Sixes and Snake eyes Rommel's luck in an alternate 1942 desert war

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nbcman

Donor
American rations heading for north Africa
{image snipped}

The citation is wrong on the number of calories in a K-rat. There's no way they were giving 9000 calories per day to soldiers. I thought it was under 3000 calories per day and that there were issues with soldier's weight loss since there was insufficient calories if they were extremely active.

EDIT: It was about 2700 calories per: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK224616/
 

cardcarrier

Banned
OK but you need the Panzer divisions to destroy those boxes. However if you use them to do that then they cannot be elsewhere on the battlefield, and will suffer significant losses doing so, both delaying and weakening any subsequent advance eastwards.
on vacation this week taking the kids to DC but will try to squeeze in some work on it :)
 
The citation is wrong on the number of calories in a K-rat. There's no way they were giving 9000 calories per day to soldiers. I thought it was under 3000 calories per day and that there were issues with soldier's weight loss since there was insufficient calories if they were extremely active.

EDIT: It was about 2700 calories per: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK224616/
well spotted.
9.000 calories is a very high number. The only time I have heard people eating that much was in the antarctic where the calories were needed because of the extreme cold.

Although the average person uses about 2,000 calories each day, the explorers in Antarctica may have burned as many as 7,000–10,000 calories per day.
https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/172352main_Have_Food_Will_Travel.pdf
 
The air war in North Africa FYI

THE MEDITERRANEAN​

As in 1941, the Mediterranean had remained a side show for the Germans through most of 1942. Air and ground forces deployed in North Africa represented the minimum required to fend off the British. The fact that Rommel with these forces had won great tactical victories is a tribute to his genius. Nevertheless, his success inevitably led to a rise in the forces deployed against him on the ground as well as in the air.
The British, saddled with a series of incompetent commanders on the ground, were well served in the air. From May 1941, Arthur Tedder, one of the outstanding airmen of the war, commanded the RAF in the Middle East, while his deputy, Sir A. "Mary" Coningham, led the air forces assigned to support Eighth Army. Tedder and Coningham built up a force in the 1941-42 period that showed extreme versatility in its employment in close air support, air superiority, and short- and long-range interdiction missions. While the RAF in the Mediterranean gained numerical and qualitative superiority over the Luftwaffe, difficulties complicated the execution of a successful British air strategy. Perhaps the most daunting were the enormous distances that British forces had to traverse within this theater. The distance between Tripoli and El Alamein was 1,500 kilometers, equal to that from East Prussia to Moscow. Moreover, supply lines reached from Britain around the African continent, while the aircraft ferrying system, although involving less distance, crossed Central Africa and thus presented considerable logistical difficulties.
Moreover, the British suffered from interservice coordination problems. Early in his command, Tedder recognized the interrelationship between the efforts of the three services and that, without a strategic conception, British armed forces could not achieve decisive results. As he noted in his memoirs:​
The campaign in North Africa provide a prime example of the complementary roles played in the Second World War by all three services. The brunt of the desert battles fell upon the Army and the Royal Air Force; the eventual intention was to turn out of North Africa, bag and baggage, the Italian and German forces. By seeming paradox, this object could not be achieved without success at sea . . . . By a further paradox, such superiority at sea could after 1941 be secured only by the exercise of airpower and could certainly not be secured by surface forces alone.55
Tedder found it difficult to cooperate with the army which could not understand the particular advantages as well as limitations of the air weapon.56 On one occasion in 1942, he wrote home that the army's performance resulted from "an excess of bravery and a shortage of brains."57 The result of such failings in army training, doctrine, and leadership largely nullified British air superiority over the desert battlefield.58 It was one matter to control the airspace over the battlefield; it was another to translate that superiority into direct success when cooperation with the army broke down or if ground commanders consistently lost to inferior forces. British air and naval forces operating from Malta were a thorn for the Italian logistics to North Africa from the onset of the Mediterranean war. By late 1941,​


