Political Aftermath of a Conventional NATO/Warsaw Pact War?

[Kung Fucious]

What it says on the tin. What would be the political fallout (both domestic and international) of a conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact? For the sake of argument, let's assume it was one similar to the one hypothesized in "Red Storm Rising": taking place sometime in the mid-80's (let's say, around 1986, shortly after Gorbachev came to power), and being a brief (let's say the summer of '86) conventional war fought almost entirely in Western Europe (primarily Germany, Norway, the North Sea and the North Atlantic), and ending in a cease-fire.

What would the treaty that follows look like? What affects would this have on Europe and the United States, politically, culturally, or socially?

 

[Dayton Kitchens]

What it says on the tin. What would be the political fallout (both domestic and international) of a conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact? For the sake of argument, let's assume it was one similar to the one hypothesized in "Red Storm Rising": taking place sometime in the mid-80's (let's say, around 1986, shortly after Gorbachev came to power), and being a brief (let's say the summer of '86) conventional war fought almost entirely in Western Europe (primarily Germany, Norway, and the North Sea and the North Atlantic), and ending in a cease-fire.

What would the treaty that follows look like? What affects would this have on Europe and the United States, politically, culturally, or socially?

Depends. I've pondered this often. Wondering about stuff from the political fall out to the television shows that might end up being made.

First political. I think that depends on how the war is perceived in the west. If it is seen as a "victory" in the United States then President Reagan comes out in all likelihood as the man who "prepared" the U.S. for the war and successfully led the country through it.

Successful Democrats will probably be those stronger on national security historically like Senators Sam Nunn and Al Gore.

I foresee Star Trek: The Next Generation being far, far more conservative than in the original timeline. The Klingons will still be enemies because they were always considered stand ins for the Soviets.

New television shows and movies will probably mine the events of the war for material just as World War Two was despite the brevity of the conflict.

I see the future European Union more heavily dominated by France due to the staggering destruction to Germany that probably sets it back for a couple of decades.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Red Storm Rising relied on a massive amount of contrivances to produce the war, a NATO victory, and avoid the nukes coming out so... I hardly view it as a good example for a NATO/WAPAC war.

In fact, pretty much any major Soviet invasion of Europe war where the nukes manage to stay cashed strains my SoD pretty hard, although I'm generally willing to give it a pass if it makes for a good story (which admittedly, it usually does).

 

[GarethC]

The NATO doctrine is that we will fight with conventional forces until we are losing, then we will fight with tactical weapons until we are losing, and then we will blow up the world.

It feels a bit unfair to use that quote, as Halperin was never all that senior, but still it's not entirely wrong, and really does illustrate the point - neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact expects that there really can be a conventional war in Europe, so it sort of has to be a damp squib affair, where the Warsaw Pact forces do not make significant gains towards Hamburg or through the Fulda Gap before giving up on the whole thing as a bit of a waste of time - probably because USSR internal division precluded the use of WMDs at the strategic level, and the giving of operational control of WMDs at the tactical level to the military. So figure less than two weeks, maybe only one, between the commencement of hostilities and a ceasefire in place.

A short war actually diminishes the US' role in it, as the return of forces to Germany still takes some time no matter how well planned. So we're looking at a prospect where the USSR doesn't break through the standing forces (3 German, 2 US, 1 British, 1 Dutch, and 1 Belgian corps), where the reinforcements that plug the gaps are 2 French corps in the main, and the US narrative probably focuses on the war-winning impact of the USAF.

Tough for the Soviet Union not to go to pieces, I think, though the level of casualties and the economic disruption of the war are key to how orderly the transition from a Union to a bunch of pretty disorganised oligarchies is.

