@History Learner , thank you first of all for giving a detailed response. I know of many previous post-ers who, when details are questioned or asked for, immediately start with tangents and broad responses at best, and often strawmen, insults, and the sorts of things that usually derail threads very quickly. I've read these exchanges for their entertainment value, but not at all for their analysis.
As such you deserve a properly-cited and detailed response.
As I made clear in the post, the PoD is not a detour by Fitzhugh Lee and thus the delay until the 20th. Anderson's troops and Longstreet's supplies had already arrived by the afternoon of the 18th, the only lacking being the cavalry of Lee. Hence why I also provided a screenshot of the author's conclusions for an attack on the 19th:
View attachment 572469
I re-post this again just to point out I'm not making random claims, but directly supplying the author's own speculations.
A first, overall point - all of the books we are quoting from and analyzing are Histories, not Alternate Histories. Their primary job is to describe what actually happened, and we (the amateur alternate historians) rely on them to be accurate as a starting point. These author's analysis of possible alternate timelines is a valuable tool, but this is not their primary job. Their analyses carry weight, but ultimately are only as good as the supporting facts behind them. We can look at the same starting facts and come to different judgments. Hopefully the authors will consider alternate histories that are at least supported by their own facts.
See the rest of my post for other of Hennessy's quotes that seem to go against his analysis here - and oh well, no author or person is perfect.
For your starting PoD - Good, we are all in agreement. You, me, and Hennessy all agree that Lee's initial plan for an attack on the morning of the 18th *was* going be delayed no matter what (due to Anderson's late arrival and provisioning necessities), and that the proposed PoD is Fitzhugh's earlier arrival leading to a move on the evening of the 18th.
To quote Martin:
The Yankees were closely guarding all the crossings of the Rapidan River and Robertson's River on a 15 mile front from near Madison Court House to Raccoon Ford, but they were vulnerable to a flanking movement on either end of their line. Longstreet favored a move around the Federal right, where the arm could enjoy the protection of the Blue Ridge Mountains, if needed. Lee, on the other hand, favored a march around Pope's left, for the purpose of forcing the enemy to fight by cutting off the Union supply line from Washington. The latter plan was determined upon, and Lee commenced drawing up orders for his troops to march to the east-northeast under cover of Clark's Mountain, and cross at Somerville and Raccoon Fords for the purpose of engaging the enemy. Jackson and Lee were anxious to begin the advance the next day in order to strike Pope on the 17th, but Longstreet demurred because he needed time to organize and provision his men. Lee assented, and set the army's departure for the night of the 16th, with plans to engage Pope on the 18th.
Lee's plans would have had a reasonable chance for success if they had not been upset by a strange set of circumstances. Part of his strategy called for Jeb Stuart to take Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry and cut the railroad line at Rappahannock Station in order to prevent Pope from escaping in the direction of Washington. Stuart, who had been with Lee's brigade at Beaverdam Station, rode to army headquarters on 17 August to confirm his mission. He left orders for Fitz Lee to march that day to Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan, where he was to secure the crossing for Longstreet before setting off on his mission to Rappahannock Station. After conferring with R.E. Lee, Stuart departed for the village of Verdiersville on the Orange Plank Road, where he expected to meet Fitz Lee's troops during their march westward. Plans began to go awry when Fitz Lee decided to take a different route to Raccoon Ford than Stuart had anticipated. Lee needed to supply his men with food and ammunition, so he detoured his march to go via Louisa Court House, where his supply train was then parked. He did not think that this would pose any problem, since Stuart had not given him a timetable for reaching Raccoon Ford. Fitz Lee did notify his uncle, R.E. Lee, however, that his horses were in bad shape and could not take the field on the 19th. This news forced R.E. Lee to reluctantly delay the army's advance until the 20th.
So, again, we have Martin agreeing with Hennessey about Lee's chances for his plan; again, it's important to note this to the audience for the record.
Very true - and the same argument about speculative conclusions needing to be grounded in historical facts applies (we're getting to that).
I think we can also both agree that Martin's book is much more of an overview than Hennessy's - this 2 paragraph description summarizes several pages Hennessy spends on the situation - so for our historical facts, for the moment (and welcoming other sources as they come), I will stick to Hennessy for now.
As it were, the Federal pickets won't prevent an attack given the exposed flanks and the Confederates plans for the same.
Now we hit our Alternate History analysis, and here is where the facts simply do not back this up.
