation, see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-12#post-10272930
The granting of the independence of the North Borneo Federation (also known as North Kalimantan) was achieved in November 1971 after long rounds of negotiations between various parties involved. Despite the communist-influenced Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force and North Kalimantan People's Army's leading roles in the insurgency, achieving independence from Malaya and the establishment of a stable nation required compromise with other factions in North Bornean politics. As such, the results of elections held under Malayan governance to local legislatures were recognised. A unicameral parliament was established, the Dewan Negara, which had 90 seats: 32 from Sabah, 10 from Brunei and 48 from Sarawak. All 10 Brunei seats were held by the Parti Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party, PRB). The Sarawak seats were divided between the largest single party, the Parti Rakyat Bersatu Sarawak (Sarawak United People's Party, PRBS) with 12 seats, the Parti Kebangsaan Sarawak (Sarawak National Party, PKS) with 12 seats, the Parti Pesaka with 8 seats and the Sarawak Alliance, comprised of the Parti Bumiputera (11 seats) and the Sarawak Chinese Association (4 seats, for an Alliance total of 15). The remaining seat was won by an independent. The 32 seats of Sabah were divided between the Sabah Chinese Association, and the Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Sabah Bersatu (United Sabah National Organisation, PKSB). The Sabah Chinese Association was nevertheless practically under the sway of the PKSB leader Datu Mustapha bin Datu Harun, better known as Tun Mustapha, leaving Mustapha in virtually complete control of Sabahan politics. Upon independence, a new constitution establishing the state also selected the Sultan of Brunei as the head of state. Whilst the Bruneian monarchy had opposed the PRB, an action which had been a major catalyst for the North Bornean rebellion in the first place, they were forced to accept the position of a purely ceremonial constitutional monarchy, giving up the absolute power they had held in their small kingdom. The alternative would likely had been the exile or complete destruction of the royal house, so Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and the Seri Begawan Sultan (retired Sultan) Omar Ali Saifuddien III were forced to acquiesce to the will of the rebels. Whilst Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah was Head of State, he remained Sultan of Brunei only. Opposition to the idea of Bolkiah as Sultan of the whole nation was steadfast from Tun Mustapha, whose defection from Malaya was necessary to achieve independence. He would never allow even de jure authority of the Sultan over Sabah. As such the Sultan of Brunei was merely President of the North Bornean Federation. The first Prime Minister of North Kalimantan was A.M. Azahari, leader of the PRB. The three provinces of North Kalimantan would also each be headed by a Chief Minister. Azahari would play this role for Brunei, Tun Mustapha for Sabah and Jugah Anak Barieng (better known as Tun Jugah), founder of the Parti Bumiputera and paramount chief of the Iban people (known by the British as Sea Dayaks) would take the mantle of Chief Minister for Sarawak. The contested nature of politics in Sarawak would give Tun Jugah much less influence than his peers in the other two provinces, however. The first post-independence elections were selected for June 1976, with all three provinces to synchronise their elections for the first time. In the meantime, a shaky alliance of the PRB, PRBS and USNO governed the nation.
