Sarah Knox Taylor doesn't die of Malaria in 1835 or the End of the American Republic
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Sounds good! If you busy like me it's hard to find time to finish and research timelines. I'm patient though.
The Hanover Campaign
General’s Wool’s Army of the Potomac found itself far from its namesake in late August, 1851. The Union army was quickly marching north to meet the ASA army, having already successfully prevented the fall of the state’s capital by scoring a minor victory over a smaller southern force, forcing Davis to withdraw south to face his opponent. His men were horrified by the carnage they saw; Franklin County, Adams County and York County had been looted and burned to a degree the United States hadn’t seen since the War of 1812 and much more of the southeastern part of Pennsylvania was deserted, civilians fleeing anywhere they could slowing Wool’s men to a crawl. Wool latter stated that the stripped farms looked like “if a soul had never inhabited the land, nor could ever inhabit it.”
The North’s army had improved remarkably since being forced out of Virginia three months before, a fact often overlooked by modern historians. Despite the army’s low morale things weren’t as grave as they’re often stated and the conclusion of the campaign was far from inevitable. General Wool, having learned valuable lessons on the battlefield, had shuffled around commanders and had qualified officers in charge of all of his four divisions and most of his brigades by the time he entered Pennsylvania. The Union army was adequately trained, a marked change from months before when the army had floundered from lack of competent drill instructors. President Taylor – who had a habit of micromanaging the military – had amassed a large number of munitions, - mainly absolute - muskets, rifles and a good deal of food all of which had been in short supply during the Virginia campaign and still hampered the South. The overall quality improvements of the army had been seen in their victories at the Battle of Emmitsburg and in several skirmishes (mainly the cavalry duels at Crossroads, Pennsylvania and Spring Grove, Pennsylvania both of which ended with Southern withdrawal after light casualties.)
Wool’s former Southern countrymen were in an different predicament. The Allies were of high spirits, with fresh – looted – supplies for one of the first times in two months, and were positive that after one last victory the North would no longer be able to continue the war. Despite this the Army of Northern Virginia only had a short window of time before supplies, and most likely morale, would start to dwindle. When Jackson’s and Davis’s commands reunited south of York on August 24th, Davis hoped that clogged roads would slow his opponents long enough for his army to reach the town of Gettysburg, a crucial crossroads in southern Pennsylvania, and fight a defensive battle that he would sure to win. Fortunately, Wool realized the importance of the crossroads and ordered a forward detachment of Union cavalry to meet-up with Adams County militia and take control of the roads, especially the hills around it. Wool also asked for the authority, which the governor quickly granted, for control of the state’s southern roads and the permission to use force to keep them clear. The extensive use of force freed the roads of refugees and Wool cut the distance between his and Davis’s position in half in three days. General Davis, surprised by Wool’s speed, rerouted the Army of Northern to Hanover, Pennsylvania in York County, another important crossroads, but not to the level as Gettysburg.
The Battle of Hanover is well documented in numerous texts so only a cursory view will be offered here (1). A cavalry unit of about 200 men under Major A. P. Hill reached Hanover on August 28th and drove off a small force of armed locals before withdrawing. The following day Colonel John B. Magruder’s brigade with some 2,000 men occupied the partially deserted town only hours before a similar number of Union cavalry under recently appointed Brigadier General Philip St. George Cooke. The first fighting between regular soldiers in this battle went badly for the US when Cooke ordered a cavalry attack on the Magruder’s partially entrenched men. Although Magruder’s men took heavy causalities –around 150 in a half-hour of fighting – Cooke’s men were devastated by close range gunfire suffering 350 casualties; with around half, as well as almost 500, horses being captured. Cooke retired west of the town and waited for the entirety of the Union army, but continued to harass the Southerners. By early morning August 30th Wool’s Army of the Potomac and Davis’s Army of Northern Virginia had reached the small town with more then 90,000 men, around 55,000 and 38,000 respectively, within three miles of Hanover.
By sunrise of the 30th Davis had positioned most of his men to either side of the town on a northeast-southwest axis roughly parallel to Frederick Street and Broadway as well as in Hanover itself with most of his men to the South of the town. Heavy woods anchored his right flank (which also sat on rolling hills) and Southern cavalry was placed to the far south to prevent a flanking movement around the open fields on his left. Wool concentrated most his men to the south of the town as well, but his distribution of men was more even (30,000 to the South and 15,000 to the North against Davis’s 25,000 to the South, 8,000 to the North and 2,000 to Hanover) and planned to try to break his opponent in the North and in the town itself. At noon Wool opened with an artillery bombardment south of the city as well as a brief spoiling attack and a feigned flanking movement to mask the main blow falling to the north. The initial attack on the Davis’s right did surprise the Southerners under Thomas Jackson, but the terrain favored defending and the Union attack fell back with heavy losses and an Allied counterattack was turned back only with the deployment of Wool’s reserves. General St. George Cooke, who had lead the feigned flanking movement on the Allied left, tried to exploit a gap about three miles south of Hanover near the farming village of Buttstown only to turned back by cavalry with the help of well placed sharpshooters. Sunset came and the first day of battle ended with firefighting still going on both to Northeast and Southwest of the town.
Wool casualties had been great for his minimal gains, about 3,000 dead and 9,000 casualties with Southern losses around a third of that number, but Wool’s Army could afford to loss that many men. Davis’s couldn’t. Wool refocused his attack the next day, August 31st, planning to renew an attack to the north of the town and advance on Hanover itself. At the same time Davis strengthened the town and weakened his left for a reserve. Fighting resumed at 10 o’clock with a simultaneous bombardment of both Davis’s right and center with the advance following soon after. Hanover had been heavily fortified by the Southerners with everything available including wagons, dirt, debris from building, especially stones and the natural cover offered by fences and buildings. The Army of the Potomac tried desperately to seize the town, to the point that artillery bombardment continued even as the Union men entered the town, but couldn’t gain more than a toehold. Wool poured in more men, but so did Davis. To the north Jackson’s men weren’t fairing as well as the day before and had been pushed back over Broadway but the area had already been surveyed and prepared extensively by Jackson and the line was held despite heavy casualties on both sides. By 1 o’clock it was obvious that Hanover wasn’t to be taken and the fighting died down as Davis withdrew soldiers and prepared for a push in the south.
By this point Davis knew want he most do to score a victory. He had planned for this from the beginning, but the battle wasn’t going as well as he had hoped and causalities had been heavy, especially on his right, but a minor victory or a draw here wouldn’t be acceptable. Davis had to gamble his army, his career and – in Davis’s mind – the South’s changes for victory on an attack in order to gain a major victory. Around 2 o’clock Davis ordered his left to advance with all of his reserves against Wool’s right which had been reduced in strength for the fighting in Hanover and on Davis’s right. Wool’s men, not expecting the South to attack, gave way at first slowly using the cover of artillery as protection and then quickly when Allied cavalry hit their flank and forced the abandonment or spiking of dozens of Union cannons. The Army of the Potomac withdrew from the town and from the battlefield to stave off total disaster, but it was likely that it would lead to disorganized retreat, if not rout. To Wool’s credit, or Davis’s generosity – possibly to ensure that the Union didn’t suffer a crushing defeat that might have galvanized the North – the Army of the Potomac maintained relative discipline and order for the couple of days immediately after the battle.
