Sealion Naval Forces Mk II

Which doesn't invalidate what hipper said at all.

No, but it does invalidate the thesis that only lighter weapons were used against the transports - the 6" cruisers had to expend something like 1,900 rounds to fire 60% of their ammunition, and Lupo could not have absorbed anything near that total.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
No, but it does invalidate the thesis that only lighter weapons were used against the transports - the 6" cruisers had to expend something like 1,900 rounds to fire 60% of their ammunition, and Lupo could not have absorbed anything near that total.

Well, if we divide through by the known Lupo dud rate, then that means there were approx. 320 live rounds fired.
 
the quote regarding ammunition expenditure is quite specific - it referred to AA ammo expended

The article stated that Dido expended 22% of its ammunition before 0930 and 70% by the next morning. It did not state how much of the remaining 48% was fired for anti-aircraft, and how much was fired in surface combat.

6" guns were not Anti aircraft Guns therefore the ammo expended was not 6" ammunition

The article did not state that. It stated that after the convoy battle, the 6" cruisers had expended 60% of their ammunition and the Dido had expended 70%.

That night convoy battles could eat up ammunition is also suggested by the actions of Force C when it contacted the second Axis convoy; King decided not to attack due to fears of exhausting AA ammunition supply.
 
Some more interesting info ... at least I think it is. It tends to suggest that in the Med theatre at least the RN was conducting a war based on preservation of forces and that the high rates of ammunition expenditure might have something to do with British caution as much as anything else.

http://rommelsriposte.com/2008/07/16/some-italian-navy-reports/

Interesting link,

As was already told, an Arethusa class cruiser was hit once or twice by Lupo. Previously, this same cruiser had already been hit by Cassiopea shortly before. In total 304 rounds of 100/47 [main armament of the torpedo boats] were expended: 116 by Lupo and 188 by Cassiopea.

1-2 hits for 304 rounds fired.

The tactical conduct of combat by the English was in my view based on not running risks. Instead of aiming for the complete destruction of the enemy forces, which would not have been difficult to achieve given the great disparity in forces and the measurable distance in speed, they contented themselves with only sinking the steamers in the care of the Destroyer Escorts, in a way that could not cause significant damage to their own units

That is the tactics that I've theorized the RN would have used against Sealion, and are the tactics that are evident from the northern battles; maximizing destructrion while minimizing damage received in return.

The fire of the English was as always heavy, but I can not say I was favourably impressed by the precision and the speed. It must of course be said that a Destroyer Escort taking high-speed evasive actions is anything but a simple target.

This is saying naval gun fire was often more like a fire hose, applied en mass, rather than a scalpel. Keep in mind it's late 1941 and he's referring to radar directed gunfire, not its considerably less accurate optically guided cousin.
 
Well, if we divide through by the known Lupo dud rate, then that means there were approx. 320 live rounds fired.

Why the Lupo was hit by that many non-detonating shells could be duds, could also be improper fusing, could be failure of the striking surface to set off the fuze.
 
Why the Lupo was hit by that many non-detonating shells could be duds, could also be improper fusing, could be failure of the striking surface to set off the fuze.
If I had to put my money on one of those three options it would be the last one to be honest.
 
That night convoy battles could eat up ammunition is also suggested by the actions of Force C when it contacted the second Axis convoy; King decided not to attack due to fears of exhausting AA ammunition supply.
That will be less of an issue here, first because of the RAF, and secondly because the RN will be mixing it up with the convoy, reducing their ability to attack without risking significant collateral damage. In addition, it's not just Fighter Command you have to worry about, but also Bomber Command, Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm. Training Command (mostly Tiger Moths fitted with 8 * 20lb bombs) was going to be held back to repel actual landings.
 

hipper

Banned
Originally Posted by hipper
the quote regarding ammunition expenditure is quite specific - it referred to AA ammo expended


The article stated that Dido expended 22% of its ammunition before 0930 and 70% by the next morning. It did not state how much of the remaining 48% was fired for anti-aircraft, and how much was fired in surface combat.

Originally Posted by hipper
6" guns were not Anti aircraft Guns therefore the ammo expended was not 6" ammunition

The article did not state that. It stated that after the convoy battle, the 6" cruisers had expended 60% of their ammunition and the Dido had expended 70%.

That night convoy battles could eat up ammunition is also suggested by the actions of Force C when it contacted the second Axis convoy; King decided not to attack due to fears of exhausting AA ammunition supply.

You are being quite disingenuous here Glen

the London gazette article of may 21st 1948 clearly states

"DIDO had expended 70 per cent, of her A.A. ammunition (22 per cent, having been used up (between 0600 and 0930 on the 2ist May). ORION had expended 62 per cent, and AJAX 58 per cent. R.A.D. felt that his force might well find itself unable -to deal with the further expected scale of air attack."

and continues

"in view of the serious shortage of A.A. ammunition he was joining Force A."

in reply to the signal the CICM (Cunningham not King )

"On receipt of R.A.D.'s 0405 of 22iid May, reporting the A.A. ammunition shortage, the Commander-'in-Chief, Mediterranean, ordered Force D to return to Alexandria with all despatch"


IMHO Its quite clear that the Anti aircraft ammunition remaining was the subject of the Signals you seem to differ, I'm curious why.

