Roman Republic survives by Federalism and collective farming

[octoberman]

The Roman Republic fell because of the Marian reforms which abolished the militia system of soldiers equiping themselves who loyal to the Republic and replaced them with soldiers recruited by the generals transferring the army's loyalty to the generals who used it to take power away from the Republic. These reforms were facilitated by the concentration of power into those rich enough to travel to Rome to vote because votes could only be cast in Rome's pomerium and they were necessitated by the reduction of people who had enough wealth to equip themselves. This was because they lost their land to Latfundia because they could not compete with those plantations.

So what if Rome allowed people outside jRome's pomerium to elect presentatives locally who would represent their votes in Rome and small farmers adopted collective farming to complete with Latfundia by using collection of small farms as a big farm Latfundia retaining their property along with the militia system ?

 

[bguy]

The Roman Republic fell because of the Marian reforms which abolished the militia system of soldiers equiping themselves who loyal to the Republic and replaced them with soldiers recruited by the generals transferring the army's loyalty to the generals who used it to take power away from the Republic.

I would disagree with the idea that it was the Marian reforms that caused the downfall of the Republic.

For one thing the Marian reforms never actually happened. (Or at least they weren't anything done by Marius.) Professor Bret Devereaux has a good article explaining this and showing that the only one of the Marian reforms that might have actually been done by Marius himself was the standardization of the eagle standard for the legions.

Collections: The Marian Reforms Weren’t a Thing

This week we’re going to take a bit of a detour because the previous post on the Roman conscription system, the dilectus, sparked some discussion both here and on social media which made me r…

acoup.blog

In particular the army becoming a professional force made up of volunteers was a development that occurred during the reign of Augustus. Marius did use poor volunteers for one of his campaigns but that was in response to a specific political conflict between him and the Senate (the Senate was upset that Marius had used the Popular Assembly to take the command of the war against Jugurtha away from Quintus Caecilius Metellus and thus refused to allow Marius to hold a levy which led to him taking on volunteers), but there's no evidence that Marius continued to rely on volunteer troops after that campaign, and the historical record does show the Romans continuing to use their traditional levy all the way to the end of the Republic.

At any rate the Republic's ultimate defeat was not because of a lack of loyal troops. Caesar had to defeat four separate major Republican armies (and after his death the Liberators that were fighting in the Republic's name raised yet another huge army), so the Republic never lacked for troops willing to fight for it.

So what if Rome allowed people outside jRome's pomerium to elect presentatives locally who would represent their votes in Rome and small farmers adopted collective farming to complete with Latfundia by using collection of small farms as a big farm Latfundia retaining their property along with the militia system ?

I don't think that would help. What brought down the Republic was allowing Caesar to serve as proconsul in Gaul for so long and not keeping the size of his army in check. This allowed Caesar to build up a huge force of very experienced troops that were personally loyal to him. And with the wealth he obtained from his successful campaigns in Gaul, he was able not just to cement the loyalty of his troops (Caesar doubled the pay of his men right before the civil war), but also to fund a lavish building program in Rome (that won him a lot of popular support in the city) and buy the support of key politicians.

And how did Caesar obtain that long command? Through the popular assemblies. (He got his initial 5 year command through the Lex Vatinia passed in the Tribal Assembly during his consulship in 59 BC, and then got a 5 year extension enacted in 55 BC through the Lex Trebonia which was also passed in the Tribal Assembly.) Likewise, Caesar used friendly tribunes of the plebs (who are elected by the Tribal Assembly) to block the many attempts by the Optimates to terminate his command early.

The kind of reforms you are talking about would strengthen the popular assemblies and weaken the Senate. Thus they would only serve to make it easier for men like Caesar to get and hold extraordinary commands, since it was in the popular assemblies that granted such commands. (Caesar was not the only ambitious individual to obtain an extraordinary provincial command through the popular assembly after all. Prior to Caesar, Marius used the popular assembly to get command of the Jugurthine War, and Pompey used the assembly to get his commands against first the pirates and then against Mithridates, and after Caesar's first proconsulship, Aulus Gabinius, Lucius Calpurnius Piso, Crassus, and Pompey all used the popular assembly to get extraordinary provincial commands for themselves.)

 

[octoberman]

I would disagree with the idea that it was the Marian reforms that caused the downfall of the Republic.

For one thing the Marian reforms never actually happened. (Or at least they weren't anything done by Marius.) Professor Bret Devereaux has a good article explaining this and showing that the only one of the Marian reforms that might have actually been done by Marius himself was the standardization of the eagle standard for the legions.

Collections: The Marian Reforms Weren’t a Thing

This week we’re going to take a bit of a detour because the previous post on the Roman conscription system, the dilectus, sparked some discussion both here and on social media which made me r…

acoup.blog

In particular the army becoming a professional force made up of volunteers was a development that occurred during the reign of Augustus. Marius did use poor volunteers for one of his campaigns but that was in response to a specific political conflict between him and the Senate (the Senate was upset that Marius had used the Popular Assembly to take the command of the war against Jugurtha away from Quintus Caecilius Metellus and thus refused to allow Marius to hold a levy which led to him taking on volunteers), but there's no evidence that Marius continued to rely on volunteer troops after that campaign, and the historical record does show the Romans continuing to use their traditional levy all the way to the end of the Republic.

