Russia in a world with no World Wars

A little while ago, I made a thread about culture in a world with no World Wars, but some of the discussion there made me want to talk about Russia in particular, and beyond just culture. After seeing folks like WIAH and plenty of other Anti-communists talk about how well off Russia would be without the October revolution, I must ask how accurate this statement is.

Would Russia be well off if there were no world wars? Would the Tsar remain on the throne? If so, how long? And if a Russian Republic would form, what would it be like?
 
Short term: Russia has a good amount of growth, is below almost everywhere inside of the Western World in development and above almost everything outside of it.

Intermediate term: Russia has inefficient import substitution model, is somewhat dependent on commodity prices and foreign investment, has unpopular government and social unrest in much of the country. Creates potential for things to go very wrong.

Long term: Government is effectively addressing literacy issues and building infrastructure. Private property is gradually becoming more common and Russia is building its own capitalist class. Russia is tied to international markets.

Russia probably ends up somewhere between the Southern Cone and Japan in terms of economic development, with my guess being that it is around as rich as OTL Greece or Spain. Ukraine and Belarus are probably assimilated while most of Central Asia gets a European majority. Russia remains a major cultural powerhouse, and as its population grows it becomes a scientific powerhouse by the mid 20th century. Russia probably continues to become more democratic and secular, but at a gradual and uneven rate. The population is probably several times greater than the OTL, but peaked today.
 
Prior of WW1 Russian economy was growing and there was notable population boost. But problem was that government was instable and tsar and monarchy was quiet unpopular. Sovial disequality was huge and there was huge social gap between nobility and peasants. Russia too suffered from famines quiet often. Futhermore many minorities was frustrated with russification politics. Society was anyway yet quiet peaceful.

And Russia was politically still absolute monarchy altough it had constitution. But it was for tsar just a paper where was some ink. He occassionally dissovled Duma and there wasn't any checks on tsar's power.

I would imaginate that economic boost will end at some point and at end of 1920's or early 1930's things begin blow up. Not that way as in OTL but something would be going to happen. There probably is some revolutionary events and either Russia becomes republic or then changes as true constitutional parliamentary monarchy.

If Russia becomes republic it is another thing what form it takes. Most probably it would be still bit authotarian but hardly as totalitarian as Soviet Union was. Economy is probably bit better. Russia probably can too keep most of its OTL territories but it is possible that Poland and Finland gain independence.

In 2022 I would imaginate Russia being still quiet conservative and probably bit authotarian nation. It has too much highter population and probably still somehow growing or at least stable enough so there is not demographic problem where is lot of old people but only few of young ones. Economy would be too much better. Russia would be still great power altough not in every way as notable as Britain or Germany.

Minorities are probably still bit opressed altough some might have some autonomy. Probably Jews are not still treatened equally altough probably violent pogroms are now over.
 
A belligerantly nationalistic semi-democratic republic. Argentina or Mexico but cold. Similar to OTL Russia except for healthier fertility, more rural people and significantly more religiosity.

I'd be surprised if the czar makes it to 1940 without being rendered irrelevant. Whether this is westminster style symbolic monarcy or a republic where the czar is either exiled or loses his title/lands but gets a pension is up to whoever writes the atl.
 
Assuming it develops a viable government under, quite literally, anyone other than Nicholas II, it may well be the superpower the soviets dreamed of. Its industrial growth was predicted to surpass Germany by the 20s, and it would easily out populate most of Europe at the end. This is why germany eventually became hostile, Russia's growth was putting a gun to Berlin.

However, russia without the world wars keeps the same goals and strategies of the world wars. Influence in the Balkans, middle east, and slapping japan around given the chance. Meaning it remains on a collision course with at least three great powers.
 
Russia without the Great War is still a deeply problematic piece of awful ruled by a hopelessly out of his depth smug autocrat pretending he can personally manage a nation sprawling across 11 time zones, and everyone invested in the dysfunction going along with the charade, while exercising petty powers. There is no oversight. And there is zero incentive for things to get better. Improvement is not a natural historical imperative. The mere presence of peace does not perpetuate progress. You have a society so broken down, the members of the secret police sworn to protect it are fermenting rebellions and terrorism against fellow state officials to force through changes they think otherwise cannot be done. There's flawed, and then there's Russia.