I'm also curious if you think That the RN regarded the the 6" naval gun an anti aircraft gun.

regards

Hipper
 
Its quite clear that the Anti aircraft ammunition remaining was the subject of the Signals you seem to differ, I'm curious why.

The fact that any ammunition was expended in aerial combat invalidates the reference for ammunition expenses in naval combat, because we simply don't know which was which. (The enormous ammunition expenses off Crete will require checking of ammunition stocks in each British port, if this information is even available).


You indicated that the context of the discussion was AA ammunition, which is correct, but the decision to withdraw due to shortage of ammunition was takenafter the convoy battle, not after the air attacks the proceeding day. Force C's ammunition expenses in aerial combat had been so heavy that it could not afford to even engage in surface combat.

I think this suggests that ammunition expense in surface combat had either been heavy, (Force D) or anticipated to be heavy (Force C). Otherwise Force D would have withdrawn before the convoy battle, and Force C would have attacked the 2nd Convoy without fear of depleting its stocks.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The fact that any ammunition was expended in aerial combat invalidates the reference for ammunition expenses in naval combat, because we simply don't know which was which. (The enormous ammunition expenses off Crete will require checking of ammunition stocks in each British port, if this information is even available).


You indicated that the context of the discussion was AA ammunition, which is correct, but the decision to withdraw due to shortage of ammunition was takenafter the convoy battle, not after the air attacks the proceeding day. Force C's ammunition expenses in aerial combat had been so heavy that it could not afford to even engage in surface combat.

I think this suggests that ammunition expense in surface combat had either been heavy, (Force D) or anticipated to be heavy (Force C). Otherwise Force D would have withdrawn before the convoy battle, and Force C would have attacked the 2nd Convoy without fear of depleting its stocks.

I don't see any reason why they wouldn't withdraw because they had increasingly good reason to think further air attacks were coming in. Low AA ammunition (say, good for three-four hours of expected occasional combat) isn't a problem at dusk, but certainly is a problem at dawn - or if the attacks are heavier than anticipated, in which case there's only an hour or two to withdraw.
So low AA ammo doesn't have to immediately cause a withdrawal.
 

hipper

Banned
The fact that any ammunition was expended in aerial combat invalidates the reference for ammunition expenses in naval combat, because we simply don't know which was which. (The enormous ammunition expenses off Crete will require checking of ammunition stocks in each British port, if this information is even available).


You indicated that the context of the discussion was AA ammunition, which is correct, but the decision to withdraw due to shortage of ammunition was takenafter the convoy battle, not after the air attacks the proceeding day. Force C's ammunition expenses in aerial combat had been so heavy that it could not afford to even engage in surface combat.

I think this suggests that ammunition expense in surface combat had either been heavy, (Force D) or anticipated to be heavy (Force C). Otherwise Force D would have withdrawn before the convoy battle, and Force C would have attacked the 2nd Convoy without fear of depleting its stocks.

Hi Glen the situation is not complex


There are three signals between Rear Admiral Destroyers and the CICM

All specifically mention AA ammunition not "Ammunition" as you carefully put it
Only DIDO had dual purpose guns she had also used 10 % more ammunition than AJax and Orion which had 6" guns not suitable as AA guns AND 4" AA guns.

I think that for AJAX and ORION the 58% and 62% of AA ammunition expended refers to 4" ammunition.

The simplest conclusion is that all the signals are talking about AA ammunition, thus we cannot use the data we have to see how much ammo was used in the night attack.

If we were going to make assumptions one might be to note the greater ammo expenditure of Dido 70% vs approx 60% in AJAX and ORION to conclude that the ships used about 10% of their ammo in the convoy battle.

Other possibilities exist this one has some support from the gazette article

regards

hipper
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I think this suggests that ammunition expense in surface combat had either been heavy, (Force D) or anticipated to be heavy (Force C). Otherwise Force D would have withdrawn before the convoy battle, and Force C would have attacked the 2nd Convoy without fear of depleting its stocks.

I'm sorry, I just happened to find this:
This statement is factually incorrect and was made without any evidence - history by excel spreadsheet.

in another thread, and I thought "that's rich!"
 
I think that for AJAX and ORION the 58% and 62% of AA ammunition expended refers to 4" ammunition.

Yes, I understood your point when you first made it. The problem is that it doesn't actually say that and it doesn't explain why Force D aborted after the convoy battle and not before it, or why Force C didn't attack its convoy. (If surface battles were so easy on the ammo, then Force C attacks, right?)
 
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