Pearl Harbor WI
- Thread starter Evil Opus
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David S Poepoe
Banned
I think the answer is fairly self-evident. But I didn't have to tell you that.
Japan gets beaten into paste sooner. How soon depends on what you mean by defeat.
If the ASB's put a couple of fleet boats with some torpedoes that actually work into the Kido Butai's OPArea the result is different than the Japanese hitting a dry hole (i.e. the Fleet being sent out to sea & out of reach a few hours before the attack). Same goes for an air attack that is blunted with a 50 or 60 Japanese losses vs. one where the U.S. has gotten wind of the attack in advance via ASB and laid in an air ambush with an extra 100 or so late model P-40's & P-38's that fall out of the rising sun onto the bomber & torpedo plane formations resulting in a couple of hundred lost aircraft & crews.
You also need to look at the Philippine attacks. If the U.S. has a bushwack waiting for the Japanese initial air attacks and a few S Boats waiting for the IJA troop transports the war is completely different. A major change here is possibly even more of a history changer than Japan being defeated at Pearl. The loss of the Philippines REALLY damaged the allies, making the losses in the Java Sea region and Indonesia more or less inevitable. The losses at Pearl, conversely, did not have a STRATEGIC impact on the war. The shock effect was huge, but only two of the battleships were really destroyed, and the casualties, while tragic, pale in comparision with losses in the Islands. No Philippine defeat means no Japanese control of Java, New Guinea's not invaded (avoiding that nasty fight), Singapore & Wake becomes untenable, Australia isn't threatened, Coral Sea never happens, Japan runs out of oil even sooner, etc.
Defeat the Japanese attack in the Philippines, regardless of Pearl Habor's result, and Japan's out of the war by 1944, perhaps earlier.
If the ASB's put a couple of fleet boats with some torpedoes that actually work into the Kido Butai's OPArea the result is different than the Japanese hitting a dry hole (i.e. the Fleet being sent out to sea & out of reach a few hours before the attack). Same goes for an air attack that is blunted with a 50 or 60 Japanese losses vs. one where the U.S. has gotten wind of the attack in advance via ASB and laid in an air ambush with an extra 100 or so late model P-40's & P-38's that fall out of the rising sun onto the bomber & torpedo plane formations resulting in a couple of hundred lost aircraft & crews.
You also need to look at the Philippine attacks. If the U.S. has a bushwack waiting for the Japanese initial air attacks and a few S Boats waiting for the IJA troop transports the war is completely different. A major change here is possibly even more of a history changer than Japan being defeated at Pearl. The loss of the Philippines REALLY damaged the allies, making the losses in the Java Sea region and Indonesia more or less inevitable. The losses at Pearl, conversely, did not have a STRATEGIC impact on the war. The shock effect was huge, but only two of the battleships were really destroyed, and the casualties, while tragic, pale in comparision with losses in the Islands. No Philippine defeat means no Japanese control of Java, New Guinea's not invaded (avoiding that nasty fight), Singapore & Wake becomes untenable, Australia isn't threatened, Coral Sea never happens, Japan runs out of oil even sooner, etc.
Defeat the Japanese attack in the Philippines, regardless of Pearl Habor's result, and Japan's out of the war by 1944, perhaps earlier.
Incidentally, the Japanese had actually planned for, and expected to lose a couple of the carriers in the attack. This is interesting because there are the possible effects that it could have on OTL's 'Victory Disease'. They may become more cautious. I would imagine no Midway later on.
That would be a good ATL to follow. Of course, the end result is the same, but the way they get there would be changed and interesting to speculate about.
So, why not have that as your 'defeat'...but still doing a lot of damage to the ships at Pearl?
Sargon
A Timeline of mine: The Roman Emperor Who Lost His Nose
That would be a good ATL to follow. Of course, the end result is the same, but the way they get there would be changed and interesting to speculate about.
So, why not have that as your 'defeat'...but still doing a lot of damage to the ships at Pearl?
Sargon
A Timeline of mine: The Roman Emperor Who Lost His Nose
No ASB's needed
There would not be ASB's needed for the USA to have forwarning of an attack. A jumpy commander of the station could have reacted to the radar warning of incoming planes as a chance to call a full alert. Hundreds of armed aircraft in the air, ships at battle stations, ammunition not locked up.
