Political/Cultural impact of Total US/UN/ROK Victory in Korean War

[Sorairo]

Suppose that the US/UN manage to successfully overrun the entirety of North Korea and hand it over to South Korea in the Korean War. As a hypothetical POD let's say Truman agrees to an early recognition of Mao as the legitimate Chinese government in return for non-intervention. The line between the (not exactly) Free World and the (very) Unfree World is drawn on the Yalu. Some questions spring to mind.

1) Would Korea become a global cultural powerhouse earlier than OTL?
2) With a more secure domestic situation, would Korea reform to democracy sooner?
3) Would the Korean War be better remembered in Western culture?
4) Would a clear Korean War victory lead to an early Rollback policy by the US? Might this lead to, for example, a tougher response over Hungary?
5) How would a clear victory affect the 1952 US Presidential Election?
6) Would the Vietnam War be affected?
7) Would the Sino-Soviet split be delayed?

 

[Forth Eorlingas]

This Nov/Dec 1950 flyer, especially the 'Fear Exploded' part, is a good look at what American perception of the Korean War would be in the absence of the abrupt reversal from the Chinese.

Asian communism as ideology and Communist China as a state would not have as formidable a reputation in the 1940s-70s without MacArthur's Yalu advance disaster. So for question 3) I think it would be better remembered. Most Americans would view the Korean War as another 'good war' closer to the the Gulf War popular perception (undeniable victory) but with some on the sidelines (1990s/1950s hawks) saying we should have gone further (shoulda ousted Saddam / we coulda won without appeasing the Chicoms).

MacArthur's place in US popular patriotic history ascends. He would be remembered much more favourably, not quite to the level of WW2 Eisenhower but around the same victorious reputation as WW1 Pershing. This may impact your question 5) if MacArthur can run himself or endorse a candidate in the 1952 election but I'm not too familiar with that.

On question 6) Vietnam: Historically after the Korean War ended (1953) both China and America ramped up support (1954) to their allies in Vietnam. France was heavily leaning on American financing (escalating up to 80% war costs paid by US) to keep up the pace from 1951-1954. On the other side of the hill, the Viet Minh needed Chinese supplied artillery (including 48 American 105mm howitzers captured in Korea - almost half of Giap's heavy artillery park at Dien Bien Phu was US origin stuff) to win set piece battles.

With the Korean War ending in late 1950, both America and China ramp up supplies to Vietnam at a time when the French are in a stronger position (Tassigny De Lattre in command, the only French leader who could match Giap). So the Red River perimeter battles of 1951 which were already French victories go even better. But none of this solves the problem of no credible anticommunist native Vietnamese leadership to face the Viet Minh.

I think the end effects on Vietnam would only buy more time until French defeat. To defeat the Viet Minh would need not just US supplies but a guarantee of huge American air support and the President leaning hard on France to hand over to native leadership. I don't know if a changed 1952 election would bring someone to power who would provide that.

On questions 1) and 2) earlier cultural influence and democracy: the changes would seem to point that way if it weren't for Rhee being in power while the victory's happening. The short term political boost from successful Korean reunification will go to Rhee who is no fan of democracy.

 

[Gillan1220]

This probably butterflies away the Vietnam War from escalating than OTL. With the victory at the Korean peninsula, this will also compel the U.S. to come to Batista's aid over at Cuba, possibly crushing Fidel Castro's revolution.

 

[chankljp]

As a hypothetical POD let's say Truman agrees to an early recognition of Mao as the legitimate Chinese government in return for non-intervention.

Would Mao accept such a deal? The US recognizing the PRC is only words as far as he is concerned. While a reunification of Korea under the RoK will mean a Western aligned and anti-communist Korea right there on the boarder across the Yalu River. With someone as paranoid as Mao, I cannot imagine him trusting the US to not betray him, and use Korea as a springboard for Chiang Kai-shek to launch Project National Glory at the first sign of weakness on the part of the PRC.

