(POLL) WWII Squad Organization: Garand or Bren

[Not James Stockdale]

During WWII, the US, Britain, and Germany all used substantially similar squad organizations, with a lead command team, a machine gun element, and a rifle element, usually with ten to twelve soldiers. This was an unbalanced organization that often led to problems implementing "fire and maneuver" tactics because the rifle element, even with Garands in the US Army, was unable to provide sufficient fire to cover the displacement of the machine gun team.

The question here is: Should the squad be armed with one automatic rifle (a Bren, for example) and the balance semi-auto infantry rifles, or two automatic rifles and bolt-action rifles.

I am looking at a ten-man squad, which I think provides the best balance of mass and usability for an inexperienced junior NCO. Option A, with the semi-auto infantry rifles and one LMG, would be organized into a six-man assault section with the squad leader and five riflement and a four-man MG section with the assistant squad leader, an autorifleman and his assistant, and an ammo carrier. Option B would use a two-man command element, a squad leader and a scout rifleman, marksman, medic, or RATELO, and two four-man fireteams, each with a team leader, autorifleman, assistant autorifleman, and rifleman.

Based on the historical effectiveness of automatic infantry rifles over bolt-action rifles, I think the Garand's attributes are hard to overcome, even with more LMGs. Does the equation change with a squad composed of three three-man cells, each with an automatic rifle? Does switching from a Bren-like automatic rifle to a belt-fed GPMG like an MG-42 or T23E1 change the answer?

 

[Michael Muzzarelli]

Didnt the marines organize their squads into three fire teams? As i recall these consisted of one BAR and 3 m1 garands. According to my wifes uncle who was a BAR man on surubachi, they had all the firepower they wanted. Pesonally I think most belt feds would be a lot more weight to lug around. By the way couldnt agree more on the m1.

 

[MichaelWest]

I have read everything I could find that the Army wrote about its testing this issue. At bottom the balance is base of fire to maneuver fire, the latter covering the positioning of the former is where we see fears that the fire is not sufficient. And on the defensive we see the MG34 move up from a mere BAR as base of fire. It simply can put out more fire at the cost of sustaining its ammunition supply. In the attack I think the MG34 looks less appealing than something more portable like our BAR. Thus I see an inherent bias in the Army's after action reviews. If we fought the war more on the defense I think the BAR might not have been seen as so very adequate.

I think the biggest issue was the blur from fire and movement to fire and maneuver. The Squad simply could not both fire and maneuver, tests proved that was when the Squad failed. Here I mean having two or more elements both fighting and moving, almost independently. Thus the base of fire is static as the riflemen move or vice versa, the leader can coordinate this but one cannot send the two halves on separate tasks. That was a thing the Platoon was beginning to achieve. It is a thing the modern Squad is asked to do and even with modern radios has been criticized. The issue is how sustaining can 3 to 5 men be in a fight.

To me the perfect Squad is 9 to 10 men, one MG team (MG42), the balance riflemen with Garands, led by an NCO. At Platoon give me the light mortars and a Bazooka team for anti-tank and boom! The mortars could move to Company as radios let them stay connected and give me M79 to lob boom in close or at things although the rifle grenade might do that from the beginning. This is designed to fight at a quarter mile or less, usually less, partly urban, mostly broken or forested terrain, it can by exception both fire and maneuver but should be a fire and move element in the Platoon fight. I size it to fit one Squad on one truck before the radio is reliable at this level.

 

[von Adler]

The French had solved that question - their Dragoons Portes (motorised infantry in the armoured divisions) squads were equipped with two magazine-fed LMGs and bolt-action rifles for the rest of the men. Leap-frogging fire and advance was the standard, and by the end of the war, the British squad also had two LMGs per squad - if they removed the LMGs from their Universial Carriers, or used them as a (very light) armoured support.

The Germans, Swiss, Soviets, Swedes and Finns went with SMGs to supplement the squad LMG, allowing a short-range supressive fire.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The French had solved that question - their Dragoons Portes (motorised infantry in the armoured divisions) squads were equipped with two magazine-fed LMGs and bolt-action rifles for the rest of the men. Leap-frogging fire and advance was the standard

I read a US Army officer describing the same thing for a platoon of French Tiralleurs in 1918. The Chauchat MG were with the flanking squads and each in turn provided covering fire while the other two squads and LMG advanced. The MG of the adjacent platoon could be added to the covering fire as well. My memory is the French platoons observed were only twenty men average.

