-Part 3 – Grey Seas and Iron Skies
The cancellation of almost almost all post war piston engined aircraft projects in 1946 left the Royal Navy with a problem. Nearly the entirety of the Fleet Air Arm's inventory of carrier aircraft were either obsolete or had to be returned under the terms of lend lease. Even with the post war contraction in the number of flight decks, it would become difficult to fill them all with the British built aircraft remaining aircraft, primarily Seafires and Fireflies.
The Hawker Sea Fury was being procured as an interim solution, and whilst it was a very capable aircraft in comparison to it's predecessors and was regarded by some to be the 'ultimate piston fighter' the rapid proliferation of jet fighters in major militaries cast serious doubt as to whether it could remain competitive for very long.
The Soviets and Americans had made rapid advances in the field, and from what information could be gathered from these programs, it was judged that they were on verge of surpassing Britain's technological lead, if not having already done so. Of perhaps even greater concern was the diaspora of former German aerospace engineers, such as Kurt Tank, who were now seeking new employment in nations across the world from Sweden to Argentina.
With naval aviation now firmly the pre-eminent striking arm of an serious sea power, and in the face of the possibility of soon even a minor power being able to field aircraft that surpassed those borne aboard His Majesties Ships, hesitance at the admiralty about the whether jet power was even suitable for carrier operations was swept aside. It was no long a question of if these aircraft should be procured, but of how quickly they could be.
In light of this urgency some of the more esoteric projects, such as a flexible landing deck that proponents argued would allow the construction of higher performance aircraft by eliminating the weight devoted to landing gear, were pushed to the side in favour of expedient solutions that would function in conjunction with existing ships.
Previously one of the prototype de Havilland Vampires had been were procured for testing and underwent limited modifications for carrier operations on HMS Ocean in 1945. These had been generally successful, and now with a lack of any other suitable aircraft currently in production, the admiralty had no choice but to commit to a Sea Vampire. However arguments against the type's limited range and limited performance compared to in development designs caused the initial production run to be fairly limited. Only thirty Sea Vampire F.1s were put into service in 1946, and were used primarily for familiarization training to allow the Royal Navy to develop new handling procedures for jets at sea.
An example of the second mark of Sea Vampire procured by the FAA, Many of these would subsequently be sold on to commonwealth militaries as they were replaced by the production of the Sea Sparrow and Harpy.
Some serious consideration was given to a Nene powered follow on variant derived from the Mk.2 Vampire currently under development at de Havilland. However observations, by exchange officers, of the new North American FJ-1 and Vought F6U jet aircraft that were being put into service by the United States Navy, both far larger and more capable aircraft, convinced the FAA, just like the RAF, that the Vampire's future was limited. Instead modest modifications were made to the existing aircraft to increase their performance in range that involved reducing the armament to two cannon and the more powerful Goblin 3 engine, these would be designated as the F.2 in 1949.
Significant pressure was being exerted by the Air Ministry for the Navy to adopt common aircraft types to the RAF to lower development and logistics costs, and so the FAA was drawn at least peripherally into the troubled E.1/44 program. To say that the Royal Navy was unimpressed by the sluggish and difficult progress being made by Gloster would be an understatement. The backup solution of the jet powered spiteful derived Type 328, developed by Supermarine, interested them even less, the jet blast being directed down onto the carrier deck by the tail dragger landing gear being highly concerning.
It was with this environment that the Admiralty was approached by Hawker, who desperately seeking contracts in the post-war cuts had developed their own interim jet fighter design based on the Sea Fury. The Hawker P.1040 originated in concepts that began as a 'simple' swap of a Sea Fury's Griffon engine with a fuselage mounted Nene turbojet, though the Air Ministry had expressed interest, they had done little more than encourage Hawker to keep working on the project.
The prototypes produced in 1947 was highly promising with range and speed highly superior to the Sea Vampire. Though compared to the prototype Sparrow, it's straight wing layout appeared more old fashioned. Having grown frustrated with delays at Gloster the Navy committed to the the Hawker aircraft. However the Air ministry which had just managed to break the deadlock for the RAF jet fighter program though brokering an alliance between Vickers and de Havilland took a dim view of this inexpedient action against it's wishes and refused to release funding for such a procurement, forcing the FAA to use parts of it's existing budget to do so. Despite this the first Hawker Sea Hawks, designated F.1 began production in 1948.
The lack of support from the Air Ministry did however curtail the number of aircraft that Hawker could produce for the FAA. The Navy was now faced with the choice of buying more Sea Vampires, that it had already deemed insufficient for future operations, or giving in to pressure and also joining the RAF in the Sparrow.
With government support Supermarine had been anticipating naval orders and already had a prototype carrier capable version of their aircraft ready to. By the time the Royal Navy was convinced of the necessity of expanding their jet aircraft orders The Type 333 design had incorporated several features that would also feature on the F.2 model of the sparrow, inclining a new swept tail plane and a slightly redesigned intake geometry that increased low speed performance. Adopted as the Supermarine Sea Sparrow FGA.1, this aircraft would enter limited service only three years later in 1951 and both it and the Sea Hawk would serve alongside each other for the rest of the 1950s, and would enable the British fleet to field capable air groups in several conflicts that took place during this period.