It might not be a defeat per se for the Japanese, but they would have lost a lot of trained aircrews that day--much more important than the planes themselves, given Japanese training practices.
(The Japanese pilots were shocked by the amount of anti-aircraft fire on the second wave--and that was with troops in shock, ships burning, and all the chaos of the first wave. I would expect that, if the first wave was greeted by a massive wall of flak, it would have unsettled some pilots, and interfered with the attack runs. Also ,having a surprise turned around is genreally disconcerting--no free runs on targets.)
Perhaps just the loss of many trained aircrews would have given them a wake-up call, and resulted in a pilot training program that works faster than in OTL--so they have adequately trained pilots until they start running out of gasoline.
There would not be ASB's needed for the USA to have forwarning of an attack. A jumpy commander of the station could have reacted to the radar warning of incoming planes as a chance to call a full alert. Hundreds of armed aircraft in the air, ships at battle stations, ammunition not locked up.
It might not be a defeat per se for the Japanese, but they would have lost a lot of trained aircrews that day--much more important than the planes themselves, given Japanese training practices.
(The Japanese pilots were shocked by the amount of anti-aircraft fire on the second wave--and that was with troops in shock, ships burning, and all the chaos of the first wave. I would expect that, if the first wave was greeted by a massive wall of flak, it would have unsettled some pilots, and interfered with the attack runs. Also ,having a surprise turned around is genreally disconcerting--no free runs on targets.)
Perhaps just the loss of many trained aircrews would have given them a wake-up call, and resulted in a pilot training program that works faster than in OTL--so they have adequately trained pilots until they start running out of gasoline.
I wonder, what would be the result of a generally alerted Pacific fleet? The AAF planes at Pearl were inferior to the Japanese and their pilots were much inferior, so I anticipate them getting slaughtered, but certainly less so than in OTL when they were on the ground. There really doesn't seem a way for the Pacific fleet to actually engage the Japanese with the battleships as slow as they were and the carriers missing, and in any case, an actual engagement would probably just get the ships sunk where they couldn't be raised again.
Alert time
IMVHO, the ideal time for the alert to be called would be about an hour before the raid came in. This is insufficient time for the ships with cold boilers to raise steam and sail out where they could be sunk, but enough time to launch all aircraft, getting the bombers out of the area, and the fighters at high altitude--and all ships with full watertight integrity. (California sunk because she was wide open inside, so flooding spread rapidly.)
Even obsolete fighters can disrupt bombing and torpedo runs--and there were lots of them, IIRC. Each fighter that doesn't have a Japanese fighter to deal with can hack bombers out of the sky.
I can see ot happening this way:
USS Ward sinks the Japanese submarine, and reports it. From there, the report makes it further up the chain of command--but is greeted with some skepticism--just not as much as in OTL. Then comes the radar contact, and the same people realize that it's NOT the B-17's from the states, and sounds a base-wide alert.
Alternatively, IIRC, there was a late night/early morn flyover by a Japanese floatplane. If that gets spotted, then Ward's report of a submarine sinking might trigger the full alert.
IMVHO, the ideal time for the alert to be called would be about an hour before the raid came in. This is insufficient time for the ships with cold boilers to raise steam and sail out where they could be sunk, but enough time to launch all aircraft, getting the bombers out of the area, and the fighters at high altitude--and all ships with full watertight integrity. (California sunk because she was wide open inside, so flooding spread rapidly.)
Even obsolete fighters can disrupt bombing and torpedo runs--and there were lots of them, IIRC. Each fighter that doesn't have a Japanese fighter to deal with can hack bombers out of the sky.
I can see ot happening this way:
USS Ward sinks the Japanese submarine, and reports it. From there, the report makes it further up the chain of command--but is greeted with some skepticism--just not as much as in OTL. Then comes the radar contact, and the same people realize that it's NOT the B-17's from the states, and sounds a base-wide alert.
Alternatively, IIRC, there was a late night/early morn flyover by a Japanese floatplane. If that gets spotted, then Ward's report of a submarine sinking might trigger the full alert.