The Warsaw Pact is... tricky. It's very much up in the air how East Germany goes - whether a failed war will be the cause of a populist uprising, and whether Honecker tries to put it down, and if so whether his regime is successful. You could get an orderly Soviet withdrawal to the GDR at which point it is inj place to put down the East with a pretty horrific toll, or if the lid stays on until the Soviets and Poles have withdrawn then it does rather beg for West German intervention in support of the insurrection... and indeed whether that support ends at the Poland-GDR border or the Leopards continue to roll further east in a sort of anti-Barbarossa with legitimately-popular support until they get to the ethnically-Russian bits of the Baltics. Okay, that bit's pretty fanciful; only in the worst case of full-on RCWII does the RKKA not remain in force in the Baltic states until NATO gives up on liberating them. It's probably a safe assumption that any "stabilisation" moves eastwards will stop short of resuming combat against first-line Soviet formations, so wherever the motor-rifle divisions park, the Bundeswehr will laager up at least 20 miles further west.

In Western Europe as a whole, leftist sympathies are in for a beating at the ballot box. Some strongly Marxist/communist types - from the communist parties, from trade union, and from academia - will probably have been detained for the duration of hostilities, and there will be lingering issues there in many cases from the internees faced with public hostility.

As US forces stream towards Europe even after the ceasefire "just in case", there will be a temptation for Reagan to take advantage of the opportunity and have a Gulf of Tonkin moment in the Gulf of Sidra, and unleash the Sixth Fleet and the USMC on Muammar Gadaffi, though the spectre of Scud-Bs dropping chemical weapons on Naples may restrain the enthusiasm for that venture.

US politics - if the war's not that big, relatively speaking, and ends without Abrams rolling into Russia proper, there's a danger to the GOP that it won't be a big enough victory, particularly if it can be spun that Reagan's jingoism ("we start bombing in five minutes...") can be blamed for spurring the Soviets into attacking. That's a pretty speculative point, though - a few good speeches one way or the other and the zeitgeist will find a tipping point, as it's clear to everyone that things were very very close to Vera Lynn singing "We'll Meet Again" in the end-sequence to Dr. Strangelove. A lot depends on the Democrats - Dukakis was the sort of candidate to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, but a number of the other candidates might do better, maybe Gore, Simon or Gephardt, or if the disruption of the war means that Gary Hart can either keep his pants on or keep his affair secret.

 

[Dayton Kitchens]

A short war actually diminishes the US' role in it, as the return of forces to Germany still takes some time no matter how well planned. .

Depends.

It is possible a war would start only after a steady rise in tensions and lots of fits and starts by both sides.

For example, if REFORGER began more than a month before actual outbreak of hostilities it is possible more than 500,000 American and Canadian troops would've been shipped back to West Germany and that West German (and other nations) mobilization would've added 2,000,000 available troops.

Of course that brings up the possibility of the Soviets actually going to a "rolling start" where they attack with whatever forces at hand. The 3rd Shock Army in East Germany for example and conducting whatever air and missiles strikes they could to disrupt the flow of U.S., Canadian, and British reinforcements.

There is also the possibility that the Soviets would then "pull back" and allow NATO to spend billions on a massive buildup and look like a provocateur.

But that of course depends on the motivation for Soviet actions in the first place.

 

[Kung Fucious]

I don't think a limited conventional war, even one that lasts more than a month or two, is that implausible. There's a very big difference between saying "Oh, we'd use nukes the moment we start losing" and actually uncorking the nuclear genie.

 

[Byzantion]

I don't think a limited conventional war, even one that lasts more than a month or two, is that implausible. There's a very big difference between saying "Oh, we'd use nukes the moment we start losing" and actually uncorking the nuclear genie.

There is a quite haunting documentary drama from 1998 (US and German version), which uses historical material and acted scenes, where Soviet Generals remove Gorbatschow in 1989 and a spiral of events leads to a conventional war in March 1990 which eventually leads to nuclear war, because of Warsaw Pact defeat and rebellion within the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union itself.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PCblCImmgu8

 

[Dayton Kitchens]

I don't think a limited conventional war, even one that lasts more than a month or two, is that implausible. There's a very big difference between saying "Oh, we'd use nukes the moment we start losing" and actually uncorking the nuclear genie.

Well, I've read that thought NATO "officially" never adopted a No First Use policy regarding nuclear weapons because they wanted the uncertainty to act as a deterrent, NATO effectively had a no first use policy. That NATO would not use nuclear weapons even if Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces were storming over the Rhine River and into France.

