How much more difficult would've it become to maintain supply to Australia and New Zealand if Japan had taken Port Moresby and the rest of Papua New Guinea? And the U.S. doesn't conduct Operation Watchtower?
Suppose we have a situation in mid-1942 where the Japanese decide to hold at New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and build their defensive lines. The IJA did not want to attempt to invade Australia in OTL. And lets suppose the American build up in New Caledonia dissuades the IJN from pushing further Southeast.
The question I have is with the Japanese operating from the South coast of New Guinea and from Guadalcanal and Tulagi how much more difficult in distance and time would convoying ships to Australia and New Zealand be? Would there be heavy losses to the transport ships and their escorts? Or would it only be a question of adding a week or two to the shipping time as convoys take a safer, more Southerly route?
Is this a situation the Allies could deal with through 1942 and 1943 if more resources were used in the Atlantic and ETO as compared to OTL. If FDR pursued a more definitive "Germany First" policy?
Suppose we have a situation in mid-1942 where the Japanese decide to hold at New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and build their defensive lines. The IJA did not want to attempt to invade Australia in OTL. And lets suppose the American build up in New Caledonia dissuades the IJN from pushing further Southeast.
The question I have is with the Japanese operating from the South coast of New Guinea and from Guadalcanal and Tulagi how much more difficult in distance and time would convoying ships to Australia and New Zealand be? Would there be heavy losses to the transport ships and their escorts? Or would it only be a question of adding a week or two to the shipping time as convoys take a safer, more Southerly route?
Is this a situation the Allies could deal with through 1942 and 1943 if more resources were used in the Atlantic and ETO as compared to OTL. If FDR pursued a more definitive "Germany First" policy?