Actually, if the American fighters had been given sufficient warning they could have been a major pain in the ass. The P-36's (39 or so available)wouldn't have been of much use against the Zero, but they would have done just fine against the Torpedo and Dive bombers, provided they got past the escort. The P-40's, on the other hand, could have presented a serious challenge to the Japanese attack. It is worth remembering that the P-40 had done fairly well against the Japanese in China; in the correct circumstances (such as the one being discussed here) the P-40 was a very capable opponent.
The first wave was 183 aircraft included only 43 fighters, these would have been outnumbered two to one by the 90+ P-40's (leaving the P-36's to deal with the Vals and Kates). You put this fighter force up in a waiting position and the first wave would be savaged. The second wave only had 35 fighters escorting the 132 bombers. Even of the first wave managed to shoot down half of the American fighters, the Americans would outnumber the Japanese escort better than two to one overall on the second strike, assuming a second strike too place if surprise was lost.
As far as the ships in the harbor, the best case would be about an hour's warning. That would allow them to set watertight integriety & get the ammunition out of the magazines & into the ready boxes; they would also be able to get enough steam up to maintain electricity to the gun positions but not enough to try to sortie. As shallow as the harbor is, any ship sinking upright is recoverable (as happened IOTL) unless you have the magazines blown out (as happened in the Arizona). Worst thing that could happen to the BB's is to get enough warning to sortie, but not enough to get a hundred or more miles out to sea going AWAY for the Kido Butai's position. If that happens they get sunk in the open sea, greatly increasing the human losses AND preventing salvage.
Perfect result from the American side would be a true bushwack; All four American carriers (Enterprise, Lexington, Saratoga, Yorktown) hanging to the southeast of the Japanese launch position timing a launch to catch the second strike on deck immediately after the half wing of B-17's makes a run on the Kido Butai from the other direction (i.e. from Pearl) & the Army fighters waiting at altitude for the 1st wave. Hell, since we are talking perfect world here, get 40 or so P-38E's onto the Islands in time for the attack, that would REALLY put the Fox into the henhouse.
All it would take is an ASB or three.
I do not know that it would take ASBs. Bits of the US intelligence and code breaking had quite a lot of information. A bit of luck and better judgement could have had US forces on the alert in the Pacific on December 7 1941.
pacifichistorian
Banned
That's a pretty major miracle even for ASBs.
Unfortunately, given Kimmel is CinCPac, a few hrs' warning means he probably steams to his doom & we see 20,000 USN KIA.
Not really so ASB. Ward detected a sub (not sure if it was known to be a minisub then OTL) around 03.40, enough time to ready a warm reception by USAAF interceptors & USN/AUS AA. Not sure if it's enough for the Fleet getting steam up. (I hope not!
) The trouble with this is, there'd been exercises ongoing for days, & numerous false sub sightings. What's needed is a firm, rpt firm, sighting of a sub, & a type not used by USN. This could wake up the DO (actually, it wouldn't; he was asleep) & get him to push the report up the chain more strongly (it was widely expected subs would precede TFs, so spotting 1 could mean an attack is imminent), & get the Fleet on alert. You'd then have to get Kimmel, or somebody, to call the Army & say, "This could be the real deal." (since AUS & USN used different alert status settings...& since they didn't have a joint alert plan, AFAIR). Reading the J-19 "bomb plot" message is a bit ASB. Shutting the Japanese embassies, seriously considered, could butterfly the attack entirely.
Ambush by P-40s & P-36s in HI, yeah. P-38s is a longshot, IMO. (Want a better outcome, butterfly away the stupid transcontinental flight that wrecked the prototype & set the program back 2yr...
All the fighters in HI & P.I. would be P-38s.)I'm way less than convinced of that. AAF fighter jocks would've tried to dogfight with the Zeke (as others did in DEI & elsewhere) & had their heads handed to them. 2:1 odds don't look great for IJNAF, but these are guys with literally years of experience, including combat time, already.
