Refusing to Retaliate: Nuclear War

[EWHM]

With the increased availability of information about ordinary people past around 1990 or so, I could actually see a nuclear power attempting to subvert the second strike of its rival. If you can identify the particular individuals involved in turning the keys, you could channel them a message of this form:

Your family and clan lives around this sector. This sector is currently NOT on our target list. They'll probably be ok.

But if the nukes you're tagged as associated with fly, that sector will be completely annihilated.

Information age warfare creates the potential for a hardcore principal-agent problem with regard to nuclear custody. I wonder if that potential has actually been explored? I know that the Taliban did something similar with the ANA, basically targeting lots of key people with similar offers.

 

[Legofan4]

With the increased availability of information about ordinary people past around 1990 or so, I could actually see a nuclear power attempting to subvert the second strike of its rival. If you can identify the particular individuals involved in turning the keys, you could channel them a message of this form:

Your family and clan lives around this sector. This sector is currently NOT on our target list. They'll probably be ok.

But if the nukes you're tagged as associated with fly, that sector will be completely annihilated.

Information age warfare creates the potential for a hardcore principal-agent problem with regard to nuclear custody. I wonder if that potential has actually been explored? I know that the Taliban did something similar with the ANA, basically targeting lots of key people with similar offers.

That only works if the many people working at a base are from one area. In the U.S. at least they have long discarded units only raised from a single state even let alone only one city. The only part that works that way is the national guard which doesn't handle strategic weapons.

 

[Mad Bad Rabbit]

Russia may or may not have Perimiter (aka "Dead Hand") still active, possibly with automated launch capability.

 

[EWHM]

That only works if the many people working at a base are from one area. In the U.S. at least they have long discarded units only raised from a single state even let alone only one city. The only part that works that way is the national guard which doesn't handle strategic weapons.

If you're talking, say a submarine, you don't need everybody, just enough to subvert the sub's launch or, I suppose, to make your rival believe you may be able to subvert the sub's launch. And certain areas of the US are disproportionately places of origin for military types and not particularly high value nuclear targets. I can't say if the same is true for other nuclear powers. The US has a disproportionately Southern and rural military.

 

[comrade cat]

I don't recall where but i am pretty sure I saw a study by the AirForce that said that they expect a certain percentage of ICBMs to not be launched because the Airmen not being able to bring themselves to turn the key.
So i don't think this idea is out of the realm of possibility in limited numbers.

That being said.. for the most part those turning the key where not (i believe) random draftees. I believe they were all screened and all volenteers for the positions. And that they could ask for a change of assignment if they had second thoughts. So it would more or pess he a last minute thing of not being able to turn the key and not an intentional thing they had been thinking about for a long time,

I read somewhere in this forum that they conduct drills that were indistinguishable from the real deal all the time specifically to avoid this.

Some of Ronald Reagan's aides apparently believed he wouldn't order a retaliatory nuclear strike in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack.

"One of Reagan's aides, Fred Ikle, recalled a meeting between Reagan and his advisors in the late 1970s during which they discussed a president's response upon being warned of an incoming missile attack. According to Ikle, one person present said, "If we see that the Russians are attacking, we just launch our missiles before [theirs] hit." Reagan replied, "That would be the wrong thing to do." Neither Reagan nor any of his advisers ever publicly stated that he expressed doubts that he would retaliate if the United States came under Soviet nuclear attack. Such a statement would have undermined the very basis of nuclear deterrence. Yet some of Reagan's presidential advisers were almost certain that he would not retaliate in the event of an attack, as will be seen in Chapter 4."
-"Ronald Reagan And His Quest To Abolish Nuclear Weapons", pg. 35 by Paul Lettow

This makes me wonder, If any president ever decide to do that in the event of an obvious nuclear strike, will somebody literally try to wrestle the nuclear football from him?

 

[freelander]

I believe that in the US that if the ICBN capsule crew do not fire then the chain of command can remotely fire the weapons.