Between independence and the 1976 elections, there was a great deal of political flux in Sarawak. The Parti Bumiputera and the Parti Pesaka would merge in 1973 (negotiations for a merger had been ongoing for years) forming the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (United Bumiputera Heritage Party, PBB). The PBB now effectively controlled 23 seats. In response, the PRBS and the PKS began to send out feelers to each other regarding potential future collaboration. If united, they would have 24 seats, eking out a majority in the next Sarawak election if no seats were turned. The North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP), founded on the 30th of March 1971, was essentially a formalisation of the armed communist movement which had fought against the Malaysia plan. The NKCP was, due to its illegality, unable to contest the elections held under Malayan supervision during the konfrontasi period, and as such held no parliamentary seats. Also aware that amongst some Dayak chieftains there were concerns about alliance with communists, the NKCP didn't show any intention to run for seats themselves, but receiving financial assistance from China, Korea and Indonesia, the NKCP was one of the most well-funded political forces in the country. Using these funds to establish various social programmes appealing to the poor of the Sarawak townships, they rapidly acquired a committed and easily-mobilisable political base. NKCP sympathisers actively infiltrated the PRBS, which was also able to be swayed towards certain NKCP policies by promises from chairman Wen Ming Chyuan to mobilise their supporters to vote for the PRBS in the upcoming elections. The NKCP was also highly-influential in Chinese schools and local trade unions in the area, giving them a political strength greatly out of proportion with their representation in the democratic institutions of North Kalimantan. The NKCP's actual leadership was mostly ethnic Chinese. The PBB was a multiracial centre-right party which represented the interests of various Dayak ethnicities and also represented a significant number of local Malays also. Whilst they were fairly moderate on most issues, the party was occasionally rather clumsy and slow to arrive at new policy proposals, due both to the enduring internal divide between the Bumiputera and Pesaka wings of the party, regionalism among the various Dayak groups, and the differences in interests between the Chinese business class represented in the Sarawak Chinese Association and the Dayak people, most of whom were relatively poor. The PKS was largely comprised of moderate Dayaks (such as its leader Stephen Kalong Ningkan) and Malays. Overall it was a social-progressive party, but the strong anti-communist stance of Ningkan was a major factor behind the NKCP not openly endorsing the PRBS prior to election, as not to spook off the PKS and foreclose the possibility of toppling the PBB leadership of the province.
Bruneian postal stamp depicting Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah
In Brunei, the PRB continued the policy of development that had been promoted by the Sultans, but aiming at wider benefit for the ordinary Bruneian, subsidising fisheries and meat and egg production in order to encourage the greater consumption of proteins by locals by making them more affordable, and the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund which would give a portion of oil revenues to each registered adult Bruneian. With the high oil prices of the 1970s, this would result in a sudden rise in incomes and living standards amongst the population of Brunei, as well as encouraging economic development. The Brunei construction boom and concomitant economic growth saw Bandar Seri Begawan double in population in a mere seven years. Investment in rural electrification, sanitation and drainage infrastructure, and agricultural equipment loans also improved the lifestyle of the rural peasantry in the province. The latter especially improved yields in Limbang, the so-called "rice bowl" of Brunei which had been transferred back to the region with North Kalimantan's independence (along with the island of Labuan, off the coast of Bandar Seri Begawan). Rural development saw a significant drop in malaria contraction and fatalities. Despite being better for the average Bruneian, Sultan Bolkiah continued to be a thorn in the side for the PRB, both him and his father often attempting to use their personal wealth to undermine Azahari's party and their governance.
In control of the most Dewan Negara seats out of anybody, Tun Mustapha had effectively been the kingmaker both in the independence negotiations and in the establishment of a post-independence government. Nevertheless, despite his power, he had an intense local focus; not interested in the goings-on in Brunei and Sarawak, he instead sought to rule Sabah as his personal fiefdom. Tun Mustapha had been a notable anti-Japanese resistance leader in the region, and since the Second World War had rose to become the most significant political figure in the province. In 1961 he had established the PKSB as a vehicle for his political ambitions in the region and worked towards independence from Britain, collaborating with Donald Stephens' (Muhammad Fuad Stephens from 1971) United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation, which was merged into PKSB in 1967, when Mustapha took control of Sabah (through the state election), although technically under the aegis of Kuala Lumpur. Tun Mustapha had a number of issues with the Malaysia government, most notably the share of Sabahan oil revenues. At one point, Tun Mustapha refused to sign an oil agreement with the federal government that would leave only 5% of Sabahan oil revenues in the province, and he demanded at least 30% so that he could put aside funds for the development of Sabah province. In order to convince Tun Mustapha to join their side in negotiations at the end of the North Kalimantan War of Liberation, the rebels allowed Sabah to retain 50% of its oil wealth; something they reasoned that they could afford to do due to oil revenue also coming in from Brunei, which had never actually been part of the Federation of Malaysia. In his time as Chief Minister of Sabah, Tun Mustapha took it open himself to ensure the supremacy of Islam in the province; he succeeded in converting a number of indigenous villages en masse which had prior adhered to traditional belief systems, and engaged in a state harassment campaign against Catholic missionaries operating in the province. On several occasions, using expiration of temporary residency permits as a pretext, he would send hundreds of police to arrest individual missionaries, in an effort to intimidate locals into shying away from the Christian faith. Mustapha also sponsored the creation of the United Sabah Islamic Association in 1969 and encouraged the settlement of Moros from Sulu and Mindanao in Sabah. He even went so far as to sponsor Moro rebels against the Philippine government. Seeking to reform the multicultural, multiethnic and multiconfessional Sabah province into a hegemonically Malay-speaking, Muslim region, Tun Mustapha banned the broadcast of languages other than Malay in radio and discouraged the use of English as a lingua franca. This campaign was relatively successful, with 75,000 conversions to Islam in 1974 and 95,000 in 1975. Whilst this flew in the face of constitutional guarantees to freedom of religion and multilingual governance, Tun Mustapha's position as a kingmaker in North Bornean politics allowed him to institute whatever policies he wanted in Sabah [253].