At any rate the Republic's ultimate defeat was not because of a lack of loyal troops. Caesar had to defeat four separate major Republican armies (and after his death the Liberators that were fighting in the Republic's name raised yet another huge army), so the Republic never lacked for troops willing to fight for it.



I don't think that would help. What brought down the Republic was allowing Caesar to serve as proconsul in Gaul for so long and not keeping the size of his army in check. This allowed Caesar to build up a huge force of very experienced troops that were personally loyal to him. And with the wealth he obtained from his successful campaigns in Gaul, he was able not just to cement the loyalty of his troops (Caesar doubled the pay of his men right before the civil war), but also to fund a lavish building program in Rome (that won him a lot of popular support in the city) and buy the support of key politicians.

And how did Caesar obtain that long command? Through the popular assemblies. (He got his initial 5 year command through the Lex Vatinia passed in the Tribal Assembly during his consulship in 59 BC, and then got a 5 year extension enacted in 55 BC through the Lex Trebonia which was also passed in the Tribal Assembly.) Likewise, Caesar used friendly tribunes of the plebs (who are elected by the Tribal Assembly) to block the many attempts by the Optimates to terminate his command early.

The kind of reforms you are talking about would strengthen the popular assemblies and weaken the Senate. Thus they would only serve to make it easier for men like Caesar to get and hold extraordinary commands, since it was in the popular assemblies that granted such commands. (Caesar was not the only ambitious individual to obtain an extraordinary provincial command through the popular assembly after all. Prior to Caesar, Marius used the popular assembly to get command of the Jugurthine War, and Pompey used the assembly to get his commands against first the pirates and then against Mithridates, and after Caesar's first proconsulship, Aulus Gabinius, Lucius Calpurnius Piso, Crassus, and Pompey all used the popular assembly to get extraordinary provincial commands for themselves.)

So how to save the republic ?

 

[bguy]

Erich Gruen is his book “The Last Generation of the Roman Republic” makes a compelling case that the Republic was much more vibrant than is commonly thought and would have survived if not for the hammer blow it took from Caesar’s Civil War.

In support of Gruen’s theory it’s worth considering that Pompey had taken steps during his sole consulship of 52 BC to address several of the Republic’s most serious issues. Pompey basically demonstrated how to effectively deal with political street violence (through a combination of a revised court procedure that made it much easier to prosecute political violence and by bringing legionnaires into Rome to both prevent street fighting and to safeguard court proceedings during the prosecution of gang leaders) and the law Pompey enacted that year regarding provincial governorships (where praetors and consuls would not assume their provincial commands until five years after their magistracy) was an imaginative attempt to solve the problems of corruption in the electoral process and provincial administration. Pompey’s theory was that candidates for elected office took out huge loans to bribe their way to victory and then had to fleece their provinces to get the money to pay off their debts. Pompey believed he could break this cycle by imposing a five year limit between holding office and assuming a governorship as he believed people would be much less willing to loan huge sums to candidates if they had to wait 5 years before they would even begin to get repaid, and thus it would help get money out of electoral campaigns while also reducing oppression in the provinces since governors would have much less need to fleece the provinces if they didn’t have huge debts they needed to pay off. I don’t know if it would have worked in practice, but it was an interesting idea and showed that even in the twilight of the Republic the government was not hopelessly sclerotic but was still capable of energetic reform.)

Thus if we accept Gruen’s theory then we just have to avoid Caesar’s Civil War (or failing that have the Republicans win it) to save the Republic. Both of those are doable.


For avoiding the civil war there are a number of possibilities including:

-have the Optimates realize that it is foolish to simultaneously antagonize both Pompey and Crassus in 60 BC and instead have them do the sensible thing and ally with Crassus (who hated Pompey and would have no reason to work with him if not for the Optimates opposing and humiliating Crassus over the tax relief for the Asian publicani.) Caesar may still get elected that year but his (and Pompey’s) positions are a lot weaker if Crassus is allied with the Optimates.

-have Caesar get killed or otherwise defeated while fighting the Gauls. (There are several battles where this could have easily happened.)

-have Julia survive (thus maintaining the alliance between Caesar and Pompey.) It may seem counterintuitive that maintaining the alliance between Caesar and Pompey protects the Republic, but as long as that alliance is intact Caesar is effectively safe from any prosecution and thus doesn’t have any reason to go into armed rebellion against the Republic. (Even when Caesar was allied with Pompey, the Optimates were much more effective at resisting Caesar politically then they ever were militarily, so they are much better off if they don’t push Caesar into a corner where he sees war as his only option.)