For a Korea reunification under the RoK, I think you will have more luck with the UN forces somehow managing to dig in and fortify the Yalu, repelling every Chinese attack, until even Mao is forced to give up.

 

[raharris1973]

With the victory at the Korean peninsula, this will also compel the U.S. to come to Batista's aid over at Cuba, possibly crushing Fidel Castro's revolution.

Do not see why it would do anything of the sort. Batista would be just as embarrassing. The USA never to my knowledge made analogies between Cuba and Korea. The only military analogies it ever made were between invading Cuba and invading some Japanese held islands in WWII. When Cuba was compared with other Cold War battlefields of its own day, it was nearly always with Berlin or Turkey, not any place in Asia.

 

[raharris1973]

This probably butterflies away the Vietnam War from escalating than OTL.

This just causes the Communist side to not dare fight?

I see that as quite, quite, quite....unlikely.

Or causes the US to not care as the Communists take over all Vietnam. I see that as nearly unlikely as the opposite alternative.

 

[raharris1973]

I think the end effects on Vietnam would only buy more time until French defeat.

I do not know why the new balance would even buy more time for the French, if it is just a matter of providing aid. It would probably be the Chinese, and to some extent, the Soviets, who feel more 'antsy' and pressured to perform and deliver support to their Vietnamese client in the face of an ideological/defeat in Korea than the Americans do in taking a victory walk after Korea.

The only way this changes would be if American fatigue from the shortened, and victorious Korean War is *so* light that whenever the French do say it is time to quit unless they have massive US intervention on their behalf (massive air campaign, maybe nuclear, or across the Chinese border, or US ground troops) that the US says, sure, we will send in our ground troops ---- at which point it would be the USA gradually taking over the fight for Vietnam, over a decade early, and primarily in the north rather than the south, and possibly dealing with Chinese regulars in addition to Viet Minh.

Sorry to disagree with everybody who made a reply on one thing or another. Trying to agreeably disagree. This is an interesting idea. One more disagreement, which is also an agreement with one of the repliers - I do not think a mere promise of recognition of the PRC is enough to get China to stand aside. China needs to be kept out by being thrown out through better preparations and deployments, or alternatively, stay out because of different calculations within its own leadership or Soviet leadership, something like Mao's sudden death and OTL's doubters have their way, or Stalin vetoes Chinese intervention instead of actively urging it on, for some paranoid cautious reason.

 

[Gillan1220]

This just causes the Communist side to not dare fight?

I see that as quite, quite, quite....unlikely.

Or causes the US to not care as the Communists take over all Vietnam. I see that as nearly unlikely as the opposite alternative.

It could have two butterflies:
1. The U.S. and the West is more aggressive in containing communism seeing the victory in Korea.
2. It also encourages the Soviets to be more aggressive in spreading the communist ideology.

 

[Alex1guy]

What happens to a united Korea?

 

[Seandineen]

Rhee calms down and leaves before 1960. Hopefully if Park comes in he does it the right way, economic boom without twenty five years of authoritarianism.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

A very good source book from the U.S. Policy perspective is David M Finkelstein's Washington's Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950: From Abandonment to Salvation. By March 1950, this Policy was based largely upon the following assessments.
1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined Taiwan was outside the sphere of US National Security; and that at current conventional military, naval and air power strength, the United States could not prevent a Communist occupation of Taiwan.
2) The Nationalist Chinese Government could not successfully repel a Communist invasion of Taiwan.
3) With the inevitable conquest of Taiwan, U.S. diplomatic recognition was merely a matter of timing.

After the conquest of Hainan Island on 2 May 1950, the U.S. State Department began to prepare the necessary groundwork for recognition of the PRC, as Taiwan was no longer expected to last much past July 1950.
This sets the stage for starting points of possible threads. The first is if President Truman and the Democratic Party, already beaten senseless by the Republican Party and the China Lobby (two different entities) over losing China, decided bite the bullet and to extend diplomatic recognition in May 1950. This allows the possibility that China may wash its hands of the Soviet-DRPK invasion of the ROK so as to not jeopardize its infant relations with Washington.
A second possibility is the Chinese threats of intervention are made directly on the ambassadorial level, and not through third parties. They are also not filtered through MacArthur's HQ in Japan. A likely line drawn by Peking may be that ROK troops are allowed to approach the Yalu River, but not U.S. or U.N. This Korean-only option may take a year or two, with the U.S./U.N. on the sidelines.
A third possibility is MacArthur goes on his "no substitute for victory tirade in October 1950, rather than later, with his insubordination more obvious, and the crashing of his political hopes coming sooner.
Thoughts?