The total losses will never quite be known because of the confusion after the battle. Estimates for Northern losses range around 15-19,000 causalities, a full third of the army, including about 7,000 dead. Allied losses are widely believed to have been around 6,000 men. The defeat was far worse for the Union then the one at Stafford two months. At Stafford the Army of the Potomac had withdrawn in good order with very few cases of desertion and had been quite capable of strong rearguard actions, although not to full-fledged battle. The Battle of Hanover was quite different. General Wool lost most of his core regiments, his most talented officers became causalities – many which were daring and experienced soldiers, prime examples being; Colonels Robert Anderson and Christopher C. Augur, General Joseph K. Mansfield –and months of work in building a combat-ready army was gone as was Wool’s career. On September 5th, President Taylor ordered Wool removed from command and reassigned to Missouri with an eastward shift of qualified commanders with Colonel Grant promoted to Lt. General and reassigned to western Virginia and General Harney, having been relatively successfully in the western Virginia campaign, appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac with Winfield Scott assuming direct command of the Army of the Potomac until he arrived.
Kentucky Campaign
During these crucial events in the East, the West for the most part remained quite. The major exception was the Tennessee-Kentucky Campaign of August-September 1851. Lt. General Beauregard spent most of early August clearing Eastern Tennessee of Unionist holdouts in Appalachia and chasing Governor Campbell, hoping to capture him and assert the supremacy of Allied-installed Governor, Meredith P. Gentry. Campbell successfully evaded him and gathered a decent-sized force of Unionist Tennesseans; completing a successful rearguard action at Knoxville and managing to win minor delaying actions at Clinton and Kingston before reaching the end of the recently abandoned Wilderness Road at Kingsport on August 10th and quickly retreating into Kentucky.
Beauregard was given orders to march after Campbell and into the Bluegrass of Kentucky by the War Department, fulfilling Beauregard’s wishes to advance while he still had momentum. Tennesseans had been mustered to bolster the worn and weakened Army of Northern Alabama (renamed the Army of Tennessee on August 14th by Allied President Berrien.) Beauregard ignored orders to march over the Wilderness Trail, which he considered pointless, and rerouted his men to Nashville for an easer march over open terrain instead of the heavy woods and mountains of the fringe of Appalachia. In Nashville, some 5,000 Tennesseans had been mustered and trained in the six weeks since Beauregard entered the state bringing the Army of Tennessee’s to nearly 20,000 men, making it the biggest ASA force behind the Army of Northern Virginia. With demands for movement to hammer home the North’s defeat coming from Richmond, Beauregard advanced to Lexington, crossing into Kentucky at Allen County on August 27th.
Further north; Lt. General Ethan A. Hitchcock had been raising men in Unionist-leaning Louisville and had been steadily gaining reinforcements from Illinois, Ohio and even experienced soldiers from the Army of the Ohio fighting in Western Virginia. President Taylor – a born Virginian, but livelong resident of Kentucky – had assigned valuable resources to Kentucky after the Allied campaign in Tennessee and the Army of Kentucky had increased from under 1,500 men in Jun to 13,000 men by September 1 with 19,000 state militiamen throughout Kentucky including Campbell’s 8,000 veteran Tennessee men. After Hitchcock received word that Beauregard had entered Kentucky he marched South with his Army, despite the fact that most of his army was poorly trained or untrained. Campbell – operating under his official position as Brigadier General of Tennessee militia – and his men in Lexington moved south to delay Beauregard’s men and skirmished with the Allies in Lebanon, Kentucky on September 6th withdrawing from the field after the Allied forces became overwhelming and again in Danville, Kentucky on September 7th where General Campbell managed to capture 750 men of 8th Alabama Battalion, the first Battalion to enter Nashville, in a skillful cavalry-infantry encirclement.
General Hitchcock meant up with General Campbell’s men on September 11th just southwest of Lexington, Kentucky. Together their soldiers numbered a little less then 32,000 men, but Hitchcock proofed an inadequate commander and was outmaneuvered by Beauregard despite Campbell’s valiant efforts to force the Army of Tennessee to battle. Lexington fell to Beauregard on September 18th after a skillful double encirclement that almost saw 10,000 Union men being captured only saved be efforts by Major Orlando B. Willcox during the infamous Battle of Versailles. Hitchcock, determined not to let the state capital of Frankfort fall, heeded Campbell’s advice and organized a defense at the edge of the Bluegrass near Georgetown on September 20th. Beauregard’s right, commanded by Colonel Braxton Bragg, assigned to attack at 10 o’clock attacked at daybreak by mistake and was pushed back by the Union men with sizeable causalities and forgetting the element of surprise that the South possessed. Hitchcock ordered a general advance and Campbell’s division managed to turn the Allied right flank and the Army of Tennessee began to crumble, but Beauregard rallied his men by noon and managed to take back most of the lost ground by nightfall suffering heavy causalities. The Union suffered 8,000 causalities while the Allies suffered 4,000. It was a moderate sized battle that would have just been one in the Kentucky campaign if events in the east hadn’t taken their course. By September 21st Hitchcock still remained in position in Georgetown, but Beauregard withdrew back to Lexington because of the unsteadiness of his position and the lack of water in the area. It’s know from the letters of Beauregard, Campbell and Hitchcock that the two sides would have joined battle within days if not for the feeling that the war was already decided after the fall of Philadelphia which rendered continued bloodshed in Kentucky pointless.
(1) The best of these are the classic, but somewhat dated, “The Hills of York” by Thomas Anderson from the Southern perspective and “The Twilight of the Old Republic” by John Altman.
Hanover Campaign and the Fall of Philadelphia
Winfield Scott temporarily took over a severely battered army after the Battle of Hanover. The Army of the Potomac’s strength was down to anywhere from 40,000 to 35,000 and would have been much less if General Davis hadn’t showed restrain when following the army. After the battle Davis harassed the crumbling army as it withdrew to – or fled in the direction of – Central Maryland and managed to capture from 3,000 to 5,000 men. President Zachary Taylor, who had been following the army and had tried to supersede Wool on the battlefield, but was convinced not to, had been trying to rally Union soldiers after Hanover and was even briefly captured by South Carolina cavalry on September 2nd, but managed to escape(1). The situation was so dire when Wool was removed from his position on September 5th that Taylor commented to General Wool that “[he] would go done as the most reviled American army commander since [Benedict] Arnold” and Scott was recorded as saying “An army of brave rifles has been reduced to an army of vagabonds.”
Inexplicable and for reasons never explained on September 7th, when the Union Army was closest to disintegration, the Army of Northern Virginia stopped its pursuit of the Army of the Potomac just south of Westminster, Maryland. It has been suggested that Davis feared that Allied President Berrien would have him recalled because of his nearness to Virginia, that he didn’t want (or was afraid) to fight Winfield Scott in open battle (very unlikely given the state of the Union Army), that he believed the Army of the Ohio would manage to slip by the Army of Western Virginia and meet up with the Army of the Potomac for an epic battle that he couldn’t win, that he was trying not to antagonize the North by destroying an Union Army or that he just saw a better attack strategy to the north. In reality some combination of these most likely was the reason for his change of course. The Army of Northern Virginia changed direction by September 8th, had reentered Pennsylvania by September 13th and had occupied weakly defended Harrisburg after a minor battle (2nd Battle of Harrisburg) on September 17th and seized most of the state treasury before burning governmental buildings as it marched on Philadelphia.