Tun Mustapha, kingmaker and unopposed Chief Minister of Sabah
The June 1976 election saw little change in the electoral map of the provinces of Brunei and Sabah. Tun Mustapha's ability to mobilise the PKSB political machine left him unchallenged in Sabah, and the popularity of the PRB's development campaigns in Brunei left the Parti Sultan established by Hassanal Bolkiah unable to make any inroads amongst the people [254]. The real electoral battlefield was the province of Sarawak. Once again the PRBS and PKS allied with each other against the PBB/Sarawak Chinese Association Alliance. But this time, able to mobilise the urban poor with aid of the communists, and able to fund a strong campaign utilising funds from Revolutionary Nusantara, the PRBS is able to turn the predominantly Chinese Kuching Barat, Miri and Semera constituencies, leaving the Sarawak Chinese Association only winning a single seat, at Igan. The Alliance were able to convince Lias Anak Kana, the independent from Ngemah, to come to their side. Whilst the race was extremely close and recounts were necessary in several provinces, with the outbreak of electoral violence particularly between communist political activists and PBB supporters in various townships, the PRBS-PKS partnership was only able to turn one non-Chinese-dominated constituency. This still left the PRBS-PKS with 28 seats to the Alliance's 20. With the PRBS-PKS likely to resume their electoral alliance with the PRB in the national race, leaving them with a guaranteed 38 seats out of the 90 total, this left the Alliance's only hope to get Tun Mustapha onside, Mustapha's lack of interest in national governance could then allow Tun Jugah to become Prime Minister and use his federal post to interfere with the PRBS' provincial agenda. One term of lame duck governance of Sarawak would almost certainly allow political power to swing back in his favour come 1981. The cunning Tun Mustapha, well aware that he held the national destiny in his hands, took overtures from both sides of the aisle. In the end the PRBS held an ace up their sleeve; behind closed doors, they passed word to Tun Mustapha that they maintained a close clandestine relationship with the government of Revolutionary Nusantara, and that not only would Nusantara be willing to guarantee the defense of Sabah against Philippine claims of sovereignty over the area, but that they may even be willing to assist in the equipping and training of Moro insurgents in the Southern Philippines. Ong Kee Hui, founder and leader of the PRBS, even promised to ask Aidit if Nusantara would be willing to encourage emigration by Nusantaran Muslims to Sabah if Tun Mustapha were to back him as Prime Minister. It was a deal Tun Mustapha couldn't possibly refuse.
