By December of 1973, Portugal's prime minister Marcello Caetano had become increasingly unpopular. For those on the left, he hadn't gone far enough in democratizing the regime. For those on the right, he was a weak technocrat who was incapable of ruling in the way Salazar had done.
Around December 15-17, General Kaúlza de Arriaga who had been Military Commander of Mozambique until earlier that year was preparing a coup along with other right-wing generals. They included General Joaquim da Luz Cunha (his brother-in-law), and a military commander in Angola, and General Henrique Troni (Minister of Defence). The other accomplices were General Silvino Silvério Marques (Governor-General of Angola) and José Manuel Bettencourt Rodrigues (Governor of Portuguese Guinea). All of this was to go on with the tacit approval of Admiral Américo Tomás (the aging President of the Republic).
The plan was to use paratroopers if necessary and replace the government of Marcello Caetano with Adriano Moreira (the former Overseas Minister under Salazar) and Franco Nogueira (Salazar's former Foreign Minister). However, General de Arriaga made the mistake of informing a member of the Captain's movement of the plans for a coup, and he brought this to the attention of the Generals Costa Gomes and Spinola whom in turn informed Marcello Caetano. General de Arriaga backed down, and as it turned out a leftist coup would take place 25 of April 1974.
Also, with the complicity of President Tomás, the idea was to make the coup look seamless. The idea would be to have Tomás stay on for a while and dismiss Marcello Caetano, and appoint a new cabinet headed by Adriano Moreira. Tomás who had planned on resigning upon his 80th birthday in November of 1974, would step aside with the Council of Ministers and Corporate Chambre nominating Kaúlza de Arriaga as president.
However, what if the coup had succeeded? General de Arriaga was a prodigious righter, especially after 1974 where he outlined his ideas for Portugal and its empire. In 1977 he co-authored a book called "África A Vitória Traída" (Africa: Victory Betrayed) with his co-conspirators Generals Joaquim da Luz Cunha, Bettencourt Rodrigues and Silvino Silvério Marques.
In the book, they do outline how the war in Portuguese Guinea was stalemated and was consuming too many resources. By 1974, 35,000 troops were bogged down in the smallest and poorest of Portugal's colonies. In the book, it appears that General Bettencourt Rodrigues (Governor of Portuguese Guinea) advocated a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all of the loyalist African troops and their familes.
In OTL there were around 7,500 former Portuguese-Guinean troops that were killed or driven into exile after the PAIGC assumed power. The best solution would have been to take the African troops, loyalists and their families and resettle them in the Tete district in Mozambique around the Zambezi river. The idea would be to grant them homesteads on the newly irrigated land around the new Cabora-Bassa dam. Here they would act as militias and be retrained as commando units. This was similar to what had been done with the 4,000 or so former Katangan soldiers in Eastern Angola. These Guineans would be under command of the Secret Police and not the army and by offering them land to defend, they could provide a buffer zone within Mozambique.
This would be important, because in the sparsely populated Tete district of Mozambique, FRELIMO had opened a new front in 1969, from its bases in Zambia. The idea was initially to settle Portuguese settlers in the irrigated land, but since 1969 irregular African troops (commandos, and special forces) had proven their valour in Angola and were the fiercest fighters the Portuguese had in war, and had turned the tide in Angola.
As of late 1973, the Portuguese government had high-level meetings with Rhodesia and South Africa to cooperate militarily in the defence of Southern Africa. To this end, plans were drawn up on how to defend both Angola and Mozambique, as they were buffers for both countries. Since 1966, the SAAF had already had 6 Puma helicopters stationed in the Caprivi Strip to assist the Portuguese in Eastern Angola.
However, under a secret plan code-named Alcora, military cooperation was about to become much more extensive between the three countries. General de Arriaga was a proponent of this, as he along with using more African troops as a way of decreasing the burden on mainland Portugal. Rhodesian and South African forces would be allowed be actively engaged in Mozambique after 1973. The Rhodesians, would help defend the Beira railway corridor which was vital for their survival. The South Africans in turn were to base SA-330 Puma helicopters around the Cabora-Bassa damn and in Northern Mozambique to station Mirages and Canberras to attack FRELIMO bases in Tanzania.
In Angola where the situation very much under control of the Portuguese after 1974, the SAAF was to send Mirages and Canberras to Luanda to protect Angolan oil supplies from foreign powers. Two-thirds of Angola's oil however, was in Cabinda a sparsely populated enclave north of the Congo river. According to the Portuguese constitution of 1933, it was listed as a separate overseas province. In 1965 the FNLA leader from Cabinda left the party and joined the Portuguese, becoming the commander of 2,000 Cabindan special forces protecting the enclave. The leader of these troops said that Cabinda could not exist as an independent country (with only 100,000 inhabitants in 1974), and that its future was with Portugal. The plan would be to integrate this territory into Portugal along with the Cape Verde Islands, São Tome e Príncipe and Portuguese Timor, just as the Azores and Madeira had been.
