Second Chancellorsville at Mine Run?

[Douglas]

I'm far from familiar with the Mine Run campaign, but from a brief summary it seems as if Lee could have won a fairly substantial victory at Mine Run given a few rebel-leaning butterflies.

It seems like Meade planned to send 10,000 troops under Warren in an ill-advised frontal assault of the Confederate positions opposite them, and then follow it up with another attack. Lee apparently planned to hit the Federal left wing on the same day that Meade planned his assaults, but Meade canceled his attack and the campaign.

What if a significant engagement had taken place at Mine Run? What would be the worst case scenario for Meade's army in such a battle, and what effects would it have had in the near- to mid-term of the war? For the purposes of discussion, let near- to mid-term extend from Mine Run up until the beginning of the Overland Campaign, or, if Mine Run was disastrous enough for the Federals, up until the resumption of offensive operations by Grant when he takes command in the theater.

 

[Elfwine]

A pile of casualties and some dead officers he'd rather not lose for nothing.

Lee is suffering the same, however, unless he gets very lucky. I doubt the circumstances at Chancellorsville will be repeated, though. So its more the assault by Meade that will be too bloody for the gains. Meade is likely to recognize that its not working faster than a Lee or to a lesser extent Grant will, so it won't be too bad for the army on the whole.

Depending on how favorable the butterflies are you might get more, but I'm cautious about assuming these politically partial butterflies are able to radically change things based on the questions asked. Something more drastic has to happen than those attacks not be called off for them (the butterflies) to lead to anything disastrous for the Army of the Potomac.

So the consequences are likely to be relatively minimal in the big picture (depends on who dies or is incapacitated, obviously), though they'll show up in the next campaign.

 

[Douglas]

Well, let's get the situation clarified a little bit. I don't have access to the wide range of excellent sources that you Civil War buffs seem to have, but here's a description of the planned attack by Meade:

On the 28th of November, disposition was made to attack the Confederates. After a march of several miles, the Confederates were found to have established themselves in strong fortifications on the west bank of Mine Run. The Fifth Corps moved and took position at four o'clock A. M., the 29th, in a thick forest immediately in front of Mine Run and the enemy's works. The opposite bank of Mine Run at this point had an elevation of over one hundred feet, with a gentle smooth slope to the creek of over one thousand yards. General Meade, having received favorable reports from his engineers, decided to make three assaults on the enemy's works—one on their left with the Fifth and the Sixth Corps, one on the center with the First and the Third Corps, and one on the Confederate right with the other corps, all under command of General G. K. Warren. After an inspection of the Confederate position, General Meade concluded to abandon the center attack, and to reinforce Warren's column with two divisions of the Third Corps, giving him nearly half the infantry under Meade's command. Orders were accordingly issued. The battle was to be opened by the Union batteries on the left firing at eight o'clock A. M. on the 30th, this being a signal for General Warren to make the main attack; and at nine o'clock, General John Sedgwick was to assault with his column.

Promptly at eight o'clock on the morning of the 30th, the Union batteries opened, the skirmishers of the First and the Third Corps advanced across Mine Run, and drove in the Confederate skirmishers, and every preparation was made by General Sedgwick and others for the assault. Fifteen minutes rolled by, yet nothing was heard from General Warren. Three-quarters of an hour passed and still nothing was heard from Warren, and General Meade was fretting like a war-horse under curb. At ten minutes to nine o'clock a dispatch was received by General Meade from General Warren to the effect that the position and strength of the enemy in Warren's present front seemed so formidable that he advised against making an attack; that the full light of the sun showed him that he could not succeed. General Meade rode to General Warren's headquarters and, after inspecting the position of the enemy and concurring in the opinion of General Warren that it was hopeless to make an attack, reluctantly abandoned the assault: and, therefore, when night came, the Third, Fifth and Sixth Corps returned to their former positions. General Meade, after mature deliberation, finding by this inspection that the Confederates had been working all night to render the only weak point in their position as strong as any other on their line, decided to withdraw his army.