To south – now Major – General Harney had taken command of the army from Winfield Scott and quickly withdrew nearly all 15,000 Federal soldiers stationed in Maryland, effectively ceding the state to the South, to bolster his forces as well desperately tried to get the Army of the Ohio to unite with his Army of the Potomac. General Grant was unable around the Johnston’s Army, suffering a minor defeat at Martinsburg, Virginia and lost heavily fortified Romney to a strong, but costly attack by the Allies. Harney marched north from Baltimore on September 15th hoping to meet fresh reinforcements of New England and New York soldiers soon to be disembarked in Wilmington, Delaware. Harney had managed to successfully bring up his forces to around 55,000 men, but he was weary of combat because of discipline problems and weak morale. Despite his misgivings he marched north into Pennsylvania to exert pressure on Davis.
On September 18th a patrol of Virginia militia crossed into Maryland near Georgetown after receiving word that Maryland militia had been given orders by previously Unionist-leaning Governor Enoch L. Lowe not to resist Southern troops if and when they entered Maryland. No opposition was confronted and the small group of around 50 men led by a Lieutenant James E. B. Stuart entered deserted Washington, DC and accepted the surrender of now Maryland-militia-controlled Fort Washington, the only fully-functioning fort in the town and then received the surrender of the Washington Arsenal. After sending word to Alexandria, Virginia that he had taken Washington without a fight the 2,000 men of the Army of Northern Virginia that had been left as a skeleton force in Alexandria crossed the Potomac to occupy the city on September 19th and within 5 days most of central Maryland, with the exception of Baltimore still had a small federal force, and the southern portion of the East Shore were occupied by Allied troops. On September 25th Governor Lowe in a joint statement with Allied Brigadier Colonel Felix Zollicoffer ordered the release of all citizens arrested for treason within the state – an order which was not enforced for some time in counties bordering Delaware or in west of the state, but was in Baltimore were Fort McHenry, which housed somewhere around three-fifths of Maryland’s prisoners held for treason, was emptied. On September 28th a rump of Maryland General Assembly – with voters in attendance who were not actually members of the Assembly such as John H. T. Jerome, the removed mayor of Baltimore, who just been released from prison – meant in special session in Allied-occupied Annapolis and voted nearly unanimously for a general election on secession when “hostilities had ended.”
As Maryland became the latest state to try to leave the United States, Jefferson Davis was inching toward Philadelphia. His supplies were becoming stretched and his men, despite a string of victories stretching back to Stafford, were becoming increasingly haggard from forced marching and foraging in the Pennsylvania countryside. By September 19th Davis was in Chester County, Pennsylvania, within miles of Philadelphia, but, just like when he almost seized Harrisburg before turning to fight Wool, the Army of Northern Virginia stopped their advance to face the reinforced Army of the Potomac. General Harney had supplemented his men with 18,000 reinforcements that had landed in Wilmington, Delaware since the overland routs had been cut of, bringing his army’s strength to over 70,000 against a force of less then half that number.
General Davis feared that he could not beat an army that was double his strength nor take Philadelphia because the Union Army would cut his supply lines and starve his men. In order to prevent this Davis desperately sent word to Maryland’s Governor Lowe for the state’s 20,000-strong militia to reinforce him as well as to Johnston’s 25,000 strong Army of Western Virginia to dispatch an entire division, some 7,000 soldiers under Brigadier General Longstreet, to him. The direness of his situation caused Davis’s requests to immediately be accepted and – in one of the most successful uses of railroads in warfare to that point – 7,000 soldiers from Romney, Virginia were sent to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania via the Cumberland Valley Railroad in an amazing six days reaching Harrisburg on September 28th. Further south, the recently organized Army of Maryland, numbering 13,000, (Davis didn’t take in to account Federalized and Unionist Maryland militia that refused to answer to Governor Lowe) took the Northern Central Railway and York and Cumberland Railroad to Harrisburg reaching there by September 25th were they were point under the command of Longstreet.
Harney, who had been moving slowly and deliberately towards Davis, was cut of guard by the movement of nearly 20,000 men to his west. The Army of the Potomac was pushed to act fast to face General Davis as he withdrew towards Harrisburg. Several low key battles – generally never above 3,000 men on either side, with the exception of Honey-Brook – between elements of Harney’s and Wool’s respective armies took place between September 24th and 29th at Spring City, Honey-Brook and Akron all of which were Allied victories besides Honey-Brook was a strategic victory for the Union (Harney managed to field some 7,000 men against an Allied force of less then 3,000), but neither side was capable of exploiting these victories. On September 29th Longstreet’s command marched out of Harrisburg and meant Davis’s men west of Elizabethtown after successfully avoiding several attempts to force him to battle.
The Battle of Elizabethtown began as much by accident as strategic planning by either Harney or Davis(2). General Harney didn’t realize that the two groups had united and were near Elizabethtown and Harney ordered previously Allied-controlled Elizabethtown liberated by a division of men lead by Brigadier General George G. Meade and to collect locals’ horses (many supply animals had been lost during the Hanover campaign) on September 30th. A Maryland brigade – ironically, one which months earlier had supported Wool’s command in Virginia – from Longstreet’s command had already entered the town to collect supplies as well. The two sides fought a running battle through the town as the Allied brigade withdrew north. Davis sent his recently united command south towards the sound of gunfire, confident in an easy victory with fresh scouting reports coming in that the balk of Harney’s Army was between Elizabethtown and Susquehanna River and preparing to encamp. Lt. General John B. Grayson Virginia Corps, under which Longstreet’s Marylanders and “Knife-Tip” Division and Jackson’s “Old Dominion” Division served, was to initiate the attack on the left, west of the town, as General Davis’s separate “Dixie” Corps, by far the most weary and worn-down portion of the army, attacked mainly east of the town with a division of Davis’ Crops backing Grayson. Union scouts quickly discovered the Army of Northern Virginia as it was deploying and Harney’s men formed up South of Elizabethtown, but in a chaotic fashion and with no clear plan of battle.
The Battle of Elizabethtown (The Battle of the Susquehanna in the South) opened with the Allied left pushing back a disorganized opponent, but Davis’s men on the right had come up against the strongest section (the fresh New York and New England regiments) of the army and was taking heavy causalities. In a sweeping action concentrated around the Dauphin-Lancaster county-borderline the Allies folded the Northern right and the disheartened Union soldiers were unable to be rallied as night came, but were still in good order and Harney withdrew east while the path was still open towards several hills and positioned his men for defense along the Donegal Heights. The second day of battle began slightly before sunup with Davis launching a massive, short-term – because of powder shortages – artillery bombardment on the center of the Union Army at the same time as Grayson’s Corps on the right attacked. Union artillery, which still had not recovered from Hanover, and Brigadier General George S. Greene’s division managed to turn back the attack, but with heavy causalities. At this point two brigades of cavalry under Colonel Wade Hampton III crossed the Susquehanna River over an unnoticed shallow spot to the rear of Harney’s army, but were spotted by a Union patrol and Harney removed some 6,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry from his reserves to repulse the attack. Davis heard the gunfire to the south and assumed that the Hampton’s men had reached the rear and Grayson’s Corps launched an attack on the Union right, trying to flank them as well, and Davis’s Corps attacked the center. The Allies were trying to drive the Union into the river by pining them against it. Harney’s right, weakened already, began to collapse as his men lost heart. Hampton managed to force the much larger Union force attacking him to retreat. The Army of the Potomac, already defeatist and feed up before the battle, disintegrated slowly, but steadily as day turned into night. Harney pulled back southeast by midnight, but his army was in total disarray and only portions of it could be saved.