Though what the French would do is another matter. Some say France had a "first Russian soldier" policy. That is the first Russian to cross into France would trigger a nuclear attack by the French.

I find that difficult to believe as long before Russian soldiers crossed into France, Soviet air and missile strikes would've already killed thousands in France anyway.

So why would NATO not use nuclear weapons?

No need. The Soviets couldn't invade Great Britain. Even if NATO was forced off the continent it would not be difficult with their far, far larger economy for the U.S. to build an invincible conventional force that based in Britain could invade and liberate the continent much as was done in World War Two.

Soviet war aims in a war in Europe would've had to be limited in order to have any hope of victory. In short a "smash & grab" where they took West Germany and stopped.

 

[CarribeanViking]

How do you get missile age combat, even without nukes, to last that long? Look at the first Gulf War- it's the closest we've come to that kind of fighting. Now picture it with two sides.

Round the clock, maximum intensity, artillery and air strikes continuous- grid square removal up and down the line, armoured thrusts and atgm fire, that simply cannot be kept up for long. People and buildings just aren't that hard to kill.

Maybe GW1 isn't the right analogy. Think more along the lines of Prokhorovka- on a two hundred mile front, with both sides thinking use it or lose it.

The only way we were going to get a conventional result is if it isn't a long war- if either NATO's wildest dreams come true and Pact forces are shredded and driver back from the first shock onwards, or if they do something sensible, attack at pub closing time on Saturday night and are on the channel before the decision to go nuclear can be taken.

In the unlikely event it does work out to a stalemate, garethC may have it right.

 

[Dayton Kitchens]

How do you get missile age combat, even without nukes, to last that long? Look at the first Gulf War- it's the closest we've come to that kind of fighting. Now picture it with two sides.

Round the clock, maximum intensity, artillery and air strikes continuous- grid square removal up and down the line, armoured thrusts and atgm fire, that simply cannot be kept up for long. People and buildings just aren't that hard to kill.

Maybe GW1 isn't the right analogy. Think more along the lines of Prokhorovka- on a two hundred mile front, with both sides thinking use it or lose it.

The only way we were going to get a conventional result is if it isn't a long war- if either NATO's wildest dreams come true and Pact forces are shredded and driver back from the first shock onwards, or if they do something sensible, attack at pub closing time on Saturday night and are on the channel before the decision to go nuclear can be taken.

In the unlikely event it does work out to a stalemate, garethC may have it right.

Remember that the Soviet predictions were for a two week war. IIRC, from what is known, the Soviets didn't even plan for a longer conflict.

I've heard NATO experts suggesting that in about one week, the intensity of combat would decline immensely as most of the deadliest stocks of weapons and munitions would be exhausted.

NATO figured on losing at least 2,000 warplanes within 7 days and about as many aircrew with the Soviets losing 3-5,000 and about as many aircrew.

Tank losses were estimated to be around 5,000 on the NATO side at least with 10-15,000 on the Soviet side.

About half of all NATO warships were projected to be sunk within the first week while the Soviet naval forces both ship and land based were projected to be effectively annihilated.

So you're looking at about 500,000 soldiers killed in the first week with probably 1-2,000,000 civilians (depending on how many have not fled the Inter German Border before shooting starts).

You're figuring Berlin, Hamburg, Bonn, Stuttgart, and a host of port cities reduced to ruins within that time.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Remember that the Soviet predictions were for a two week war. IIRC, from what is known, the Soviets didn't even plan for a longer conflict.

Not remotely true at all. The Soviets had a variety of plans calling for a variety of options and wars of a variety of length. They had mobilization schemes that projected for conflicts lasting years.

Though what the French would do is another matter. Some say France had a "first Russian soldier" policy. That is the first Russian to cross into France would trigger a nuclear attack by the French.

Those "some" including the French themselves. That is far more solid information then your idle speculation.

No need. The Soviets couldn't invade Great Britain. Even if NATO was forced off the continent it would not be difficult with their far, far larger economy for the U.S. to build an invincible conventional force that based in Britain could invade and liberate the continent much as was done in World War Two.