So, let's say that Warren makes his attack, which consisted of going up a gentle slope, crossing a stream, reforming, and then attacking the Confederate works. It fails with heavy casualties. Meade is thoroughly disappointed, and spends that day and the next trying to figure out what to do next. (Is this plausible?)

Then Lee executes his plan that he was going to undertake on December 2 in OTL either on December 2, if Meade waits two days, or, if it makes more sense, on December 1, the day after the failed assault.

...Lee issued orders for an advance the following morning. He instructed Hill to extend the Mine Run line further south and told him "to concentrate [Maj. Gen Richard H.] Anderson's and [Maj. Gen. Cadmus M.] Wilcox's divisions on my extreme right with a view to making the attack" on December 2. Lee's intention was that while the rest of the army continued to hold Meade in position, those two divisions and Stuart's cavalry would assail the Federal left and rear...

...the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac across the Rapidan, Lee understood, had denied him a chance (however slim, given the cautious nature of Meade's generalship) to create an opportunity for a victory on the battlefield...

So let's say that "slim chance" does occur; the frontal assault costs casualties (how many?) and then the planned December 2 attack on either December 1 or 2 goes splendidly (for the Rebels )and costs the Federals further casualties. What sort of range seems likely for this, and what effects does this have later on down the road?

EDIT: If disaster seems unlikely, which it does to me, just ensure that a clearly recognizable defeat takes place with significant US casualties and Rebel casualties as minimal as possible required to obtain said victory.

 

[Elfwine]

Well, let's get the situation clarified a little bit. I don't have access to the wide range of excellent sources that you Civil War buffs seem to have, but here's a description of the planned attack by Meade:

So, let's say that Warren makes his attack, which consisted of going up a gentle slope, crossing a stream, reforming, and then attacking the Confederate works. It fails with heavy casualties. Meade is thoroughly disappointed, and spends that day and the next trying to figure out what to do next. (Is this plausible?)

So far, yes.

Then Lee executes his plan that he was going to undertake on December 2 in OTL either on December 2, if Meade waits two days, or, if it makes more sense, on December 1, the day after the failed assault.


So let's say that "slim chance" does occur; the frontal assault costs casualties (how many?) and then the planned December 2 attack on either December 1 or 2 goes splendidly (for the Rebels )and costs the Federals further casualties. What sort of range seems likely for this, and what effects does this have later on down the road?

A lot depends on how exactly this plays out, but potentially (total) 15-25 thousand (or more) - total. Say a third to half the attackers for the assault.

So say 25,000 for the whole fiasco.

I wish I knew more on this, but for all the fact I have a decent Civil War library, this is an undercovered subject.

 

[Douglas]

So far, yes.

Ok, good.

A lot depends on how exactly this plays out, but potentially (total) 15-25 thousand (or more) - total. Say a third to half the attackers for the assault.

So say 25,000 for the whole fiasco.

I wish I knew more on this, but for all the fact I have a decent Civil War library, this is an undercovered subject.

I've noticed! Usually Google Books turns up a kazillion results, but Mine Run seems to be rather poorly covered.

But let's get a little more specific, just to clarify things. Let's assume that Warren's attack fares roughly as "well" as the assault on Marye's Heights, a vaguely analogous charge up a slope against a fortified position, with 8000 US casualties vs. 1000 Rebel casualties. Let's blindly push on with the analogies and suggest that Lee's attack on the US left/rear gives casualties similar to Jackson's attack at Chancellorsville on XI Corps on May 2 (~3000 US/1000 Rebel). As Meade withdraws on December 3 in the ATL, we get a final (over)analogy to Anderson and McLaws' attacks on II and XII Corps on May 3 (~5000 US/3000 Rebel) at Chancellorsville.