In January 1977 the new government of North Kalimantan was formed. A mere formality, once against Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah was selected as President of the North Bornean Federation. Ong Kee Hui was Prime Minister, Stephen Kalong Ningkan of the PKS was appointed Chief Minister of Sarawak as a sign of gratitude (although his party would only be able to pass policies through the state legislature with PRBS support, leaving him in charge in name only), Azahari remained Chief Minister of Brunei and Tun Mustapha of course was once again Chief Minister of Sabah. This coalition government held an overwhelming 70 out of 90 total national seats, leaving the opposition largely ineffectual and limited to activity within Sarawak province. The new government immediately began to deepen ties with international partners, most notably China, Korea and Nusantara. A number of major arms acquisitions deals were made with the People's Republic of China, including the purchase of North Kalimantan's first jet aircraft, the Chinese Chengdu J-7 (a license-built MiG-21). Large quantities of small arms and ammunition, mostly somewhat outdated, were purchased from Vietnam and Korea. Two modified Kashin-class destroyers were also purchased from the Soviet Union, the Ognevoy ("fiery") and Smely ("valiant"), renamed to the Langmeitong ("hornbill bird") and Kemerdekaan ("Independence"), respectively. A defense agreement was signed with Nusantara, which pledged to come to North Kalimantan's aid against any foreign violation of its territorial sovereignty. It became increasingly obvious to the rest of the world that the North Borneo Federation was becoming sometwhat of an oddity: a parliamentary democracy petro-state in Southeast Asia, aligning itself with the socialist East. It was yet to become evident exactly what this would mean for the future of the region.
Ong Hee Kui, founder and leader of the PRBS and second Prime Minister of North Kalimantan
===
[253] IOTL, with Sabah as part of Malaysia, Tun Mustapha's disputes with the Malaysian Federal Government led to him openly promoting Sabahan separatism. In response, the powers that be in Malaysia sponsored the creation of the BERJAYA party under the leadership of PKSB Secretary-General Harris Salleh. BERJAYA managed to defeat PKSB in the 1976 state election. ITTL, with Sabah as a province of a smaller federation, and Mustapha as essentially ensuring whoever he supports becomes national rulers, there is no force willing to incur his disapproval by sponsoring an alternative. As such doesn't get ousted in the mid-1970s.
[254] The Parti Sultan is not an IOTL entity. I figured that given the bad blood between the PRB and the Sultan, the latter would at least attempt to form an electoral vehicle to reassert his power.
The North Borneo Federation, also known as North Kalimantan
The granting of the independence of the North Borneo Federation (also known as North Kalimantan) was achieved in November 1971 after long rounds of negotiations between various parties involved. Despite the communist-influenced Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force and North Kalimantan People's Army's leading roles in the insurgency, achieving independence from Malaya and the establishment of a stable nation required compromise with other factions in North Bornean politics. As such, the results of elections held under Malayan governance to local legislatures were recognised. A unicameral parliament was established, the Dewan Negara, which had 90 seats: 32 from Sabah, 10 from Brunei and 48 from Sarawak. All 10 Brunei seats were held by the Parti Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party, PRB). The Sarawak seats were divided between the largest single party, the Parti Rakyat Bersatu Sarawak (Sarawak United People's Party, PRBS) with 12 seats, the Parti Kebangsaan Sarawak (Sarawak National Party, PKS) with 12 seats, the Parti Pesaka with 8 seats and the Sarawak Alliance, comprised of the Parti Bumiputera (11 seats) and the Sarawak Chinese Association (4 seats, for an Alliance total of 15). The remaining seat was won by an independent. The 32 seats of Sabah were divided between the Sabah Chinese Association, and the Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Sabah Bersatu (United Sabah National Organisation, PKSB). The Sabah Chinese Association was nevertheless practically under the sway of the PKSB leader Datu Mustapha bin Datu Harun, better known as Tun Mustapha, leaving Mustapha in virtually complete control of Sabahan politics. Upon independence, a new constitution establishing the state also selected the Sultan of Brunei as the head of state. Whilst the Bruneian monarchy had opposed the PRB, an action which had been a major catalyst for the North Bornean rebellion in the first place, they were forced to accept the position of a purely ceremonial constitutional monarchy, giving up the absolute power they had held in their small kingdom. The alternative would likely had been the exile or complete destruction of the royal house, so Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and the Seri Begawan Sultan (retired Sultan) Omar Ali Saifuddien III were forced to acquiesce to the will of the rebels. Whilst Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah was Head of State, he remained Sultan of Brunei only. Opposition to the idea of Bolkiah as Sultan of the whole nation was steadfast from Tun Mustapha, whose defection from Malaya was necessary to achieve independence. He would never allow even de jure authority of the Sultan over Sabah. As such the Sultan of Brunei was merely President of the North Bornean Federation. The first Prime Minister of North Kalimantan was A.M. Azahari, leader of the PRB. The three provinces of North Kalimantan would also each be headed by a Chief Minister. Azahari would play this role for Brunei, Tun Mustapha for Sabah and Jugah Anak Barieng (better known as Tun Jugah), founder of the Parti Bumiputera and paramount chief of the Iban people (known by the British as Sea Dayaks) would take the mantle of Chief Minister for Sarawak. The contested nature of politics in Sarawak would give Tun Jugah much less influence than his peers in the other two provinces, however. The first post-independence elections were selected for June 1976, with all three provinces to synchronise their elections for the first time. In the meantime, a shaky alliance of the PRB, PRBS and USNO governed the nation.