--126--

what had began as a nuisance had now become a strategic threat. In September 1941, the British sank 38.5 percent of the tonnage sent from Italy to Libya. In October, the figure reached 63 percent and in November an astonishing level of 77 percent.59 British forces undoubtedly received considerable help from "Ultra" decrypts of Axis cypher traffic, making convoy operations relatively easy to pinpoint and attack. This intolerable pressure on Rommel's logistical system helps explain the sudden transfer of Luftflotte 2 into the theater in November. The fact that these forces represented a substantial portion of the aircraft supporting the advance on Moscow does, however, raise an interesting question about the OKW's strategic priorities.
Indeed the arrival of new air units in Sicily in December 1941 allowed the Germans to clear the waters around Malta and protect Axis convoys from British interference. Shipping losses fell to a more acceptable level of 20-30 percent. However, until logistical preparations had been accomplished, Kesselring could not launch an aerial offensive aimed at destroying Malta.60 Beginning in early April 1942, the air offensive on Malta began. By May 10, Second Air Fleet had flown 11,000 sorties against the island fortress and placed the garrison and local population in desperate straits.61 The question now facing the Germans was whether to proceed with an airborne and naval invasion. After considerable debate within the Axis' high commands, Hitler vetoed the operation. In retrospect, given the enormous logistical difficulties in the theater, Malta's capture would only have made a marginal difference to the North African situation.62 Nevertheless, the failure to seek a decision forced the Luftwaffe to leave strong forces in Sicily to harass Malta--a further dispersal of limited air resources.63
In the summer of 1942, despite Rommel's brilliant successes in the spring, the Mediterranean balance was shifting against the Axis. On the ground, the British were accumulating a numerical superiority that outweighed whatever qualitative superiority the Germans still enjoyed. Even more important was the fact that in July, Eighth Army acquired a commander who refused to tolerate the "nice chap" syndrome that had so hampered the British army.64 By October, the British possessed an impressive numerical superiority. Although the Mediterranean campaign operated on a smaller scale, the similarities between the strategic situation in the Mediterranean and those existing in Russia are striking. German air and ground units at the end of long lines of communications faced massive enemy buildups with little prospect of reinforcement. The situation represented a recipe for strategic disaster.​
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-4.html
 

cardcarrier

Banned
I lost a post and editing work in the server refresh yesterday

corrections to the timeline

final destruction of Gazala box troops is as follows

2 remaining brigades of the 50th division and associated stragglers are isolated by trento, brescia and 21st panzer and attacked 1 at a time with air support and army artillery support; south african brigades are fixed by the remaining 3 Italian infantry divisions

as each box is broken, south to north, the axis displaces north

there are domino effects to morale due to lack of air defenses and other pockets being destroyed sooner

15th panzer moves up and helps the them defeat the south african boxes in detail 1 at a time with air and artillery support, south to north

Rommels losses have been kept at similar ratios to otl roughly 8:1 in his favor

I'll cover his remaining strength in ~consolidation period~ posts in the timeline
 
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corrections to the timeline

final destruction of Gazala box troops is as follows

2 remaining brigades of the 50th division and associated stragglers are isolated by trento, brescia and 21st panzer and attacked 1 at a time with air support and army artillery support; south african brigades are fixed by the remaining 3 Italian infantry divisions
Seems the same as you proposed before; you're attacking mutually supporting brigades behind minefields with a strength advantage of (at most) 2:1; defenders probably have more anti-tank guns than the attackers have tanks.
Rommels losses have been kept at similar ratios to otl roughly 8:1 in his favor
:rolleyes:
 

cardcarrier

Banned
Seems the same as you proposed before; you're attacking mutually supporting brigades behind minefields with a strength advantage of (at most) 2:1; defenders probably have more anti-tank guns than the attackers have tanks.

:rolleyes:
they arent mutually supporting, that was the whole problem with the box system in the first place

The Italian divisions at the start of Gazala would have had a strength of 7-8k men; the individual brigade boxes other than stragglers driven into the perimeter didn't number much more than 3500-4000 so with airpower being worth half a point...ish id evaluate it as 3:1 conditions for the 151st and 69th brigade boxes and 5+ for the south african brigades inside of a crisis of confidence situation

Gazala was not the finest day for British arms :confused: British and German histories have it at 7-8 to 1. Playfair has it as 7.7
 
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they arent mutually supporting, that was the whole problem with the box system in the first place

The Italian divisions at the start of Gazala would have had a strength of 7-8k men; the individual brigade boxes other than stragglers driven into the perimeter didn't number much more than 3500-4000 so with airpower being worth half a point...ish id evaluate it as 3:1 conditions for the 151st and 69th brigade boxes
The 2 remaining 50th Division boxes are close together - only a mile or so between them, and so well within 25pdr range.