The problem with the narrative Russia was doing great or getting there is that it comes from people with agendas. The myth of Russia as a giant awakening from its slumber was a nightmare keeping French and British diplomats awake in the run up to the Great War. The British wrote bizarre in retrospect reports of how if they don't get in bed with the Russians, the Russians may realize they don't need them and start gobbling up parts of Asia and then reach - the horror of horrors - India! The French diplomatic views was more scattered, because the French diplomatic view on virtually everything was scattered, but they wanted to puff up Russia as their big bad pal who will back them in a rumble should Germany ever try to fight them again. Nobody seemed to have realize that Russia was fundamentally a giant third world country in a mink coat. The other great contributors towards the myth of Emerging Russia Finding Her Way were the men who pissed her away to the Bolsheviks, who in exile would write gloriously self-serving accounts of how Russia was getting bigger, better and stronger if it hadn't been for those meddling revolutionaries, by which they mean Lenin, not the totes cool revolutionaries they were hanging out with to make Russia a constitutional monarchy.

Russia was a mess, of epic proportions, a mess not solved for by universal adult male literacy, or a buffing of GDP stats here and there as if we're playing a strategy game. The economy was getting better, by the hard work of first- and second-generation merchants who were kept out of the machinery of power unless they were married into noble households, but who rammed through innovations and were trying to transform a rural nation. How far they could have gone is interesting to consider, because these type of men would get ground into powder by Lenin and Stalin, only to emerge in the 1960s and give the gray market a good shove.

My own prediction, Russia stays a monarchy, creakily, awkwardly and painfully moving three steps forward, two steps back.
 
I think Russia could have developed into a stable middle-income great power by mid-to-late century, but it's not guarranteed. No matter how viciously Nikolas cracks down on dissent, how well the okhrana keep everything under control, the Romanov régime is going to face a serious problem when Aleksei dies. Aleksei's death is both an opportunity for reform and a moment of great vulnerability for the Tsarist state.

A lot would depend on how industrialisation is handled. If China has shown us anything these last 30 years it's that people are far more willing to tolerate an oppressive government if their standard of living is noticeably improving. If the Tsarist state can navigate its way to a semi- or fully constitutional monarchy with a developed economy, it's likely to stay relatively intact. If there's a revolution, it's likely to lose outlying regions no matter who wins. A short, sharp coup might only lose Poland. A long, drawn out civil war, without a major war to distract the other great powers, could result in the empire being totally dismembered.

Without the strain of the first world war, I'm not sure the state is so weak that it could be overthrown, nor would life have become so desperate that the populace would rise up in support of radical change.

Ultimately, I think a writer has a lot of freedom with Russia in this scenario. If you want to have a stable, developed Russian Empire, it would be possible. If you want a slightly dingy Russian Republic, also possible. If you want bickering post collapse successor states, that could happen too.
 
Assuming Stolypin's reforms continue and last, I can see something akin to Orthodox Saudi Arabia coming about. Wealthy from resource exports and vaguely friendly with the rest of the world, but still highly autocratic.
 
I don't think the monarchy in itself was unpopular so much as Nicholas II. The key to Russia's medium-term success will be whether the ageing Tsar coupled with a potentially sick (but not always) heir can hold their part together. As a note, Alexei clearly had long periods of good enough health, and may well have grown up analogous to Britain's Prince Leopold, able to marry and have a family, but always at risk of some calamity which might claim his life.

Nicholas also fermented division and opposition by his treatment of his own family - at one time there were several Grand Dukes in exile, because of his hatred of divorce, affairs, and less than auspicious marriages, and these included his brother, and the theoretical heir after Alexei, Grand Duke Michael.

Russia was also pretty well over-run with grand dukes, even after reforms culled the nomenclature after 3 generations, and many other grand ducal families had numerous sons, whilst Nicholas's own family had produced a basketful of girls, and one sickly boy.

The survival of the monarchy mainly depends on how this plays out. Depressions can be weathered, setbacks recovered from, but if a perfect storm occurs then one of several events might happen:-
- Nicholas deposed for Alexei, under either regency or general control (if an adult) of one or more grand dukes
- Alexei dies, and Nicholas falls into melancholy, and is deposed, either for Michael, or for the next Romanov with a male heir
- Palace coup which removes NIcholas' family and places that of another grand duke on the throne
- Bungled palace coup which ends up with a republic

Alternatively, Nicholas II might mellow in old age, make amends with the family, Alexei might become like Leopold, able to live a normal life, if always on the edge, and Russia might see a royal marriage, the birth of an heir, Nicholas die on the throne, a potentially short reign of Alexei, and the accession of his son,maybe as a minor under a regency
 

Aphrodite

Banned
Neither Nicholas or the monarchy were unpopular and the regime was very stable Just compare the attendence at celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the dynasty to the small rallies the opposition could muster.