Pure nonsense. The Soviet Union in the 1970s and 80s has so much more means to invade Britain then the Germans ever did. At the same time the British have so much less means to defend it then they did in 1940. Compared to 1940 their army is entirely professional and forward deployed in Germany. Once that is gone that leaves only the territorial army to defend the British mainland. The Soviet VDV (Airborne forces) alone had more men then the entire territorial army. And unlike the TA, which cannot be concentrated, the Red Army can and will concentrate its entire invasion force.

NATO figured on losing at least 2,000 warplanes within 7 days and about as many aircrew with the Soviets losing 3-5,000 and about as many aircrew.

Tank losses were estimated to be around 5,000 on the NATO side at least with 10-15,000 on the Soviet side.

About half of all NATO warships were projected to be sunk within the first week while the Soviet naval forces both ship and land based were projected to be effectively annihilated.

You've clearly plucked these numbers from thin air, given that nobody was sure what the losses would be.

In any case, prior to the mid-1980s, NATO would more likely lose a conventional conflict then not. Their lack of centralized control, defense-in-depth, and basically deciding to hand the Soviets the initiative (NATO doctrine didn't pay more than lip-service to the idea of a pre-emptive invasion) would effectively doom effective resistance against the Soviet concepts of rapid mechanized deep operations.

Once you get into the mid-1980s, things get more complicated. The adoption of AirLand battle represented a great step forward in centralized control, but the issues of lack of depth and initiative would remain. AirLand Battle also placed heavy reliance on near perfect intelligence in order to identify key targets quickly, and then on superlative command and control able to quickly task forces to destroy them - which were overambitious goals, based on the technology and C3I nets of the day, and what we know of the capabilities of airpower today. The Soviets also placed a great deal of emphasis in decoys and deception at all levels, which would have complicated targeting immensely, particularly with 1980's technology and command structure. Since NATO was relying heavily on taking out Soviet command nodes and key "mobility assets" (engineering vehicles, bridgelayers and the like) with their new wonder weapons in order to slow their advance and gain the initiative, this was a significant point of potential failure. The Soviets also were developing their own plan for the deep battle, envisaging fast moving mobile formations of considerable combat power being flung out ahead of the main body, and seizing objectives deep in NATOs rear in combination with commando, paratroop and heliborne assaults.

In the end, AirLand Battle assumed NATO would be able to quickly seize the initiative and then defeat the Soviets in battles of our choosing where we would target key nodes rather than allow battles of attrition - yet NATO intended to let the Soviets strike first, and they drilled relentlessly to be able to respond in battle faster than NATO could, sacrificing tactical flexibility for sheer speed, trusting that this would disrupt all of NATOs vaunted but highly complex all arms co-ordination. Letting your enemy take the initiative (militarily a bad idea, but politically necessary in this case) and then relying on taking it back off him is a very risky plan, particularly if he has the potential to react and move faster than you do, and your forces are deployed in limited depth.

This (serious) concern was generally countered not by doctrinal argument but by pointing to the declining state of Soviet soldiery and assuming their skills would fall well short of those needed to perform as their doctrine demanded. While this was possibly true, our own skills at co-ordinating our own ambitious groupings of forces were themselves open to debate. It was a somewhat shaky foundation on which to base NATOs chances. That's not to say AirLand Battle wasn't a good doctrine. Its concepts were ambitious, and it was a much needed step forward. However the Soviets did not merely sit still as it was developed, but adapted their own operational art to match, based on a more solid theoretical foundation. To assume AirLand Battle would have been an instant win button against a Warsaw Pact invasion is to drink a little too much of our own kool-aid. Whether NATOs inexperience in co-ordinating Air and Land forces on the required scale, and the politically necessarily but militarily poor forward deployment would have been more of a hindrance than the Soviets stultified command structure and inferior tactical leadership is luckily one of those questions that will now never be answered.

 

[Kung Fucious]

Not remotely true at all. The Soviets had a variety of plans calling for a variety of options and wars of a variety of length. They had mobilization schemes that projected for conflicts lasting years.