On strength, Brescia is 2 infantry regiments less the mobile companies which you removed earlier in the battle, Trento has been through 2 hard fought engagements, as has 21st Panzer. Not convinced they have even the equivalent of 12 full strength battalions between them.
 
The 2 remaining 50th Division boxes are close together - only a mile or so between them, and so well within 25pdr range.

On strength, Brescia is 2 infantry regiments less the mobile companies which you removed earlier in the battle, Trento has been through 2 hard fought engagements, as has 21st Panzer. Not convinced they have even the equivalent of 12 full strength battalions between them.
25 pounder rang is not mutually supporting.
 
14

cardcarrier

Banned
Chapter 14

6-06-42 23:59 hrs British 8th army and Middle East HQ Cairo Egypt Reporting back to American President Roosevelt and Joint Chiefs of Staff; Colonel Bonner Fellers, American military attache to MEGHQ

Urgent update and personal observations:

Briefings and disclosures are disjointed due to chaotic situation at the front, will report 2-3 times a day as necessary or ordered
GHQ is now largely assuming that no additional stragglers or survivors outside of minor elements of 29th Indian infantry will retreat into British held Egypt
GHQ openly discloses that Army has lost 84000 men in the Western Desert, they will not share their middle case estimate of axis loss but Smith claims their losses are "heavy"
Desert Air force staff officers advise that axis fighters and tactical bombers are relocating to fields at the frontier
Desert Air force staff officers advise that once axis airforce is reorganized and resupplied that Mersah Matruh fortress can be dive bombed with fighter escorts
Smith and Auchinlek inspected fortress of Mersah Matruh and have concerns about the deterioration of its defenses
Smith advises the anti tank defenses where they havent been damaged by the environment are not fit for a modern defensive battle
Smith is adamantly opposed to making defensive stand at Matruh; he advises that it is vulnerable to flanking maneuvers to the south, and there is not enough armor, time or total forces to stop Rommel from making such a move
Desert Air force staff officers continue to agitate for final decision on defensive operations, they advise that they are not stock piling fuel, spares, bombs, ammunition at Matruh because of GHQ's considered withdrawal;
Desert Air force staff officers advise that so many drop tanks where consumed in western desert that on a temporary basis, staging of their fighters, particularly the long range kitty hawks must be carefully measured and planned by all staffs; they do advise emergency shipments of additional drop tanks have been dispatched but may not arrive for a few weeks
Royal Navy staff officers advise they cannot resupply Matruh fortress in the even it becomes surrounded, they advise they do not currently have assets to run gauntlet of axis dive bombing attacks at excessively close range
Royal Navy staff officers vehemently reject "alamein" position as too close to the fleet anchorage and inside their red line for evacuation; they advise there is not enough motoring time between "alamein" and the delta for them to conduct rapier before Rommel might arrive into Alexandria and disrupt the demolitions
Royal Navy staff officers advise they cannot risk trying to conduct rapier under heavy air attacks from escorted dive bombers
Royal Navy staff officers confirm they have independent approval from London to withdraw the fleet on their red line, they also confirm that the port/harbor portions of rapier have been approved for the Royal Navy to execute on their own authority separate from Auchinlek; Londond doesn't want to allow the Italian fleet or any elements of it to become based at Alexandria in the event the city is captured by the axis
Above separation of harbor portions of rapier causes explosive confrontations between Royal Navy and Smith and Auchinlek
Auchinlek is furious saying the troops will not fight if the fleet evacuates and if the harbor is demolished
Smith for first time shows some reluctance to elements of rapier, stating that it would cause grave logistical difficulties for the British military once they would recapture the area to resume their drive to Tripoli, he calls some of the planned demolitions excessive and too punishing for the civilian population
GHQ staffers privately disclose that Rommel has captured the army rail line between Belhamed and the frontier largely in tact
I tried repeating my questioning to GHQ officers and to General Smith about why the rail line between Matruh and Belhamed is not covered by rapier (my best current understanding is that Auchinlek has supreme authority over the demolition (or not) of the railroad) which at every instance has lead to me being removed from the command post; General Smith finally conceded that he wants to re-use the line when the army eventually returns to Libya and doesn't want to waste another 4 months rebuilding it; even if Rommel might temporarily weaponize it against him; given Rommel's known fuel issues this methodology is shocking to our entire attache staff;
some GHQ staffers are using back channels to London to try and have ICGS order Auchinlek to destroy the rail line
none of our previous maneuver radius calculations assumed Rommel could save ANY meaningful amounts of fuel using the rail line
none of GHQ privately disclosed maneuver radius estimations have accounted for Rommel having any use of the rail line
Major Oswald advises that if Rommel can optimize his most critical fuel supplies into Tobruk (beyond his captured on hand booty fuel) and make some use of the rail line that he would up his middle case estimate to Rommel being able to push 7 divisions to the delta including all of his known mobile divisions (not including his undeployed "littorio" and "6th" divisions, which we are still researching their exact role in the theater)
Major Oswald advises that the infantry replacements Rommel is receiving will likely be used to garrison the choke points and small fishing ports/ beyond making good some of the losses he has taken in the Gazala fighting, freeing up his maneuver divisions to carry their attacks into Egypt
Major Oswald feels that GHQ middle case estimates grossly underestimate Rommel's reinforcements, maneuver range, on hand tanks, remaining infantry strength, and augmented firepower in the context of his capture of most of the 8th army's equipment