 

[Gillan1220]

A very good source book from the U.S. Policy perspective is David M Finkelstein's Washington's Taiwan Dilemma 1949-1950: From Abandonment to Salvation. By March 1950, this Policy was based largely upon the following assessments.
1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined Taiwan was outside the sphere of US National Security; and that at current conventional military, naval and air power strength, the United States could not prevent a Communist occupation of Taiwan.
2) The Nationalist Chinese Government could not successfully repel a Communist invasion of Taiwan.
3) With the inevitable conquest of Taiwan, U.S. diplomatic recognition was merely a matter of timing.

After the conquest of Hainan Island on 2 May 1950, the U.S. State Department began to prepare the necessary groundwork for recognition of the PRC, as Taiwan was no longer expected to last much past July 1950.
This sets the stage for starting points of possible threads. The first is if President Truman and the Democratic Party, already beaten senseless by the Republican Party and the China Lobby (two different entities) over losing China, decided bite the bullet and to extend diplomatic recognition in May 1950. This allows the possibility that China may wash its hands of the Soviet-DRPK invasion of the ROK so as to not jeopardize its infant relations with Washington.
A second possibility is the Chinese threats of intervention are made directly on the ambassadorial level, and not through third parties. They are also not filtered through MacArthur's HQ in Japan. A likely line drawn by Peking may be that ROK troops are allowed to approach the Yalu River, but not U.S. or U.N. This Korean-only option may take a year or two, with the U.S./U.N. on the sidelines.
A third possibility is MacArthur goes on his "no substitute for victory tirade in October 1950, rather than later, with his insubordination more obvious, and the crashing of his political hopes coming sooner.
Thoughts?

Why was Taiwan outside the U.S. foreign policy? Nearby Philippines hosted U.S. bases and also had an active communist movement. Even as Truman knew the KMT was a waste of time, his administration saw the threat of communism as real so that's why the 7th Fleet was sent to protect Taiwan. I'm not sure if the U.S. at this time was aware of what naval and amphibious capabilities the Communist Chinese had. I know the Communists used junks and left-over Lend Lease equipment like LVTs to take over Hainan, but none of the early PLA-N ships were ocean-going.

Not to mention, the U.S. would not have recognized Mao Zedong's PRC because it itself was an ally to the USSR in 1950.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Why was Taiwan outside the U.S. foreign policy?

Outside the sphere of US National Security, not U.S. Foreign Policy. There is a difference. This decision was made by the National Security Council (NSC) on the recommendation of The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was realistically acting as a result of the massive cuts in budget since 1946. The Decision Papers are NSC 34, 37, 41 and 48. They can be summarized as Chiang Kai-Shek will be left to fend for himself.
The US Seventh Fleet was deployed to the Taiwan Straits on 27 June 1950, two days after the DRPK invasion of the ROK. Politically, the Truman Administration had no choice.

Not to mention, the U.S. would not have recognized Mao Zedong's PRC because it itself was an ally to the USSR in 1950.

The Truman Administration hope at this timeframe was that Mao would follow the course of Tito in Yugoslavia, and break with Stalin. Diplomatic relations were perceived at the time as helpful to what the U.S. State Department referred to as "Chinese Titoism." This also shows how dramatically U.S. Policy fully reversed itself after the North Korean invasion of the South.