Between independence and the 1976 elections, there was a great deal of political flux in Sarawak. The Parti Bumiputera and the Parti Pesaka would merge in 1973 (negotiations for a merger had been ongoing for years) forming the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (United Bumiputera Heritage Party, PBB). The PBB now effectively controlled 23 seats. In response, the PRBS and the PKS began to send out feelers to each other regarding potential future collaboration. If united, they would have 24 seats, eking out a majority in the next Sarawak election if no seats were turned. The North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP), founded on the 30th of March 1971, was essentially a formalisation of the armed communist movement which had fought against the Malaysia plan. The NKCP was, due to its illegality, unable to contest the elections held under Malayan supervision during the konfrontasi period, and as such held no parliamentary seats. Also aware that amongst some Dayak chieftains there were concerns about alliance with communists, the NKCP didn't show any intention to run for seats themselves, but receiving financial assistance from China, Korea and Indonesia, the NKCP was one of the most well-funded political forces in the country. Using these funds to establish various social programmes appealing to the poor of the Sarawak townships, they rapidly acquired a committed and easily-mobilisable political base. NKCP sympathisers actively infiltrated the PRBS, which was also able to be swayed towards certain NKCP policies by promises from chairman Wen Ming Chyuan to mobilise their supporters to vote for the PRBS in the upcoming elections. The NKCP was also highly-influential in Chinese schools and local trade unions in the area, giving them a political strength greatly out of proportion with their representation in the democratic institutions of North Kalimantan. The NKCP's actual leadership was mostly ethnic Chinese. The PBB was a multiracial centre-right party which represented the interests of various Dayak ethnicities and also represented a significant number of local Malays also. Whilst they were fairly moderate on most issues, the party was occasionally rather clumsy and slow to arrive at new policy proposals, due both to the enduring internal divide between the Bumiputera and Pesaka wings of the party, regionalism among the various Dayak groups, and the differences in interests between the Chinese business class represented in the Sarawak Chinese Association and the Dayak people, most of whom were relatively poor. The PKS was largely comprised of moderate Dayaks (such as its leader Stephen Kalong Ningkan) and Malays. Overall it was a social-progressive party, but the strong anti-communist stance of Ningkan was a major factor behind the NKCP not openly endorsing the PRBS prior to election, as not to spook off the PKS and foreclose the possibility of toppling the PBB leadership of the province.
Bruneian postal stamp depicting Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah
In Brunei, the PRB continued the policy of development that had been promoted by the Sultans, but aiming at wider benefit for the ordinary Bruneian, subsidising fisheries and meat and egg production in order to encourage the greater consumption of proteins by locals by making them more affordable, and the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund which would give a portion of oil revenues to each registered adult Bruneian. With the high oil prices of the 1970s, this would result in a sudden rise in incomes and living standards amongst the population of Brunei, as well as encouraging economic development. The Brunei construction boom and concomitant economic growth saw Bandar Seri Begawan double in population in a mere seven years. Investment in rural electrification, sanitation and drainage infrastructure, and agricultural equipment loans also improved the lifestyle of the rural peasantry in the province. The latter especially improved yields in Limbang, the so-called "rice bowl" of Brunei which had been transferred back to the region with North Kalimantan's independence (along with the island of Labuan, off the coast of Bandar Seri Begawan). Rural development saw a significant drop in malaria contraction and fatalities. Despite being better for the average Bruneian, Sultan Bolkiah continued to be a thorn in the side for the PRB, both him and his father often attempting to use their personal wealth to undermine Azahari's party and their governance.