Major Oswald has privately worked with a GHQ logistics officers to assess if the large number of truck companies Rommel has captured in tact would not only paper over his losses in German vehicles but temporarily allow him to move some of his footbound infantry formations; we will advise further on that once his report is complete, but his impressions are not good
I have become personally concerned about the presence of German and Italian parachute infantry in the theater now, which have never been in Africa before; Rommel is known to be supported by a number of German and Italian transport aircraft
I asked General Auchinlek and Smith if they have any contingency plans or rapid maneuver forces in the event of the Axis conducting a regimental or even brigade sized parachute attack on their current rear areas (rear areas is a loose term at the moment in the aftermath of the loss at Gazala) which led to General Smith removing me from the command post for the 3rd time today
I asked General Smith later in the day what would happen if they attempt to stand at either Matruh or Alamein and axis paratroopers where dropped on the coastal road behind them blocking the way to Alexandria (I don't presume it to be viable to drop the parachutists on the city itself), this triggered a wild round of heated arguments with desert air force staff officers, and a second even further heated round of arguments with Royal Navy staff officers who were furious because Smith's previous motoring time estimates between Rommel and the fleet anchorage have never taken into account the possibility of Axis regimental or brigade sized parachute attacks into the outskirts of the delta and would correspondingly need to be revised downwards
One senior Royal Navy officer in this exchange shouted at general Smith "I will move my red line up your arse, Rommel is not getting to the fleet or the in tact harbor, I will have London approve rapier the second he reaches Matruh!" I was removed from the room as this happened
Royal Navy Staff officers are vastly more pessimistic about vigorous and julius and are forming a concensus to cancel or postpone them
Royal Navy Staff officers advise that Rommel's ability to locate the proposed convoys by air is greatly improved by his access to forward air fields and that the displacement of his attached submarine force makes it more likely the convoy could face difficult engagement profiles for it's entire journey
Royal Navy Staff officers privately advise that they think Rommel has spies in Alexandria and would meet vigorous with all available assets and could destroy the convoy
Royal Navy Staff officers advise they cannot afford to lose the escort ships currently proposed for operation vigorous
Royal Navy Staff officers are not at a consensus about Malta's fate but there are a sizeable number of officers who are saying that supply submarines are not viable to address the lack of food and fuel on the island; and that terms should be opened with the Italian government to take custody of the Island in the event of Rommel seizing the delta, to spare the civilian population mass starvation
Royal Navy staff officers privately advise that if Rommel can utilize Tobruk, the small frontier fishing ports and Egyptian ports that he will bypass Malta in his supply runs and leave it to rot as a defacto pow camp
Royal Navy staff officers advise they are using all means to transfer units from Auchinlek deep areas to Egypt, and move reinforcements from British homeland to Egypt, especially replacement tanks
Major Oswald advises British tank repair technicians are collapsing on their work benches from exhaustion; loss of divisional workshops and spares has wildly overtaxes army rear depot resources, he advises number of tanks are being repaired below GHQ middle case restoration estimates
Major Oswald advises remaining armor has to have it's command structure completely rebuilt from scratch as nearly all armored commanders in theater where killed or captured in Libya; this issue causes explosive problems in GHQ because staff officers disapprove of Smith's choices
Major Baxter advises that the axis have complete use of RAF gambut hard runways and have numerous transport flights coming in with fighter escorts, bringing up replacements/reinforcements to Rommel
GHQ staff officers privately advise that they need at least 14 days to build a defensive line at Matruh or Alemein and 30 days to integrate deep replacements onto the line
GHQ middle case estimate is that Rommel needs 25 days to resume his offensive; this is the fastest GHQ has ever assumed Rommel could rebound after a major attack, it is far too wishful in our opinion, Rommel has been British estimates on his speed of reorganization since the day he landed here
Our own staff feels that between his air delievered replacement troops and large scale capture of 8th army supply depots that there is little other than rest and deployment to stop the axis from resuming the attack much sooner
Major Hillaire advises that atmosphere in Cairo is permeated with the defeat of the 8th army, despite no official press releases being conducted
He advises that the army's destruction is discussed in market places, clubs and bars; as is Rommel's presumed arrival in Egypt
Most disturbing, an Egyptian army source of Major Hillaire advised there are German and Arab spies whom are in contact with disaffected members of the Egyptian army
The source also started asking major Hillaire if there was a planned demolition of the delta about to occur
It is our opinion that some details or flavor of the discussion of operation rapier is leaking out of GHQ, if that becomes widely diseminated, this could bring about devastating consequences for the British army in Egypt; even if the Egyptian army refused to stop doing manual labors, this would have drastic consequences on the battlefield; we can't even imagine if they had to contend with a full blown rebellion and Rommel simultaneously; as of now we are concerned about the mental states of General Smith and Auchinlek to disclose this to them, if they know of such a problem via their own sources they haven't told us
Auchinlek has many fires and few buckets of water and has once again been on duty 66 out of the last 70 hours, his lack of decision regarding a defensive plan, due to repeated moving of goal posts by all subordinate commands, and Smith's agitating for a great thrust from the south is wasting precious time to recover from their defeat