Those "some" including the French themselves. That is far more solid information then your idle speculation.

Pure nonsense. The Soviet Union in the 1970s and 80s had significant amphibious, airborne assault, and naval assets which could launch an invasion of the UK, except with the US and British military wiped out trying to defend continental Europe. The Soviet airborne forces alone were bigger then the UK home army.

You've clearly plucked these numbers from thin air, given that nobody was sure what the losses would be.

In any case, prior to the mid-1980s, NATO would more likely lose a conventional conflict then not. Their lack of centralized control, defense-in-depth, and basically deciding to hand the Soviets the initiative (NATO doctrine didn't pay more than lip-service to the idea of a pre-emptive invasion) would effectively doom effective resistance against the Soviet concepts of rapid mechanized deep operations.

Once you get into the mid-1980s, things get more complicated. The adoption of AirLand battle represented a great step forward in centralized control, but the issues of lack of depth and initiative would remain. AirLand Battle also placed heavy reliance on near perfect intelligence in order to identify key targets quickly, and then on superlative command and control able to quickly task forces to destroy them - which were overambitious goals, based on the technology and C3I nets of the day, and what we know of the capabilities of airpower today. The Soviets also placed a great deal of emphasis in decoys and deception at all levels, which would have complicated targeting immensely, particularly with 1980's technology and command structure. Since NATO was relying heavily on taking out Soviet command nodes and key "mobility assets" (engineering vehicles, bridgelayers and the like) with their new wonder weapons in order to slow their advance and gain the initiative, this was a significant point of potential failure. The Soviets also were developing their own plan for the deep battle, envisaging fast moving mobile formations of considerable combat power being flung out ahead of the main body, and seizing objectives deep in NATOs rear in combination with commando, paratroop and heliborne assaults.

In the end, AirLand Battle assumed NATO would be able to quickly seize the initiative and then defeat the Soviets in battles of our choosing where we would target key nodes rather than allow battles of attrition - yet NATO intended to let the Soviets strike first, and they drilled relentlessly to be able to respond in battle faster than NATO could, sacrificing tactical flexibility for sheer speed, trusting that this would disrupt all of NATOs vaunted but highly complex all arms co-ordination. Letting your enemy take the initiative (militarily a bad idea, but politically necessary in this case) and then relying on taking it back off him is a very risky plan, particularly if he has the potential to react and move faster than you do, and your forces are deployed in limited depth.

This (serious) concern was generally countered not by doctrinal argument but by pointing to the declining state of Soviet soldiery and assuming their skills would fall well short of those needed to perform as their doctrine demanded. While this was possibly true, our own skills at co-ordinating our own ambitious groupings of forces were themselves open to debate. It was a somewhat shaky foundation on which to base NATOs chances. That's not to say AirLand Battle wasn't a good doctrine. Its concepts were ambitious, and it was a much needed step forward. However the Soviets did not merely sit still as it was developed, but adapted their own operational art to match, based on a more solid theoretical foundation. To assume AirLand Battle would have been an instant win button against a Warsaw Pact invasion is to drink a little too much of our own kool-aid. Whether NATOs inexperience in co-ordinating Air and Land forces on the required scale, and the politically necessarily but militarily poor forward deployment would have been more of a hindrance than the Soviets stultified command structure and inferior tactical leadership is luckily one of those questions that will now never be answered.

Good to know, though I feel like we're getting off topic. The question isn't "Could NATO fight a conventional war with the Warsaw Pact?", but rather, "What would be the consequences of a conventional NATO/Warsaw Pact war?"

Like I said, let's assume (for the sake of argument), that NATO and the Warsaw Pact have already fought a brief, albeit highly destructive, conventional war across West Germany, and a cease-fire now holds following the Soviets being driven back/retreating into East Germany (if you want to throw in a Red Storm Rising-style invasion/liberation of Iceland, sure). What follows on from there? Would this permanently scuttle any plans for German re-unification?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Too many unknowns to say for sure. All of these things are going to be dependent on why the war started, how it ended, many of the details of how it developed both in Central Europe, and how all of this was interpreted by the respective sides leaderships and populace...