-have Pompey agree to allow Caesar’s compromise proposal where Caesar keeps Illyricum with one legion and is allowed to stand for the consulship in absentia. (Caesar without the bulk of his legions is not a threat to the Republic.)


As for the Republicans winning the civil war there’s a number of possibilities there as well:

Caesar was nearly killing in a number of battles (Dyrrachium, Pharos, and Munda.) Munda is probably too late (the war was pretty much over by that point), but if Caesar dies at Dyrrachium the Republicans win the war right then and there, and if Caesar dies at Pharos that might be enough to enable a Republican victory.

Caesar also came close to suffering a crippling defeat at Ruspina during the Thapsus Campaign but was saved by the enemy commander, Titus Labienus, getting wounded at a key moment in the battle when he came to close to the Caesarian line to taunt the Caesarian troops. If Labienus is more cautious (or the centurion that chucked the pilum at his horse is not as good a shot), then Caesar might have been killed or captured at Ruspina which probably would have meant a Republican victory.

IIRC there was also a point in the 48 BC campaign in Greece when Caesar’s army was divided between him and Antony, and Pompey moved to intercept Antony’s half of the army. Antony was warned by the locals about Pompey’s movements and thus was able to avoid Pompey’s ambush and link back up with Caesar’s forces, but if Antony hadn’t gotten that timely warning then Pompey would have had an excellent chance of defeating the Caesarians in detail by first smashing Antony’s half of the army and then turning to face a horribly outnumbered Caesar.


It’s also possible the Republic could have been saved even after Caesar as the Republican forces had some really crazy bad luck during the War of Mutina with both consuls being killed in battle during the Mutina Campaign. If even one of those consuls (Aulus Hirtius or Gaius Vibius Pansa) had survived then the War of Mutina probably turns out very differently as either Hirtius or Pansa probably would have worked with Decimus Junius Brutus to finish Antony off (rather than refusing to work with D. Brutus as Octavian did.)


Now admittedly it’s always possible that even if the Republic survives Caesar, some later general might come along and bring it down. However, I think that’s less likely because Caesar in some ways represented the perfect storm to the Republic as he was not only a world class military commander but also had the opportunity to fight a really long war in a rich territory against a hated enemy (which resulted in him not only becoming incredibly wealthy and popular but also having the justification to raise an enormous army that became extremely skilled through years of campaigning.) I don’t know how likely those circumstances are to repeat themselves because after the conquest of Gaul there just aren’t that many targets left for the Republic that are strong enough to need a long war to subjugate and rich enough to be worth conquering while actually being conquerable by the level of force a Republican proconsul could realistically raise.

Thus if the Republic can just make it past Caesar then I think it has a decent chance of surviving.

 

[octoberman]

Now admittedly it’s always possible that even if the Republic survives Caesar, some later general might come along and bring it down. However, I think that’s less likely because Caesar in some ways represented the perfect storm to the Republic as he was not only a world class military commander but also had the opportunity to fight a really long war in a rich territory against a hated enemy (which resulted in him not only becoming incredibly wealthy and popular but also having the justification to raise an enormous army that became extremely skilled through years of campaigning.) I don’t know how likely those circumstances are to repeat themselves because after the conquest of Gaul there just aren’t that many targets left for the Republic that are strong enough to need a long war to subjugate and rich enough to be worth conquering while actually being conquerable by the level of force a Republican proconsul could realistically raise.

Thus if the Republic can just make it past Caesar then I think it has a decent chance of surviving.

But Marius overthrew the Republic and Sulla took over Rome with his army yet neither were as wealthy nor popular as Ceaser was. The Republic seems to be doomed after it became an Empire

 

[not livius]

Pompey’s theory was that candidates for elected office took out huge loans to bribe their way to victory and then had to fleece their provinces to get the money to pay off their debts. Pompey believed he could break this cycle by imposing a five year limit between holding office and assuming a governorship as he believed people would be much less willing to loan huge sums to candidates if they had to wait 5 years before they would even begin to get repaid, and thus it would help get money out of electoral campaigns while also reducing oppression in the provinces since governors would have much less need to fleece the provinces if they didn’t have huge debts they needed to pay off. I don’t know if it would have worked in practice, but it was an interesting idea and showed that even in the twilight of the Republic the government was not hopelessly sclerotic but was still capable of energetic reform

The other thing the 5-year gap does is keep former consuls in Rome as civilians for enough time for them to be prosecuted for anything illegal they did while in office, which might have reduced the amount of political violence and constitutionally questionable activities in Rome after the 50s BCE. One reason Caesar was so insistant on his right to stand for his second consulship in absentia was because he was concerned that Cato and his supporters would charge him with something (starting an illegal war? political violence? both were plausible) and that Pompey would use the trial to get rid of him.