In sum, Meade gets back over the Rapidan after suffering 16,000 casualties compared to Lee's 5,000, a clear Confederate victory, even taking percentages into account; 81,000 Federals and 48,000 Rebels were present for the campaign. The units that suffer the worst are the II, III (Warren's assault) and VI Corps (Sedgwick's assault) on November 30, V and VI Corps semi-disintegrating due to the surprise December 2 attack, but reforming that evening, and, say, III Corps taking the brunt of the final assault, as the freshest Corps left to cover the withdrawal across the Rapidan on December 3.

Please pick any holes apart in this, but if it seems generally solid, let's discuss the ramifications.

EDIT: As the prose above is rather confusing, a day-by-day proposal.

November 30 [POD]: Warren's assault on the Confederate left goes through. A couple disastrous attempts later, Meade calls off the slaughter. Sedgwick goes ahead with a similar attack on the Confederate right, but quits while he's less behind.

December 1: Lull. Meade's trying to figure out what to do next, the Federals half-heartedly dig in at some points. Lee begins considering an attack, issues orders to Anderson and Wilcox to extend to the right, coordinate an attack with Stuart the following day.

December 2: The Confederate attack is delayed, coming in the late afternoon/evening. This is what saves the full disintegration of the US left, which reacts somewhat similarly to XI Corps at Chancellorsville. That night, Meade decides to withdraw. V and VI Corps reform and move north, away from the battleground of the afternoon, III Corps is now the Union left.

December 3: Renewed Rebel assault in the morning faces much tougher opposition than the previous day, III Corps takes heavy casualties but allows Meade to withdraw across the Rapidan. End of the battle.

 

[Elfwine]

Ok, good.



I've noticed! Usually Google Books turns up a kazillion results, but Mine Run seems to be rather poorly covered.

But let's get a little more specific, just to clarify things. Let's assume that Warren's attack fares roughly as "well" as the assault on Marye's Heights, a vaguely analogous charge up a slope against a fortified position, with 8000 US casualties vs. 1000 Rebel casualties. Let's blindly push on with the analogies and suggest that Lee's attack on the US left/rear gives casualties similar to Jackson's attack at Chancellorsville on XI Corps on May 2 (~3000 US/1000 Rebel). As Meade withdraws on December 3 in the ATL, we get a final (over)analogy to Anderson and McLaws' attacks on II and XII Corps on May 3 (~5000 US/3000 Rebel) at Chancellorsville.

In sum, Meade gets back over the Rapidan after suffering 16,000 casualties compared to Lee's 5,000, a clear Confederate victory, even taking percentages into account; 81,000 Federals and 48,000 Rebels were present for the campaign. The units that suffer the worst are the II, III (Warren's assault) and VI Corps (Sedgwick's assault) on November 30, V and VI Corps semi-disintegrating due to the surprise December 2 attack, but reforming that evening, and, say, III Corps taking the brunt of the final assault, as the freshest Corps left to cover the withdrawal across the Rapidan on December 3.

Please pick any holes apart in this, but if it seems generally solid, let's discuss the ramifications.

I think its solid enough to go on unless someone has more information to add. We are assuming a Confederate win here, so how hard that would be is another story - hard does not mean impossible.

First question on ramifications: What leaders are killed/captured/too wounded to continue serving? This applies to both sides.

 

[Douglas]

I think its solid enough to go on unless someone has more information to add. We are assuming a Confederate win here, so how hard that would be is another story - hard does not mean impossible.

First question on ramifications: What leaders are killed/captured/too wounded to continue serving? This applies to both sides.

I'm not in a place where I could accurately state any "lower-level" officers killed/wounded, but let's ride the analogy train further; at Marye's Heights, one of the Confederate brigadiers was killed, so let's take one of them down here on the Confederate left; I randomly drew BG Gordon to be mortally wounded.

On the second day of Chancellorsville, Howard braved Rebel fire and nearly got himself shot, so lets say that Sedgwick undertakes the same role and gets himself wounded, though he makes it back across the Rapidan. Flip of the coin says he's out of the war (amputee? no idea). Reversing the fates of the corps commander (Jackson) and the division commander (A. P. Hill) at Chancellorsville, Hill gets wounded while touring the front lines on the night of December 2-3 (but will be able to command again), while Anderson is mortally wounded in the renewed assault on December 3.