 

[Gillan1220]

Outside the sphere of US National Security, not U.S. Foreign Policy. There is a difference. This decision was made by the National Security Council (NSC) on the recommendation of The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was realistically acting as a result of the massive cuts in budget since 1946. The Decision Papers are NSC 34, 37, 41 and 48. They can be summarized as Chiang Kai-Shek will be left to fend for himself.
The US Seventh Fleet was deployed to the Taiwan Straits on 27 June 1950, two days after the DRPK invasion of the ROK. Politically, the Truman Administration had no choice.

The Truman Administration hope at this timeframe was that Mao would follow the course of Tito in Yugoslavia, and break with Stalin. Diplomatic relations were perceived at the time as helpful to what the U.S. State Department referred to as "Chinese Titoism." This also shows how dramatically U.S. Policy fully reversed itself after the North Korean invasion of the South.

Yes, the Truman Administration saw the KMT as a liability due to their corruption, incompetence, and losing lots of Lend Lease equipment to the Communists. Even General MacArthur was against going to intervene on the side of the KMT.

It makes an interesting scenario on how the PRC would have developed if it did not ally with the Soviets initially. The PRC would have been like Yugoslavia or Albania, being in the middle of the communist bloc and the West.

Now I wonder what culture will be like in both the ROK and the PRC. I'm sure there will still be mandatory military service in the ROK because the USSR is near and the PRC might attack Korea because of the presence of U.S. troops. I also wonder how this will affect Sino-American ties. With the U.S. right at its doorstep, Mao might be more aggressive here. This might butterfly the 1970s-80s rapprochement.

No doubt the ROK will still be under an authoritarian dictatorship for the next 50 years or so. Depending on the circumstances, it might parallel as OTL where in the ROK becomes an economic powerhouse. Alt versions of K-pop and K-Drama will still come out.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

It makes an interesting scenario on how the PRC would have developed if it did not ally with the Soviets initially. The PRC would have been like Yugoslavia or Albania, being in the middle of the communist bloc and the West.

It should be noted that the United States did not order its consulates in Shanghai, Nanking, Peking and Tientsin closed until 14 January 1950. On 6 January 1950, the PRC informed Consul General Edmond O Clubb in Peking that portions of the enlarged U.S. Consulate were no longer needed and would be repossessed by the PRC. When Chinese police entered the parts of the Peking Consulate specified, all consulates were closed.
The State Department conditions for recognition of the PRC were: 1) The PRC had control of the country (hence waiting for the fall of Taiwan); 2) had the general acceptance of the Chinese people; 3) the PRC was prepared to honour international commitments and obligations.

 

[Gillan1220]

It should be noted that the United States did not order its consulates in Shanghai, Nanking, Peking and Tientsin closed until 14 January 1950. On 6 January 1950, the PRC informed Consul General Edmond O Clubb in Peking that portions of the enlarged U.S. Consulate were no longer needed and would be repossessed by the PRC. When Chinese police entered the parts of the Peking Consulate specified, all consulates were closed.
The State Department conditions for recognition of the PRC were: 1) The PRC had control of the country (hence waiting for the fall of Taiwan); 2) had the general acceptance of the Chinese people; 3) the PRC was prepared to honour international commitments and obligations.

Another thing I knew today. I thought the U.S. closed all diplomatic outposts in 1949 after the USS Dixie evacuated the last Americans out of China. There were still American diplomatic personnel when Mao Zedong established the People's Republic.

 

[Cudymcar]

If China doesn't intervene, then the Korean war isn't even started, or more probably, starts later with Rhee as an agressor.

 

[NorthTension]

Going off of what happened before and after the war you would probably have massacres and purges of anyone viewed as a threat to the Republic, and most of the North would probably be viewed as left-wing and thus targets, sparking a refugee crisis that China and the Soviers would have to manage.

Ilminism would be the dominant ideology and the power struggle within the Liberal Party between Rhee and Lee Beom-seok would have become even more brutal, if the latter wins you would have a Nazi-inspired government ruling the peninsula. I don't see Park taking power in the event of an Ilminist dictatorship unless political history plays out literally the exact same as OTL. Asian Fascism might also gain more credibility as a result of this too.