The Battle of Elizabethtown was a massive defeat for the Union, worse then even Hanover, with over 26,000 killed, wounded or captured out of an Army of 75,000 and over 10,000 deserting or being captured over the couple of weeks. The biggest army the Union had ceased to exist as a fighting unit by October 15. Allied causalities were heavy as well, 12,000 causalities out of a force 55,000, but Davis had scored another impressive victory. Davis didn’t bother to follow the Army of the Potomac as it limped to Wilmington, Delaware to await reinforcements and try to rebuild, instead continuing on his march on Philadelphia which fall on October 13 without incident after Mayor Charles Gilpin declared it an open city. Davis was eating dinner in the Mayor’s house that night and in a whirlwind month the South had taken the second biggest city in the Union as well as the capitol.
(1)The events surrounding his escape are still little known. He was dressed as a civilian and wasn’t recognized as the US President and most likely was either released or escaped from a light guard.
(2)Again, this is only a cursory view; a brilliant and well-researched book is "Crimson Fields & the Bloody Heights" (1971) by Dr. Theodore Shelton is highly recommended for full details of this battle.
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Great!
*claps like a madman*
Really great! I bet the Union's fed up now. I wonder what's going to happen next!
*claps like a madman*
Really great! I bet the Union's fed up now. I wonder what's going to happen next!Quick note on ranks: anyone paying close attention will notice that the Union Generals ranks have gone done in the last two installments (a lot of Lt. Generals became Brigadier Generals). This is because I've my flawed view of Union Army ranks. I erroneously thought that a Brigade was commander of a Brigadier General while a Lt. General was lower then a Major General. It turns out that a Brigade, at this time in the US army, was usually commanded by a colonel and that the actually military hierarchy for Union generals is Brigadier, Major, Lieutenant and then full General (known in modern American usage as Four Star General.) I apologize for the mistake.
The Political Situation in October, 1851
When General Harney’s broken and demoralized army entered Wilmington, Delaware in mid-October the Union position seemed downright dire. Philadelphia was under Allied occupation and the main Union army was stuck far behind the lines and in no shape to fight. Although the military situation appeared grime, it was by no means lost. Plenty of recently raised volunteer units were either in the process of being trained or being deployed, but problems with railroads and sea transport made this process slow and cumbersome. Although the common modern image is of a US army defeated on all fronts after the loss of Lexington in Kentucky, Romney in Virginia and Washington, Baltimore and Philadelphia on the East Coast, this is not the case. Although Lexington had been lost, Hitchcock’s army was in position to defeat the Army of Tennessee and drive it back, as had been seen during the Battle of Georgetown, which had been a strategic Union victory. The same is likewise true in Virginia, where Brigadier General Grant, who is usually decried as incompetent because of his incapability to meet Harney’s army after Hanover, managed to skillfully retake heavily fortified Romney days before Philadelphia fell, although this small victory is mainly overlooked in contemporary histories. A number of recent studies (1) have used large amounts of uncontestable data to prove that the main reason for the US’s withdrawal from the war was not setbacks on the battlefield, but the result of political wrangling. Internationally, French President Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte had offered to mediate between the two sides as early as the beginning of August. After word of the Battle of Elizabethtown reached London, Lord Palmerston vowed to recognize A.S.A as a sovereign nation and have the Union embargo removed, by force if necessary, and, with Queen Victoria’s assent, sent letters to this effect to both President Taylor and President Berrien – although the letters did not reach the offices of either until a ceasefire had already gone into effect. However, these foreign efforts were negligible compared to the eroding of support for the war in the United States Congress (2). As mentioned before a “War Party” made up of Northern Whigs, Free-Soilers and some Unionist Democrats managed to control – with the help of heavy-handed, and later defined as illegal, acts by the Taylor Administration – both Houses of Congress up until this period in the war. Following the Battle of Hanover, however, most of the remaining “War” Democrats had started to question the continuation of the war. By early October the entirety of the Democratic Party had bolted the “War Party” after the Battle of Elizabethtown followed by the majority of the Free-Soilers and slightly less then half of the “War” Whigs leaving Taylor with little-to-no support in Congress by mid-October.
The Death of Zachary Taylor and the General Ceasefire of 1851
President Taylor had refused to go to New York with the rest of the government during the Hanover and Elizabethtown campaigns, instead following the army until his brief capture on September 2nd and then, after successful pleading from General Winfield Scott, staying in Wilmington, Delaware to avoid the risk of death or capture. Surprisingly, Taylor seemed to not have been fazed by the fall of Philadelphia and continued to direct the war in his usual demanding and hardworking way, readying the Army of the Potomac to march out of Wilmington to attack Southern supply lines in the hopes of drawing Davis into another battle. These plans were interrupted on October 21st when former “War” Democrat Lewis Cass, President pro tempore of the United States Senate – and former Democratic Presidential Candidate who lost to Taylor in 1848 – landed in Wilmington from New York. Senator Cass told Taylor, in no uncertain terms, that the war was finished and that the North had lost. The occupation of Philadelphia had been the final straw and that very little support existed for “Mr. Taylor’s bloody, vain war.” Taylor’s was given by October 28th to either seek a ceasefire with the ASA or, if he could not bring himself to do so, resign. If he did neither of these by October 28th Congress would paralyze the war effort and take emergency action to remove him from office. Cass told Taylor that the Senator had Congress’s support as well as that of Vice President, Millard Fillmore, and the Supreme Court. If Taylor sought a ceasefire with the South he would most likely still be impeached, but would probably not be prosecuted for his actions during the war – there was strong hints that Taylor was to be tried for his acts in arresting and detaining political figures during the war. President Taylor’s answer was expected in New York City on October 28th to be delivered by him personally. Senator Cass later said that while he addressed the President that Taylor said nothing, but something seemed go out of him as Cass progressed with his demands. Cass, who was slightly older then the President, commented that when he began talking to Taylor that he looked “full of vigor and youth,” but when he stopped Taylor looked truly old, “as if youth and energy had drained from the President” as Cass spoke(3).
Over the next couple of days Taylor was mainly secluded in the house of the mayor. On October 25th he boarded the steamship California, previously a private boat that had been commandeered and fitted as a long distance patrol boat by the US Navy, on the journey to New York City. He retired in the captain’s quarters and requested not to be disturbed until the ship landed. Captain Cleveland Forbes knocked on the door when the boat docked in New York and, when he received no response, entered the quarters to find President Taylor dead, apparently from a heart attack, sitting at the captain’s desk. He immediately notified the waiting delegation, which included Vice President Fillmore and Chief Justice Robert B. Taney, that the President was dead. Fillmore and Taney returned to the New York Customs House, which had reverted to its old role as Federal Hall and capitol, where Fillmore was quickly sworn in by Taney with a small group watching on October 26th. Fillmore was now President.