I would not like to be around if my country was hit by Nuks and we did not let ours fly an eye for an eye and all that.

 

[DougM]

Back in the day it took the crew to launch, what it takes now… I have no idea.
As for not retaliating because the President chooses not to. Well that is going to be short lived. Once the President is dead. Most likely by nuclear blast, then the chain of command moves elsewhere most likely to a military officer in an aircraft or a bunker somewhere. And odds are those folks WILL launch whatever is left of the nuclear triad. Mostly sub launched missiles but perhaps a few ICBM in silos that survived.

So you probably need at least two or three different people to all let the USSR get away with destroying the US for free. Not to likely.
Also what happens to the President? A lot of folks around him may ummm disagree with is letting them and there families die and not returning fire for this. So you may see the President accidentally sho, or suffer a “heart attack” thus expediting the transfer of launch authority to the next person in the chain.

So I find it very unlikely that the US wont retaliate.

 

[Two fingers awry]

If you're talking, say a submarine, you don't need everybody, just enough to subvert the sub's launch or, I suppose, to make your rival believe you may be able to subvert the sub's launch. And certain areas of the US are disproportionately places of origin for military types and not particularly high value nuclear targets. I can't say if the same is true for other nuclear powers. The US has a disproportionately Southern and rural military.

The problem with this premiss is that mobile phones wont work through a stainless steel hull 100m underwater and as they can be tracked would be banned from use 1990s phones were not a mass item owned by everyone as now

 

[BlueTrousers]

Ironically, what has kept the Last War from happening is the belief that nuclear retaliation was CERTAIN. The pacifist who thinks that he's saving the world by refusing to retaliate is the guy who makes that first strike more likely, not less.

This is why the UK's semi-official doctrine of strategic uncertainty seems strange to me. Of course, it's unwise to disclose what the precise circumstances are under which you'd use nuclear weapons. The UK government, though, seems to think that disclosing that such circumstances do exist would undermine deterrence.

Which does call into question why the UK has them if it wouldn't use them, but then I'm no nuclear strategist.

As for not retaliating because the President chooses not to. Well that is going to be short lived. Once the President is dead. Most likely by nuclear blast, then the chain of command moves elsewhere most likely to a military officer in an aircraft or a bunker somewhere. And odds are those folks WILL launch whatever is left of the nuclear triad. Mostly sub launched missiles but perhaps a few ICBM in silos that survived.

Back in the day, there were no Permissive Action Links on the USN's submarine-launched ballistic missiles. They could be launched by the crew of the submarine without any external authorisation whatsoever. I'm absolutely sure the conversation took place about what they should do if there was nothing left of the United States except those submarines and their missiles. I doubt very much that the conclusion of that discussion was 'sail for Australia and hope for the best', though it might have been - that's supposedly one of the options placed before the UK Prime Minister when they're writing the orders for the equivalent scenario.

 

[MKD]

If one side launched everything no reason not to retaliate in full, but what if surrendering avoided a second, third, etc. strike?

In the UK and much of Europe what happens after the first strike is, frankly, academic.

I cant see either side not launching, Most likely while the missiles are airborne, To much would be lost if you wait until the first strike lands.

Exactly - the question must be if I DONT fire back immediately will I be able to launch a counter punch of any strength ?

As for not retaliating because the President chooses not to. Well that is going to be short lived. Once the President is dead. Most likely by nuclear blast, then the chain of command moves elsewhere most likely to a military officer in an aircraft or a bunker somewhere.

Exactly - The general in the looking glass plane IS going to fire. That is the whole point.

Which does call into question why the UK has them if it wouldn't use them, but then I'm no nuclear strategist.