 

[Byzantion]

Good to know, though I feel like we're getting off topic. The question isn't "Could NATO fight a conventional war with the Warsaw Pact?", but rather, "What would be the consequences of a conventional NATO/Warsaw Pact war?"

Like I said, let's assume (for the sake of argument), that NATO and the Warsaw Pact have already fought a brief, albeit highly destructive, conventional war across West Germany, and a cease-fire now holds following the Soviets being driven back/retreating into East Germany (if you want to throw in a Red Storm Rising-style invasion/liberation of Iceland, sure). What follows on from there? Would this permanently scuttle any plans for German re-unification?

Would depend how far the Soviets retreat back . If there are beaten bad and driven way behind the Iron curtain, East Germany would collapse, as it´s participation on behalf on the Warsaw Pact would have made it a target, too. Possibly the East german NVA-army would have great losses and a disatrous morale, the state of the GDR (DDR) would be in dissolution with the people welcoming the NATO troops as liberators. This could mean a Reunification de facto. Also, there could be insurgencies in many parts of the Soviet Union in case of an disastrous defeat in an conventional war.

 

[sloreck]

IMHO the key question here is how much could either side "lose" before they would begin using WMD in order to tilt the scales in their favor. For example, one book posited a Soviet victory where they overrun West Germany but send no ground forces beyond that, and force the West German government to "surrender". At this point the Soviets declare "game over" - what does NATO do. Only one example. Another might be mutinies in the Polish and Czech militaries, cutting off the Soviet forces in the west logistically. Would this trigger nuke use, maybe against those countries but not against NATO.

Obviously a Soviet military taking everything east of Britain with the possible exceptions of the Iberian peninsula and Italy is not going to be acceptable so tacnukes get used. Likewise a NATO military crossing the border of the USSR will start the dance. Some writers postulated that tacnuke use at sea might, just might, prevent going strategic, but most accepted the reality that escalating from tacnukes to strategic would be almost impossible to prevent.

If the USSR "wins" taking over Germany and no more, expect a shakeup in Europe - will the Europeans get serious about defense or will they attempt to cuddle up to the bear to avoid being gobbled? In either case I see the USA becoming moie militarized, draft reinstated etc and a fortress America attitude, anyone who prior to the war was soft on defense spending will find themselves unemployed as a politician. If the USSR loses, with complete/partial breakup of the Warsaw Pact, I can see something akin to OTL happening as communism loses what luster it had, but with a very paranoid and nationalist Russia emerging and no soft exit for the stans etc.

 

[elektro]

Interestingly, a number of studies identified political conflict resolution as one of the most difficult aspects of any conventional NATO-WARPAC conflict. That is, a settlement that doesn't end in a strategic nuclear exchange.

The Global War Game put on by the Naval War College in the mid and late 80s looked at this area in significant depth and commented on how difficult it was to find a mutually agreeable ceasefire proposal regardless of which side had the tactical and/or strategic upper hand. US/NATO wanted at the very least status quo ante bellum, and the USSR/WARPAC usually pushed for cease fire in place. The first was unacceptable to USSR/WARPAC because of the potential for unrest at home and in the satellite states (especially so if they had control of all/most of the FRG and Benelux) and the second was unacceptable to the US/NATO because the loss of an independent and territorially intact FRG was the de facto collapse of the alliance. In fact, they ended the last gaming session at an impasse because they couldn't sort it out!

The political difficulty in trying to accomplish a successful war termination means barring complete political collapse of one side or another the likelihood of tactical and resultant strategic exchange is extremely high; thankfully we never had to find out!

I agree with a lot of what has been posted previously. With your scenario (conventional US/NATO victory) I see the following:

NATO/Western Europe: Significant economic destruction/dislocation. Probably some form of Marshall Plan v2. Long term, strengthening of the proto-EU and European integration.

WARPAC: Probably collapses, how soon and to what extent depending on the war details. Interestingly, I could see no German reunification if the enmity from German-German fighting is too high and especially if the DDR regime is able to hang on to some sort of power.