Taylor’s death was greeted with celebration throughout the south – who continued to call Taylor “the traitor” for years afterwards because of his Unionism and Southern-birth – and among the large, and growing, peace groups in the north. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, also in New York, begged Fillmore to continue the war and stressed that it was still winnable for the Union if only patience was practiced. Scott pointedly said that the United States had no where to go but up. Industrial production and military power were only increasing each day as the country geared itself for war. Qualified battlefield commanders were being found and the Union armies were on the verge of turning Southern advances. The Army of Northern Virginia was miles away from its home, could not advance further and could easily have their supply lines cut leading to starvation or surrender in Philadelphia. The Union situation was in no way hopeless and, in fact, was better then it had been before the Army of Northern Virginia had entered Maryland.
Fillmore maintained other ideas, believing that the Union was not unfixable shattered and that with the right about of compromise the south would rejoin the Union and the damages of the war would be undone. Fillmore quickly made clear his intentions to undo everything that Taylor had caused and quickly fired most of Taylor’s cabinet. He, along with several members of Congress, had kept secret contacts with southern officials and had sent out peace feelers before notifying Taylor of his loss of support of Congress. He sent word to General Davis for a temporary ceasefire so a Union delegate could be sent to negotiate a total ceasefire to predate a general peace conference. On November 2nd Fillmore sent war-opponent and Democratic Senator Stephen A. Douglas, who was prominent enough to avoid persecution during the war, to Philadelphia to negotiate with Allied Secretary of State, Alexander H. Stephens.
On November 8th they fixed to signatures to the “USA-ASA General Ceasefire” which kept the AS’s official status vague – neither clearly independent nor part of the US. The basic core promised a peaceful resolution with no future conflict between the two sides as well as the release of both sides’ prisoners of war and the north’s ceasing of blockading of Allied ports. “Pending negations for a peaceful resolution” both sides’ armed forces would withdraw from “conflict places” – Stephens had original pushed for it to read “disputed places,” but Douglas objected because it implied that the two sides were independent nations in dispute of the same area. These “conflict places” were the states of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri. Stephen’s had tried to have “Western Virginia,” – after the Union defeat at Hanover, the Restored Government of Virginia had petitioned for entrance into the Union as the State of the Appalachia, but had not been formerly admitted by early November – but Douglas had refused this provision because of fears that the state government, which viewed the Restored Government as illegal, would quickly crush local Unionism. In order to keep the Union army stationed in Western Virginia Senator Douglas had conceded Tennessee as a “conflict place” much to the dismay of the Unionists within the state and in Campbell’s Army of Tennessee, still operating in Kentucky. Jefferson Davis’ army in Philadelphia would stay in Pennsylvania until commencement of formal peace talks. Stephens and Douglas agreed to formal negations between the two opposing factions to occur on December 1, 1851 at “neutral town or county” – Wilmington, Delaware was decided by Presidents Fillmore and Berrien as a “neutral town” by November 12th. The war of Allied Independence was effectively finished with only the formalities of where the border would fall left to decide.
(1)Namely; Dr. Phillip Paterson’s “United States’ Politics During the War of Allied Independence,” Ezekiel Jacobs’ “North American Politics in the late Unified Era,” Dr. Henry Gates’ “A History of North American Politics” and Dr. Frederick Konn’s “Taylor’s Politicians.” All of these writing used the Hailing’s Cache, a large amount of recently discovered Congressional, military records and personal communications that were assumed to have been lost between the flight from Washington, DC and the establishment of the Interim Federal Capitol in New York City.
(2) For clarification purposes; the US Congress was evacuated along with the Supreme Court and most of the executive branch to Philadelphia on Jun 30th, 1851 and was subsequently relocated to New York City between August 18th, 1851 and September 3rd, 1851.
(3)This passage’s is greatly expounded by Lewis Cass’ own autobiography, titled “Lewis Cass: Politician and Diplomat,” which includes a great source of private letters between Cass and other politicians and military figures between 1850 and 1852.
I know its been a while, but here's the next part. I plan to at least finish the parts about the war, time permitting me.
President Fillmore designs upon coming to office were very clear; to end the war preferably with the southern states returning to the Union. With this in mind, Fillmore had no intention of continuing an unpopular war against a seemingly unbeatable opponent. His pre-Wilmington Conference goals were to assure the AS of the US’ peaceful intentions by demobilizing a large percent of the military and strictly adhering to the ceasefire agreement. Fillmore believed that if the late conflict could be written off as “Mr. Taylor’s War” and not as a war of the Federal government that the south would rejoin the US with appropriate concessions – up and including amendments to the constitution regarding states’ rights, popular sovereignty and slavery in the Mexican Cession (1). Basically, Fillmore was willing to give in to all pre-war Southern demands in order to maintain the Union.
By November, 1851 the US army had expanded to 250,000 men and the navy to 60,000. Slightly more then half of the armed forces had seen combat in some form. The remaining soldiers where either waiting deployment, on garrison duty or still in training by the enacting of the ceasefire. Upon assuming the presidency Fillmore immediately ordered the military to stop all recruitment for the army, navy or marines. On November 10th, after the ceasefire agreement, Fillmore released all soldiers who had been recruited “for the duration” of the war and all of those not yet fully trained – about 85,000 men. On November 17th he terminated the enlistments of soldiers in units that had suffered over one-third causalities during the war, nearly halving the combat strength of the Army of the Potomac. These measures reduced the US army’s strength to fifty percent of the 250,000 of the previous month. The navy was a similar story with most of the ships from the blockade having their recently recruited sailors dismissed and nearly all of commandeered US ships returned to their owners. The navy’s demobilized even faster than the army with 2/3 of wartime navy, both ships and sailors, released from service by January 1, 1852.
The AS armed forces were not so pacifistic, possibly because the War Department considered the resumption of fighting as a strong possibility. After the signing of the ceasefire the War Department stopped all national recruitment and prohibited further bounties for recruits previously offered from government funds. The War Department, at Berrien’s request, also stopped any increase in size of the Provisional Allied Army. This meant that all further volunteers or privately raised units could only be augmentations to the state militia forces – a tactic that allowed an increase of Border States’ militia forces. These efforts stopped Allied military growth, but the Provisional Allied Army remained mobilized in its entirety and even extended enlistments during the ceasefire and peace negotiations. The total strength of the Provisional Allied Army was 80,000 at the time of the ceasefire and remained that strength until the finalizing of peace negotiations. The combined number of the various state militias of the seceded states remained around 50,000 until the enacting of the ceasefire. However, after the ceasefire the number in the various state militias increased to nearly double the pre-ceasefire number by January 1, 1851 (2). For the most part the various Allied field armies withdrew from the states named in the ceasefire agreement, but remained fully mobilized and close to state borders. Jefferson Davis’ Army of Northern Virginia remained in Philadelphia and only withdrew on December 4th after news reached them that peace negotiations had begun. The Allied Navy, never having more then 10,000 men, also remained entirely operational, but stayed close to port – mainly because its navy was made up of a handful of coastal-defense ships and a far smaller number of government-paid blockade-runners.