Surely the strategy is clear. We will fire back if attacked. That is obvious even if unsaid. What more is needed? The word is that the nuclear briefing, followed by writing the last letters, is the first job on the incoming PM list and I suspect that makes fairly clear what is likely to happen to you, the UK and everyone you know AND what is expected of you as PM in those circumstances.

lets be honest - as PM you are not going to survive. You wont get out of London and your last job as the missiles descend will be to order Northwood to issue the release order to our submarines and then wait for the bang.

If you wont give the order one of your nuclear deputies will - what isn't clear is what happens if they are all dead. I assume the Chief of the Defence staff ( or similar survivor) will be able to give the order but that has never been made clear other than the Sub captain heading to the safe and opening the letters of last resort.

that's supposedly one of the options placed before the UK Prime Minister when they're writing the orders for the equivalent scenario.

We don't, of course, know the contents of the "last letters" but logically there can only be 4 options:

• Fire
• Don't fire
• Put your self under friendly control ( before or after firing)
• Sorry chaps - bottled it - up to you.

 

[DougM]

I was working on the theory that if the CCCP/USSR launches a strike and the US president dies not reply in kind and assuming he is not otherwise removed before the strike lands, then i assume that in some bunker underground somewhere in in an aircraft flying around will be an ifficer that take command of the military once Washington gets its moment in the (artificial) sun. And that said officer will in fact order a response. And that mostly subs will be what the US has left.
You bring up an interesting point, and that is what do the subs do if there is no order but the US is flattened, Or the remaining silos for that matter.

 

[EWHM]

The problem with this premiss is that mobile phones wont work through a stainless steel hull 100m underwater and as they can be tracked would be banned from use 1990s phones were not a mass item owned by everyone as now

You don't communicate with them while they're on duty, at ship. It's something you do while they're on leave.

 

[BlueTrousers]

Surely the strategy is clear. We will fire back if attacked. That is obvious even if unsaid. What more is needed? The word is that the nuclear briefing, followed by writing the last letters, is the first job on the incoming PM list and I suspect that makes fairly clear what is likely to happen to you, the UK and everyone you know AND what is expected of you as PM in those circumstances.

You would think so, and I'm sure But it seems to be an article of faith in the UK that actually saying so would weaken deterrence. As far as I'm aware, no other nuclear power has come to the same conclusion.

Quite why the UK government thinks that allowing an adversary to believe it might be able to bomb the entire country flat and park its tanks on the remains of Whitehall without nuclear retaliation (obvious hyperbole alert!) is good strategy, I have no idea. But it does.

We don't, of course, know the contents of the "last letters" but logically there can only be 4 options:

• Fire
• Don't fire
• Put your self under friendly control ( before or after firing)
• Sorry chaps - bottled it - up to you.

Those are generally understood to be the options put before a Prime Minister, though of course what any individual actually ordered remains secret.

 

[DougM]

It thinks this because odds are no one is going to nuke GB without nuking the US as well and if that happens then GB’s nukes are mostly irrelevant if the US retaliates with its nukes. And if only a few nukes hit GB and nowhere else then it probably does not come to the point that thecpetter will matter.
But i agree it is probably better for deterrence if you make it known that if attacked you will strike back.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

You would think so, and I'm sure But it seems to be an article of faith in the UK that actually saying so would weaken deterrence. As far as I'm aware, no other nuclear power has come to the same conclusion.

Less weaken deterrence and more weaken the UKs room for maneuver. As Brody observed back in 1946, “the threat of retaliation does not have to be 100 per cent certain; it is sufficient if there is a good chance of it, or if there is a belief that there is a good chance of it. The prediction is more important than the fact.”

A degree of strategic ambiguity can have it’s advantages in permitting flexibility, rather than unknowingly committing one to a course of action that may prove unwise when the actual situation arises. One can always clarify where the red line actually is if a situation where it is about to be crossed appears to be imminent.

 

[DougM]

But flexibility is not what you want as a deterrent, You want your enemy 100% positive that if they attack you, that you will flatten them. Flexibility is nice up to the point we are talking about Nuclear weapons. You don't have room for maneuvering with nuclear weapons. That war is to fast. you are potentially in and out of WW3 with nukes in an hour or less. it is not a maneuver and counter maneuver type of war, where you need or want yo kerp your enemy guessing.
Just as you dont want your doomsday device to be kept secret from your enemy as it does not work as a deterrent (see Dr Strangelove) you want you enemy to know if the nuke you you WILL nuke them back. It does you NO good to leave your enemy wondering about that. If the are not sure you will return fire then they may decide to. try it and with Nukes you do NOT want them testing your resolve, because once the nukes are flying there is no going back.
The only way ambiguity helps is if you are planning to not return the attack. Then the doubt is better for you then your enemy knowing you wont respond if they attack you. Historically it is when your enemy doubts you will put ip much of a fight that you get in trouble. The US in 1941 is an example where Japan doubted the US would stay in the fight. Germany doubted France and GB and got WW2. Arguntina doubted Gzb would fight to keep the Falklands.. And so on and so forth.
Note i am not saying you need to send a copy of your orders to your enemy. But you need to make sure your enemy BELIEVES you will retaliate in a dramatic and powerful manor. So in this case it is great that each PM writes there own letter but is a a bad idea to leave your enemy any doubt what so ever that you will flatten then if the dare to attack you.
That is the whole point of a deterrence,
It is called Mutually ASSURED Destruction and not Mutually POSSIBLE destruction, for a reason.

 

[RanulfC]

But flexibility is not what you want as a deterrent, You want your enemy 100% positive that if they attack you, that you will flatten them. Flexibility is nice up to the point we are talking about Nuclear weapons. You don't have room for maneuvering with nuclear weapons. That war is to fast. you are potentially in and out of WW3 with nukes in an hour or less. it is not a maneuver and counter maneuver type of war, where you need or want yo keep your enemy guessing.
Just as you don't want your doomsday device to be kept secret from your enemy as it does not work as a deterrent (see Dr Strangelove) you want you enemy to know if the nuke you you WILL nuke them back. It does you NO good to leave your enemy wondering about that. If the are not sure you will return fire then they may decide to. try it and with Nukes you do NOT want them testing your resolve, because once the nukes are flying there is no going back.
The only way ambiguity helps is if you are planning to not return the attack. Then the doubt is better for you then your enemy knowing you wont respond if they attack you. Historically it is when your enemy doubts you will put ip much of a fight that you get in trouble. The US in 1941 is an example where Japan doubted the US would stay in the fight. Germany doubted France and GB and got WW2. Argentina doubted Gzb would fight to keep the Falklands.. And so on and so forth.
Note i am not saying you need to send a copy of your orders to your enemy. But you need to make sure your enemy BELIEVES you will retaliate in a dramatic and powerful manor. So in this case it is great that each PM writes there own letter but is a a bad idea to leave your enemy any doubt what so ever that you will flatten then if the dare to attack you.
That is the whole point of a deterrence,
It is called Mutually ASSURED Destruction and not Mutually POSSIBLE destruction, for a reason.

You still want some "flexibility" in response because having a set "standard" for retaliation tends to leave out politics which is something that always has to be factored in.

IIRC my "standing orders" during my time of service in the Cold War the "official" line was "Any hostile launch or attack on any NATO member will be considered an attack on the US and responded to accordingly." The USSR had a similar policy for the Warsaw Pact and Cuba. Of course the 'wiggle room' here is the phrase "hostile" since everyone was aware that accidents COULD happen and a straight knee-jerk reaction of retaliation would turn things ugly very fast. On the converse side both sides understood this and accepted that there were always going to be "shades" of "Mutually Assured Destruction" but in the very end any full on attack by one side would automatically cause a full attack back on them, Presidential hesitation or no.
Today we "reserve the right to respond as we see fit to any WMD attack on the US or it's allies". Which is essentially the same as the Cold War policy it's just more aimed at everyone ELSE with WMD's. Aka we will likely responds to, say, a chemical attack on South Korea with cans of instant sun shine so be warned

Randy

 

[freelander]

If the missiles fly the U.K. would be turned into radio active dust which is probably why the Captains of our Subs have l letter of last resort to fall back on. Given the amount of time our PM would have to Oder a counter strike about four minuets the letters make sence. It’s hard to imagine how long it would take a PM to get to a Video link to Northwood up and running to give the order four minuets just would not cut it also add in the time it would take to get the Oder to the on patrol subs also adds delay. The only time that a perminaty open like would be around is if there was a ground war first or so would like to think. The PM according to the wed does have a nuclear deputy if he is taken out but the same time frame applys.

With the end of the Cold War nuclear planing has almost died a death almost all of our bunkers have either been sold or abandoned almost. I would rather get turned to ash than live in a post war U.K. sod that.

When I was basses in Germany in the early 80s we were told that go blogs infantry would last four to six minuets if RussIa can over to play due to the lack of ammo and the shear amount of troops that would be thrown at us. I must admit that I acquired more SLR and LMG magazines than we were issued for some insane reason I had visions of a valiant last stand.

We used to bee tasked with site gaurd on the Nuc storage sites along with our colonial cousins I remember talking to a young American captain and asked home what he would do if Nucs flew and he simply said pray why simple he we were sitting on ground zero that comment kind of opened my eyes some what.

I most definitely would want the U.K. to let fly with all weapons at its disposal if we die then Russian should die.

 

[L'amateur d'aéroplanes]

One of the scenarios of the Cold War was a surprise offensive by the Warsaw Pact which managed to cross Germany without NATO being able to mobilize its troops in time.

And with millions of European civilians hostage, and a population frightened by the apocalypse that threatens them, would the French and British leaders have launched a nuclear strike?

A French novel titled ''The 6th Column'', written by a French colonel using a pseudonym, released in bookstores in January 79 has this following scenario:

La 6e colonne : Si les russes attaquaient... - Babelio

Critiques, citations, extraits de La 6e colonne : Si les russes attaquaient... de Guy Doly-Linaudière. Amis des « Et si », Nostalgiques de la guerre froide et Historiens de...

www.babelio.com

We are in the 1980s, after the spectacular reconciliation between China and Russia which left the latter free rein in the West. The Soviet attack took place during the Pentecost weekend, a brutal blitzkrieg that took Europe by surprise. Invading Germany in twenty-four hours, Russian troops are on the French borders, while the country is prey to multiple sabotages instigated by the Communist Party. Abandoned by the United States, which fears an uncontrollable escalation, the President of the French Republic hesitates to initiate nuclear fire. But under the pressure of a political opinion terrorized by the nuclear specter of the Russian response (and manipulated by the PC in the pay of the Warsaw Pact forces), the President does not trigger the atomic strike and is taken prisoner at the Elysium. Soviet tanks enter Paris.

Emmanuel de Richoufftz, staff officer who was aide-de-camp to Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy in the early 1980s also wrote a novel - docu-fiction in 1987 entitled ''December 1997, the Russians arrive. An active-duty officer's account '' which also describes the conventional armed forces in Western Europe unable to mobilize quickly to victoriously oppose a lightning attack, here in winter, and the Red Army rushing into the major cities before the Western leaders cannot agree on a nuclear response. the documentary aspect describes the mobilization and deployment procedures of the French army as planned at the time. - with hindsight, we know that the Soviet troops were less overpowered than we think...-.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

A question that I think is far more interesting is whether a nation would respond with nuclear weapons to a large-scale conventional attack aimed directly at its nuclear forces. For example, if a hostile power used conventional cruise missiles to destroy the Air Force's 450 MMIII silos and the nuclear weapons bunkers at Barksdale, Whitman, and Minot and simultaneously attacked and sank a few SSBNs at sea, would an American politician be willing to launch a nuclear counterattack with the remaining SSBNs?