Schnellbomber vs Heavy Bomber?

During WWII, the Germans generally focused their efforts on fast twin-engine bombers that would normally be called medium bombers. They generally tried to rely on speed for defense, but their maneuverability was also an important component to their survivability. The size and handling of these aircraft often made them effective as heavy or night fighters, interdictors and intruders, and anti-ship bombers.

In contrast, the Allies carried out strategic bombing using heavy bombers that emphasized defensive firepower and armor for survivability. Aircraft like the B-17 were easy to catch and shoot at, but they were difficult and dangerous to bring down. Heavy bombers had somewhat more limited utility outside the strategic bombing role, although the Allies' position made them useful as maritime patrol aircraft.

Which bomber doctrine proved itself more effective during the war? Would the Germans have been more effective in their air campaigns over Britain, the Mediterranean, or the Soviet Union with aircraft like the Fw 200 Condor rather than the OTL medium bombers? Would the Allied air offensive have been more effective focusing on light aircraft like the Mosquito rather than the big heavy bombers?
 

Ian_W

Banned
The problem with fast bombers is they have to be faster than fighters for them to work.

In the middle 1930s, this was true, as fast bombers were monoplanes and fighters were biplanes.

But then they started building monoplane fighters, including fast multi-engine monoplane fighters.

The bomber doctrine that worked, however, involved escort fighters to fight the enemy fighters while bombers did their thing.
 
The answer is that in WWII you need a mix of escorted long range heavy bombers, medium bombers and fast intruders for pin point attacks and fighter bombers for tactical strike and army co operation.
 

Deleted member 1487

During WWII, the Germans generally focused their efforts on fast twin-engine bombers that would normally be called medium bombers. They generally tried to rely on speed for defense, but their maneuverability was also an important component to their survivability. The size and handling of these aircraft often made them effective as heavy or night fighters, interdictors and intruders, and anti-ship bombers.
I can't agree with your take above. The He111 was not fast, it was slow and heavily armed for a medium bomber of the period. The Do17 was even worse, having been designed in 1934 and well past it's design end date. Only the Ju88 was technically a 'fast' bomber and that was only reaching significant numbers in service by the time of the battle of France, but required upgrades to make it stable in flight in time for the Battle of Britain, where it was a solid minority of bombers used in the campaign (less than 30% IIRC).
The problem for the Ju88 was that it wasn't really a fast bomber anymore, it's design was heavily compromised by the dive bombing modifications, the extra gunner added in the ventral gondola, and the external bomb racks that were added. It was just a faster, less well defended He111 rather than a fast bomber. So other than the name the Ju88 was no 'Schnell Bomber' like the Mosquito (which very much was a fast bomber, as it lack ANY defensive armament, had two crew, and a small payload that even required modified bombs to fit bigger stuff in the bomb bay, which they opted to do than in any way compromise the speed of the aircraft by external additions that would induce drag).

In contrast, the Allies carried out strategic bombing using heavy bombers that emphasized defensive firepower and armor for survivability. Aircraft like the B-17 were easy to catch and shoot at, but they were difficult and dangerous to bring down. Heavy bombers had somewhat more limited utility outside the strategic bombing role, although the Allies' position made them useful as maritime patrol aircraft.

Which bomber doctrine proved itself more effective during the war? Would the Germans have been more effective in their air campaigns over Britain, the Mediterranean, or the Soviet Union with aircraft like the Fw 200 Condor rather than the OTL medium bombers? Would the Allied air offensive have been more effective focusing on light aircraft like the Mosquito rather than the big heavy bombers?
The B17 was in a lot of ways a four engine He111 (the main German bomber until about 1942). The US heavily relied on the heavy bombers and for what they were called on to do that was exactly what was needed. They were quite a bit superior to German aircraft with the same philosophy.

The true fast bomber was the Mosquito, the only real one of the war (well other than the Ar-234). IMHO the Mosquito was the finest bomber of the war and what the Brits should have built en masse instead of the Lancaster. Of course the Brits were fighting a different air war, so they didn't need B17 or 29 style flying fortresses.

In terms of most effective, the US manufacturing system papered over any issues, because they simply could produce more than the enemy could shoot down. Quantity had a quality all it's own.

Any nation needed a mix of aircraft, so one type of bomber philosophy is a flawed concept to start with. You have to look at what sort of missions you will need to do and build aircraft around that. Things are skewed by the industrial disadvantage the Axis was at compared to the Allies, which was amplified by their messed up aircraft R&D system after 1936, which largely botched the vital 2nd generation designs that were needed from 1942 on and were supposed to enter service in 1942 and replace the pre-war models.