In control of the most Dewan Negara seats out of anybody, Tun Mustapha had effectively been the kingmaker both in the independence negotiations and in the establishment of a post-independence government. Nevertheless, despite his power, he had an intense local focus; not interested in the goings-on in Brunei and Sarawak, he instead sought to rule Sabah as his personal fiefdom. Tun Mustapha had been a notable anti-Japanese resistance leader in the region, and since the Second World War had rose to become the most significant political figure in the province. In 1961 he had established the PKSB as a vehicle for his political ambitions in the region and worked towards independence from Britain, collaborating with Donald Stephens' (Muhammad Fuad Stephens from 1971) United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation, which was merged into PKSB in 1967, when Mustapha took control of Sabah (through the state election), although technically under the aegis of Kuala Lumpur. Tun Mustapha had a number of issues with the Malaysia government, most notably the share of Sabahan oil revenues. At one point, Tun Mustapha refused to sign an oil agreement with the federal government that would leave only 5% of Sabahan oil revenues in the province, and he demanded at least 30% so that he could put aside funds for the development of Sabah province. In order to convince Tun Mustapha to join their side in negotiations at the end of the North Kalimantan War of Liberation, the rebels allowed Sabah to retain 50% of its oil wealth; something they reasoned that they could afford to do due to oil revenue also coming in from Brunei, which had never actually been part of the Federation of Malaysia. In his time as Chief Minister of Sabah, Tun Mustapha took it open himself to ensure the supremacy of Islam in the province; he succeeded in converting a number of indigenous villages en masse which had prior adhered to traditional belief systems, and engaged in a state harassment campaign against Catholic missionaries operating in the province. On several occasions, using expiration of temporary residency permits as a pretext, he would send hundreds of police to arrest individual missionaries, in an effort to intimidate locals into shying away from the Christian faith. Mustapha also sponsored the creation of the United Sabah Islamic Association in 1969 and encouraged the settlement of Moros from Sulu and Mindanao in Sabah. He even went so far as to sponsor Moro rebels against the Philippine government. Seeking to reform the multicultural, multiethnic and multiconfessional Sabah province into a hegemonically Malay-speaking, Muslim region, Tun Mustapha banned the broadcast of languages other than Malay in radio and discouraged the use of English as a lingua franca. This campaign was relatively successful, with 75,000 conversions to Islam in 1974 and 95,000 in 1975. Whilst this flew in the face of constitutional guarantees to freedom of religion and multilingual governance, Tun Mustapha's position as a kingmaker in North Bornean politics allowed him to institute whatever policies he wanted in Sabah [253].
Tun Mustapha, kingmaker and unopposed Chief Minister of Sabah
The June 1976 election saw little change in the electoral map of the provinces of Brunei and Sabah. Tun Mustapha's ability to mobilise the PKSB political machine left him unchallenged in Sabah, and the popularity of the PRB's development campaigns in Brunei left the Parti Sultan established by Hassanal Bolkiah unable to make any inroads amongst the people [254]. The real electoral battlefield was the province of Sarawak. Once again the PRBS and PKS allied with each other against the PBB/Sarawak Chinese Association Alliance. But this time, able to mobilise the urban poor with aid of the communists, and able to fund a strong campaign utilising funds from Revolutionary Nusantara, the PRBS is able to turn the predominantly Chinese Kuching Barat, Miri and Semera constituencies, leaving the Sarawak Chinese Association only winning a single seat, at Igan. The Alliance were able to convince Lias Anak Kana, the independent from Ngemah, to come to their side. Whilst the race was extremely close and recounts were necessary in several provinces, with the outbreak of electoral violence particularly between communist political activists and PBB supporters in various townships, the PRBS-PKS partnership was only able to turn one non-Chinese-dominated constituency. This still left the PRBS-PKS with 28 seats to the Alliance's 20. With the PRBS-PKS likely to resume their electoral alliance with the PRB in the national race, leaving them with a guaranteed 38 seats out of the 90 total, this left the Alliance's only hope to get Tun Mustapha onside, Mustapha's lack of interest in national governance could then allow Tun Jugah to become Prime Minister and use his federal post to interfere with the PRBS' provincial agenda. One term of lame duck governance of Sarawak would almost certainly allow political power to swing back in his favour come 1981. The cunning Tun Mustapha, well aware that he held the national destiny in his hands, took overtures from both sides of the aisle. In the end the PRBS held an ace up their sleeve; behind closed doors, they passed word to Tun Mustapha that they maintained a close clandestine relationship with the government of Revolutionary Nusantara, and that not only would Nusantara be willing to guarantee the defense of Sabah against Philippine claims of sovereignty over the area, but that they may even be willing to assist in the equipping and training of Moro insurgents in the Southern Philippines. Ong Kee Hui, founder and leader of the PRBS, even promised to ask Aidit if Nusantara would be willing to encourage emigration by Nusantaran Muslims to Sabah if Tun Mustapha were to back him as Prime Minister. It was a deal Tun Mustapha couldn't possibly refuse.