The Germans, Swiss, Soviets, Swedes and Finns went with SMGs to supplement the squad LMG, allowing a short-range supressive fire.

Counter intuitively the US Marines did not go for lots of SMG. They passed on the Riesling, & Thompsons were at hand, but not common.

Didnt the marines organize their squads into three fire teams? As i recall these consisted of one BAR and 3 m1 garands. According to my wifes uncle who was a BAR man on surubachi, they had all the firepower they wanted. Pesonally I think most belt feds would be a lot more weight to lug around. By the way couldnt agree more on the m1.

The Marines evolved to that, but also increased the MMG in the company. Interwar the regimental commanders experimented with many configurations. On my shelf is a Gazette article showing a couple different organizations tried by the 4th Marines in China. One of those had four man teams with a BAR each. The companies fighting in Nicaragua 1927-1934 were very flexible. The actual practice varied, but often amounted to the BAR in a company group & teams attached to the platoons on a per mission basis. MG were not a company weapon, but were farmed out from a battalion weapons company as needed. In that war platoons or companies were often on independent posts reinforcing Nicaraguan National Guard companies.

This variable TO thing continued. Described for one regiment enroute to Guadalcanal was a rifle company with sixteen BAR. Each of three platoons in a company had three eight man rifle squads & one eight man BAR squad with four of the auto rifles. A fourth BAR squad of eight men was with the company commander. There were still no MG officially attached to this 1942 company. In 1943 the common organization put two BAR in each rifle squad of two teams, for a total of 18 per company. MMG were added to the company, four IIRC. & the 60mm mortars appeared in the company in 1943. In 1944 the three team squad of thirteen men appeared & the company was boosted to six MMG that year. So the line firepower was 3 mortars 4-6 MMG, 27 BAR, & 100+ Garands. The US Army line firepower for the inf company remained a couple mortars, two MMG nine or ten BAR, and between 90 & 100 Garands or M1 Carbines. The Marines acquired a habit of distributing the MG in the battalion weapons company to the rifle companies. During the 1944-45 battles it was not uncommon for a company commander to have up to ten MG in his companies fire power.

In the 1980s the US Marines changed the auto weapons in the squad to the belt fed M249 SAW. Combined with the six MMG still in the company weapons platoon that meant the company deployed 33 MG in its firing line.

3x 60mm mortars

4x Javelin or other AT rocket launchers

6x M60 MMG

27x M249 SAW

27 M203 grenade launchers. Each four man team leader carried one attached to his rifle

100+ M16A2 rifles. These were the heavy barrel versions for increased range, and three shot burst limiters.

What with all the belt fed MG this was really a MG company with lots of AT/HE fire power. Currently the USMC is replacing the M249 with a magazine fed heavy barreled M27, derived from the Heckler & Kock 416. this has been controversial & theres accusations the proponents of the M27 lack much combat experience & are motivated by non combat administrative reasons. Time will tell.

 

[marathag]

To me the perfect Squad is 9 to 10 men, one MG team (MG42), the balance riflemen with Garands, led by an NCO. At Platoon give me the light mortars and a Bazooka team for anti-tank and boom!

The 1944 F series Marine squad was 13 men, the Squad Leader, a Sergeant, armed with an M1 Carbine,
and Three Fire Teams with
Fire Team Leader, a Corporal with M1 Rifle or Carbine
BAR Gunner
Assistant to the BAR gunner, with M1 Carbine and M8 Grenade Launcher
Rifleman with M1 Garand with the M7 Grenade Launcher


The Assault Squad was Seven Marines.
Squad Leader, with SMG, M1 Carbine or Garand
Flamethrower
Flamethrower assistant with M1 Carbine
Bazooka
Bazooka assistant with M1 Carbine
Two Demolition men, with SMGs or Carbines

 

[Deleted member 1487]

To me the perfect Squad is 9 to 10 men, one MG team (MG42), the balance riflemen with Garands, led by an NCO. At Platoon give me the light mortars and a Bazooka team for anti-tank and boom! The mortars could move to Company as radios let them stay connected and give me M79 to lob boom in close or at things although the rifle grenade might do that from the beginning. This is designed to fight at a quarter mile or less, usually less, partly urban, mostly broken or forested terrain, it can by exception both fire and maneuver but should be a fire and move element in the Platoon fight. I size it to fit one Squad on one truck before the radio is reliable at this level.