OTL 7/12/41, Pac Fleet had only 3 CVs assigned: Big E, Lady Lex, & Sara, of which Sara was under refit in Puget Sound. And again, against 3:1 odds in decks (slightly less in aircraft; IJN air wings were a bit smaller), with very superior Japanese experience, you risk losing all 3 USN CVs
(presuming Sara is even present). This is not IJN defeat...Having air waiting is actually pretty easy, if you can get MacArthur's nose out of his Bible & his ass in gear: he had 8.5h warning,
but couldn't get off the dime. S-boats are harder; Hart's dispositions are (charitably) terrible. Between the 2, tho, you could really, really bugger the Japanese timetable. Defeat, tho, I'm very dubious of being achieved.You're overstating the importance of conquest of the P.I. Don't forget, most of Japan's objectives in DEI were achieved before P.I. fell OTL. You make it more difficult, & maybe compel drawing manpower from Kwantung Army much earlier than OTL (& maybe, just maybe, get a more rational approach to manpower allocation & ops planning).
I do agree you could butterfly Coral Sea, & probably Midway, too, with more IJA resistance to Midway & less capacity to spare. This could instead lead IJA to try something like Kokoda Track months earlier, say 2-3/42, when it actually might have succeeded against the flimsy Oz forces in place OTL.
If the P.I. campaign goes longer, you could also see some reinforcement (Doolittle's B-25s? or A-20s TTL? a couple doz P-40s?), tho given Pye's weak nerves & IJNAF strength in the area, not much more, IMO. Might just see MacArthur KIA.
(Yep, not a fan.) That could see the war end in '44, with subs all in Pearl (instead of Oz), no "return" mania, & one Central Pacific thrust. Which, don't forget, means the Bomb isn't used on Japan nor (presuming ETO is unchanged from OTL, unlikely since more LCs, shipping, & probably manpower, would be available) ready for Europe by VE-Day, which conceivably means the U.S. uses it when Stalin gets frisky in the '50s (not believing the U.S. would use it on civilians, by accounts I've seen; just don't ask where...).
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One other thing to consider might be, interestingly enough, the morale effect that this has on the American public.
Now, as we all know, Pearl Harbour was a massive shock and a major wake-up call to the American public. But the scenario most of us are envisioning here generally involves the Japanese attack getting savaged by a mix of American fighters and flak, with minimal USN loses and possibly a few japanese carriers on the bottom of the pacific. now, if the attack is stood off that well, then it is possible that the American public never really unites to fight Japan the way that they did IOTL. It is not impossible to see the Americans getting over-confident about the chances of a quick victory, and then a few maulings (say, around the Philippines) cause a high body count and some disillusionment with the war.
Now, as we all know, Pearl Harbour was a massive shock and a major wake-up call to the American public. But the scenario most of us are envisioning here generally involves the Japanese attack getting savaged by a mix of American fighters and flak, with minimal USN loses and possibly a few japanese carriers on the bottom of the pacific. now, if the attack is stood off that well, then it is possible that the American public never really unites to fight Japan the way that they did IOTL. It is not impossible to see the Americans getting over-confident about the chances of a quick victory, and then a few maulings (say, around the Philippines) cause a high body count and some disillusionment with the war.
Markus
Banned
??? IIRC they did have S-boats at PH, didn´t they?
Grumpf! Bad enough you diss the Buffaloo at each opportunity, but now you even badmouth the Hawk? Unacceptable!
From mid-42 onwards the RAF used the A-4 version of the Hawk over Burma. The former had a 1,200hp engine, made 323mph and was armed with six .303 guns, while the latter had 1,050hp/313mph/ and one .50 and one .30 gun.
The British Hawks were retired in early 1944, until than they more than held their ground against the Ki-43 Oscar, which was pretty similar to a Zero.
Do they need that long? In OTL it took them a few minutes to get the guns firing and save one BB by counterflooding
Errr, a guy in another forum told me for some time in 1943 P-38 pilots tried to dogfight Zeros ... and payed the price. If that´s true the Lightings won´t help that much. Not that much help is needed. USAAF, USN and USMC have more than enough fighters to take a toll on the first wave.
??? IIRC they did have S-boats at PH, didn´t they?
Grumpf! Bad enough you diss the Buffaloo at each opportunity, but now you even badmouth the Hawk? Unacceptable!
From mid-42 onwards the RAF used the A-4 version of the Hawk over Burma. The former had a 1,200hp engine, made 323mph and was armed with six .303 guns, while the latter had 1,050hp/313mph/ and one .50 and one .30 gun.