It’s also possible the Republic could have been saved even after Caesar as the Republican forces had some really crazy bad luck during the War of Mutina with both consuls being killed in battle during the Mutina Campaign. If even one of those consuls (Aulus Hirtius or Gaius Vibius Pansa) had survived then the War of Mutina probably turns out very differently as either Hirtius or Pansa probably would have worked with Decimus Junius Brutus to finish Antony off (rather than refusing to work with D. Brutus as Octavian did.)

Yes, Octavian was very lucky, and even after 44/43, anything that gets him out of the way is likely to lead to some kind of republican restoration, depending on how we define that. My actual suggestion for avoiding civil war is getting rid of Cato, not Caesar -- I think Cato pushed Pompey more strongly to oppose Caesar than he might have done otherwise, and that in turn gave Caesar the opportunity to act more forcefully than he might have.

So what if Rome allowed people outside jRome's pomerium to elect presentatives locally who would represent their votes in Rome and small farmers adopted collective farming to complete with Latfundia by using collection of small farms as a big farm Latfundia retaining their property along with the militia system ?

So your point about latifundia isn't quite right: latifundia and small farms aren't in competition with each other. But you have touched on an issue which does contribute to instability: military commanders want their soldiers to have land in Italy, and their soldiers want land in Italy, because they need to be near Rome to be politically active/politically useful. But. once the publically owned land is distributed there isn't a lot of land to be parcelled out, and not much of it is suitable for small veteran-owned farms. And the people who already own that land are understandably unwilling to have it confiscated from them. So basically to get land grants for your veterans is going to involve some violence to other Romans somewhere, most of the time. But if they could, say, do a redistribution of the voting tribes and let each tribe vote in its own local center, even outside Italy, and then have those votes transferred to Rome, that would take the pressure off Italian land. It would be awkward and time-consuming but so was Roman voting in general. (I am thinking of once center per tribe -- so the voting by tribes would occur locally and the votes of each tribe would be reported in Rome, and the winner chosen that way. I think the comitia centuriata might just keep meeting in Rome but those people can get to Rome anyway so its less of a problem.)

You know, I am going to tuck this idea way in case I ever do write a Cicero timeline.

 

[bguy]

My actual suggestion for avoiding civil war is getting rid of Cato, not Caesar -- I think Cato pushed Pompey more strongly to oppose Caesar than he might have done otherwise, and that in turn gave Caesar the opportunity to act more forcefully than he might have.

Very true. Out of the 4 scenarios I listed for avoiding the civil war, Cato is the problem in two of them. (He was the one driving opposition to Crassus' tax bill when the Optimates had already picked a fight with Pompey, and IIRC he was also instrumental in convincing Pompey not to accept Caesar's one legion + Illyricum offer.)

So your point about latifundia isn't quite right: latifundia and small farms aren't in competition with each other. But you have touched on an issue which does contribute to instability: military commanders want their soldiers to have land in Italy, and their soldiers want land in Italy, because they need to be near Rome to be politically active/politically useful. But. once the publically owned land is distributed there isn't a lot of land to be parcelled out, and not much of it is suitable for small veteran-owned farms. And the people who already own that land are understandably unwilling to have it confiscated from them. So basically to get land grants for your veterans is going to involve some violence to other Romans somewhere, most of the time. But if they could, say, do a redistribution of the voting tribes and let each tribe vote in its own local center, even outside Italy, and then have those votes transferred to Rome, that would take the pressure off Italian land. It would be awkward and time-consuming but so was Roman voting in general. (I am thinking of once center per tribe -- so the voting by tribes would occur locally and the votes of each tribe would be reported in Rome, and the winner chosen that way. I think the comitia centuriata might just keep meeting in Rome but those people can get to Rome anyway so its less of a problem.)

It's an interesting idea but were the tribes still geographically contiguous by the late Republic? I know they were in the early Republic but as the Republic gained more and more territory, I believe that newly acquired land started getting added on to the existing tribes in a rather ad hoc manner and without any regard to whether the new land actually bordered the tribes' existing territory (with the end result that all the rural tribes ended up consisting of a bunch of disconnected districts.) It will be hard to make regional voting centers work if half the tribe is in Samnium, one quarter is in Cisalpine Gaul and one quarter is in Further Spain.

 

[not livius]

It's an interesting idea but were the tribes still geographically contiguous by the late Republic? I know they were in the early Republic but as the Republic gained more and more territory, I believe that newly acquired land started getting added on to the existing tribes in a rather ad hoc manner and without any regard to whether the new land actually bordered the tribes' existing territory (with the end result that all the rural tribes ended up consisting of a bunch of disconnected districts.) It will be hard to make regional voting centers work if half the tribe is in Samnium, one quarter is in Cisalpine Gaul and one quarter is in Further Spain.