On paper I get your point, but per some combat studies and reports on squad optimization you really should factor in at least 2 men off the top won't be present at the start of a fight for any number of reasons, including injury/sickness and previous casualties. On top of that you should expect that an additional 2 men are going to become casualties in an average engagement, so plan on at least a 4 man cushion in terms of your squad numbers. Can you have 4 men down and still function in combat? That should be the starting point, so expect that you'll need at least a 14-15 man squad just to have say an average of 10 effectives in the field barring disaster that pushes you down further. In terms of pushing firepower further up the unit TOE combat experience in WW2 generally showed that the further down the better, so in some cases there were company mortars pushed down to the platoon level along with company MGs. Organizationally it is better to have them intrinsic to the company, but in practice to push them down to the platoon in combat. There are of course exceptions like the bazooka/panzerschreck, which probably should stay at the platoon level to make sure their firepower is properly directed. Don't rely on radios to keep you in contact with firepower, there are plenty of examples of electronics failing or being lost in combat (remember Arnhem). It probably wouldn't hurt to plan even on having 1 extra squad member to operate as a runner to stay in contact with the rest of the units if need be.

In terms of weapons, OR showed that 9mm SMGs were just as effective as Brens at 300 yards, so having a WW2 squad with SMGs instead of any rifles supported by LMGs/auto rifles is going to be more effective than those with Garands especially when you factor in the help of company and battalion level support weapons. Of course there should, if possible, be at least 1 scoped semi-auto rifle at the squad level and if not possible then a 2 man team of marksmen at the platoon level. Combat did show that having a trained marksman with proper equipment, even with bolt action rifle, was more effective that several regular conscript rifleman with semi-autos. That was probably a function of what Lionel Wigram described of units being made of up a handful of 'gutful' men willing to do whatever was necessary, a handful of 'malingerers' who wouldn't fight no matter what and try to linger to the rear, and the majority pretty variable and needing to be well led and pushed into action or they would be influenced by the malingerers and not fight. That problem also led to the serious problem of the attrition of the gutful men, as they bore the brunt of the fighting and weren't easily replaced, especially once their experience was lost. Training only goes so far and generally cannot keep up with casualties in a huge war like WW2. Then there is problem of lower than average IQ men, which McNamara identified and tried to find a role for in Vietnam, but was even more of a problem in WW2:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_100,000

In WW2 it generally accepted that the most successful soldiers in combat were of at least average IQ or 1 standard deviation above. So just having to take what you can get in a world war means that especially for the Wallies the lowest IQ men are going to be sent to the infantry, as the more skilled men will be pushed into technical or other skilled jobs/branches, a practice the Wallies really leaned on.

So you really need to design infantry units and tactics for the lowest common denominator and expect performance is probably not going to be great regardless, but will get even worse once training gets cut to try and keep up with casualties and with a replacement system like the US had in WW2 and beyond that doesn't prepare men for combat or to fit into an existing unit. Elite units can arguably not worry about that, but eventually it will hit them too.

 

[von Adler]

Counter intuitively the US Marines did not go for lots of SMG. They passed on the Riesling, & Thompsons were at hand, but not common.

The US considered the SMG a replacement for the pistol for rear-line troops such as mortar teams and so on, while most other countries considered it a NCO or dedicated infiltrator/assaulter weapon. One shold also remember that the US BAR was not a proper LMG, as it lacked an interchangable barrel, making its ability to provide sustained fire for supression quite low. Interestinly, the FN-BAR that Sweden, Belgium and Poland used DID have a quickly interchangable barrel.

The US paratroopers were the only formation to officially use SMGs in frontine units. Of course, in the field troops really liked the firepower of the SMG and the 6 .45 SMGs available in the weapons pool of each US rifle company rarely remained in the pool, being assigned to NCOs, usually the platoon commander or squad commanders or dedicated infiltrators/assaulters.

The Swedish infantry squad from 1943 onwards had 10 men with 1 LMG, 2 SMGs, 1 semi-automatic rifle, 1 scoped bolt-action rifle and 5 bolt-action rifles.

