If for some reason, the Japanese had been unable to provide carrier support for an amphibious attack on Port Moresby in May (the Coral Sea), could the Japanese have done what they did in the Kokoda Track Campaign? If so, how would they have fared compared to the historical operation?
Plausibility Check: Earlier Kokoda Track Campaign instead of the Coral Sea
- Thread starter AbeLincoln1865
- Start date
Amphib attack on Port Moresby was probably cheaper than overland. It was thought that CarDiv6 could use more operational experience before Midway/Hawaii campaign.
Garrison
Donor
Well the obvious question is why wouldn't they be able to provide carrier support? The carriers not being available would require something major to divert them. Unless the Japanese are also going to cancel the operation against Midway I can't see them mounting a major effort on New Guinea earlier.
The reason I was thinking was that the Indian Ocean Raid is expanded into an invasion of Ceylon and the Japanese need every carrier on deck.
That may have been the Army intent, I can't say for certain, but... In March 42 a reinforcement & supply convoy was headed towards the north coast of New Guinea. It got jumped by the Lexington and Enterprise operating off the south coast of New Guinea. The Wildcat and SBD pilots nursed their aircraft over the Owen Stanley range and scattered the cargo ships. Only one was sunk and few others damaged , but none went on to complete their mission that week or the next. it was 3-4 weeks before the bulk of the men and material were delivered. This stalled the corps ashore in New Guinea & seems to have delayed their advance south.
The Army was outraged its convoy had been attacked. It may be the attempt by the embarrassed Navy to get at Port Moresby was a effort to help get the New Guinea campaign back on track.
The Army was outraged its convoy had been attacked. It may be the attempt by the embarrassed Navy to get at Port Moresby was a effort to help get the New Guinea campaign back on track.
McPherson
Banned
1. The Lae / Salamaua raid of 10 March 1942 was a spoiling attack to buy time. Wilson Brown conducted a brilliant operation.
2. The Japanese never had the logistics or even the portage to make the Kokoda trail campaign work. Going the other way, the Australians and Americans sensibly went by sea as part of CARTWHEEL.
3. It was CARDIV 5. Hara's two were picked because the other four were worn out and needed refit and replenishment from the Indian Ocean Raid and or other operations.
4. The Japanese did not possess the lift or tanker support of fuel for a Sri Lanka invasion, for the same reasons they did not have it for the Hawaii plan lunacy that Yamamoto pushed at the time. Not enough hulls and inadequate oil reserves due to bungled logistic calculations. In retrospect, it appears they were badly overextended when they attempted Coral Sea, which was their prelude to RY which was their version of CARTWHEEL. They just did not have the shipping tonnage and haulage to implement. Midway and the Aleutians just makes no sense at all to a logistician by that reason.
2. The Japanese never had the logistics or even the portage to make the Kokoda trail campaign work. Going the other way, the Australians and Americans sensibly went by sea as part of CARTWHEEL.
3. It was CARDIV 5. Hara's two were picked because the other four were worn out and needed refit and replenishment from the Indian Ocean Raid and or other operations.
4. The Japanese did not possess the lift or tanker support of fuel for a Sri Lanka invasion, for the same reasons they did not have it for the Hawaii plan lunacy that Yamamoto pushed at the time. Not enough hulls and inadequate oil reserves due to bungled logistic calculations. In retrospect, it appears they were badly overextended when they attempted Coral Sea, which was their prelude to RY which was their version of CARTWHEEL. They just did not have the shipping tonnage and haulage to implement. Midway and the Aleutians just makes no sense at all to a logistician by that reason.
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Didn't the Japanese historically almost win in the face of even more resistance than they would have faced in May?
They nearly reached Port Moresby if I'm not mistaken? Would you care to elaborate?