Quoting Hennessy, page 39:
"New arrivals to the Army of Virginia held the army's left, south of Stevensburg near Morton's, Raccoon and Somerville fords. These troops consisted of part of Burnside's corps, lately returned from its expedition to the Carolina coast. Burnside himself was at Fredericksburg, but he sent two small divisions to Pope, numbering only twelve regiments, perhaps five thousand men. These troops were commanded by General Jesse L. Reno."
I already admitted the fairly small size of this force, but the OTL situation is that we have 2 infantry divisions patrolling the river as far downstream as Morton's ford. We also have, as Hennessy details on page 40, Buford's cavalry brigade - nominally attached to Banks' corps, but during this time operating with Reno.
Pope was rightfully concerned with a move *around* his flanks as they were exposed, but this was a specific fear against a specific location. From Hennessy page 41:
"The army already
covered the Rapidan from Robertson's River on the right, above Rapidan Station, to Raccoon Ford on the left, a distance of seventeen miles. Pope feared that Jackson might fall back quickly to Louisa Court House, then join Longstreet moving northwest from Hanover Junction, cross the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, several miles beyond his left, and strike towards his rear. Halleck recognized this possibility too, but until McClellan's forces arrived he could offer only one solution to Pope's problem. "If [you are] threatened too strongly," he told Pope on August 16, "fall back behind the Rappahannock,"
Now this would be a severe threat indeed - an actual flanking move around Pope's left via Germanna Ford.
This, however, was not Lee's plan. Hennessy, page 35:
"Lee saw great promise in a move against the Federal left. Jackson and Longstreet could cross the Rapidan at Somerville and Raccoon Fords to assail Pope's left directly, while Fitzhugh Lee and his cavalry brigade sliced toward the Federal rear to wreck the bridge across the Rappahannock."
We'll come back to Fitzhugh's placement in a moment, but Lee's main plan was to have all of his infantry *attack* Pope's left flank. While it is an attack on his left (versus a frontal attack), it is not flanking inasmuch as it does not actually get around Pope's flank - the river crossing points in this plan were ones Pope's infantry (Reno) was actively picketing and would be actively covering iTTL.
Here I would 'quote' Hennessy's map on page 36 that shows exactly this, if I had the technology to do so. If anything, it shows Jackson's part of the crossing, at the farther-west Somerville Ford, as also possibly hitting McDowell's corps. It also places Lee's initial plan as to attack Pope on the morning of the 18th. Hennessy describes the move itself starting on page 42:
"Jackson's destination was Somerville Ford, where he was to cross on the 18th. After a day's march that by Jackson's standards was moderate (fifteen miles), his command encamped the night of the 16th along the southern slope of Clark's Mountain, north of Orange Court House. Longstreet headed for Raccoon Ford, about four miles downstream (east) from Somerville."
So at no point in the plan was for Lee's army to attempt a river crossing anywhere east of Raccoon Ford. As for Fitzhugh's brigade, this statement at first may be complicated by the earlier part of the plan to have them get into the Union rear. Surely this would be made easier by using a ford farther east to get even further around Pope's flank. However, that was not the plan either. Hennessy, page 43:
"That afternoon [the 16th] Stuart gave Fitzhugh Lee instructions to ride to Raccoon Ford, then took the train to join the army near Clark's Mountain."
This and all other indirect references on the next pages make clear that the cavalry was also to cross at Raccoon Ford once the movement began.
As it seems we are in agreement that iTTL Lee will still delay the plan to the
evening of August 18th, due to the later arrival of Anderson's division and the resupplying thereof, Fitzhugh Lee may be in position and ready to move but he will not actually do so until late on the 18th. This is a day
after Pope has had Buford/Brodhead launch their cavalry reconnaissance. As I described in my previous post, if Fitzhugh's presence causes any deviation from OTL regarding this move, it will be to have Pope even *more* focused on his left wing and the Rapidan crossings.
As for Fitzhugh Lee, if he doesn't take his detour he doesn't run into the Federal cav and thus is prepared to carry out his mission. I know for a fact Pope already had independent confirmation of Lee's approach from his own spies, which is why the Federal cavalry was in operation, but that won't matter; I'll explain why below.
Glad we're in agreement here. As to why you think it won't matter:
To quote Martin:
Night marches are difficult undertakings at best, and so it was on the night of 18-19 August. Sigel's and McDowell's corps both needed to go through Culpeper, and it was not long before their immense wagon trains became entangled in a huge traffic jam. Had it been daylight, the wagoneers would have been able to avoid each other or make progress on the sides of the roads. As it was, the confused mass of vehicles stalled the progress of all the infantry stacked up on the roads south of Culpeper. The mess was not cleared up until midmorning the next day, when the infantry of the two corps were finally able to get moving.