Oh, yes -- I wasn't clear enough. You're right, by the Late Republic the tribes aren't contiguous. I'm imagining an redrawing of tribal affiliations, from scratch, so that they would be contiguous and so that people could vote easily within their tribes. So imagine that, say, all the Roman citizens within a single province vote in the same tribe, or one of two or three, depending on the size & population of the province, and likewise the regions within Italy. To take this back to the original question, I somewhere encountered the idea (maybe in T. P. Wiseman somewhere?) that one of the contributing factors to the fall of the Republic was that the Italians just never really bought into the system: it didn't work for them, and the post-Sullan settlement didn't really empower them. And of course the same is true of poorer Romans in the countryside: they werere never going to show up to vote in the city, or hardly ever. So from their perspective, voting assemblies & elections in Rome just weren't worth fighting for (unlike a general, who might actually be able to do something for you!) But if ordinary citizens, especially Italians and veterans, see the rituals of Roman civic life as an important part of their identity then they're less likely to shrug their shoulders and follow whichever warlord looks likely at the moment.

Obviously the time to do this would be the census of 69 BCE, so it's not very likely! And I have a feeling Romans would not want to be shifted around into other tribes like this. But I'm not sure that top-down solutions to salvaging the republic are sufficient: coming back to Sulla, the issue isn't just that he decides to march on Rome, it's that his soldiers follow him.

 

[octoberman]

Yes, Octavian was very lucky, and even after 44/43, anything that gets him out of the way is likely to lead to some kind of republican restoration

How ?

 

[isabella]

Erich Gruen is his book “The Last Generation of the Roman Republic” makes a compelling case that the Republic was much more vibrant than is commonly thought and would have survived if not for the hammer blow it took from Caesar’s Civil War.

In support of Gruen’s theory it’s worth considering that Pompey had taken steps during his sole consulship of 52 BC to address several of the Republic’s most serious issues. Pompey basically demonstrated how to effectively deal with political street violence (through a combination of a revised court procedure that made it much easier to prosecute political violence and by bringing legionnaires into Rome to both prevent street fighting and to safeguard court proceedings during the prosecution of gang leaders) and the law Pompey enacted that year regarding provincial governorships (where praetors and consuls would not assume their provincial commands until five years after their magistracy) was an imaginative attempt to solve the problems of corruption in the electoral process and provincial administration. Pompey’s theory was that candidates for elected office took out huge loans to bribe their way to victory and then had to fleece their provinces to get the money to pay off their debts. Pompey believed he could break this cycle by imposing a five year limit between holding office and assuming a governorship as he believed people would be much less willing to loan huge sums to candidates if they had to wait 5 years before they would even begin to get repaid, and thus it would help get money out of electoral campaigns while also reducing oppression in the provinces since governors would have much less need to fleece the provinces if they didn’t have huge debts they needed to pay off. I don’t know if it would have worked in practice, but it was an interesting idea and showed that even in the twilight of the Republic the government was not hopelessly sclerotic but was still capable of energetic reform.)

Thus if we accept Gruen’s theory then we just have to avoid Caesar’s Civil War (or failing that have the Republicans win it) to save the Republic. Both of those are doable.

The problem is not so much Cesar than Augustus, so you need to prevent Octavian‘s rise for saving the Republic.

For avoiding the civil war there are a number of possibilities including:

-have the Optimates realize that it is foolish to simultaneously antagonize both Pompey and Crassus in 60 BC and instead have them do the sensible thing and ally with Crassus (who hated Pompey and would have no reason to work with him if not for the Optimates opposing and humiliating Crassus over the tax relief for the Asian publicani.) Caesar may still get elected that year but his (and Pompey’s) positions are a lot weaker if Crassus is allied with the Optimates.

I am not sure of what Caesar’s position would be in this scenario as he was closer to Crassus than Pompey…

-have Caesar get killed or otherwise defeated while fighting the Gauls. (There are several battles where this could have easily happened.)

This work without doubt

-have Julia survive (thus maintaining the alliance between Caesar and Pompey.) It may seem counterintuitive that maintaining the alliance between Caesar and Pompey protects the Republic, but as long as that alliance is intact Caesar is effectively safe from any prosecution and thus doesn’t have any reason to go into armed rebellion against the Republic. (Even when Caesar was allied with Pompey, the Optimates were much more effective at resisting Caesar politically then they ever were militarily, so they are much better off if they don’t push Caesar into a corner where he sees war as his only option.)

I agree

-have Pompey agree to allow Caesar’s compromise proposal where Caesar keeps Illyricum with one legion and is allowed to stand for the consulship in absentia. (Caesar without the bulk of his legions is not a threat to the Republic.)

I would say who any scenario in which Caesar is not basically forced to start a Civil War by his enemies would work (because the Optimates were the ones who truly started that Civil War not Caesar)

The other thing the 5-year gap does is keep former consuls in Rome as civilians for enough time for them to be prosecuted for anything illegal they did while in office, which might have reduced the amount of political violence and constitutionally questionable activities in Rome after the 50s BCE. One reason Caesar was so insistant on his right to stand for his second consulship in absentia was because he was concerned that Cato and his supporters would charge him with something (starting an illegal war? political violence? both were plausible) and that Pompey would use the trial to get rid of him.