All other officers come out unscathed. Thoughts?

 

[Elfwine]

I'm not in a place where I could accurately state any "lower-level" officers killed/wounded, but let's ride the analogy train further; at Marye's Heights, one of the Confederate brigadiers was killed, so let's take one of them down here on the Confederate left; I randomly drew BG Gordon to be mortally wounded.

On the second day of Chancellorsville, Howard braved Rebel fire and nearly got himself shot, so lets say that Sedgwick undertakes the same role and gets himself wounded, though he makes it back across the Rapidan. Flip of the coin says he's out of the war (amputee? no idea). Reversing the fates of the corps commander (Jackson) and the division commander (A. P. Hill) at Chancellorsville, Hill gets wounded while touring the front lines on the night of December 2-3, while Anderson is mortally wounded in the renewed assault on December 3.

All other officers come out unscathed. Thoughts?

Seems reasonable. Probably more brigade and regiment level leaders fall, though.

Judging by its luck OTL, the Stonewall Division (Johnson's division, Ewell's Corps) will lose a brigadier or three, and possibly several colonels to give one example.

 

[Douglas]

Seems reasonable. Probably more brigade and regiment level leaders fall, though.

You're certainly right, but I don't know how many/which ones. You're welcome to take a look at the OOB and pick some for yourself at random.

Judging by its luck OTL, the Stonewall Division (Johnson's division, Ewell's Corps) will lose a brigadier or three, and possibly several colonels to give one example.

I'll be generous and have it lose a brigadier and two regimental commanders; BG Leroy Stafford and COL Funk and MAJ Terry.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I'm not entirely sure Lee would have gotten a Second Chancellorsville. Meade was better at executing his plans than Hooker was. If Meade bulls through with 81,000 troops against 41,000 when Lee's not expecting him that gets very, very dicey for the Confederacy. Lee'd more than likely get a tactical stalemate after which Meade *might* withdraw but even a tactical stalemate is more likely to embolden the Army of the Potomac than not.

Meade was not McClellan, Hooker, or Burnside to be Brobdignagian in plans and Lilliputtian in execution.

 

[67th Tigers]

I'm not entirely sure Lee would have gotten a Second Chancellorsville. Meade was better at executing his plans than Hooker was. If Meade bulls through with 81,000 troops against 41,000 when Lee's not expecting him that gets very, very dicey for the Confederacy. Lee'd more than likely get a tactical stalemate after which Meade *might* withdraw but even a tactical stalemate is more likely to embolden the Army of the Potomac than not.

Meade was not McClellan, Hooker, or Burnside to be Brobdignagian in plans and Lilliputtian in execution.

The numbers aren't quite that advantageous.

Lee has, in round figures 33,300 effective infantry, 7,000 effective cavalry and about 250 guns. Meade has about 35,000 effective infantry (5/6ths PFDE, using usual proportions of detachments to the trains), 6,500 effective cavalry and 286 guns.

You've committed the classic Lost Causer mistake of applying Lee's effectives against a higher Federal category (in this case aggregate present).

Hence the shadow boxing of the Bristoe and Mine Run movements. It was the most favourable ratio Lee got since the Seven Days.

 

[Douglas]

Well, 67th, what do you think would take place in the near-term aftermath of my postulated scenario?

 

[67th Tigers]

Well, 67th, what do you think would take place in the near-term aftermath of my postulated scenario?

Lee will follow up by moving north, much as he tried the month before. While he can't assault or besiege Washington he can cause a major panic and likely force the redeployment of forces from the west to protect Washington. Lee can at least get north enough to cut the B&O RR, which threatens the Federal position in the Shenandoah Valley and WV.

The Army of WVa can be counted on to send 10-15,000 men to reinforce the meagher Middle Dept (barely 6,000 PFD) and hope.

