Screaming Eagles in Arnhem

[gtrof]

Almost done re-reading A Bridge Too Far. Anyway been wondering what would have happened if an American airborne division (82nd or 101st) had been dropped into Arnhem. Obiviously this is a little ASB as Monty wouldn't have let the Americans have the 'honnor' of taking the bridge over the Rhine.

But would having a U.S. commander and division on the ground be better equiped to deal with the situation in Arnhem. Since the Brits had major commincation issues, would the Americans be able to move faster and grab the bridge quicker? Plus could they hold longer or better than the British 1st Airborne for the 30th Corps to link up?

Or does the American division get wiped out by the II SS Panzer Corps, because of the fawls in the Market-Garden Plan?

 

[stalkere]

Just off the top of my head, this seems like a "60-40 split the difference"
A lot of the comm issues the Brits had seemed to have counterparts in the US Airborne forces.
I dunno - despite an American-centric bias, cold logic tells me that the 101st would have probably fared just as badly against the Germans in Arnhem. The overall plan seems flawed, and the few advantages - better base of fire with the Garand, slightly better radios, just doesn't seem to add up to a decisive win.
A Brit Centric bias might have the 30th clearing their area faster, letting the tanks proceed faster -- but I just can't call it.

 

[rcmcciii]

I agree with Stalkere. Despite being Airborne and serving in US 82d before and during Viet Nam, if the Arnhem's drop zones were the same, I believe the result would be the same.

The affect on US/UK relations would be very severe. The US troops would not trust UK troops to serve next to themselves. My father was a US pilot shot down and captured in Germany. The Luftwaffe manned the POW Camps to ensure that they were treated properly and thus protect their men in Allied POW Camps. The Falschirmjaegers were Luftwaffe, so Allied Airborne were in the same camps. There was very bad blood between the Polish prisoners and UK prisoners because the Poles believed the UK forces were to slow to support the troops in Arnhem. This would have been worse if US troops were in Arnhem.

After Normandy the US doctrine was changed to direct drop on the objective. The units were allowed to choose their own drop zones. The UK division commander had no airborne experience. He had to drop in a glider because he did not have even one practice drop. He chose a remote drop zone, despite US advice in order to drop the whole division together for safety. Once 1st AB was on the ground they took forever to get organized and moved slow just like XXX Corps did. Thus getting only one battalion on the objective.

When with the 82d AB Div I was told more than once by WWII veterans that the US attitude was don't drop the Airborne unless the objective was worth 50 percent casualties. After all there were going to be chute malfunctions and crashed gliders anyway. Would anyone want to discuss the what ifs of different drop zones?

Robert

 

[Readman]

Good point, rcm, IIRC one major problem (aside from (a) Monty's arrogance and (b) Poor/faulty Intel..) was that the 1st Airborne had to essentially march 5-10 km (?) from the LZ in Oosterbeck (sp) to the bridges at Arnhem. that easily lost them the element of surprise essential to airborne ops. However, M-G as an operation on the whole was based entirely on assumptions ("kids and old men, minimal armor support") that proved the axiom of "assume and you make an ASS out of U and ME" IMHO.

Of course all of this is, as always with the benefit of hindsight.

 

[Lazzars]

as has already been said the problem with the operation was less with the men on the ground and more with the overall plan of attack, remote drop zones caused unnecessary delay in trying to take the bridge. maybe an american division being dropped would have called for a more bold strategy and maybe a more direct drop zone.

however i believe at the time they assumed that by dropping behind lines they could bypass the really dangerous obstacles and take the bridges with little or no opposition. the presence of SS reserves was unknown and must have come as a surprise. so maybe american planners would have chosen a similar plan to avoid any casualties due to triple A around the towns.

 

[Magniac]

In 'Armageddon' Max Hastings details how James Gavin thought he could have taken the bridge by dropping the parachutists of his division on the very centre of Arnhem, casualties be damned.
Anyway, Hastings has endless admiration for the 82nd's ruthless commander, not to mention the toughness of the entire U.S. airborne corp, while at the same time he's quite harsh about the Red Devils' abilities (or lack thereof) after Normandy despite having himself been a British territorial paratrooper in the sixties.
Another option for a successful operation on the lower Rhine is raised in Stephen Ambrose's 'Pegasus Bridge'. Apparently Major John Howard of the Ox and Bucks thought his specially-trained independent glider infantry/airlanding company might have been able to pull-off a coup de main and seize the bridge at Arnhem, as they had at two bridges on D-Day.
FWIW I think the whole campaign was only ever going to work if Jerry was still falling back in relative chaos, able to mount nothing more than rearguard actions, not the pretty coherent defence they put up in Holland and on the West Wall.