Yes, Octavian was very lucky, and even after 44/43, anything that gets him out of the way is likely to lead to some kind of republican restoration, depending on how we define that. My actual suggestion for avoiding civil war is getting rid of Cato, not Caesar -- I think Cato pushed Pompey more strongly to oppose Caesar than he might have done otherwise, and that in turn gave Caesar the opportunity to act more forcefully than he might have.

Fully agree on the fact who get rid of Cato is a great idea for preventing the Civil War between Caesar and Pompey as Caesar do not wanted the war and was basically forced in taking the military option by his enemies.

 

[bguy]

To take this back to the original question, I somewhere encountered the idea (maybe in T. P. Wiseman somewhere?) that one of the contributing factors to the fall of the Republic was that the Italians just never really bought into the system: it didn't work for them, and the post-Sullan settlement didn't really empower them. And of course the same is true of poorer Romans in the countryside: they werere never going to show up to vote in the city, or hardly ever. So from their perspective, voting assemblies & elections in Rome just weren't worth fighting for (unlike a general, who might actually be able to do something for you!)

Of course to the Roman elites marginalizing the political power of the Italians and the rural poor was not a bug but a feature of the system. And from their perspective it was effective. The rural poor may not have been super motivated to fight for the Republic, but they also don't appear to have been particularly motivated to fight against it. (Notably, all the rebellions that were aimed at addressing grievances of the rural population (Lepidus, Catalina, Lucius Antonius) all withered and died due to a lack of sufficient troops. It was the rebellions that were addressing the grievances of wronged patricians (Sulla and Caesar) that succeeded.)

But if ordinary citizens, especially Italians and veterans, see the rituals of Roman civic life as an important part of their identity then they're less likely to shrug their shoulders and follow whichever warlord looks likely at the moment.

I don't know if that would work because even if the Romans create a stronger sense of civic unity, the warlords that actually succeeded (Sulla and Caesar) did so by portraying themselves as patriotic Romans who had performed great service for the Republic and were only marching on Rome because they had been unfairly targeted for destruction by corrupt and even tyrannical political rivals. Instilling greater commitment to the Republic in the populace won't stop the warlords if the warlords themselves can convince the populace that they are the actual champions of the Republic.

Of course I'm also skeptical how much mass popular support really mattered in the Roman civil wars. Sulla and Caesar won their civil wars, not because of mass popular support but because of the large number of veteran troops they had that were loyal to them, and I don't know if any kind of franchise reform would do any good at preventing veterans from bonding to their long time commanders. (It's always going to be easier for people to form strong bond with other people over institutions or ideas, and that's doubly so if you've been through a difficult experience (like years of warfare) with that person. Thus it's going to be extremely difficult to prevent troops who spend years in the service of a charismatic, capable successful general to keep from becoming loyal to that commander.)

The problem is not so much Cesar than Augustus, so you need to prevent Octavian‘s rise for saving the Republic.

Which shouldn't be that hard. Octavian got a lot of lucky breaks and even so he still had several really close calls.

I am not sure of what Caesar’s position would be in this scenario as he was closer to Crassus than Pompey…

He certainly had a stronger history with Crassus though at some point during Caesar's (first) consulship he seems to have decided to prioritize his relationship with Pompey over Crassus. (At the start of that year Caesar would always call on Crassus first in senate debates, but after Pompey married Julia, Caesar called on Pompey first for the remainder of the year,) I think that suggests that if forced to choose, Caesar would go with Pompey over Crassus. (Though of course he will try very hard to keep both of them as allies.)

 

[isabella]

Which shouldn't be that hard. Octavian got a lot of lucky breaks and even so he still had several really close calls.

Exactly

He certainly had a stronger history with Crassus though at some point during Caesar's (first) consulship he seems to have decided to prioritize his relationship with Pompey over Crassus. (At the start of that year Caesar would always call on Crassus first in senate debates, but after Pompey married Julia, Caesar called on Pompey first for the remainder of the year,) I think that suggests that if forced to choose, Caesar would go with Pompey over Crassus. (Though of course he will try very hard to keep both of them as allies.)

Yes, but that was after their alliance was established and Pompey married Julia. If the First Triumvirate do not happen and so Pompey do not marry Julia is likely who Cesar’s relationship with Crassus will remain strong

 

[Flavius Iulius Maiorianus]

What would be the effects of a surviving Roman Republic? Would it be able to effectively govern the vast territory Rome had aquired?

 

[bguy]

What would be the effects of a surviving Roman Republic?

Ptolemaic Egypt might maintain its independence as a Roman client state. The Senate was very sensitive to any one Roman getting control of Egypt since the wealth and grain of that country would instantly make that individual a threat to the entire Republic and thus the entire political class will rally against any Roman official that tries to conquer Egypt. Thus absent one man achieving domination over the Roman state, there's a good chance Egypt stays independent just because it's too dangerous to the Republic to let any one person conquer it.