A FAA Sea Hawk shortly before the type was retired in 1956, by which point they were typically deployed to secondary bases and training units.
Hawker however knew that without further development the Sea Hawk would be quickly relegated to secondary roles, and would be unlikely to see further orders in the face of Navy that had access to the more advanced Sea Sparrows, a design that was also being heavily pushed by the Air Ministry. Seeking to keep themselves in the game, they continued the development of the airframe, exploring concepts that had devised three years prior for a Sea Hawk with swept wings.
The P.1055 prototype assembled from existing Sea Hawk components, mated to new build elements would be first demonstrated in 1948 a few months after the first Sea Hawks began to roll of the production line.
The Navy showed some interest, its performance appeared comparable to the early model Sea Sparrows, whilst it had some characteristics that they preferred such as the wing root intakes instead of a nose inlet. Hawker was given the go ahead to continue developing the design despite the Air Ministry's mild disapproval, with a provisional order for five pre-production models by 1950.
Not content to pin their hopes on this alone Hawker also began to exploring potential export markets. Whilst the Canadians were very much focused on their own domestic aircraft development, they did find interest from the Australian government. Just like their British counterparts they too were seeking to replace their large aircraft inventories left over from the war. The Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation had over a decade of history both producing its own aircraft and license building American and British designs.
Hawker's overture came at just the right time, as Grumman representatives were already in Canberra offering a potential swept wing development of their F9F Panther. With some mild exaggeration of the Royal Navy's commitment to the aircraft, and by virtue of having an already completed prototype Hawker were able to secure an order for a further two production prototypes, one each for the RAAF and RAN. A delegation from CAC was set to visit Hawker's factory to further review the project. Hawker would go on to use this tentative Australian commitment to further secure their contracts with the Fleet Air Arm.
The P.1055 prototype number six that would be supplied to the RAAN.
Of course it does no good to have secured new if carrier aircraft, if there are no decks from which they can fly. The Royal Navy exited the war with a fleet of solid, yet heavily worn fleet carriers and a host of ships under construction that had seen delays so that resources could be diverted to more pressing needs.
The same ruthless cost cutting that gutted aircraft procurement in the late 40's was also visited upon the Navy, and it was inevitable that there were going to be a great number of disappointed people across the service and industry. The incoming Atlee government had committed itself to supporting the labour force and securing jobs, so cancelling ship construction entirely was not an option, not to mention that institutional memory amongst the admiralty of what had happened when this approach had been enacted after the First World War saw them, stand firm against any such suggestion.
When given the choice between new construction or rebuilds for existing ships, there was really no choice at all. It was quickly decided that neither the Implacable and Illustrious class ships would see any of the proposed major rebuilds, and other than economical service refits for maintenance would be disposed of within five to ten years.
The Malta class carriers had already been cancelled in 1945 for being insufficiently advanced for what the Navy wanted, whilst two of the Audacious class would continue construction, they would be used as test beds for advanced designs and technology concepts such as angled flight decks, deck edge aircraft lifts and mirror landing aids. The scope of these improvements (some which essentially meant rebuilding already completed hull components ) meant that neither ship would be in service before 1955. As this would coincide with the retirement of the existing fleet carriers, To augment this, and to prevent a period where the Royal Navy would be reliant on just two fleet carriers, a simultaneous initiative to produce at least two new vessels of a clean sheet design was also started with a view to starting construction no later than 1952. The intention being that these would be supplemented by a regular construction schedule of ships in the coming two decades that would see Britain's shipyards with continuous work, and a planned Navy of six fleet carriers.
Meanwhile the entire inventory of light fleet carriers was to be used as as stop gap, and then disposed of either by sale to allies, or scrapped. It was hoped that as essentially brand new ships that the unfinished Centaur class ships especially could find buyers (which would allow work for their continued construction) and considerable effort was co-ordinated between the Admiralty and the Foreign Office to accomplish this goal.
Whilst the Royal Navy had always prided itself as being the primary instrument of British global power, the events of the Second World War had propelled another organisation upwards as a claimant to that title. Though indeed the tireless flotillas of corvettes and destroyers had guarded the Atlantic convoys against the U-boat menace and kept Britain fed, it had been the unstoppable juggernaut of RAF Bomber Command that brought the hammer of Britain's wroth to the heart of the Nazi reich.
It was unquestionable in the minds of the military planners of Whitehall that a strong and capable bomber was absolute requirement for any modern global power. The cancellation of further Lincoln bomber production in early 1946 had been a wound to Bomber Command's pride. Such was this pre-eminence in the minds of superior Air Ministry figures that when they demanded new jet bombers with which to maintain this capability in a world quickly filling with fast jet interceptors, little protest or impediment was made.