Pope now directed his troops to withdraw on a wide front in order to use all the roads available and try to avoid any more traffic jams. Reno's division, which had managed to avoid all the confusion at Culpeper, marched by direct route though Stevensburg and crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford about 1600. Banks' corps had the shortest march route, straight up the main road from Culpeper to the bridge at Rappahannock Station (which had not been destroyed as Lee planned because of Fitz Lee's movements previously mentioned). Banks crossed the Rappahannock in the afternoon and formed to the south of the railroad. McDowell's corps was also heading for Rappahannock Station, but their late start and a difficult 20 mile march under the day's broiling sun left them a little short of their goal that night. Sigel's men took a more northerly course, which they fortunately had all to themselves. They crossed the Rappahannock that evening at the bridge at White Sulphur Springs, eight miles upriver from Rappahannock Station, and burned the bridge behind them Thus Pope had his entire command safely behind the Rappahannock by noon on 20 August.
In short, all would be in danger as Lee's plans for the 19th were to attack by the early afternoon; I see no ability you can speed up this retreat.
If we get up to this point in a TL then I will respond in detail again page-by-page. I will agree that Pope's eventual retreat out of the V will take time, and cannot be *much* sped up compared to OTL. Note again though that Martin summarizes the situation that Hennessy goes into in more detail. A "huge" traffic jam at Culpeper is likely but not guaranteed, and the time it takes to resolve is not set in stone - again, we can go through Hennessy in detail in another post if it matters.
However, I think *this*, the above, doesn't matter.
This is because it will never get to a point where Pope is pressed to strongly that he doesn't have at least a full day to carry out his backwards move. As I have made clear, Lee's plan as it would be carried out iTTL is a
frontal attack against Reno's infantry at the Rapidan crossings, and not a 'flanking move' in the sense of an unopposed maneuver. I simply cannot envision Lee's army quickly forcing a crossing in this situation. If they do it will be strongly opposed breeding delay. Any created beachhead is not guaranteed to be held permanently - one very possible reaction Pope may take iTTL is to order Reno to hold fast and shift large portions of the rest of the army eastward to support him. Near elements from McDowell's corps would be only a couple hours' march away, and Lee's troops will have hard fighting to maintain their possible hold on the fords let alone expand their lines.
I think you're getting confused at the positions here:
Gray Line is for Lee, Blue for Pope (Naturally). Lee's plan is to attack Pope's left, driving him into the V and thus placing the Army of Northern Virginia between Pope and Jefferson, Warrenton, etc.
I would love to know where you got this map because I would love to look at it - certainly it looks like multiple shades of each color are used for different time snapshots. And I guess you added the brighter blue and gray lines?
As made clear earlier, Lee's plan would *never* get as far east as the gray line indicates. The dashed red line suggests Jackson's planned movement; Longstreet's with Fitzhugh leading would be at Raccoon Ford, about halfway between Somerville and Morton's it looks like. No part of Lee's army would cross the river even at Morton's let alone farther east. As for the blue lines, the Dark blue circles seem to accurately show the *general picture* of Pope's army, leaving out that they were picketing the river as far east as Morton's ford and would cover the river line more strongly iTTL. No part of Pope's army was ever where the bright blue line is (Reno's retreating men for a short portion of time on 19th, at best). A move by Lee via Germanna Ford would be a good idea to outflank Pope to the east, but this was not his plan. In fact, the specific placement of the lines you added suggest that Lee's plan is to flank Pope to the *west*, and force him eastwards into the V, so I have to assume that is a typographic error on your part? Again I wish I knew how to post Hennessy's map from page 36 as it shows Lee's plan much more accurately.
I hope I have adequately done so to your desire.
Again I want to thank you for creating a detailed response with critical thought. I am sorry to say, however, that it doesn't even begin to create a TL to fit the result you are looking for. A TL based on the PoD you suggest *may* instead go like this:
August 17th evening: Fitzhugh's cavalry is in position. Brodhead launches his reconnaissance, finding Raccoon Ford unguarded but a large Confederate presence not far south of the river.
August 18th day: Brodhead reports as much to Pope. Having not captured Lee's detailed plans Pope is not concerned enough to retreat. However, he is now aware that Confederates may be preparing for an *immediate* attack on his left flank. He orders Reno to move his main force to the Rapidan crossings instead of merely picketing them, and sends Buford further downstream to picket Germanna Ford.