Rome in general is likely to be less involved in Africa than IOTL. Numidia and Egypt only got annexed because they ended up on the wrong side of a Roman civil war, and Mauretania only got annexed because of Caligula. (Your typical Roman proconsul stationed in Africa or Spain isn't going to go and invade a long standing Roman ally for no reason, so there's no reason for them to invade Mauretania.)

I would expect Rome to be more aggressive in northwest Europe, the Balkans, and the Mid-East than it was IOTL as the Republican political system encourages ambitious Roman politicians to try and make a name for themselves by winning military victories. We might actually see Rome make serious attempts to conquer Scotland and Ireland ITTL, and there will almost certainly be much more fighting against the Germans and Parthians.

Would it be able to effectively govern the vast territory Rome had aquired?

Very possible. By the OTL fall of the Republic, Rome's only real foreign rival was the Parthian Empire, and the Parthians, though powerful, had their own critical weaknesses (endemic political instability, poor siegecraft, and their eastern border was vulnerable to attack from steppe nomads) that kept them from ever being able to truly threaten Roman territory. The Germans, Illyrians, and Dacians, though fierce warriors who would prove difficult for Rome to conquer, were all too politically fragmented to really threaten the Republic. Thus a surviving Republic would be pretty safe from foreign threats for the foreseeable future.

As for provincial rebellions, most of Rome's provinces at the OTL fall of the Republic were fairly well pacified. Gallia Comata and Judaea were exceptions of course, but a surviving Republic should be strong enough to keep them under control. (And without the cult of the Caesars, there will probably be somewhat less tension in Judaea, so it might be less rebellious.) Pompey's new law on provincial governors might also help reduce unrest in the provinces by giving governors less reason to exploit their provinces. Long term the Republic really needs to bring the publicani to heel as their exploitative tax farming is causing a great deal of resentment in the provinces. That will be difficult as the publicani have a lot of political muscle in Rome, but by the end of the Republic more and more of the most powerful figures seemed to realize the need for better government in the provinces (Caesar, Pompey, and Cato all supported various reforms of provincial administration for instance), so there's definitely influential voices that could push for the needed reform. I could see Caesar in particular in a timeline where the civil war is avoided, having his second consulship then going off to fight the Parthians and (assuming that war is reasonably successful), then coming back for a third and final consulship and pushing for legislation to clip the publicani's wings in that final consulship as the capstone to his career.)

Now certainly if the Republic continues to expand (which I think it will) then they are likely to conquer areas like Britain and Illyricum that will be rebellious for some time. That will put pressure on the Republic, but IOTL the Republic proved pretty effective at dealing with native rebellions in Gaul and Spain and Asia Minor as it expanded into those regions, so there's no real reason to think the Republic will prove less effective than the Principate did at quelling uprisings in Illyricum and Britain.

The biggest danger to the Republic is that with no one really directing its foreign policy and a political system that encourages military adventurism from its frontier governors, it could easily overextend itself. It's easy to imagine a scenario where ambitious Roman proconsuls get the Republic involved in wars in Scotland, Germany, Dacia, and against Parthia all at the same time.

 

[Flavius Iulius Maiorianus]

Ptolemaic Egypt might maintain its independence as a Roman client state. The Senate was very sensitive to any one Roman getting control of Egypt since the wealth and grain of that country would instantly make that individual a threat to the entire Republic and thus the entire political class will rally against any Roman official that tries to conquer Egypt. Thus absent one man achieving domination over the Roman state, there's a good chance Egypt stays independent just because it's too dangerous to the Republic to let any one person conquer it.

Rome in general is likely to be less involved in Africa than IOTL. Numidia and Egypt only got annexed because they ended up on the wrong side of a Roman civil war, and Mauretania only got annexed because of Caligula. (Your typical Roman proconsul stationed in Africa or Spain isn't going to go and invade a long standing Roman ally for no reason, so there's no reason for them to invade Mauretania.)

I would expect Rome to be more aggressive in northwest Europe, the Balkans, and the Mid-East than it was IOTL as the Republican political system encourages ambitious Roman politicians to try and make a name for themselves by winning military victories. We might actually see Rome make serious attempts to conquer Scotland and Ireland ITTL, and there will almost certainly be much more fighting against the Germans and Parthians.



Very possible. By the OTL fall of the Republic, Rome's only real foreign rival was the Parthian Empire, and the Parthians, though powerful, had their own critical weaknesses (endemic political instability, poor siegecraft, and their eastern border was vulnerable to attack from steppe nomads) that kept them from ever being able to truly threaten Roman territory. The Germans, Illyrians, and Dacians, though fierce warriors who would prove difficult for Rome to conquer, were all too politically fragmented to really threaten the Republic. Thus a surviving Republic would be pretty safe from foreign threats for the foreseeable future.