 

[Fearless Leader]

A Bridge Too Far is one of my favorite books by far and most of my knowledge of Market Garden is based off that. That being said going to school full time hasn't given me much time to re-read it lately.

As for my thoughts on the subject. My opinion is that if the Americans had used the same drop-zones as the British the result would have been basically the same. However these were not the only drop-zones available. In fact there was one drop zone just south of the bridge that was ruled out early on due to it not being able to support gliders (the field was too soft). Also I believe there was also a ferry nearby that was missed by the initial planners of MG if the Americans notice that they'd be able to land their heavy equippment closer to the actual combat zone and bring it into action around the bridge earlier and more effectively than the British. Couple that with a purely infantry force being landed at the LZ south of the Bridge itself and you have a paratrooper group in a much better position than the British were. It would still be hell but they'd have a much better chance at holding out considerably longer.

But that all assumes that they choose closer drop zones...

 

[PMN1]

What's forgotten by a lot of people is (in the words of Robin Niellands)

'The Guards Armoured Division were not ready to advance up the road to Arnhem on the evening of D plus 3 because for the past two days they had been scattered all over Nijmegan and the south bank of the Waal, an area of some twenty five square miles, assisting the 82nd Airborne Division carry out a task General Gavin (and Browning) had neglected to complete on D-Day.'


Gavin complained about the British being late into Nijnmeigan but doesn't seem to want to say much on the 36 hour delay caused by the failiure to take Nijmeigan Bridge.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=64599&highlight=Gavin

 

[Shimbo]

(snip) Obiviously this is a little ASB as Monty wouldn't have let the Americans have the 'honnor' of taking the bridge over the Rhine.
(snip)

I(snip)

The affect on US/UK relations would be very severe. (snip)
Robert

First, actually the idea that the British got the 'honour' of Arnhem is not correct. The original plan was for the US to land in Arnhem. It was changed because the political danger of US troops being 'let down' by British was recognised.

Second, on whose 'fault' it was that the operation failed, the British XXX Corps were only 24 hours behind schedule when they got to Nijmeggan. The battle was won and lost there by the failure to secure the bridge. Not that I'm saying it was the 82nd Airborne's fault, they simply had too much to do as was recognised by the General Gavin before the battle when one of his subordinates said they had been allocated a 2 division task and he agreed.

Third, on the drop zones, I know in general close drops = good, but in the case of Arnhem, the SS were billeted right in the centre of Arnhem, so closer drop zones might not have helped, as the paratroopers would then have been landing right on top of their opposition, which would have been painful.

BTW, check out my alternate Market Garden plan which puts the US airborne divisions in Arnhem in this thread.

 

[burmafrd]

Market Garden would only have worked against a german army still disorganized and in chaos and still retreating. NONE of that happened in this battle. It is questionable even if all the bridges had been taken on schedule (and only a complete moron would EXPECT that) that the germans could not have mustered sufficient force to take them back anyway. BOttom line is that there were a lot more germans there then the British Intelligence wonks thought there was- and they IGNORED info from the Dutch Underground (who had proven very reliable in the past) that the germans were much stronger and better organized then the brits thought.If you want a real scandal you should read up on the disgraceful things that the Brits did to the Polish paratroop commander.

 

[Kevin Renner]

I admit I am working in the dark here but just how much close air support was tasked to M-G. Would suffient numbers of Typhoons and P-47s have made a big difference in suppressing German defensive positions and disrupting the German armoured columns advancing on Arnhem. But IMO M-Gs big flaw was its being tied to one main road for the British armour to advance up towards Arnhem

 

[Shimbo]

Market Garden would only have worked against a german army still disorganized and in chaos and still retreating. NONE of that happened in this battle. It is questionable even if all the bridges had been taken on schedule (and only a complete moron would EXPECT that) that the germans could not have mustered sufficient force to take them back anyway. BOttom line is that there were a lot more germans there then the British Intelligence wonks thought there was- and they IGNORED info from the Dutch Underground (who had proven very reliable in the past) that the germans were much stronger and better organized then the brits thought.If you want a real scandal you should read up on the disgraceful things that the Brits did to the Polish paratroop commander.

Your post is IMO correct except that the Dutch underground was ignored mainly because it had proven to be hopelessly penetrated by the Abwehr. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_North_Pole

I admit I am working in the dark here but just how much close air support was tasked to M-G. Would suffient numbers of Typhoons and P-47s have made a big difference in suppressing German defensive positions and disrupting the German armoured columns advancing on Arnhem. But IMO M-Gs big flaw was its being tied to one main road for the British armour to advance up towards Arnhem

Weather was a problem as far as air support was concerned IIRC it also stopped several of the reinforcement drops such as the Poles who were supposed to drop day 3 but didn't land till day 5.