August 18th evening: With Fitzhugh in position and Anderson's division arrived, Lee orders the army forward. The advance of Jackson's and Longstreet's columns reach the Rapidan crossings during the night, and soon discover they are strongly contested. Jackson makes an attempt at a night crossing but his attacking party is forced back with severe losses. Longstreet instead prepares for a dawn attack in force.
August 19th day: As sunlight arrives Reno sees the great strength arrayed against him and sends word to Pope. Pope fears further moves against his flanks and prepares to retire across the Rappahannock. He sends the army's supply trains northward at once, and instructs Bank's and Sigel's forces to follow. Banks rides ahead to Culpeper, where Pope knows there will be a traffic jam, and gives him authority to keep the trains moving. McDowell's corps is ordered eastward along the Rapidan river at once, to support Reno and hold the river line as long as possible, at least until nightfall. Meanwhile Beardsley and Bayard's cavalry brigades take up picketing the upper Rapidan crossings just in case the Confederate move so far is a ruse, but as the day wears on it is clear that the main effort is being made at Somerville and Raccoon Fords.
Longstreet's dawn attack succeeds in taking a small perimeter on the north bank of the Rapidan River, but it remains tightly circled in a small pocket by Reno's men and bombarded fiercely by artillery. It takes Longstreet time to organize counter-battery fire from the south bank to quiet the Union guns, and to stuff enough Confederate infantry into the northern pocket to think about forcing a breakthrough. By 9 AM Longstreet prepares his breakout attack, but instead of Reno's stretched and tired men he arrives into Reynold's division of McDowell's corps arriving at the double-quick. The pocket is expanded slightly but the breakout itself fails. By late morning Reno and McDowell have their entire corps arranged in defensive rings around the beachheads of both fords. Lee orders continued attacks throughout the day but these come to naught. Aware of the need for speed, around Noon Lee also sends Fitzhugh's cavalry brigade east towards the next Rapidan crossing at Germanna Ford, hoping to get into the Union rear. However Fitzhugh runs straight into Buford's cavalry brigade waiting for just such a move. By day's end Longstreet is convinced that any successful breakout attempt will suffer unacceptable casualties and suggests a new flanking move by the infantry against Buford or even further east. Jackson has relentlessly attacked all day and by nightfall has weakened a part of the Union defensive line to a point where he thinks he can break through - but his men are also exhausted. Lee disallows any more attacks on the 19th, but prepares to shift one of Longstreet's divisions to Jackson's pocket during the night to renew a dawn attack on the 20th.
August 19th evening: Under cover of darkness McDowell and Reno begin their retreat. Buford leaves a token regiment to slow any move across Germanna ford, and moves westward to serve as rearguard. Bayard and Beardsley move east for the same purpose. The lines immediately at the Rapidan river are abandoned, and the cavalry assumes new positions - some along strong defensive terrain, some in position to spring ambushes against overeager pursuers.
August 20th day: The Confederates push northward immediately. They are slowed significantly by Union cavalry, bringing Lee's advance to a crawl as his infantry constantly has to deploy and re-deploy between marching columns and battle lines. Yet this is necessary because of the bloody nose Bayard's ambush gave to Jackson's over-eager pursuit. By early afternoon the vanguard of Jackson's column nears Culpeper with the rest of the Confederate army dragging in a long strung-out column behind. Meanwhile, the Union trains along with Banks and Sigel take more than a full day of marching and traffic jams to get beyond the Rappahannock, but by noon on the 20th these corps are in position and the supply trains are safely behind them. Reno's corps makes good time en route to Kelly's ford and with a short march is also in position by midday. McDowell's corps has a longer retreat through Culpeper proper. He leaves 1 infantry brigade behind to help as a final rearguard, and this proves useful in stalling Jackson again along with the cavalry in an early afternoon fight around the town. The bulk of McDowell's men, however, cross the Rappahannock around sundown. Confederates occupy Culpeper and their leading pursuit moves a few miles beyond the town, but never gets past the Union rear guard or anywhere close to the retreating army.
August 20th evening: The Union rearguard and cavalry crosses the Rappahannock, with immediate Confederate pursuit again called off due to darkness and the obvious futility of the plan. These specific forces may take a day or two to rest, but by dawn on the 21st the rest of Pope's army is safely behind the Rappahannock and in position, exactly like OTL. The campaign cost a couple thousand men on both sides - a couple hundred more Union stragglers missing and captured, a couple hundred more Confederate dead and wounded in their breakout attacks.