As to the question of the Mosquito IMHO very much yes, that bomber en masse was better than so many Lancasters, plus it would force the British not to waste time bombing cities from 1943 on, which was largely a costly error and probably extended the war 6-18 months vs. going after vital industrial targets.
 
Which bomber doctrine proved itself more effective during the war? Would the Germans have been more effective in their air campaigns over Britain, the Mediterranean, or the Soviet Union with aircraft like the Fw 200 Condor rather than the OTL medium bombers? Would the Allied air offensive have been more effective focusing on light aircraft like the Mosquito rather than the big heavy bombers?

From what I've read the Condor was very fragile, it probably would have been slaughtered by Spitfires and Hurricanes over the UK. What the Germans needed was a proper heavy bomber but I doubt they had the resources to build one while also building the Luftwaffe they needed to support Blitzkrieg.
 

Deleted member 94680

Just build something with four engines. Four separate engines. And if it’s bigger than a Stuka, don’t bother with dive bombing

That’s the problem with idiots who got their positions by being the best at arse licking being in charge of your airforce.
 
Proper heavy bombers need proper heavy bases.
Seethingairfield-16oct1945.png

RAF Seething 1945
 
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Deleted member 94680

Proper heavy bombers need proper heavy bases.

RAF Seething 1945

That was just a temporary base, built to "Standard A". No way the German economy could build "bomber county" and all the other things they needed.

All's that left now is half the main runway and the "SE" threshold of the secondary.
 
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Which bomber doctrine proved itself more effective during the war? Would the Germans have been more effective in their air campaigns over Britain, the Mediterranean, or the Soviet Union with aircraft like the Fw 200 Condor rather than the OTL medium bombers? Would the Allied air offensive have been more effective focusing on light aircraft like the Mosquito rather than the big heavy bombers?

Germany/LW entered the BoB with XYZ number of 2-engined bombers. We can consider the scenario where LW has half of that number of bombers, but all of them are 4-engined types. Nothing will change - LW lost there because of many other factors, like no long-range performer fighter, underestimating the RAF, not knowing the RAF & British abilities to wage a defensive air war, over-estimating their capacity, questionable choice of targets etc.
Fast bombers of ww2 cannot kill peer-enemy fighter force, that was done, in Allied case, by long-range fighters acting as hammer, and heavily armed & tough bombers acting as anvil, or a honey trap if you want. Mosquito never ventured into targets deep in Germany during the daylight.

As to the question of the Mosquito IMHO very much yes, that bomber en masse was better than so many Lancasters, plus it would force the British not to waste time bombing cities from 1943 on, which was largely a costly error and probably extended the war 6-18 months vs. going after vital industrial targets.

Mosquito was carrying 4x500 lbs = 2000lbs bombs before 1944. 'Non-special' Lancaster was carrying 8000 lb cookies, or whatever bomb load ranging between 7000 and 14000 lbs. Same with Halifax. A Mosquito force of 1942-43 was not just incapable of carrying actually useful bomb types, the RAF would've needed to have 3.5 to 7 Mosquitoes to equal the payload of a single Lancaster, along with 3.5 to 7 times as much pilots. We can recall that RAF BC slashed the number of pilots per heavy bomber from 2 to 1 in order to double the number of pilots needed to man all the new bombers they started receiving. The number of navigators also need to be much increased.

Unless the British don't change the doctrine, they will still be bombing cities. The ASB story by @Sbiper still has the 'AltHarris' trying to mass as much of Lancasters along with Mosquitoes.
 
Full coverage map RAF and USAAF
Basically only 2 countries could afford to mount a successful strategic bombing offensive, the two richest ones. Of the two, Britain was more important as it provided the real estate.

Britain spent £2.78 billion on the strategic air offensive. This amount represents around 10 percent of the £28.7 billion that the British government spent during World War II and 12.19 percent of the £22.8 billion Britain spent on defence. The £2.78 billion cost of Bomber Command’s campaign was also 5.57 percent of Britain’s total National Income for the entire war period.

Five aircraft, the Lancaster, Halifax, Wellington, Mosquito and Stirling, carried out 88.9 percent of all Bomber Command sorties. The cost of these aircraft alone was £613 million. The total cost of supplying Bomber Command with approximately 43,322 operational bomber aircraft during World War II was £1.3 billion, including a cost of £224
million for the value of factories and plant. The cost of £1.3 billion is conservative.

The 131 bomber stations that Britain built for Bomber Command were a fundamental part of the strategic air offensive, as fundamental in fact as the aircraft and the aircrew that flew from them. The total cost of the airfield-building programme, including the provision of buildings, was £247.3 million.