It is likely too late in the year for any further major movements. Lincoln will have to settle with Lee reoccupying the old Centreville position for the winter whilst he finds men and a General (Meade will be finished) to sort it out. Of course, he'll likely turn to Grant who will either take personal command of the forces at Washington or, more likely, send Sherman to do it.

 

[Douglas]

Any thoughts from anyone else?

 

[Elfwine]

I do want to note that 67th's numbers, as in every case I've seen by him, massively understate the Union army.

Unless it shrunk in half between October and the battles in question.

 

[67th Tigers]

I do want to note that 67th's numbers, as in every case I've seen by him, massively understate the Union army.

Unless it shrunk in half between October and the battles in question.

Which is strange, because they were taken from the OR with a fairly standard adjustment to account for the trains.

 

[Elfwine]

Well, given that you consistently treat the Army of the Potomac as smaller and weaker than it really was, it probably is a "standard adjustment" to cut it in half but consider Confederate numbers as reported in the OR to be at least equal to and at worst understating their actual force.

Oh we're claiming that the other half just magically disappeared?

5/6ths allowing for train guards is one thing, though something similar should be applied to Lee. Going from ~81,000 to ~41,000 is another thing entirely.

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=049/0598

How do you go from 81,714 officers and men to 42,000 effective infantry and 6,500 effective cavalry?

Not counting the train guard subtraction, since that's another story.

Note to the reader: Note the absence of anyone arguing that the aggregate present figure (94,151 in this case) reflects the Union army's fighting strength.

 

[67th Tigers]

Well, given that you consistently treat the Army of the Potomac as smaller and weaker than it really was, it probably is a "standard adjustment" to cut it in half but consider Confederate numbers as reported in the OR to be at least equal to and at worst understating their actual force.

Oh we're claiming that the other half just magically disappeared?

5/6ths allowing for train guards is one thing, though something similar should be applied to Lee. Going from ~81,000 to ~41,000 is another thing entirely.

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordView.cfm?Content=049/0598

How do you go from 81,714 officers and men to 42,000 effective infantry and 6,500 effective cavalry?

Not counting the train guard subtraction, since that's another story.

Note to the reader: Note the absence of anyone arguing that the aggregate present figure (94,151 in this case) reflects the Union army's fighting strength.

It's a strange one for anyone with no experience of the military. Remember, Grant claimed (probably correctly) that he had only 25,000 effectives at Shiloh.

Firstly you have to break down "Present for Duty" - a number that has different meanings for the Union and Confederate Army. In the Union Army it is literally "Aggregate Present - Number in Field Hospitals". It includes every non-combatant with the army. OTOH The Confederates reported a figure which is essentially "Present Under Arms" in the British way of reckoning, the non-combatants are outside of "for duty" and so are not reported as such. This is especially pertinent as their non-combatants are almost entirely African-American.

You should read this TOCWOC post.

In this case we have a return for the ANV, and if we step back a few weeks we have PFDE figures for the AoP.

The Army of the Potomac has ca. 58,000 infantry, equipped, from which the service troops must be drawn. Gunners don't pull their own wagons and the cavalry have separate organisations. Note that the difference between the Corps PFD and PFDE is 2% (1,251 enlisted men), which essentially accounts for the hospital staff and chaplains. Actual combat strength by those observing (notably Ezra Carman) were typically 60-80% of PFDE. 75% is typical. It can be lower. Sherman observed about half his PFD were not combatants in 1864.

In this case we also need to note the absence of 3rd Division, 1st Corps (and 1st Division, Cavalry Corps, but Reserve Bde has returned). The infantry thus have about 41,000 combatants going into Bristoe Station campaign, and the cavalry probably less than 5,900 combatants (that assumes only 25% detached to the rear, but cavalry is more logistics intense). They take casualties, both from combat and estrays in the Bristoe movements in the weeks before Mine Run and are reduced from this.