And on the single road thing. It isn't always appreciated that the original plan called for the two corps left and right of XXX corps to advance too, but they didn't receive the supplies they needed. The reason for that was Patton (with Bradley turning a blind eye), defied his orders and kept going with his advance, meaning the supplies had to be diverted to him and units had to be diverted to fill the gap that had opened up between the armies.

 

[seraphim74]

Originally posted by Shimbo

Weather was a problem as far as air support was concerned IIRC it also stopped several of the reinforcement drops such as the Poles who were supposed to drop day 3 but didn't land till day 5.

I think another problem with air support was poor communication, especially in Arnhem - they couldn't even report that Germans occupied drop zones and supply drops fell in wrong hands.

 

[Shimbo]

Originally posted by Shimbo

I think another problem with air support was poor communication, especially in Arnhem - they couldn't even report that Germans occupied drop zones and supply drops fell in wrong hands.

According to the wikipedia article about the battle:

The only means of calling for close air support was through two special American units dropped with the 1st Airborne Division. These units were equipped with "Veeps": jeeps having Very High Frequency SCR-193 crystal sets. It was found impossible to communicate with aircraft on the higher of two frequencies allocated for this purpose, and the sets could not be tuned to the lower frequency. Despite efforts to re-tune them, the sets were soon destroyed by mortar fire, cutting the 1st Airborne's only possible link with RAF fighter-bombers. The pilots were under orders not to attack on their own initiative since from the air there was no easy way to distinguish friend from foe. Together with poor weather, this led to a critical lack of air support.

 

[M. A. Dickens]

From what I can remember, Monty totally ignored the intel gathered by Dutch Underground, which (I think) mentioned the presence of the two SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem. If he took that into consideration, would the result of Market Garden be any different?

 

[Michele]

From what I can remember, Monty totally ignored the intel gathered by Dutch Underground, which (I think) mentioned the presence of the two SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem. If he took that into consideration, would the result of Market Garden be any different?

I'm not so sure his HQ ruled out their presence. IIRC they thought they were cadres having little to no combat worthiness. But I'm not so sure, so I'd like to know your source for this.
Anyway if he accepted not only their presence but also that they were at a reasonably dangerous strength level, there would be one rather serious consequence: operation cancelled.

 

[M. A. Dickens]

I'm not so sure his HQ ruled out their presence. IIRC they thought they were cadres having little to no combat worthiness. But I'm not so sure, so I'd like to know your source for this.
Anyway if he accepted not only their presence but also that they were at a reasonably dangerous strength level, there would be one rather serious consequence: operation cancelled.

That came from "A Bridge Too Far" by Cornelius Ryan

Marc A

p.s. sorry for the super late reply

 

[Redbeard]

I appears like the allies consistently from 1943 underestimated German will and capability to resistance, and the Americans most so. So US airborne troops on Arnhem IMHO very well could have lead to an even worse allied failure, like if dropping the entire force right on the SS in Arnhem.

That it was Monty who initiated and planned Market Garden is interesting, as it as a bold and risky operation was out of context with Monty's reputation as a very cautious commander. But seen from how the situation appeared to the allies in autumn of 44 I think Market garden was the right thing to try, as you did not risk entire armies but had the potential of ending the war before christmas by a quick occupation of the Ruhr.

I think it shows that Monty could take risks when they appeared worth taking, just too bad that in this case it just appeared so. I even think that it was right not to press on more with XXXth Corps - that would seriously have risked just increasing the losses without increasing the gains. Through all of Monty's annoying arrogancy I think it shows that he after all had a restraint about not risking too much for his own glory.

Next MG confirmed what had previously been seen in other major airborne operations, that airborne operations were close to impossible against anything but disorganised opposition.

If MG shoudl have worked it would have been because the Germans, at least in Holland, weren't able to put up a determined fight (as the allies assumed). Changing airborne nationality or dropzones IMHO would not change the outcome.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[Markus]

What the others said:

-same DZ, no glider assault on the Nijmegen bridge: failure
-different DZ, no glider assault on the Nijmegen bridge: possible success
-different DZ, glider assault on the Nijmegen bridge: very likely success

 

[BlairWitch749]

none of this changes the fact that the operation was in the wrong place!

even if they broke through the ground on the far side and between the bridges can be easily flooded. the floods would hopelessly cut off spearheads.... montgomery's later offensive operation plunder at wesel was in the correct location.

major airborne operations in ww2 were always a disaster holland(although successful took tremendous casaulties and loss of aircraft) crete, normandy, market garden, sicily take your pick.

the two ss divisions that held up the airborne were just shells... good personel but zero equipment.

the best offensive plan possible in the fall of 1944 would have been for patton to bypass metz and swing north through luxembourg... there were so few troops on this front that patton wouldn't have come across any resistance till he hit the german border