There's nothing unusual with the small strike movement either. There are a wave of strikes everywhere even in Britain. It has more to do with a tightening labor market. The Russian strike movement was heavily concentrated in the metalworking factories.

Militarily, she would have been unassailable by 1917 and international tensions would drop dramatically with the death of Franz Joseph in 1916.

None of the monarchies show any sign of real revolutionary activity. All would fall only after the extreme pressures of the War. That they could survive for years under those strains is proof that they could survive the minor strains of peace
 
Russia with no world wars would be indisputably better off. Like this isn't even a debate, without the 1-2-3-4 demographic knockout punches of World War 1, Russian Civil War, World War 2, and 90s malaise she would be more populous than America at more than half a billion people. There would be no worry about demographic irrelevance as there is now. Russia would have more than enough Russians to work her factories, settle the expanse of Siberia, and to people her armies.

The main issue is that Russia would be convulsed, if not revolution, but by minority unrest until the boot of pan-slavism and Russification came off the necks of peoples like the Finns. Even reformers like Stolypin wanted Russification to advance with all possible speed and for everyone to be speaking Russian, he saw no real use for other languages within the empire. Without any such reform on Russification policies, this issue will continue to fester and be an open wound for Russia.
 
Agree with the comment by Greg Grant above. For what its worth, Trotsky wrote that the Russian Revolution would have happened earlier without World War I.

In fact, there are arguments by historians that the trainwreck that was the government of Nikolai II was one of the major reasons World War I happened in the first place.
 
Agree with the comment by Greg Grant above. For what its worth, Trotsky wrote that the Russian Revolution would have happened earlier without World War I.
Honestly, I don't see it. A lot of the chaos that gripped Russia has such a clear cause and effect with their wars and... questionable (putting it nicely) foreign policy.
In fact, there are arguments by historians that the trainwreck that was the government of Nikolai II was one of the major reasons World War I happened in the first place.
This is basically true for the otl version of it due to the competition in the Balkans. But imo I think that Germany's perceived need for the war is the real problem- and it needed that war because Russian growth was stupefying
 
Agree with the comment by Greg Grant above. For what its worth, Trotsky wrote that the Russian Revolution would have happened earlier without World War I.

In fact, there are arguments by historians that the trainwreck that was the government of Nikolai II was one of the major reasons World War I happened in the first place.
Not sure Trotsky is the most unbiased of sources on the matter. The strength of the Whites even after 3 years of utterly bungled total war suggests that the monarchy had quite a bit of popular support, and inertia is a powerful force in politics. The war itself I put down to a cascade of diplomatic failures and fuckups. I don't think any of the foreign ministries of Europe actually wanted war, but brinkmanship is a dangerous game, and sooner or later somebody was going to call somebody's bluff. There were plenty of opportunities for the crisis to be resolved diplomatically, as so many others had been in the preceeding decades.
 
I'll give an answer here which to almost all other AH questions would be simply a cop-out - but here, it is a necessary reminder, because I see so many (too many, for my tastes) stereotyped narratives of Russia's "inevitable X" or "inevitable Y" or "Z" around:

There are many different possibilities, from a lot better to arguably worse, depending on what exactly happens.

Russia is neither doomed to have a revolution, nor doomed to dwell in backwardness if not; it is neither bound for ultra-chauvinist totalitarianism nor for unprecedented industrial growth. Like all other countries on earth, many paths are open and plausible, if only we overcome our cliches and let our allohistorical creativity work.

Pre-WW1, Russia had a high population growth. So had other countries, but Russia's was even higher. The reasons for these high birth rates had already eroded with Stolypin's agrarian reforms, though. Population growth would probably slow down a little, and then dive like everywhere else in the developed world when contraception pills come around. IF we simply assume that things continue on the trajectory of the last pre-revolutionary decades. Which isn't necessary. Some other regime which brings down birth rates could come into place, too, for the same reasons it happened under communist rule or for others.