Captured examples of German jet bombers such as the Ar 234, and after action reports of those that had encountered them, had convinced the RAF command that a fleet of long range fast jet bombers was desired as soon as possible, so as to reach targets in the most likely potential adversary in the near future, the Soviet Union* carrying the new and terrfyingly destructive nuclear weapons. **
Accordingly under the very optimistic Operational Requirement 230, it was determined that the future heavy jet bomber should be capable of carrying a 10,000 pound payload to a target 2,000 miles away, at a speed of 500 knots, at 50,000 feet.
This was a requirement that unfortunately stretched the ability of industry to satisfy it within the limits of currently available technology. (Not that this deterred some of the companies involved, so desperate as they were for any kind of work.)
When these limitations were made clear to senior officials, there was some consideration to reducing the ambitious requirements, so as to actually receive some sort of bomber force within the decade. However two factors emerged to prevent this. Firstly was with the cancellation of follow on Lincoln orders the need for new bombers was so immediate than even reducing the specification for brand new designs would still see them entering service far too late for what the RAF wanted.
Second was the resolute desire by then Air Marshal Sir William Disckson that three different types of bombers be tested, produced and put into service. His reasoning being that a similar breadth of choice had served the RAF well during the early years of the war, and if forced to choose the RAF would 'undoubtedly pick the wrong one'.***
The Air Ministry, the Ministry of Supply and the Treasury, all reacted to this suggestion with barely concealed horror. That the RAF needed a heavy jet bomber post haste was understandable, but to demand three was an extravagance in the face of cuts in every other area of procurement.
The suggestion was flatly denied. The RAF could have one advanced jet heavy bomber, and they would just have to make sure it was the correct one. The extensive time it would take to develop the designs would help with the needed testing. A desperate raft of proposals were received from industry, and by 1947 two companies, Handley Page and Avro, were selected to produce prototypes that would hopefully by ready around 1951.
In the meantime the the RAF would just have to make do with their remaining late model Lancasters the Lincolns and the new medium jet bomber force.
The specification for a jet powered medium bomber, was mercifully a far less complicated issue. English Electric had been working on it's own design during the war, and though a fairly conventional offering, it was ready with prototypes already under construction which was what mattered. The funding for this project was given priority over some others in view of the need to maintain at least some sort of modern bomber force. Trials showed it to be surprisingly capable, with test pilots praising it;s near fighter like handling. Relieved that at least this aspect of procurement had been relatively painless, the Air Ministry and RAF accepted into service in 1948 as the Canberra B.1, and ordered into full scale production with a view to replacing the RAF's entire force of twin engined bombers by the mid 1950s.
Even in early 1946 however it was clear that legacy airframes and what would become the Canberra would not really be sufficient to tide Bomber Command's heavy squadrons over until the advanced designs from Avro and Handley Page were ready. A scheme was suggested by the Ministry of supply whereby American B-29 Superfortresses, that were currently being mothballed and put into storage, could be loaned to the RAF to fill the gap. Aghast at this notion, and worried at the signals it would send to the already panicky British aviation industry) senior Bomber Command officers and Air Ministry officials conspired to undermine this effort.
Emphasising the need to protect skilled jobs, a topic that was sure to elicit positive noises form the current Labour government, they managed to get an new requirement for an interim jet bomber using current technology. Pointing out the success of the medium bomber program in operating under similar circumstances.
Operational Requirement 232, issued in 1945, asked for a jet conversion of an existing heavy bomber design to achieve performance at least as capable as the German Jet bombers. Several companies immediately showed interest in this, but in the end the only real option was for a jet conversion of the Avro Lincoln. As Avro themselves were currently busy with both the Lincoln and and their new advanced bomber project, the majority of the design and prototyping work was to be subcontracted out to Short Brothers. The Ministry of Supply was furious at this, as in their view it was a blatant example of the kind expensive short term thinking that they were trying to avoid. However in this instance they had been outmanoeuvred.
The provisionally named jet Lincoln was comforted to the advanced concepts that Avro and Handley Page had begun to develop, a very simple design. A Lincoln fuselage, and a reinforced wing straight wing had been mated with four Rolls Royce Tay turbofans mounted in twinned pods on each wing, and a streamlined cockpit and nose section. The prototype was completed in March 1947, and made its maiden flights that same year. Using the same electronics and avionics as the Lincoln it actually had a slightly smaller payload, though was capable of travelling at a speed over 50% faster to the same range. Its sole defensive armament was a twin 20mm Hispano cannon in a traversable rear turret, that was considered likely enough to dissuade any contemporary jet fighters that tried to engage it in a tail chase.
This was considered to be better than nothing for the effort allocated to it and it was accepted for production as the Avro Auckland B.1.
An Avro Auckland B.1 from the first production run as issued to No.35 Squadron RAF in September 1948.
* Though at this point it was still considered somewhat tactless to specifically identify the USSR in this way.
** Which technically Britain did not yet have, though at the time this was not considered as much of a problem as it later turned out to be.
*** This is real, and is why there were three separate V bombers produced, and another prototyped. It has some sound reasoning, but is entirely out of step with the climate of post war austerity.