end transmission
 
14.1 operation salaam

cardcarrier

Banned
Chapter 14.1

6-06-42 23:59 hrs Tobruk Libya Panzer Army Africa Command Post Field Marshal Erwin Rommel Commander, Oberst Westphal Chief of PAA operations, Major Albert Seebohme Commander 621st Radio radio intercept company

Rommel had reveled in the chance to practice his secondary school English on the higher level prisoners, who were often surprised when he would engage them in their language; so many general and staff officers had been captured that the Abwehr, and SS security services where sending additional english speaking specialists to Tripoli and Bengahzi to relieve some of the burden on the DAK and MAS interrogation teams

Westphal had completed the tabulation of the prisoner count at just around 84,000. Trucks and prime movers numbered in the many hundreds, as did cannons and other quality items left behind by the defeated British pockets

The great task of digesting the booty had fallen on the troops of the 164th and General Kleemans 90th light division. Kleeman was no quartermaster, no one in the DAK really was; but he was an industrious and thoughtful officer and the men below him where extraordinarily ambitious. Already his arab recruiters where prowling the streets of Tobruk, Arcoma and the many small fishing villages along the coastal road looking for fresh fighters to flesh out the ranks of the 90th light. The 90th light had always maintained this practice since it's birth, and the arabs had proven to be good soldiers under Kleemans leadership, with a penchent for skillful maneuvering in the desert

Kleeman and his chief of staff where everywhere mating the useful captured booty from the pockets to the British army main dumps at El Adem and Belhamed, to reinvigorate the panzer army's strength