As for provincial rebellions, most of Rome's provinces at the OTL fall of the Republic were fairly well pacified. Gallia Comata and Judaea were exceptions of course, but a surviving Republic should be strong enough to keep them under control. (And without the cult of the Caesars, there will probably be somewhat less tension in Judaea, so it might be less rebellious.) Pompey's new law on provincial governors might also help reduce unrest in the provinces by giving governors less reason to exploit their provinces. Long term the Republic really needs to bring the publicani to heel as their exploitative tax farming is causing a great deal of resentment in the provinces. That will be difficult as the publicani have a lot of political muscle in Rome, but by the end of the Republic more and more of the most powerful figures seemed to realize the need for better government in the provinces (Caesar, Pompey, and Cato all supported various reforms of provincial administration for instance), so there's definitely influential voices that could push for the needed reform. I could see Caesar in particular in a timeline where the civil war is avoided, having his second consulship then going off to fight the Parthians and (assuming that war is reasonably successful), then coming back for a third and final consulship and pushing for legislation to clip the publicani's wings in that final consulship as the capstone to his career.)

Now certainly if the Republic continues to expand (which I think it will) then they are likely to conquer areas like Britain and Illyricum that will be rebellious for some time. That will put pressure on the Republic, but IOTL the Republic proved pretty effective at dealing with native rebellions in Gaul and Spain and Asia Minor as it expanded into those regions, so there's no real reason to think the Republic will prove less effective than the Principate did at quelling uprisings in Illyricum and Britain.

The biggest danger to the Republic is that with no one really directing its foreign policy and a political system that encourages military adventurism from its frontier governors, it could easily overextend itself. It's easy to imagine a scenario where ambitious Roman proconsuls get the Republic involved in wars in Scotland, Germany, Dacia, and against Parthia all at the same time.

That all seems likely. Do you think Rome would actually conquer Germany in this timeline? And would there eventually be some massive crisis like that of the Third Century? Obviously you can't stop stuff like climate change or the Antonine plague, but would there be a huge period of instability and civil war? What would the Roman military look like?

 

[bguy]

That all seems likely. Do you think Rome would actually conquer Germany in this timeline?

I don't know. The Romans made a titanic effort to conquer Germany IOTL with some very capable generals, and it still wasn't enough, so Germany is obviously a very tough nut to crack. If the Romans do succeed it will probably be more like the Roman conquest of Iberia, with a long progression of Roman provincial governors taking little bites out of Germany every few years over the course of a century (or two) until they've gobbled the entire country up, rather than through having a Caesar like figure conquer all of Germany in one epic campaign.

And would there eventually be some massive crisis like that of the Third Century? Obviously you can't stop stuff like climate change or the Antonine plague, but would there be a huge period of instability and civil war?

In truth I'm not all that familiar with the Crisis of the Third Century (most of my study of Roman history has been of the Late Republic and the Julio-Claudian dynasty), but I would think that given the size and complexity of Rome's empire it will be difficult for them to avoid something like the Crisis indefinitely. (Eventually Rome is bound to get hit by a devastating plague, or lose a key battle due to an incompetent general, or have a civil war break out at just the wrong moment.)

What would the Roman military look like?

It will be interesting to see if more wars against the Parthians see the Romans shift to greater reliance on cavalry earlier than IOTL.

 

[Flavius Iulius Maiorianus]

I don't know. The Romans made a titanic effort to conquer Germany IOTL with some very capable generals, and it still wasn't enough, so Germany is obviously a very tough nut to crack. If the Romans do succeed it will probably be more like the Roman conquest of Iberia, with a long progression of Roman provincial governors taking little bites out of Germany every few years over the course of a century (or two) until they've gobbled the entire country up, rather than through having a Caesar like figure conquer all of Germany in one epic campaign.



In truth I'm not all that familiar with the Crisis of the Third Century (most of my study of Roman history has been of the Late Republic and the Julio-Claudian dynasty), but I would think that given the size and complexity of Rome's empire it will be difficult for them to avoid something like the Crisis indefinitely. (Eventually Rome is bound to get hit by a devastating plague, or lose a key battle due to an incompetent general, or have a civil war break out at just the wrong moment.)



It will be interesting to see if more wars against the Parthians see the Romans shift to greater reliance on cavalry earlier than IOTL.

I think Germania was just too worthless to hold on to in the long term. There was literally nothing but swampy forests and rebellious barbarians there.

The Crisis of the Third Century had some long term causes, but it also had a lot of short-term causes. Namely, the rise of the Sassanid Empire, a far more capable power than the Parthians, forced the Romans to increase their military spending to keep up with the threat. The Germanic tribes also began to group into larger, more complex groups and became a bigger threat. And Commodus set a ton of bad precedents, such as emperors being able to get away with basically whatever they wanted as long as the legions backed them up and having to up the pay of the legions when they came to power, further straining Rome's finances. And so a perfect storm of barbarian invasions, massive military expenditures and emperors buying them off, abuses of power, and the rise of a massive threat to the east.

 

[Evil Crusader]

I don't really think the Roman Republic could really endure and reform, regardless, if they did manage to push into Germania, they would probably stick to Germania Antiqua: