Proposals and War Aims That Didn't Happen Map Thread

We'll rather off topic, so I'll keep it brief: I do not mean to say that Nicholas II was good or forward-looking, he was an illiberal autocrat... but he rises out of a long line of autocrats dating to before modernity and indeed strove against it, which is fundamentally unliked the others who you listed who represent some rupture or failure of modernity. It feels uninstructive to class Nicky with those in the same way it feels uninstructive to class Ashurbahnipal with them.

But like I said, it's off topic, and it's semantic
You're not wrong though.
 
The 1359 Treaty of London would've ceded the Angevin Empire lands to England and, unlike during the Angevin era, would have fully removed the area from French sovereignty. It was signed by then-captive King John II of France but repudiated by the Estates General. Truly an epic France-Screw.

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The 1359 Treaty of London would've ceded the Angevin Empire lands to England and, unlike during the Angevin era, would have fully removed the area from French sovereignty. It was signed by then-captive King John II of France but repudiated by the Estates General. Truly an epic France-Screw.
And quite possibly a bigger England-screw as well, in terms of reducing the offshore areas to a neglected backwater taking hind-teat to ambition or even basic defense on the continent.

ETA: For that matter, the 'defrancification' of the Angevin ruling classes (to the degree that it even got started) are quite soundly reversed. Recall what happened to Scotland when England became its crown colony in OTL.
 
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The 1359 Treaty of London would've ceded the Angevin Empire lands to England and, unlike during the Angevin era, would have fully removed the area from French sovereignty. It was signed by then-captive King John II of France but repudiated by the Estates General. Truly an epic France-Screw.

644px-France_1154-en.svg.png
Something like this coming to pass could also be an Aragonwank.
 
I made a map of the proposed United Baltic Duchy, as described in this Wikipedia article:
As a parallel political movement under the German military administration, Baltic Germans began forming provincial councils between September 1917 and March 1918.

On 8 March 1918, the local Baltic German-dominated Kurländischer Landesrat declared the restoration of Duchy of Courland (Herzogtum Kurland), which was formally recognised by Kaiser Wilhelm on 15 March 1918.

On 12 April 1918, a Provincial Assembly (Vereinigter Landesrat), composed of 35 Baltic Germans, 13 Estonians, and 11 Latvians, passed a resolution calling upon the German Emperor to recognise the Baltic provinces as a monarchy and to make them a German protectorate.[7]

The United Baltic Duchy was nominally recognised as a sovereign state by Wilhelm II only on 22 September 1918,[citation needed] half a year after Soviet Russia had formally relinquished all authority over former Russian Imperial Baltic governorates to Germany in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On 5 November 1918, a temporary Regency Council (Regentschaftsrat) for the new state, led by Baron Adolf Pilar von Pilchau, was formed on a joint basis from both local Land Councils.

The new state was to have its capital in Riga and was to be a confederation of seven cantons: Kurland (Courland), Riga, Lettgallen (Latgale), Südlivland (South Livonia), Nordlivland (North Livonia), Ösel (Saaremaa) and Estland (Estonia), the first four cantons correspondings to today's Latvia and the last three corresponding to today's Estonia.

The first head of state of the United Baltic Duchy was to be Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg, not as a sovereign monarch, but as a subordinate to the German Kaiser, similar to other princes or kings of the German Empire. However, Adolf Friedrich never assumed office. The appointed Regency Council, consisting of four Baltic Germans, three Estonians and three Latvians, functioned until 28 November 1918 without any international recognition except from Germany.

In October 1918, the Chancellor of Germany, Prince Maximilian of Baden, proposed to have the military administration in the Baltic replaced by civilian authority. The new policy was stated in a telegram from the German Foreign Office to the military administration of the Baltic: "The government of the Reich is unanimous in respect of the fundamental change in our policy towards the Baltic countries, namely that in the first instance policy is to be made with the Baltic peoples".[5]

However, good references are missing, does anyone have more information about this proposal?

UnitedBalticDuchy.png
 
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Apparently, in 1977 when Fidel Castro was becoming involved in the Second Ogaden War, he attempted to broker a truce by proposing to merge Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen together in a federation. I don't know if this is totally true, but I did find a possibly credible source:
No I don't know what the finer details were besides a very vauge statement by this source. I'm not sure even what he would be thinking. It seems sort of logical since Castro was far more willing to sideline national/ethnic identities to create communist states (Hence he got involved in multiple civil wars in Africa). Although I'm not sure he ever knew much about Somalia, Ethiopia, or Yemen anyways.
Either way, it was rejected by all.
I've pursued this a bit more to try and find more detail on the matter. That this proposal was made seems to be nearly a matter of fact. The proposal was made on March 16th at a meeting that lasted all of 15 minutes before it broke down due to ireeconcilable hostility between the Ethiopian and Somali representative.

It seems that this was not just some hare-brained idea of Castro's. It was a Soviet proposal that arose out of quite practical grounding. Ethiopia under the Emperor had historically been a steadfast ally of the West. This served to cement Western and Arab control over the strategically vital (as we have seen in recent months) Red Sea, which was further strengthened by Egypt's detente with Israel, and the resolution of the North Yemen conflict in a compromise that sidelined the Soviets. A Western-aligned Ethiopia also denigrated the ability of the Soviets to project influence through sub-Saharan Africa.
  • Consequently, The Soviets had poured a tremendous amount of resources into Somalia with its irredentist claims against Ethiopia, such that Somalia became the best armed state in sub-Saharan Africa.
  • Likewise, the Soviets provided arms to the Eritrean nationalist movement to undermine Addis Ababa and to potentially gain the Soviets an outlet on the Red Sea.
  • However, with the overthrow of Haile Selassie by the socialist Derg in 1974, matters changed. The Derg was making forceful changes in Ethiopia that spoke positively to their socialist bona fides. Suddenly Ethiopia was a potential ally with many factors speaking in its favor -
    • An old ally of Washington could be wrested away from it
    • Ethiopia's large population, abundant natural resources, and good prospects for development (and the actions of the Derg which showed a commitment to development)
    • Ethiopia's central position in the Horn of Africa provided a geostrategic opportunity for domination of the whole area, including the Red Sea littoral (thus allowing control over global shipping), and the projection of influence into Arabia and sub-Saharan Africa.
    • Ethiopia's control over the headwaters of the Nile gives it strategic leverage over Egypt and Sudan who were drifting away from the Soviet camp
  • In spite of these benefits, it came with large problems, namely the potential to entirely alienate Somalia and Eritrea. This would not only waste the investment that had been poured into these parties, but it could consequently push these parties into the arms of the Arabs and Washington (or Beijing), losing Soviet influence over the Red Sea. Alliance with Ethiopia would likewise alienate Arabs, due to the close relations between Ethiopia and Israel that continued even after the Derg came to power.
With all of this in mind, the essential aim of the federation proposal was to allow the Soviets to have their cake and eat it too. A federation could provide for an extreme autonomy in the Ogaden such that the interests of Somali herdsmen are not infringed upon by the Ethiopians, but the Ethiopians still do not have to concede the territory to Somalia. On a similar note - Rather than having to alienate the Eritreans, autonomy could be provided for them within a federation, keeping them happy without forcing Ethiopia to concede it entirely. A federation would create a united front against Arab control in the Red Sea, and allow the sharing of resources to drive forward development.

It's also worth noting that the federation was also intended to ask Djibouti to join. At the time of the proposal, it was still the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas, but was due to receive independence later in the year. Presumably, as the Somalis had designs on the territory, its integration into the federation would serve to assuage Somali irredentism. The proposal was obviously a huge failure, talks broke down in 15 minutes when the Somalis said anything short of Somali control of the Ogaden was unacceptable, and the Ethiopians countered that Somalia was a made-up country invented by the British and Italians.

From my reading, it seems like though the proposal was unworkable from the start, the Somalis are more at fault from its failures. It seems as though the Deg, based on its stated ideology and negotiations made after the Ogaden War, would have been open to some kind of autonomy for the Ogaden. Siad Barre and the prevailing ideology in Somalia on the other hand was driven and held together by nationalism, with development-focused scientific socialists being a fairly sidelined in the regime: Concession of the Ogaden or Somalia's other claims (Djibouti and Northern Kenya) were unacceptable to the very constitution of the socialist Somali state. This whole paragraph is my personal speculation, I could be overstating the Derg's willingness to compromise, not sure.

With all of this in mind, here's a WorldA patch showing the federation with the inclusion of Djibouti, and autonomy of the Ogaden and Eritrea.

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References
"Eritreans Urge Negotiations." The Washington Post. 1978.
Nurthen, William A. Soviet Strategy in the Red Sea Basin. Monterrey: Naval Post Graduate School. 1980.
Papp, Daniel S. “The Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia.Current History 76, no. 445 (1979): 110–30. 1979.
Remnek, Richard. "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene." Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses. 1980.
 
In spite of these benefits, it came with large problems, namely the potential to entirely alienate Somalia and Eritrea. This would not only waste the investment that had been poured into these parties, but it could consequently push these parties into the arms of the Arabs and Washington (or Beijing), losing Soviet influence over the Red Sea.
This bit makes me chuckle since the EPLF were already Maoist by this point.
 
This bit makes me chuckle since the EPLF were already Maoist by this point.
Sloppy writing on my part: Nurthen (who I am most reliant on) only cites Soviet concern of Chinese influence as regards Somalia and, to a lesser degree, South Yemen, he doesn't bring it up relating to the Eritreans. And he does in fact hedge that the Soviet support to Eritrean movements is indirect and not extensive.

However - given the date for Nurthen's thesis, and looking over some of the references to support for Eritrea, I wonder to what degree this was fog-of-war projection on his part.

Nurthen pg. 18:
At the present time the Eritrean insurgents comprise three major groups: The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation FrontPeople's Liberation Forces(ELF-PLF). All three groups receive aid from various Arab nations, and some had received Soviet aid indirectly until the Ogaden War in 1977.[8]
Corresponding footnote, pg. 37-38:
8 Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "Soviet Thrust Into the Horn of Africa: The Next Targets," SrtgcReview 6 (Spring 1978): 27. According to discusions ith aleader of the Ethiopian Democratic Union, the ELF is not receiving aid from anybody, and the EPLF is believed to be getting assistance from Euroconununist parties. As for the ELF-PLF, a leader of this front indicated that the Arab nations have "abandoned them." This leader indicated that $1 m in Saudi Arabian aid intended for the ELF-PLF was lost somewhere in the Sudanese bureaucracy. This was the total amount of Saudi Aid provided to the ELF-PLF. According to very reliable sources, last fall this leader received $2.5 m from Libyan leader Muamar Gadhaffy who is unhappy with Ethiopia for not interceeding on behalf of Libyan prisoners in Tanzania. This aid was mainly for medical and other supplies.
This is virtually the only evidence provided of Soviet support to the Eritreans - thin gruel indeed. Though there is something to be said for the fact that both the Cubans and the South Yemenis did support the Eritreans up to 1975, which would indicate at least tacit approval on the part of the Soviets. And the Soviets did support the 9-point plan for peaceful reconciliation of the Eritrean conflict (rejected by the Eritreans and the Derg), and it seems like they did see a broader Horn Federation as a means to ameliorate the conflict.

Still, it seems Nurthen does overstate the degree of Soviet influence and support of the Eritreans, their reconciliatory approach seems more practical than anything, not wanting to be sucked into a quagmire in helping the Derg suppress the rebels (as they would end up doing). Papp's "Eritrea and the Soviet-Cuban Connection" (1978) was useful in getting a reality check on Soviet involvement in Eritrea.

The essential picture remains the same: The Soviets did not want to alienate the Eritreans. If the Eritreans ended up winning than it would cut Ethiopia off from the Red Sea, losing the Soviets their outlet when they've already alienated Somalia. If the Eritreans were put down in military conflict (as the Derg seemed to prefer), it would be costly for the Soviets, further alienate them from the Arab world, and play into the Maoist line framing the Soviets as colonizers. So the Soviets hoped for a political settlement with the Eritreans, whether that be in a Ethiopian federation or a pan-Horn federation.
 
Are you surprised at learning this because you weren't aware of the information before now? Or is your wtf in response to some non-specified other reason? <.<
its both, the sheer ridiculousness of Saddam wanting to rule islands at the very far end of the Gulf just because is what gets me
 
its both, the sheer ridiculousness of Saddam wanting to rule islands at the very far end of the Gulf just because is what gets me
Seems like it would be pretty useful for Iraqi power projection in the Gulf if they wanted to be both a stronger regional power and seize control of a huge area of oil production and thus step up exports and shipping through the Gulf.
 
its both, the sheer ridiculousness of Saddam wanting to rule islands at the very far end of the Gulf just because is what gets me
It doesn't read to me as him wanting to rule them, merely of him wanting Iran to not rule them. Getting them transferred back to the Emirate of Sharjah, which continues to claim them IOTL, would be a big propaganda coup for Iraq, and strengthen the regime's position as a defender of Arab rights. Likewise with promoting autonomy for Khuzestan; getting Sunni Arabs out from the rule of Shia Iran would make Hussein look really good to the people he wanted to impress.
 
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