That said, the magazine-fed LMG was on the way out by 1945. The experience was that a single belt-fed GPMG was better at providing the supressive fire the infantry needed than two magazine-fed LMGs and that since combat distances were usually below 200 meters and rarely exceeded 300 meters an assault rifle with a shortened cartridge was a better equipment for the infantryman than a semi-automatic rifle with a full rifle cartridge.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The 1944 F series Marine squad was 13 men, the Squad Leader, a Sergeant, armed with an M1 Carbine,
and Three Fire Teams with
Fire Team Leader, a Corporal with M1 Rifle or Carbine
BAR Gunner
Assistant to the BAR gunner, with M1 Carbine and M8 Grenade Launcher
Rifleman with M1 Garand with the M7 Grenade Launcher

Some of the WWII Marines I was acquainted with said they never saw a M1 Carbine. Others told me they were often discarded when a Garand became available. A few said they carried a carbine. Never heard anyone mention a grenade launcher, tho if you look at enough photos carefully you see them along with grenades being fired.

Another counter intuitive detail I noticed is descriptions of the BAR being used as a assault weapon. While there are descriptions of it used for "covering fire" there were others who described it as carried by the guys making the final entry into a building, trench, ect... I was told the full automatic fire was favored. It was also pointed out to me as has casualties reached 50% in the rifle companies the BAR were always kept in action, with the rifles or carbines discarded for a available BAR. Again the reason was 'it had firepower'.

On paper I get your point, but per some combat studies and reports on squad optimization you really should factor in at least 2 men off the top won't be present at the start of a fight for any number of reasons, including injury/sickness and previous casualties. On top of that you should expect that an additional 2 men are going to become casualties in an average engagement, so plan on at least a 4 man cushion in terms of your squad numbers. Can you have 4 men down and still function in combat? That should be the starting point, so expect that you'll need at least a 14-15 man squad just to have say an average of 10 effectives in the field ...

In the 20 months I led a rifle platoon I very seldom had full strength squads. 60% was common. At one point I dissolved one squad so the squad leaders could get some experience with full strength or near full squads. Twice my platoon was temporarily boosted with extras from elsewhere for a training exercise so we had tree squads at about 80% strength. In the early 1980s the USMC experimented with a smaller two team squad of eleven men. The battalion in question 2/8 was on rotation to Okinawa, so in theory it was packed to full T/O in personnel. Nevertheless my former classmates commanding rifle platoons in 2d battalion contended with seven man squads after sick call, Training Support, and the whims of the 1st Sgt were extracted.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

In the 20 months I led a rifle platoon I very seldom had full strength squads. 60% was common. At one point I dissolved one squad so the squad leaders could get some experience with full strength or near full squads. Twice my platoon was temporarily boosted with extras from elsewhere for a training exercise so we had tree squads at about 80% strength. In the early 1980s the USMC experimented with a smaller two team squad of eleven men. The battalion in question 2/8 was on rotation to Okinawa, so in theory it was packed to full T/O in personnel. Nevertheless my former classmates commanding rifle platoons in 2d battalion contended with seven man squads after sick call, Training Support, and the whims of the 1st Sgt were extracted.

Jim Webb talked about this issue too:
http://www.jameswebb.com/articles/military-and-veterans/flexibility-and-the-fire-team

 

[MichaelWest]

The 1944 F series Marine squad was 13 men, the Squad Leader, a Sergeant, armed with an M1 Carbine,
and Three Fire Teams with
Fire Team Leader, a Corporal with M1 Rifle or Carbine
BAR Gunner
Assistant to the BAR gunner, with M1 Carbine and M8 Grenade Launcher
Rifleman with M1 Garand with the M7 Grenade Launcher


The Assault Squad was Seven Marines.
Squad Leader, with SMG, M1 Carbine or Garand
Flamethrower
Flamethrower assistant with M1 Carbine
Bazooka
Bazooka assistant with M1 Carbine
Two Demolition men, with SMGs or Carbines

I regard the USMC Squad as a mini-Platoon in concept and specialized towards the offensive, it is for an assault with heavy casualties expected, I think it is not the norm for a land army model.

But I do like the Squad. But it cannot easily fit in a standard truck or APC, it has span of control issues ameliorated by putting junior NCOs at each Fire Team, it is over powered for a Squad v Squad fight in regular battle, and it does not seem to scale well for a many division army. Thus I see it as a specialist tool rather than a workmanlike unit.