It had been a very hard fight for Kleeman and the Panzer Army Africa, to produce their victory; Kleeman had avoided the worst of the fighting at the beginning but had lost valuable infantry cracking the defensive perimeter at Toburk; putting his losses for the battle at just under 40 percent. A small amount of wounded where trickling back, and members of the crete garrison where being directly put into the 90th light, along with the special "herkules" tank company, and his new arab levies. Kleeman had supervised their unloading in Tobruk, brought in today, under the highest security under courier order only, utilizing 12 special flat bottomed prams that had been intended for operation Herkules so as to not burden the harbor which was still some time from full operating capacity

Kleeman treated the Panzer IV G's like newborn babies watching them as they where painted with the insignia of the 90th light, and the crew members where shown the ropes of desert driving, range finding and command work. Those 12 tanks with their long barreled 75mm cannons where an entirely different battlefield mover than even the Panzer III series J specials the Panzer army had employed so well at Gazala. The Panzer IV G could routinely knock out a grant at 1000 meters, and could knock out the lessor British runners at even great ranges; it featured good on and off road performance and didn't weigh much more than the other medium tanks the DAK had been used to

Other tank German tank replacements would be nearly impossible to come by; as everything was being dedicated to the coiled fist for the planned case blue. The 6th panzer division's 11th panzer regiment had been almost entirely brought in and would be largely used to make good the losses of the 2 main tank divisions manpower. The Littorio division was similarly being melted into the heavily engaged Ariete and Trieste divisions; Littorio was a god send because they had been left out of the Gazala battle, their parceling out would put the XXI corps back to nearly full strength in men and equipment The DAK workshops where pushing themselves day and night to restore damaged and ditched runners; and perform the most critical service on the still running machines

The best estimate the division workshops and Kleeman could provide to Westphal was that the 15th panzer would be back to 8900 men and 82 tanks when the consolidation was completed, 21st panzer would be back at 6800 men and 73 tanks once they had sorted themselves out The Ariette and Trieste would have a little over 220 tanks and assault guns once their workshops cleared their backlogs and they absorbed the men andequipment of the Littorio

His more perplexing problem was the dozens of British tanks captured when rear areas had been over run, or abandoned without fuel in the desert after his mechanized infantry had cut the supply lines of the 8th army. Rommel, Kesselring and Bastico had seen quickly that the most intelligent use for them was the 10th special Italian tank regiment, whose crews where just beginning to disgorge at Gambut and Bengahzi. Bringing their Russian made BT-7 tanks; which they had trained so hard on, to Africa was not practical for a variety of reasons not the least of which was congestion in the ports and no existing supply system to support them even if confiscated from the enemy. The solution was to convert them to the best conditioned and most usable British tanks which was namely 19 new grant tanks and 30 other runners (Crusader and Matilda), this would take time, but it would give Rommel a nice tool down the road to make up for the difficulties replacing his own tanks; especially since depots and workshops had been captured in tact, the structure was there to keep these machines running for sometime once the crews would be come proficient on them

The luftwaffe and regia aeronautica where busy displacing further forward to establish air superiority at the frontier. Kesselring and his staff where pulling every threat, bribe and favor in their arsenal to rotate in fresher pilots from France, Greece/Balkans/Norway and the Italian mainland to give a breather to his exhausted tactical air crews. Kleemans platoons used British trucks and prime movers to relocate fuel food and water stock piles to the re-occupied bases. As well they moved a number of British anti aircraft guns to the port of Tobruk to try and increase it's security. Kesselring was arranging for AA gunner companies to be flown in from Romania and France to assist with this in parallel with his lift for the 10th special tank regiment

Kesselring had worked his optimism into Field Marshals Bastico and Cavallero and gotten the prized "Livorno assault and landing division" and the San Marco special Marine infantry regiment released as ear marked for the PAA; which where the main striking arms for Herkules. The Livorno had been put through extensive training and was probably the best line infantry division in the Italian Army, and San Marco was also a quality formation. Fuel stocks and Italian transport aircraft which had been held in reserve for Herkules would be released to transfer the Italian infantry as quickly as possible into the theater. Livornos battalions would be parceled out to make good the very heavy losses taken by the Brescia and Trento divisions, and the San Marco would be mated to British trucks and used as shock troops for the Trieste Division