The Union was not nearly as passive in the Border States as Fillmore would have wanted. By mid-November the US Army and AS Army had withdrawn from their respective occupied areas in Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware and Missouri as per the ceasefire agreement. Despite this, plentiful amounts of weapons were left and the Unionist governors kept their respective militias mobilized. These actions in support of state governments were taken by commanders in the field without Fillmore’s approval or knowledge. In western Maryland, Unionist militia in the Allied-controlled state refused to accept Governor Lowe authority, remained armed and continued to call themselves the Maryland State Militia. The AS responded by arming Allied-supporting militias in other states: the Bluegrass Guard in central Kentucky and the Missouri State Guard in Missouri. There was a real threat of mini-civil wars within most of the Border States. The only state that maintained a single, universally recognized government was strongly-Unionist Delaware.
Nowhere was closer to statewide civil war then Missouri. On November 15th unseated governor and Southern-sympathizer Sterling Price left for Jefferson City after receiving word of the ceasefire after months of exile in Arkansas. Most of the Allied-loyal Missouri State Guard, which had been fighting in Arkansas and Kentucky, reentered the state as well after being driven out with the Governor months before. Price, considering himself the legal governor, went back to the governor’s mansion – until days before used by the recently-departed Union military governor – and began assuming the functions of governor. The weak, Union-appointed Governor, David Patterson, did not contest Price’s resumption of power, but continued to act as governor and dispense his duties. Both Unionist and Allies maintained respective militia in their respective areas; St Louis and central part of the state for the Union and Jefferson City and the extreme south of the state for the Allies.
Patterson, under heavy Union pressure, tried to close the Southern border with Arkansas with the Unionist state militia. Price counter-manned his order and ordered his militia to seal borders with the Union and secure the capital. This conflict could have led to outright bloodshed if not for the actions of Major Thomas Quantrill. Major Quantrill, a native Ohioan and commander of one of the four Unionist Missouri regiments in Jefferson City, received word that Price was preparing to call in 2,000 men, adding to the 1,500 already in the city, to establish complete control of the state capital. Quantrill immediately took his men and arrested Price at his residence on November 27th. Major Quantrill and the Union garrison evacuated Jefferson City for St. Louis with the detained Governor Price in custody. Without Price the Missouri State Guard found itself without a commander when it peaceable entered Jefferson City. Once Price’s captivity became known the Missouri State Guard arrested Governor Patterson – his absence actually buttressed Unionism within the state. The Guard was preparing to march on St. Louis for a potentially bloody battle, but terms of the Wilmington Peace Treaty reached both sides on December 24th undermining the need for battle.
Representing the ASA was ex-North Carolina governor and current Senator, William A. Graham, and the Allied Secretary of State Alexander H. Stephens. Graham and Stephens pasts and views reflected a good deal of the Allied leadership. Both had been Whigs, Stephens even campaigned for Taylor, and both had been angered by Taylor’s actions during his Presidency and felt justified in leaving the service of the US government for the ASA. Stephens, who had begun his political career as a moderate, but drifted towards sectionalism, had been a compromiser and a Unionist until Taylor sent troops into South Carolina. Stephens had always been a stench supporter of “Southern Rights,” but had been an anti-Secessionist until the end of the Milledgeville Convention in 1850. Graham, a well-liked and politically-connected man throughout the former US, was by all definitions a moderate and may have even been a closest Unionist up until the implementing of the blockade on the Allied State and the “Burning of the Shenandoah,” two events that galvanized most Allied politicians. Stephens and Graham may not have been completely happy to see the Southern states leave the Union, but were strongly believed in their cause’s righteousness.
Within a week of the beginning of the conference it became clear to both delegations that the South would not rejoin the Union except by force, something that had proven incredibly unlikely during the late civil war. Although loath to do it, both Frelinghuysen and Douglas agreed that the bases of any peace treaty would be the creation of two separate and independent countries within the boundaries of what had been the United States of America. The Union delegation also agreed to the core area of the new state to comprise Virginia down to Florida to Texas.
Next came the issue of the Border States; the Union wanted to keep Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware and Missouri for sure and Tennessee and Arkansas if possible while the South wanted to expand as much as possible. In exchange for Tennessee and Arkansas the South agreed to give up claims to Delaware, which had given almost no support to the South, and a promise not to harm or prosecute Unionists in East Tennessee or in Arkansas nor to restrict or penalize any citizen of those two states that decided to move to within the borders of the US. The issue of Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland remained difficult, but Douglas, always favoring the will of the people, offered to let Kentucky and Missouri vote in a referendum as to which nation they would belong to and was quickly agreed to by Stephens and Graham.
The Allied Delegation wanted the idea of a referendum expanded to Maryland where Allied support was strong as a confirmation of the State’s secession as per Maryland’s secession ordinance. Douglas was willing to agree, but Frelinghuysen vigorously opposed it as he believed the Union had already given up to much and was abandoning to many Unionists in states that were barely, if at all, Allied-leaning. He demanded that if Maryland was to have a referendum then so should all of the upper South, including the State of Appalachia as a separate unit from Virginia. Stephens rejected the separating of Appalachia from Virginia, but backed down form allowing Maryland to be decided by one referendum and proposed a county-by-county bases that would allow the creation of two separate states in Maryland. This would mean a strong likelihood for an Allied enclave for Baltimore, but possible not cut off Washington from Union control. Frelinghuysen agreed to this as a compromise, but only if Virginia had the same country-by-county vote. Realizing that Baltimore was more important than hilly western Virginia, the Allied delegation agreed to allow the State of Appalachia to remain part of the US without a referendum, but an exchange for a county-by-county vote in Maryland. The guarantee of protection or peaceful relocation for Unionists and Secessionists was extended to all of the Border States; including Virginia, Appalachia, Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland.
The last territorial issues had to do with Washington, DC, the western frontier and negotiations for border adjustments with Mexico. It was assumed that who ever controlled the counties around DC and Maryland would effectively control the former US capitol and both sides agreed that whoever won the counties bordering DC would receive the capitol and the other side would receive financial compensation. Again, Frelinghuysen had opposed this move, but had agreed for a better deal in the West. In the West, were the Allied military had been defeated by superior US forces, the biggest natural boundary, the Rio Grande was decided as the best border for the two countries and the already defined northern border of Texas would be continued to the river as the new border in the Plains. All negations between a foreign power and either of the two American nations that involved federal acts before 1850 would be made with a delegate from the other nation has full partner. Any costs would be split evenly.
The next and final issues were national debt, the division of Federal property (ships, armaments, land and buildings), compensation for damage down against private citizens by both armies, and trade. Both delegations know the division of Federal property would be a long-term, expensive and ultimately unproductive venture. Besides this the Allied delegation, especially Stephens, feared that the new nation’s national debt would be devastating on the AS’s trade-based economy. Both delegations agreed that the AS government would retain all Federal property located on its territory will the US government would retain the rest in exchange for the US paying 2/3 of the Federal debt. In return for resumption of the majority of the national debt, the US got a guarantee of eternal and permanent free trade on the Ohio and Mississippi river. A joint commission was to be set-up to decide damages for both sides would have to pay, but the payments would be directly to individuals as opposed to governments.