 

[MichaelWest]

On paper I get your point, but per some combat studies and reports on squad optimization you really should factor in at least 2 men off the top won't be present at the start of a fight for any number of reasons, including injury/sickness and previous casualties. On top of that you should expect that an additional 2 men are going to become casualties in an average engagement, so plan on at least a 4 man cushion in terms of your squad numbers. Can you have 4 men down and still function in combat? That should be the starting point, so expect that you'll need at least a 14-15 man squad just to have say an average of 10 effectives in the field barring disaster that pushes you down further. In terms of pushing firepower further up the unit TOE combat experience in WW2 generally showed that the further down the better, so in some cases there were company mortars pushed down to the platoon level along with company MGs. Organizationally it is better to have them intrinsic to the company, but in practice to push them down to the platoon in combat. There are of course exceptions like the bazooka/panzerschreck, which probably should stay at the platoon level to make sure their firepower is properly directed. Don't rely on radios to keep you in contact with firepower, there are plenty of examples of electronics failing or being lost in combat (remember Arnhem). It probably wouldn't hurt to plan even on having 1 extra squad member to operate as a runner to stay in contact with the rest of the units if need be.

In terms of weapons, OR showed that 9mm SMGs were just as effective as Brens at 300 yards, so having a WW2 squad with SMGs instead of any rifles supported by LMGs/auto rifles is going to be more effective than those with Garands especially when you factor in the help of company and battalion level support weapons. Of course there should, if possible, be at least 1 scoped semi-auto rifle at the squad level and if not possible then a 2 man team of marksmen at the platoon level. Combat did show that having a trained marksman with proper equipment, even with bolt action rifle, was more effective that several regular conscript rifleman with semi-autos. That was probably a function of what Lionel Wigram described of units being made of up a handful of 'gutful' men willing to do whatever was necessary, a handful of 'malingerers' who wouldn't fight no matter what and try to linger to the rear, and the majority pretty variable and needing to be well led and pushed into action or they would be influenced by the malingerers and not fight. That problem also led to the serious problem of the attrition of the gutful men, as they bore the brunt of the fighting and weren't easily replaced, especially once their experience was lost. Training only goes so far and generally cannot keep up with casualties in a huge war like WW2. Then there is problem of lower than average IQ men, which McNamara identified and tried to find a role for in Vietnam, but was even more of a problem in WW2:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_100,000

In WW2 it generally accepted that the most successful soldiers in combat were of at least average IQ or 1 standard deviation above. So just having to take what you can get in a world war means that especially for the Wallies the lowest IQ men are going to be sent to the infantry, as the more skilled men will be pushed into technical or other skilled jobs/branches, a practice the Wallies really leaned on.

So you really need to design infantry units and tactics for the lowest common denominator and expect performance is probably not going to be great regardless, but will get even worse once training gets cut to try and keep up with casualties and with a replacement system like the US had in WW2 and beyond that doesn't prepare men for combat or to fit into an existing unit. Elite units can arguably not worry about that, but eventually it will hit them too.

A 10 man squad takes into account casualties of up to 5, at that point it is no longer effective but should either be over its task or rotated out by its higher echelon. I am not expecting a squad to act as independently as modern usage implies.

For a conscripted army the 9 or 10 man offers you 8 slots for conscripts with 1 or 2 professionals. If you rotate men at 6 month cycles that is 4 sets of 2 over 24 months or 2 sets of 4 in 1 year, using the unit to train from raw recruit to trained men. At 2 years you only have 2 untrained to basically trained men at a time. You have 4 buddy teams, you have adequate men to account for sickness or administrative losses in the short run. It fits the usual truck, helicopter or aircraft better without splitting men over a vehicle.

I agree, the SMG is of value, I agree with Gernan practice to put it at Squad Leader or as the Army did too, it gives that man a lighter weapon he rarely employs but if needs that extra burst of noise he has it at hand. But with a full-auto rifle it gets sent back to specialist usages. I debate if an M79 at Squad should be in the SLs hands for the same logic, it is a logistic burden but he is best suited to employ it as he sees it yet I want him in command not shooting.