Whatever the numbers were (and the above is as good as we'll ever get) it is clear that the Confederates were never as badly outnumbered as some with have us believe. Indeed, investigations show that in regimental firefights they usually had the numerical advantage, and on average had more guns in action. That element of the Lost Cause myth dies hard though.

 

[Douglas]

Would Lee really pursue all the way to Centreville? He was planning to winter at Winchester before the Mine Run campaign; would he really want to race much further north in the middle of winter, even after a victory?

 

[Elfwine]

It's a strange one for anyone with no experience of the military. Remember, Grant claimed (probably correctly) that he had only 25,000 effectives at Shiloh.

Or with no interest in underestimating Union numbers. Where does he state he only had 25,000 effectives? Based on what reports? Is this on day 1 without Lew Wallace?

Firstly you have to break down "Present for Duty" - a number that has different meanings for the Union and Confederate Army. In the Union Army it is literally "Aggregate Present - Number in Field Hospitals". It includes every non-combatant with the army. OTOH The Confederates reported a figure which is essentially "Present Under Arms" in the British way of reckoning, the non-combatants are outside of "for duty" and so are not reported as such. This is especially pertinent as their non-combatants are almost entirely African-American.

You should read this TOCWOC post.

In this case we have a return for the ANV, and if we step back a few weeks we have PFDE figures for the AoP.

The Army of the Potomac has ca. 58,000 infantry, equipped, from which the service troops must be drawn. Gunners don't pull their own wagons and the cavalry have separate organisations. Note that the difference between the Corps PFD and PFDE is 2% (1,251 enlisted men), which essentially accounts for the hospital staff and chaplains. Actual combat strength by those observing (notably Ezra Carman) were typically 60-80% of PFDE. 75% is typical. It can be lower. Sherman observed about half his PFD were not combatants in 1864.

That post does not support your idea that PFD means what you say it does.

"3. Present for Duty (PFD): all the officers and men of a unit who marched into combat, and therefore did include a number of noncombatants, such as stretcher-bearers, musicians, and couriers Newton says this category “most consistently attempted to record the number of men actually ready to participate in battle.” He calls PFD (and I bold part of this for reasons that will soon become clear) “the best consistent standard by which to measure the relative strengths of the opposing armies.”" That's not "aggregate present minus sick". This is not "different for the two armies" however the Confederates used effectives to relate to fighting strength vs. the Union not using such.



Now, that the ~81,000 reflects that only about 75% are actually capable of being put on the battle line, if the figures are accurate, but it does not mean that the resulting ~60,000 are the available troops - though it does not specify where the others are. As for gunners (by which I assume you mean the men in an artillery battery all totalled) not pulling their own wagons: This is from what?

In this case we also need to note the absence of 3rd Division, 1st Corps (and 1st Division, Cavalry Corps, but Reserve Bde has returned). The infantry thus have about 41,000 combatants going into Bristoe Station campaign, and the cavalry probably less than 5,900 combatants (that assumes only 25% detached to the rear, but cavalry is more logistics intense). They take casualties, both from combat and estrays in the Bristoe movements in the weeks before Mine Run and are reduced from this.

How you go from one detached division of less than five thousand men (for either cavalry or infantry) to those figures is a form of mathematics that seems most practiced by the My Favorite General Was Outnumbered a Zillion to One crowd, whether they're pro-McClellan or pro-Lee.

It also ought to be questioned how accurate a return from a month and a half earlier is at determining the number of men Lee will be facing.

Whatever the numbers were (and the above is as good as we'll ever get) it is clear that the Confederates were never as badly outnumbered as some with have us believe. Indeed, investigations show that in regimental firefights they usually had the numerical advantage, and on average had more guns in action. That element of the Lost Cause myth dies hard though.

The fact that the Lost Cause historians were willing to make stuff up does not mean that the Confederates were not outnumbered, and comparing Confederate regiments to Union regiments - given the difference in recruiting practices for keeping regiments up to strength - is not a good sign of whether Lee has parity with Meade or McClellan or Hooker or whoever.