McPherson
Banned
Out of supply. No portage. That simple. Another massive logistics fail example on a much larger scale... The Germans almost reached the Volga. They would never have been able to attain that objective because they did not have the haulage by rail or truck to sustain themselves. The Japanese had to man-pack everything after that 3000 kilometer trip through contested seas. And then walk it on the backs of men over the Kokoda Trail. The Australians simply had to ship it from Cairns into Port Moresby across the Coral Sea about 800 kilometers and truck a short distance to a defense perimeter under air cover all the way. Got it?
See the inset for the Japanese problem.
Why does the Battle of the Coral Sea happen again? Don't like to beat my own drum, but that thread gets into the dirty details of this campaign, from the naval side. It is what I discuss in some grimy detail. Australia really had an interesting war on her hands, logistically speaking. If you want to concentrate on that only, look at my posts from pages 20 to about 25. Pay particular attention to what I write about Australian logistics. Then you will understand CARTWHEEL.
See the inset for the Japanese problem.
Why does the Battle of the Coral Sea happen again? Don't like to beat my own drum, but that thread gets into the dirty details of this campaign, from the naval side. It is what I discuss in some grimy detail. Australia really had an interesting war on her hands, logistically speaking. If you want to concentrate on that only, look at my posts from pages 20 to about 25. Pay particular attention to what I write about Australian logistics. Then you will understand CARTWHEEL.
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And their troops were starving and their uniforms were rags. It's actually rather impressive that they got as far as they did.
Garrison
Donor
This disregard for logistics was why the Japanese pulled off most of their miraculous victories. They were willing to carry out attacks in conditions where supply lines were non-existent, essentially carrying out an all or nothing strategy that their opponents regarded as sucidal. When it failed as it did in New Guinea, Imphal/Kohima etc. the retreat was usually disastrous for the Japanese.
McPherson
Banned
The Japanese did pay attention to logistics up to a point. They were very much like the Russians in the way they approached logistics (though better organized) in that they calculated to a hare's whisker what they thought an offensive would need to attain the objective. This got them into serious trouble earlier than Kokoda Trail and Imphal / Kojima. That was the situation they faced in the Philippine Islands around 12 March 1942 when General Homma after a rather good campaign (by classic West Point standards) outmaneuvered MacArthur and pierced three defense lines driving the Filipinos and Americans back into deeper into the Bataan peninsula. Then Homma's corps had stalled out and was in the position where he could no longer McClellan his way forward and had run out of supplies. He attempted to use a WW I type assault to finally break the last Filipino-American positions, tried and failed. The chief of staff IJA IGHQ (Sugiyama, Hajima ) was kind of on the hot seat with Tojo, because Homma was now two months behind schedule and was in danger of being defeated by the Filipino- Americans who had outlasted him. With some desperation, the IJA shipped in one of their two siege artillery trains and Kitijima, Kineo; this artillery expert. This was a whole lot of artillery and additional supplies they had never originally budgeted for the Philippine Island operation. And they still bungled their logistics calculations. It took forever (by Japanese standards) for Kitijima to finally blast the defenders into submission. He ran out of ammunition twice. It would have served the IJA right if there was a USN at the time to show up to exploit the entire fiasco. But the USN was not available, being engaged in Doolittle stunts and a fight at the Coral Sea and so the Japanese got away with that one.
Shakes head. Better planning and logistics on the American side could have led to a rather shorter Pacific war. MacArthur has a lot to answer for it is true. So does the American administration, though. Millions of dollars spent wisely in 39-40 (In an effective air force, based in the islands.), could have saved two million Filipino lives lost (14% of the Filipino population.), during the MURDEROUS Japanese occupation and the blood and treasure of three years of war.
Shakes head. Better planning and logistics on the American side could have led to a rather shorter Pacific war. MacArthur has a lot to answer for it is true. So does the American administration, though. Millions of dollars spent wisely in 39-40 (In an effective air force, based in the islands.), could have saved two million Filipino lives lost (14% of the Filipino population.), during the MURDEROUS Japanese occupation and the blood and treasure of three years of war.