Pre-WW1, Russia was industrialising fast, but from a low starting level. Russia's industry grew on foreign capital influx and was export-oriented. The crises of global capitalism, if they occur comparable to OTL, would affect it greatly, but so would worldwide phases of recovery and growth. Without Stalinist ruthlessness and fervor, though, it would take very long for Russian industrial production to reach OTL levels. On the plus side, there wouldn't be the de-industrialisation of 1991ff. IF we simply assume that things continue linearily. Which they probably wouldn't. Governments trying to reduce world market dependency could change things. Or governments who mess with the underlying forces of industrial growth. Or governments who do a great job steering the country better through the up and down cycles than elsewhere, drawing on the economic depth of the country - you never know.

Pre-WW1, Russia had some of the most lively liberal movements, certainly the most interesting populist-agrarian movement of the world, a huge spectrum of labour groups and radicals, Christian sectarians, Orthodox reformers and conservatives, radical nationalists and cosmopolitanists, and yes, it had a state apparatus in which they all had very little to say. Any of these forces could have shaped Russia in very interesting ways. Its political system is absolutely unpredictable, like most country's. The likelihood of great changes is high - but that is because it is high in most countries of the world, most countries underwent radical changes in the 20th century, and Russia's system was full enough of contradictions and dysfunctionalities for it to not be immune to such changes. But in which direction - who could argue against any? The tsar appeared like an invincible autocrat for so long, who had even drowned 1905 in blood. But then, in February, he fell rather unceremoniously. The liberal parties had dominated the opposition, but when the tide of mass protests came around in 1917, they quickly became irrelevant. The SRs were the biggest party with the best network of cells across the entire country, and yet it wasn't them who governed the new post-revolutionary state. The Bolsheviks were highly unable to form effective alliances and alienated almost everyone else, and yet they took over. Nothing about this is "predictable" or carved in stone.

There is a very strong narrative that Russia, whatever happens, would always have to be some sort of autocracy. We should not forget that this is a tale which has always served those in power in Russia: first the tsars and nobility and their non-democratic state apparatus, then the party apparatus who managed to purge any trace of democracy in the first country in the world which claimed allegiance to one of the most radically anti-authoritarian political philosophies that ever existed, and today Putin's militaristic cleptocracy. And it is also a tale which flatters the allegedly superior Westerners.
No country "has it in its genes" to be autocratically governed. Russia's size is no argument when Canada is a good and solid democracy; Russia's multi-ethnic and at the beginning of the 20th century highly illiterate population is no argument when India is a good and solid democracy; its agrarian nature isn't an argument (why would it be?). The political violence and intrigues which the tsarist secret police Okhrana had implemented were, in my opinion, the most powerful factor shaping a violent, cruel, and manipulative new system, not least because the new revolutionary leaders had experienced the methods of the Okhrana first-hand as its victims. But even this must not necessarily doom a country, we must only think of all the ultra-right torture-based dictatorships of Latin America, South Africa etc., who have been replaced mostly with democracies since the 1980s/90s where such cruelty has not politico-systematically returned. (Although the scars remain, and social consequences certainly exist.)

I think we need more TLs in which Russia in the 20th century is neither communist nor some sort of fascist and also doesn't suffer a warlord era or something of the like. There are plenty of possibilities. Maybe it isn't always outright racism which dooms Russia in many TLs to autocracy of some sort - maybe it is because TL writers focus on other parts of the world and write them "better", and maybe, following some unwritten "law of balance" (so that things don't become too utopian), they need a place that becomes fascist or religiously backwards or whatever instead, and, hey, why not Russia. But still. Get more creative, guys.
 
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I'll give an answer here which to almost all other AH questions would be simply a cop-out - but here, it is a necessary reminder, because I see so many (too many, for my tastes) stereotyped narratives of Russia's "inevitable X" or "inevitable Y" or "Z" around:

There are many different possibilities, from a lot better to arguably worse, depending on what exactly happens.

Russia is neither doomed to have a revolution, nor doomed to dwell in backwardness if not; it is neither bound for ultra-chauvinist totalitarianism nor for unprecedented industrial growth. Like all other countries on earth, many paths are open and plausible, if only we overcome our cliches and let our allohistorical creativity work.