The total cost of providing Bomber Command with the 125,000 aircrew and 300,000 ground staff was approximately £646.87 million.

Figures from Britain 1939 – 1945: The Economic Cost of Strategic Bombing. By John Fahey (Doctoral thesis)
 

Garrison

Donor
The British experience suggests that both can be effective, so long as you have aircraft purpose built for the job. The Lancaster and the Mosquito were both well suited to their roles and both did impressive work, as Wiking suggested above the mistake the RAF made was shifting their focus from the industries of the Ruhr to the Battle of Berlin. The German problem was that they tried to create aircraft that were jack of all trades, so you wound up with bombers that had inadequate payloads for the strategic role and weren't fast enough to act as schnellbombers. I think this goes back to the Luftwaffe being designed primarily to provide CAS for the Heer, a role in which it excelled, but which left it il prepared for strategic bomber operations after 1940.
 
The British experience suggests that both can be effective, so long as you have aircraft purpose built for the job. The Lancaster and the Mosquito were both well suited to their roles and both did impressive work, as Wiking suggested above the mistake the RAF made was shifting their focus from the industries of the Ruhr to the Battle of Berlin. The German problem was that they tried to create aircraft that were jack of all trades, so you wound up with bombers that had inadequate payloads for the strategic role and weren't fast enough to act as schnellbombers.

The He 111 have had equal payload vs. distance vs. cruse speed when compared with Wellington or Hampden. Granted, the next-gen German bombers failed badly, bar the Do 217.

I think this goes back to the Luftwaffe being designed primarily to provide CAS for the Heer, a role in which it excelled, but which left it il prepared for strategic bomber operations after 1940.

The He 111, most numerous German bomber before 1941, was not a CAS aircraft.
 

Deleted member 1487

Mosquito was carrying 4x500 lbs = 2000lbs bombs before 1944. 'Non-special' Lancaster was carrying 8000 lb cookies, or whatever bomb load ranging between 7000 and 14000 lbs. Same with Halifax. A Mosquito force of 1942-43 was not just incapable of carrying actually useful bomb types, the RAF would've needed to have 3.5 to 7 Mosquitoes to equal the payload of a single Lancaster, along with 3.5 to 7 times as much pilots. We can recall that RAF BC slashed the number of pilots per heavy bomber from 2 to 1 in order to double the number of pilots needed to man all the new bombers they started receiving. The number of navigators also need to be much increased.

Unless the British don't change the doctrine, they will still be bombing cities. The ASB story by @Sbiper still has the 'AltHarris' trying to mass as much of Lancasters along with Mosquitoes.
Unless you're bombing cities Lancaster loads aren't necessary in most cases. They Lancaster should still be built, but used only for mission where their ability to take heavy bombs or large loads was more vital than accuracy.
 
Unless you're bombing cities Lancaster loads aren't necessary in most cases. They Lancaster should still be built, but used only for mission where their ability to take heavy bombs or large loads was more vital than accuracy.

If you want a big factory destroyed, including the machine tools, the big bombs are/were the weapon of choice. RAF wanted and got the Mosquito to carry 5000 lbs of bombs past 1943 (4000 lb cookie + 2x500 lbs).
 
Strategic bombing by far. Pinprick raids by twin engined aircraft with small bomb loads were axis specialties; the combined bomber offensive needed as much firepower as possible and only four engined bombers could provide it.
 

Deleted member 1487

If you want a big factory destroyed, including the machine tools, the big bombs are/were the weapon of choice. RAF wanted and got the Mosquito to carry 5000 lbs of bombs past 1943 (4000 lb cookie + 2x500 lbs).
Incendiaries are actually the weapon of choice to destroy industrial equipment, it just helps to have HE 'open up' the factory first:

Strategic bombing by far. Pinprick raids by twin engined aircraft with small bomb loads were axis specialties; the combined bomber offensive needed as much firepower as possible and only four engined bombers could provide it.
Of cities yes. Of factories no. Unescorted daylight raids required something like the B17 and B29, but they were incredibly wasteful of explosives even late in the war when bombing methods improved. Smaller bombers could have done the job at night thanks to all the electronic bombing aids developed by 1943.
 
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Deleted member 1487

I don't know, the He 177 and Me 264 were as good if not better than the B-17...the problem was finding the right engines though
In what ways though? The B17 was built to fly unescorted into contested air space. Neither the He177 nor Me264 were designed for that. They had defensive armament, but not as heavy as the B17. As a result they had heavier payloads and range, but were heavier, more expensive, and more complex too.
 
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