The British Hawks were retired in early 1944, until than they more than held their ground against the Ki-43 Oscar, which was pretty similar to a Zero.
Do they need that long? In OTL it took them a few minutes to get the guns firing and save one BB by counterflooding
Errr, a guy in another forum told me for some time in 1943 P-38 pilots tried to dogfight Zeros ... and payed the price. If that´s true the Lightings won´t help that much. Not that much help is needed. USAAF, USN and USMC have more than enough fighters to take a toll on the first wave.
There were none of the older S-boats (with the torpedoes that actually worked as they were design to) at Pearl. They were out in the Islands with Hart.
The P-36's biggest flaw was the weakness in firepower (as we have discussed in other threads) with only one .50 and one .30 cal. It was, however, a better build that the the dreaded F2A.
Even the early marks of the P-40 (including the B & C that were actually AT Pearl Harbor) had double that firepower. I had the ASB provide P-40E models (which had entered production in Febuary 1941) with had the U.S. wartime standard of 6 .50 cals in the wings.The P-38 wasn't a plane that could turn with the Zero, at least not at low speed. The Lightning's big advantage was in speed and high speed manuevers. The Zero was almost unable to turn near or at top speed (a function, I understand, of the overall light design) while the P-38, like most American fighters, was fine until it hit compressibility limits. If the P-38 pilot played in the Zero's garden, he was in trouble, if he flew his fight, the Zero was in REAL trouble. That is far from unique, even a pre-war fighter, if it was flown well and given the opprotunity inside its best elements, could defeat a far better aircraft (or a 300 knot A-1 Skyraider could shoot down a 650 knot MiG-19 if the MiG was dumb enough to get into a low speed, low altitude turning fight).
Markus
Banned
The P-36's biggest flaw was the weakness in firepower (as we have discussed in other threads) with only one .50 and one .30 cal. It was, however, a better build that the the dreaded F2A.
Ok, compared to a P-40E the P-36A lacks firepower indeed, but who needs 6*.50 for a target that has zero protection? In Malaya two 7.7mm guns worked ok against the Buffaloo and that plane even had externally self sealing fuel tanks.
Provided the P36´s guns work and they have incendiary ammo the P-36 should be up to the job. Note that 4*.50 without incendiary ammo set japanese planes on fire anyway.
It was the size of the ailerons. Prior to the late production P-38 they were not power boosted. The Zeros was optimized for "low" speed manouverability, so it had big ones. But the faster the plane got the more air pressure was on the rudders and the harder they were to move. I was told the Zero´s manouverability declined above 250mph. The Hawk and the P-40 had smaller ailerons and could outmanouver Zeros, Me109, Spitfires at 300mph and more.
edit: By the way, thanks for reminding me of the P-36/Hawk.
robdab2
Banned
Oahu's fighters on Dec.7'41
Gents,
Please keep in mind that according to the sworn testimonies delivered to the several of the official inquiries into the Pearl Harbor disaster, many of the American fighter aircraft on Oahu that morning were sidelined for repairs.
The numbers were -
P40 - 63 operational, 36 under repair
P36/26 - 32 operational, 25 under repair
F4F - 15 in total.
Of the 111 USAAF and USN fighters still operational, most were on 4 hour standby due to General Short's anti-sabotage measures. With even a 1 hour warning, only a very small minority would be fueled, loaded with mg ammo and airborne at combat altitudes when the first Kido Buti strike wave arrived over Oahu.
More than the historical total but not that many more.
Gents,
Please keep in mind that according to the sworn testimonies delivered to the several of the official inquiries into the Pearl Harbor disaster, many of the American fighter aircraft on Oahu that morning were sidelined for repairs.
The numbers were -
P40 - 63 operational, 36 under repair
P36/26 - 32 operational, 25 under repair
F4F - 15 in total.
Of the 111 USAAF and USN fighters still operational, most were on 4 hour standby due to General Short's anti-sabotage measures. With even a 1 hour warning, only a very small minority would be fueled, loaded with mg ammo and airborne at combat altitudes when the first Kido Buti strike wave arrived over Oahu.
More than the historical total but not that many more.