I do not prefer big squads for soan of control issues also it lures the higher ups into thinking they can be employed to fire and maneuver something that stymied the US Army 12 man three element squad. Army studies chastised this and found that in effect the 12 man squad became three separated 2 to 5 man groups who stopped fighting as a unit, worse if it took casualties. Two elements, a base of fire and a movement element fit most tactics an NCO could employ effectively.

I agree, see above, the average infantry SL is not going to be able to coordinate more than two elements, his men cannot master the intricacies of fire and maneuver where they are all conscripted, hastily trained, lack more than hand signals or shouting to communicate and are blended into a mass army. A smaller squad with a limited mission scope is better, it works as part of its platoon for complex missions, until we move to a professional army and gain radios the Squad is better simple.

 

[MichaelWest]

Another counter intuitive detail I noticed is descriptions of the BAR being used as a assault weapon. While there are descriptions of it used for "covering fire" there were others who described it as carried by the guys making the final entry into a building, trench, ect... I was told the full automatic fire was favored. It was also pointed out to me as has casualties reached 50% in the rifle companies the BAR were always kept in action, with the rifles or carbines discarded for a available BAR. Again the reason was 'it had firepower

Watch Steve McQueen employing a BAR in the Sand Pebbles, that is seeing used as an automatic rifle rather than as a light MG. I think that is how the BAR is seen, a heavy but capable rifle with gobs of firepower. In theory you could run and fire an MG42 or the Browning but that is Audie Murphy style points, those weapons are set on the bipod and fired by a team as base of fire. The Marines certainly should flex the BAR that way, they are assault infantry tending towards assault sappers in much of their fighting. A running guns ablaze battle is the island hopping campaign but aside from a street fight in Europe, the Army was more likely to set the MG, fire, move the riflemen up, repeat. The BAR becomes a lesser base of fire but adequate, if on the defensive it falls down compared to a belt fed that can sustain fire to break an attack or cover a withdraw. I love the BAR but accept its limits.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I regard the USMC Squad as a mini-Platoon in concept and specialized towards the offensive, it is for an assault with heavy casualties expected, I think it is not the norm for a land army model.

But I do like the Squad. But it cannot easily fit in a standard truck or APC, it has span of control issues ameliorated by putting junior NCOs at each Fire Team, it is over powered for a Squad v Squad fight in regular battle, and it does not seem to scale well for a many division army. Thus I see it as a specialist tool rather than a workmanlike unit.

The Marines altered the 1944-45 squad many times, & keep returning to close variations of it. After a decade plus of combat operations in Iraq theres been few proposals to move away from it. Just the perennial two team ten man squad that never gets past second base. The only significant change in the 21st Century's the replacement of the M249 with the lighter M27 that has only magazine feed.

People keep referring to the Marines & the small island battles. The truth is most of their combat, over 90% of the combat days of WWII, were in more conventional infantry fights like Guadalcanal, the other Solomon islands, or Okinawa which lasted months. Of the tiny island assaults only the Iwo Jima battle lasted for more than a few weeks. Beto, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Pellieu. Were all relatively brief, most over in a few days. A few years later the Marines used the same 1944 weapons and organization in broad combined arms battles across the Korean hills and valleys for most of three years.

 

[MichaelWest]

Te Marines altered the 1944-45 squad many times, & keep returning to close variations of it. After a decade plus of combat operations in Iraq theres been few proposals to move away from it. Just the perennial two team ten man squad that never gets past second base. The only significant change in the 21st Century's the replacement of the M249 with the lighter M27 that has only magazine feed.

What actually cements my preference was a piece written by a Marine officer discussing that debate. He set forth some good arguments why the big squad was too much, and given its unique usage by the USMC I do not find it bad, but it is not needed for the average land army. If you have not, read the struggles to organize the early Raiders, they too used a three element squad with BAR, Thompson and Garand mix with fire teams led by LCpls I believe. The concept is very much in the Marine mind, to have a two plus one or one plus two firing and moving set up down at Squad. The Army found doing that was not working as planned given its limitations on men, communications or training. The Marines are specialists despite their humility, I rely on what the Army found post war to be a good critique and guide for how big generalist armies fight. And as often the Army ignored itself so there you go.

 

[jsb]

The question here is: Should the squad be armed with one automatic rifle (a Bren, for example) and the balance semi-auto infantry rifles, or two automatic rifles and bolt-action rifles.