After nearly three weeks of negations both delegations signed the treaty and all its provisions were to be enacted within six months of the ratification by both governments. Douglas and Frelinghuysen were disappointed at their numerous failures, but they were negotiating with a nation that had clearly defeated their own and hoped that the numerous referendums would give the nation breathing space and force a weak South to come to its senses. In fact, Stephens and Graham were also disappointed having failed to gain the entirety of the slaveholding South and facing the very real change that debt incurred from both the treaty and war would crush the nation’s economy. There was also the lingering fear that the treaty might be rejected by the Allied Congress because of the loss of land by both Virginia and Texas, two very important states. Frelinghuysen feared that it would cause his own Whig Party to implode and allow Democratic-domination of Congress. Both sides left with much less then they hoped and deep fear for the future of their nations.
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(1)From Fillmore’s private letters published as “The Letters of President Milliard Fillmore” ed. Stephen D. Connolly
(2)These overwhelming upper-class late joiners, commonly called the gay-feet, joined either to share in the glory of having “served” or to remove shame that would have been brought on their families from having not. According to Etymology of Political Terms in the Modern World by Adolph Eriksson, this term purportedly comes from a popular Richmond editor, George K. Johnson, who supposedly said “They [these late recruits] are all too gay to run to the army when the war is over.” This quote has never been found in any surviving written source pre-1860 and we can only assume its origins. At this time “gay” often had scandalous or immoral connotations.
Events To Wilmington Peace Conference
President Fillmore designs upon coming to office were very clear; to end the war preferably with the southern states returning to the Union. With this in mind, Fillmore had no intention of continuing an unpopular war against a seemingly unbeatable opponent. His pre-Wilmington Conference goals were to assure the AS of the US’ peaceful intentions by demobilizing a large percent of the military and strictly adhering to the ceasefire agreement. Fillmore believed that if the late conflict could be written off as “Mr. Taylor’s War” and not as a war of the Federal government that the south would rejoin the US with appropriate concessions – up and including amendments to the constitution regarding states’ rights, popular sovereignty and slavery in the Mexican Cession (1). Basically, Fillmore was willing to give in to all pre-war Southern demands in order to maintain the Union.
By November, 1851 the US army had expanded to 250,000 men and the navy to 60,000. Slightly more then half of the armed forces had seen combat in some form. The remaining soldiers where either waiting deployment, on garrison duty or still in training by the enacting of the ceasefire. Upon assuming the presidency Fillmore immediately ordered the military to stop all recruitment for the army, navy or marines. On November 10th, after the ceasefire agreement, Fillmore released all soldiers who had been recruited “for the duration” of the war and all of those not yet fully trained – about 85,000 men. On November 17th he terminated the enlistments of soldiers in units that had suffered over one-third causalities during the war, nearly halving the combat strength of the Army of the Potomac. These measures reduced the US army’s strength to fifty percent of the 250,000 of the previous month. The navy was a similar story with most of the ships from the blockade having their recently recruited sailors dismissed and nearly all of commandeered US ships returned to their owners. The navy’s demobilized even faster than the army with 2/3 of wartime navy, both ships and sailors, released from service by January 1, 1852.
The AS armed forces were not so pacifistic, possibly because the War Department considered the resumption of fighting as a strong possibility. After the signing of the ceasefire the War Department stopped all national recruitment and prohibited further bounties for recruits previously offered from government funds. The War Department, at Berrien’s request, also stopped any increase in size of the Provisional Allied Army. This meant that all further volunteers or privately raised units could only be augmentations to the state militia forces – a tactic that allowed an increase of Border States’ militia forces. These efforts stopped Allied military growth, but the Provisional Allied Army remained mobilized in its entirety and even extended enlistments during the ceasefire and peace negotiations. The total strength of the Provisional Allied Army was 80,000 at the time of the ceasefire and remained that strength until the finalizing of peace negotiations. The combined number of the various state militias of the seceded states remained around 50,000 until the enacting of the ceasefire. However, after the ceasefire the number in the various state militias increased to nearly double the pre-ceasefire number by January 1, 1851 (2). For the most part the various Allied field armies withdrew from the states named in the ceasefire agreement, but remained fully mobilized and close to state borders. Jefferson Davis’ Army of Northern Virginia remained in Philadelphia and only withdrew on December 4th after news reached them that peace negotiations had begun. The Allied Navy, never having more then 10,000 men, also remained entirely operational, but stayed close to port – mainly because its navy was made up of a handful of coastal-defense ships and a far smaller number of government-paid blockade-runners.
The Union was not nearly as passive in the Border States as Fillmore would have wanted. By mid-November the US Army and AS Army had withdrawn from their respective occupied areas in Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware and Missouri as per the ceasefire agreement. Despite this, plentiful amounts of weapons were left and the Unionist governors kept their respective militias mobilized. These actions in support of state governments were taken by commanders in the field without Fillmore’s approval or knowledge. In western Maryland, Unionist militia in the Allied-controlled state refused to accept Governor Lowe authority, remained armed and continued to call themselves the Maryland State Militia. The AS responded by arming Allied-supporting militias in other states: the Bluegrass Guard in central Kentucky and the Missouri State Guard in Missouri. There was a real threat of mini-civil wars within most of the Border States. The only state that maintained a single, universally recognized government was strongly-Unionist Delaware.
Nowhere was closer to statewide civil war then Missouri. On November 15th unseated governor and Southern-sympathizer Sterling Price left for Jefferson City after receiving word of the ceasefire after months of exile in Arkansas. Most of the Allied-loyal Missouri State Guard, which had been fighting in Arkansas and Kentucky, reentered the state as well after being driven out with the Governor months before. Price, considering himself the legal governor, went back to the governor’s mansion – until days before used by the recently-departed Union military governor – and began assuming the functions of governor. The weak, Union-appointed Governor, David Patterson, did not contest Price’s resumption of power, but continued to act as governor and dispense his duties. Both Unionist and Allies maintained respective militia in their respective areas; St Louis and central part of the state for the Union and Jefferson City and the extreme south of the state for the Allies.
Patterson, under heavy Union pressure, tried to close the Southern border with Arkansas with the Unionist state militia. Price counter-manned his order and ordered his militia to seal borders with the Union and secure the capital. This conflict could have led to outright bloodshed if not for the actions of Major Thomas Quantrill. Major Quantrill, a native Ohioan and commander of one of the four Unionist Missouri regiments in Jefferson City, received word that Price was preparing to call in 2,000 men, adding to the 1,500 already in the city, to establish complete control of the state capital. Quantrill immediately took his men and arrested Price at his residence on November 27th. Major Quantrill and the Union garrison evacuated Jefferson City for St. Louis with the detained Governor Price in custody. Without Price the Missouri State Guard found itself without a commander when it peaceable entered Jefferson City. Once Price’s captivity became known the Missouri State Guard arrested Governor Patterson – his absence actually buttressed Unionism within the state. The Guard was preparing to march on St. Louis for a potentially bloody battle, but terms of the Wilmington Peace Treaty reached both sides on December 24th undermining the need for battle.