Pre-WW1, Russia had a high population growth. So had other countries, but Russia's was even higher. The reasons for these high birth rates had already eroded with Stolypin's agrarian reforms, though. Population growth would probably slow down a little, and then dive like everywhere else in the developed world when contraception pills come around. IF we simply assume that things continue on the trajectory of the last pre-revolutionary decades. Which isn't necessary. Some other regime which brings down birth rates could come into place, too, for the same reasons it happened under communist rule or for others.

Pre-WW1, Russia was industrialising fast, but from a low starting level. Russia's industry grew on foreign capital influx and was export-oriented. The crises of global capitalism, if they occur comparable to OTL, would affect it greatly, but so would worldwide phases of recovery and growth. Without Stalinist ruthlessness and fervor, though, it would take very long for Russian industrial production to reach OTL levels. On the plus side, there wouldn't be the de-industrialisation of 1991ff. IF we simply assume that things continue linearily. Which they probably wouldn't. Governments trying to reduce world market dependency could change things. Or governments who mess with the underlying forces of industrial growth. Or governments who do a great job steering the country better through the up and down cycles than elsewhere, drawing on the economic depth of the country - you never know.

Pre-WW1, Russia had some of the most lively liberal movements, certainly the most interesting populist-agrarian movement of the world, a huge spectrum of labour groups and radicals, Christian sectarians, Orthodox reformers and conservatives, radical nationalists and cosmopolitanists, and yes, it had a state apparatus in which they all had very little to say. Any of these forces could have shaped Russia in very interesting ways. Its political system is absolutely unpredictable, like most country's. The likelihood of great changes is high - but that is because it is high in most countries of the world, most countries underwent radical changes in the 20th century, and Russia's system was full enough of contradictions and dysfunctionalities for it to not be immune to such changes. But in which direction - who could argue against any? The tsar appeared like an invincible autocrat for so long, who had even drowned 1905 in blood. But then, in February, he fell rather unceremoniously. The liberal parties had dominated the opposition, but when the tide of mass protests came around in 1917, they quickly became irrelevant. The SRs were the biggest party with the best network of cells across the entire country, and yet it wasn't them who governed the new post-revolutionary state. The Bolsheviks were highly unable to form effective alliances and alienated almost everyone else, and yet they took over. Nothing about this is "predictable" or carved in stone.

There is a very strong narrative that Russia, whatever happens, would always have to be some sort of autocracy. We should not forget that this is a tale which has always served those in power in Russia: first the tsars and nobility and their non-democratic state apparatus, then the party apparatus who managed to purge any trace of democracy in the first country in the world which claimed allegiance to one of the most radically anti-authoritarian political philosophies that ever existed, and today Putin's militaristic cleptocracy. And it is also a tale which flatters the allegedly superior Westerners.
No country "has it in its genes" to be autocratically governed. Russia's size is no argument when Canada is a good and solid democracy; Russia's multi-ethnic and at the beginning of the 20th century highly illiterate population is no argument when India is a good and solid democracy; its agrarian nature isn't an argument (why would it be?). The political violence and intrigues which the tsarist secret police Okhrana had implemented were, in my opinion, the most powerful factor shaping a violent, cruel, and manipulative new system, not least because the new revolutionary leaders had experienced the methods of the Okhrana first-hand as its victims. But even this must not necessarily doom a country, we must only think of all the ultra-right torture-based dictatorships of Latin America, South Africa etc., who have been replaced mostly with democracies since the 1980s/90s where such cruelty has not politico-systematically returned. (Although the scars remain, and social consequences certainly exist.)

I think we need more TLs in which Russia in the 20th century is neither communist nor some sort of fascist and also doesn't suffer a warlord era or something of the like. There are plenty of possibilities. Maybe it isn't always outright racism which dooms Russia in many TLs to autocracy of some sort - maybe it is because TL writers focus on other parts of the world and write them "better", and maybe, following some unwritten "law of balance" (so that things don't become too utopian), they need a place that becomes fascist or religiously backwards or whatever instead, and, hey, why not Russia. But still. Get more creative, guys.
I think it's a lot like the tendancy to always have at least one world war. Autocracy in Russia is such a familiar and foundational part of our conception of modern history that not having it is quite alien, and requires significantly more imagination.

There's also the desire to craft an engaging story, for which one does need an antagonist and some climactic event.
 
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