Although time would be needed to integrate the units and trickle the wounded back to the lines, the Italian infantry would largely have their strength restored once the units could be deployed to the theater

Reading Fellers reports Rommel appreciated the man, he even procured a copy of Fellers book and came to respect him even further. Rommel thought that Fellers seemed like the smartest allied soldier in Egypt despite unknowingly dropping his reports directly into Rommel's mailbox. He promised himself should he ever get the chance to finish his memoirs and war history, that he would solicit Fellers to write the forward and consult with him on the allied side; no matter how much money he might want

Seebohme's people via Operation Salaam and pilfering Fellers mail, had communicated the broad strokes of Operation Rapier to their agent Von Eppler in Cairo.

Von Eppler was in a difficult situation mostly of his own doing, having rented a house boat in Cairo and used some contacts in a dance hall of his youth, he had been put in touch with Anwar Sadat of the Egyptian Free Officers movement. Utilizing his codes from the book Rebecca he had made contact with his handlers in the 621st. Eppler didn't especially care about Rommel's cause and was flamboyantly spending the money Rommels people had given him and probably attracting too much attention. However, when Ritchie was relieved general Smith had dialed back some of the ongoing security sweeps granting Eppler a brief reprieve. As much as he didn't exactly care about the German war cause, he was smart enough to take the threat of death seriously; which would be forthcoming if Rommel arrived in Cairo and he hadn't done something resembling his assignment for his handlers.

Anwar Sadat was the key as much as the heavy handedness of the British diplomatic and military mission to Egypt. British and Egyptian relations had been in an excellent position following the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, leading to the British-Egyptian treaty of 1936 which allowed the stationing of British military and security forces in the country to deter Italian aggression; however the British diplomatic and military leadership had taken it on themselves in February to launch the Abdeen Palace incident where King Farouk was bullied with military force into firing his prime minister and cabinet and replacing them with a more pro British government. This incident which was widely known about caused considerable discontent inside the Egyptian public and the Egyptian military, converting a number of people including Anwar Sadat and his free officers club into forces opposed to the British and sympathetic to the axis

News of Rommels major victory at Gazala spread quickly through the Egyptian army whom was performing many thankless but critical manual labor and delivery tasks for the British army which emboldened many sympathizers; but when Sadat and Eppler got the story of operation Rapier, a power keg was shaken up. Sadat was able to convince a sympathetic officer to recall his friend and the leader of their group Gamal Nasser back to Cairo from his current posting in Khartom, whilst Nasser was in transit Sadat collaborated with his friend Abdel Amer about carefully leaking rapier not only into some more senior commanders of the Egyptian Army but also to key civilian hands as well

Sadat had a small number of loyal confidants observe the activities of Royal Navy and British Army engineer squads in the delta and Alexandria itself compiling the proof of rapier and growing more and more shocked at what Auchinlek was preparing to do his country and his people. Nothing in the 1936 treaty gave the British the right to affect the lives of the citizens of Alexandria in this way Sadat and Amer thought, and so they where able to convince fence sitters to join them; plans where drawn up for a variety of options, but the key to all would be resistance to the British army performing rapier; even the tightest fence sitter would accept that action even if outright mutiny or other anti British activities where not in their hearts
 
The British still having problems.
I am sure the Americans will send their best men to help the British.
Like these guys.
91OQh3pBa5L.jpg
 

cardcarrier

Banned
"I bless the day you urged Fredendall upon me and cheerfully acknowledge that my earlier doubts of him were completely unfounded." - Eisenhower to Marshal 4 days after operation torch

his opinions after Fredendall's style of command was tested in battle at Kasserine changed... greatly
 
"I bless the day you urged Fredendall upon me and cheerfully acknowledge that my earlier doubts of him were completely unfounded." - Eisenhower to Marshal 4 days after operation torch

his opinions after Fredendall's style of command was tested in battle at Kasserine changed... greatly
Looks like the Americans are going to learn about modern mobile warfare the hard way.
The Afrika Korps will soon be dining on American C rations and drinking American coffee.
 
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