In January 1977 the new government of North Kalimantan was formed. A mere formality, once against Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah was selected as President of the North Bornean Federation. Ong Kee Hui was Prime Minister, Stephen Kalong Ningkan of the PKS was appointed Chief Minister of Sarawak as a sign of gratitude (although his party would only be able to pass policies through the state legislature with PRBS support, leaving him in charge in name only), Azahari remained Chief Minister of Brunei and Tun Mustapha of course was once again Chief Minister of Sabah. This coalition government held an overwhelming 70 out of 90 total national seats, leaving the opposition largely ineffectual and limited to activity within Sarawak province. The new government immediately began to deepen ties with international partners, most notably China, Korea and Nusantara. A number of major arms acquisitions deals were made with the People's Republic of China, including the purchase of North Kalimantan's first jet aircraft, the Chinese Chengdu J-7 (a license-built MiG-21). Large quantities of small arms and ammunition, mostly somewhat outdated, were purchased from Vietnam and Korea. Two modified Kashin-class destroyers were also purchased from the Soviet Union, the Ognevoy ("fiery") and Smely ("valiant"), renamed to the Langmeitong ("hornbill bird") and Kemerdekaan ("Independence"), respectively. A defense agreement was signed with Nusantara, which pledged to come to North Kalimantan's aid against any foreign violation of its territorial sovereignty. It became increasingly obvious to the rest of the world that the North Borneo Federation was becoming sometwhat of an oddity: a parliamentary democracy petro-state in Southeast Asia, aligning itself with the socialist East. It was yet to become evident exactly what this would mean for the future of the region.
Ong Hee Kui, founder and leader of the PRBS and second Prime Minister of North Kalimantan
===
[253] IOTL, with Sabah as part of Malaysia, Tun Mustapha's disputes with the Malaysian Federal Government led to him openly promoting Sabahan separatism. In response, the powers that be in Malaysia sponsored the creation of the BERJAYA party under the leadership of PKSB Secretary-General Harris Salleh. BERJAYA managed to defeat PKSB in the 1976 state election. ITTL, with Sabah as a province of a smaller federation, and Mustapha as essentially ensuring whoever he supports becomes national rulers, there is no force willing to incur his disapproval by sponsoring an alternative. As such doesn't get ousted in the mid-1970s.
[254] The Parti Sultan is not an IOTL entity. I figured that given the bad blood between the PRB and the Sultan, the latter would at least attempt to form an electoral vehicle to reassert his power.
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Thanks omrk, always great to hear from you. Nusantara definitely adds something a little different and interesting to the region, doesn't it? West Papua isn't going to be the only change thats significant in Melanesia. I guess as a New Zealander I feel a bit of an obligation to give the South Pacific the shine it deserves (and doesn't usually get in the AH community).
I am waiting to see which Western leaning companies and countries will come looking for Borneo's oil wealth.
ITTL so far, the British Malayan Petroleum Company assets in North Borneo were nationalised.
Agreed, every TL has its own crazy Africa but a one with somewhat balkanization of the Pacific area is always welcome.