USSR: I could see it going in two different directions. One, and probably most likely is eventual collapse. The other is hardliner/military coup taking over, blaming the loss on Gorbachev. If that happens, I see a fairly good chance for round 2 and I doubt the ASB would save us from the nukes the second time around.

USA: Will be rightly shocked by the material and human losses in even 1-2 weeks of modern no holds barred conventional war. Will be a strong push for isolationism again, may or may not succeed depending on the geopolitical climate. Assuming an '86 war I could easily see a Democrat in '88 as the shine of the war has fallen off and the likely economic recession.

 

[Blue cat]

What it says on the tin. What would be the political fallout (both domestic and international) of a conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact? For the sake of argument, let's assume it was one similar to the one hypothesized in "Red Storm Rising": taking place sometime in the mid-80's (let's say, around 1986, shortly after Gorbachev came to power), and being a brief (let's say the summer of '86) conventional war fought almost entirely in Western Europe (primarily Germany, Norway, the North Sea and the North Atlantic), and ending in a cease-fire.

What would the treaty that follows look like? What affects would this have on Europe and the United States, politically, culturally, or socially?

To echo the comments made by others. I have my doubts that WW3 could have started and ended on the terms postulated in "Red Storm Rising."

That being said... I would expect there would be a lot of debate in the west following such an outcome. There would be those who would be breathing a sigh of relief that the war ended without nukes being used. There would be others who would be saying...

"WTF... We were attacked and fought a major war, and the side that attacked us is not defeated yet, let's finish this now so they won't be able to attack us again.."

I have my doubts that NATO would survive in its current form if the war ended on those terms. Some NATO nations might want to keep going to definitively end the war, others might want to cut a deal to preserve the status quo..

My $.02 worth some of the NATO nations start gearing up for a re match to put the the USSR out of commission for good or at least force them to accept more favorable (to the West) terms, while some other NATO nations might decide to sit out round two.

Frankly though I don't see the war ending on the terms outlined in Red Storm Rising.

 

[juanml82]

My $.02 worth some of the NATO nations start gearing up for a re match to put the the USSR out of commission for good or at least force them to accept more favorable (to the West) terms, while some other NATO nations might decide to sit out round two.

How? The USSR has nuclear weapons, they can't be put out of commission by military means.

 

[Napoleonrules]

One thing to those saying that nukes are inevitable- please remember how many times the Soviets and the US (and allies) each thought the other had seriously fired off a nuclear weapon and yet someone kept a level head and instead of firing back, believed it "could" have been a malfunction, false reading, etc. If they could hold restraint on pressing the button while they believe a real nuke is heading their way, surely they can restrain during a conventional war. Now if during the conventional war a false reading comes through... then we're screwed and MAD kicks in I'm sure. I don't see it being like "The Third World War: the untold story" by Sir John Hackett (great book by the way) where the Soviets nuke Birmingham and the UK nukes Minsk and everyone considers "we're even now".

 

[Blue cat]

How? The USSR has nuclear weapons, they can't be put out of commission by military means.

Presumably in this time line, that relevance of nuclear weapons will be discredited in some circles as the Western Nuclear weapons clearly failed to prevent an un provoked Soviet attack that did massive damage to parts of Western Europe, and Soviets didn't resort to them when they started to loose (or perhaps stopped winning depending on your perspective..)

As the resulting conflict didn't go nuclear, I can see some members of the west advocating using the Western Economic superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact to rebuild their armies and at least push the Soviets out of Eastern Europe before the Soviets decide to try again. That being said I doubt this view would be universally accepted in the west and I can see NATO fracturing over this issue.

I just can't see all of NATO being happy with an out come that leaves parts of Western Europe devastated and the Soviets getting to return to the pre war status quo after an un provoked Soviet attack. Frankly though if the US, the West Germans and probably the French and or the UK decide to kick off round two, the opinions of the bulk of the other NATO nations may not count for much.

To recap my prior comments I don't see the war stopping (or starting) as outlined in the Red Storm Rising story so this debate while interesting is not very relevant.