I am looking at a ten-man squad, which I think provides the best balance of mass and usability for an inexperienced junior NCO.

May I suggest that it depends on if you are cost or man limited or something else.....?

Option C (cost limited)
10ish man squad
2 LMGs best you can buy Bren, BAR (preferably export FN Mle D or Kg m/37), etc....... this is the main cost of your squads weapons.
2-4 Bolt action rifles for DMR and rifle grenades... mostly surplus stocks from WWI so near free.
6ish the rest with cheap SMGs, preferably better than a Sten gun but still relatively cheap even if new.

Option D (Man limited)
12 man squad (inc 1 driver and 1 MG gunner)
1x Kangaroo with .50"(maybe swap to a .3" to aid logistics) in shielded pintle mount
2x FN Mle D (in 30-06)
8x M1 in 30-06)
(and some spare SMGs, rifle grenades and a Bazooka if they want to swap to them)
And a powerful tank radio and a hand held for dismounted squad commander to talk to it......and cost no object....

 

[AdA]

A squad should, regardless of rir type either have two automatic rifles (like the BAR) or one light MG (like the Bren) a single AR doesn't provide enough sustained volume of fire and two LMG turn the rifle squad into an over large LMG squad.
My ideal WW2 platoon would be:
3x Rifle squads
1 Sergent, two team leaders, eight riflemen (total, nine rifles and two automatic rifles)
1x command squad
1 officer, platoon sergent, radio operator, LMG team (2 LMG four men) Grenade Launcher team (two 50mm GL four men)
Squad total, nine rifles two GL two LMG.
Platoon total
44 men, 36 rifles, 6 AR, 2 LMG, 2GL
Weapons of choice (in 1939:
KAR98
Polish BAR in 7,92 Mauser
VZ30 in 7,92 mauser
Type 89 50mm GL

 

[Not James Stockdale]

A squad should, regardless of rir type either have two automatic rifles (like the BAR) or one light MG (like the Bren) a single AR doesn't provide enough sustained volume of fire and two LMG turn the rifle squad into an over large LMG squad.

What do you think is the difference between one 20 lbs gun with a 20 round magazine and a QC barrel and the other? Compared to the Vz-26, the BAR is compromised by the combination of under-barrel gas tube snd bottom-feed, but they are functionally identical when they have the same options.

As far as I can tell, an LMG in the WWII context is normally the squad (sometimes the platoon) machine gun, so it's a role more than a type. The automatic rifle is normally defined as a machine gun fed by box magazines that usually is used as an LMG.

 

[Zincwarrior]

Didnt the marines organize their squads into three fire teams? As i recall these consisted of one BAR and 3 m1 garands. According to my wifes uncle who was a BAR man on surubachi, they had all the firepower they wanted. Pesonally I think most belt feds would be a lot more weight to lug around. By the way couldnt agree more on the m1.

Yes. Each squad had three fire teams, with three squads to a platoon. They also had multiple M1 carbines (later converted to M2 select fire carbines).

2. a. The squad is a group of men organized primarily as a combat team. The squad is usually kept intact but may be broken into fire teams which are used on special missions. The squad leader himself may desire to use one fire team as a maneuver element while using the others as a base of fire or direct attack element.

1. The squad consists of a sergeant, squad leader and three fire teams--a total of thirteen men. Since the squad leader carries a Carbine, the total armament of a squad is:
   • 
     Nine Ml Rifles.
     One Carbine.
     Three Automatic Rifles.
2. A portable Flame Thrower, M2, is carried in the supply section of battalion headquarters for use by the squad when needed. Each squad may also carry a demolitions kit.

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/OOB/Regt-TOE-F/index.html#I-1

 

[AdA]

What do you think is the difference between one 20 lbs gun with a 20 round magazine and a QC barrel and the other? Compared to the Vz-26, the BAR is compromised by the combination of under-barrel gas tube snd bottom-feed, but they are functionally identical when they have the same options.

As far as I can tell, an LMG in the WWII context is normally the squad (sometimes the platoon) machine gun, so it's a role more than a type. The automatic rifle is normally defined as a machine gun fed by box magazines that usually is used as an LMG.

The Polish wz 28 is very close to the original BAR. It lacks a QCB and is not meant for sustained fire like the Vz30. If you use a BAR with a QCB, like the swedish model 37, it can fulfill the LMG role.