Wilmington Peace Conference
The Wilmington Peace Conference began on December 2, 1851 in Wilmington, Delaware. The USA was represented by the reconciliatory and well-known Senator Stephan Douglas and recent Fillmore-appointee as Secretary of State, New Jersey attorney and ex-Senator Theodore Frelinghuysen. Both Frelinghuysen and Douglas had been moderates “hawks,” but strong Unionists despite greatly divergent political views. Frelinghuysen was a Whig from a prominent family, a friend of the deceased Henry Clay as well as friend of Zachary Taylor and of the current President Fillmore, and a highly respected attorney. Douglas, a prominent Democratic Senator from Illinois, had been a hawk at the beginning of the war, but developed a strong anti-Taylor view and openly spoke against Taylor in Congress. Taylor is known to have debated either removing or arresting Douglas, but Douglas prominence made that impossible. However, both these men were committed to the better interests of the US and opposed secession as unconstitutional.Representing the ASA was ex-North Carolina governor and current Senator, William A. Graham, and the Allied Secretary of State Alexander H. Stephens. Graham and Stephens pasts and views reflected a good deal of the Allied leadership. Both had been Whigs, Stephens even campaigned for Taylor, and both had been angered by Taylor’s actions during his Presidency and felt justified in leaving the service of the US government for the ASA. Stephens, who had begun his political career as a moderate, but drifted towards sectionalism, had been a compromiser and a Unionist until Taylor sent troops into South Carolina. Stephens had always been a stench supporter of “Southern Rights,” but had been an anti-Secessionist until the end of the Milledgeville Convention in 1850. Graham, a well-liked and politically-connected man throughout the former US, was by all definitions a moderate and may have even been a closest Unionist up until the implementing of the blockade on the Allied State and the “Burning of the Shenandoah,” two events that galvanized most Allied politicians. Stephens and Graham may not have been completely happy to see the Southern states leave the Union, but were strongly believed in their cause’s righteousness.
Within a week of the beginning of the conference it became clear to both delegations that the South would not rejoin the Union except by force, something that had proven incredibly unlikely during the late civil war. Although loath to do it, both Frelinghuysen and Douglas agreed that the bases of any peace treaty would be the creation of two separate and independent countries within the boundaries of what had been the United States of America. The Union delegation also agreed to the core area of the new state to comprise Virginia down to Florida to Texas.
Next came the issue of the Border States; the Union wanted to keep Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware and Missouri for sure and Tennessee and Arkansas if possible while the South wanted to expand as much as possible. In exchange for Tennessee and Arkansas the South agreed to give up claims to Delaware, which had given almost no support to the South, and a promise not to harm or prosecute Unionists in East Tennessee or in Arkansas nor to restrict or penalize any citizen of those two states that decided to move to within the borders of the US. The issue of Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland remained difficult, but Douglas, always favoring the will of the people, offered to let Kentucky and Missouri vote in a referendum as to which nation they would belong to and was quickly agreed to by Stephens and Graham.
The Allied Delegation wanted the idea of a referendum expanded to Maryland where Allied support was strong as a confirmation of the State’s secession as per Maryland’s secession ordinance. Douglas was willing to agree, but Frelinghuysen vigorously opposed it as he believed the Union had already given up to much and was abandoning to many Unionists in states that were barely, if at all, Allied-leaning. He demanded that if Maryland was to have a referendum then so should all of the upper South, including the State of Appalachia as a separate unit from Virginia. Stephens rejected the separating of Appalachia from Virginia, but backed down form allowing Maryland to be decided by one referendum and proposed a county-by-county bases that would allow the creation of two separate states in Maryland. This would mean a strong likelihood for an Allied enclave for Baltimore, but possible not cut off Washington from Union control. Frelinghuysen agreed to this as a compromise, but only if Virginia had the same country-by-county vote. Realizing that Baltimore was more important than hilly western Virginia, the Allied delegation agreed to allow the State of Appalachia to remain part of the US without a referendum, but an exchange for a county-by-county vote in Maryland. The guarantee of protection or peaceful relocation for Unionists and Secessionists was extended to all of the Border States; including Virginia, Appalachia, Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland.
The last territorial issues had to do with Washington, DC, the western frontier and negotiations for border adjustments with Mexico. It was assumed that who ever controlled the counties around DC and Maryland would effectively control the former US capitol and both sides agreed that whoever won the counties bordering DC would receive the capitol and the other side would receive financial compensation. Again, Frelinghuysen had opposed this move, but had agreed for a better deal in the West. In the West, were the Allied military had been defeated by superior US forces, the biggest natural boundary, the Rio Grande was decided as the best border for the two countries and the already defined northern border of Texas would be continued to the river as the new border in the Plains. All negations between a foreign power and either of the two American nations that involved federal acts before 1850 would be made with a delegate from the other nation has full partner. Any costs would be split evenly.
The next and final issues were national debt, the division of Federal property (ships, armaments, land and buildings), compensation for damage down against private citizens by both armies, and trade. Both delegations know the division of Federal property would be a long-term, expensive and ultimately unproductive venture. Besides this the Allied delegation, especially Stephens, feared that the new nation’s national debt would be devastating on the AS’s trade-based economy. Both delegations agreed that the AS government would retain all Federal property located on its territory will the US government would retain the rest in exchange for the US paying 2/3 of the Federal debt. In return for resumption of the majority of the national debt, the US got a guarantee of eternal and permanent free trade on the Ohio and Mississippi river. A joint commission was to be set-up to decide damages for both sides would have to pay, but the payments would be directly to individuals as opposed to governments.
After nearly three weeks of negations both delegations signed the treaty and all its provisions were to be enacted within six months of the ratification by both governments. Douglas and Frelinghuysen were disappointed at their numerous failures, but they were negotiating with a nation that had clearly defeated their own and hoped that the numerous referendums would give the nation breathing space and force a weak South to come to its senses. In fact, Stephens and Graham were also disappointed having failed to gain the entirety of the slaveholding South and facing the very real change that debt incurred from both the treaty and war would crush the nation’s economy. There was also the lingering fear that the treaty might be rejected by the Allied Congress because of the loss of land by both Virginia and Texas, two very important states. Frelinghuysen feared that it would cause his own Whig Party to implode and allow Democratic-domination of Congress. Both sides left with much less then they hoped and deep fear for the future of their nations.
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(1)From Fillmore’s private letters published as “The Letters of President Milliard Fillmore” ed. Stephen D. Connolly
(2)These overwhelming upper-class late joiners, commonly called the gay-feet, joined either to share in the glory of having “served” or to remove shame that would have been brought on their families from having not. According to Etymology of Political Terms in the Modern World by Adolph Eriksson, this term purportedly comes from a popular Richmond editor, George K. Johnson, who supposedly said “They [these late recruits] are all too gay to run to the army when the war is over.” This quote has never been found in any surviving written source pre-1860 and we can only assume its origins. At this time “gay” often had scandalous or immoral connotations.
Thank you. I always planned on continuing the TL and even put lots of thought into it and had some interesting ideas; mainly dealing with the economic dislocation caused by the US' division, the mass migration between North and South that would dwarf the 62,000 British loyalists that left the US following the American Revolution and the politics of the North and South. However, I never was able to give the time to properly write out and research a continuation. As it is, re-reading it over a year later, it actually works out nicely for a detailed time line of specific time events. Really, any writing more than a couple of years after the main PoD starts getting into the fantasies of the author more than historical facts.
All and all, I'm probably proudest of this timeline than any of my others.