Around December 15-17, General Kaúlza de Arriaga who had been Military Commander of Mozambique until earlier that year was preparing a coup along with other right-wing generals. They included General Joaquim da Luz Cunha (his brother-in-law), and a military commander in Angola, and General Henrique Troni (Minister of Defence). The other accomplices were General Silvino Silvério Marques (Governor-General of Angola) and José Manuel Bettencourt Rodrigues (Governor of Portuguese Guinea). All of this was to go on with the tacit approval of Admiral Américo Tomás (the aging President of the Republic).
The plan was to use paratroopers if necessary and replace the government of Marcello Caetano with Adriano Moreira (the former Overseas Minister under Salazar) and Franco Nogueira (Salazar's former Foreign Minister). However, General de Arriaga made the mistake of informing a member of the Captain's movement of the plans for a coup, and he brought this to the attention of the Generals Costa Gomes and Spinola whom in turn informed Marcello Caetano. General de Arriaga backed down, and as it turned out a leftist coup would take place 25 of April 1974.
Also, with the complicity of President Tomás, the idea was to make the coup look seamless. The idea would be to have Tomás stay on for a while and dismiss Marcello Caetano, and appoint a new cabinet headed by Adriano Moreira. Tomás who had planned on resigning upon his 80th birthday in November of 1974, would step aside with the Council of Ministers and Corporate Chambre nominating Kaúlza de Arriaga as president.
However, what if the coup had succeeded? General de Arriaga was a prodigious righter, especially after 1974 where he outlined his ideas for Portugal and its empire. In 1977 he co-authored a book called "África A Vitória Traída" (Africa: Victory Betrayed) with his co-conspirators Generals Joaquim da Luz Cunha, Bettencourt Rodrigues and Silvino Silvério Marques.
In the book, they do outline how the war in Portuguese Guinea was stalemated and was consuming too many resources. By 1974, 35,000 troops were bogged down in the smallest and poorest of Portugal's colonies. In the book, it appears that General Bettencourt Rodrigues (Governor of Portuguese Guinea) advocated a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all of the loyalist African troops and their familes.
In OTL there were around 7,500 former Portuguese-Guinean troops that were killed or driven into exile after the PAIGC assumed power. The best solution would have been to take the African troops, loyalists and their families and resettle them in the Tete district in Mozambique around the Zambezi river. The idea would be to grant them homesteads on the newly irrigated land around the new Cabora-Bassa dam. Here they would act as militias and be retrained as commando units. This was similar to what had been done with the 4,000 or so former Katangan soldiers in Eastern Angola. These Guineans would be under command of the Secret Police and not the army and by offering them land to defend, they could provide a buffer zone within Mozambique.
This would be important, because in the sparsely populated Tete district of Mozambique, FRELIMO had opened a new front in 1969, from its bases in Zambia. The idea was initially to settle Portuguese settlers in the irrigated land, but since 1969 irregular African troops (commandos, and special forces) had proven their valour in Angola and were the fiercest fighters the Portuguese had in war, and had turned the tide in Angola.
As of late 1973, the Portuguese government had high-level meetings with Rhodesia and South Africa to cooperate militarily in the defence of Southern Africa. To this end, plans were drawn up on how to defend both Angola and Mozambique, as they were buffers for both countries. Since 1966, the SAAF had already had 6 Puma helicopters stationed in the Caprivi Strip to assist the Portuguese in Eastern Angola.
However, under a secret plan code-named Alcora, military cooperation was about to become much more extensive between the three countries. General de Arriaga was a proponent of this, as he along with using more African troops as a way of decreasing the burden on mainland Portugal. Rhodesian and South African forces would be allowed be actively engaged in Mozambique after 1973. The Rhodesians, would help defend the Beira railway corridor which was vital for their survival. The South Africans in turn were to base SA-330 Puma helicopters around the Cabora-Bassa damn and in Northern Mozambique to station Mirages and Canberras to attack FRELIMO bases in Tanzania.
In Angola where the situation very much under control of the Portuguese after 1974, the SAAF was to send Mirages and Canberras to Luanda to protect Angolan oil supplies from foreign powers. Two-thirds of Angola's oil however, was in Cabinda a sparsely populated enclave north of the Congo river. According to the Portuguese constitution of 1933, it was listed as a separate overseas province. In 1965 the FNLA leader from Cabinda left the party and joined the Portuguese, becoming the commander of 2,000 Cabindan special forces protecting the enclave. The leader of these troops said that Cabinda could not exist as an independent country (with only 100,000 inhabitants in 1974), and that its future was with Portugal. The plan would be to integrate this territory into Portugal along with the Cape Verde Islands, São Tome e Príncipe and Portuguese Timor, just as the Azores and Madeira had been.
